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Before adopting the primary judge’s conclusion that the taxpayer had a habitual abode in both countries, the Court stated (at paras. 29-30): [T]here is no warrant … for imputing that the habitual abode of a person is the place where the individual has spent more days. … [T]here is no warrant to give the expression “habitual abode”… a meaning other than the meaning conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the phrase. ... It was this Thai sourced income stream, derived from Mr Pike’s ongoing employment there, which not only supported his life and lifestyle there but also, all the more so after Ms Thornicroft’s employment with Ernst & Young came to an end, supported his family in Australia, including him, when he was able to be with them. ...

The majority reasons (for Middleton and Steward JJ – with whom Thawley J agreed in the result) found that for the transfer–pricing purposes at issue, it was posing the wrong question to ask “whether an arm’s length party would have agreed to the amendments, given the pre-existing terms of trade” (para. 188), and that the correct question was simply whether “the pricing formula established by those [amended] terms did not differ from those formulae which might be expected to have operated between independent enterprises dealing wholly independently with one another in the copper concentrate market at the time” (para. 191). ... In finding this approach to be insufficiently nuanced, the majority stated, that in determining the arm’s length consideration: “one should include all of the objective circumstances of the actual … mine” and the “objective circumstances of the copper concentrate market as at February 2007” (para. 179) “it would be appropriate to exclude any considerations that are the product of C.M.P.L.’s non-arm’s length relationship with G.I.A.G. and the broader Glencore Group” which “would include whatever attitude or policy C.M.P.L. had formed about the issue of risk when selling to G.I.A.G” (para. 180) “C.M.P.L. … could legitimately adopt a more conservative approach to risk so long as it was commercially rational to do so, and it is what an independent party dealing at arm’s length might reasonably be expected to have done” (para. 181) “the possibility of a range of arm’s length outcomes, each of which would be sufficient to answer the statutory test, is supported by authority” (para. 183) ...

. … Limiting the activities to only those that directly promote amateur athletics would lead to difficulties and uncertainty concerning whether a particular activity or function directly or indirectly promotes amateur athletics and, therefore, could discourage organizations from doing the promotion that the provision is intending to encourage. ... In rejecting the second ground, Webb JA stated (at paras. 62 and 66): For the purposes of paragraph (d) of the definition of a CAAA, it is only necessary that a CAAA carry on its activities across Canada, it is not necessary that such organization have a physical presence in each province and territory. … So long as the organization is promoting amateur athletics in Canada on a nationwide basis, even if it only has an office in one province, it would satisfy the requirement. Before reaching the above conclusions, Webb JA noted that in determining whether registered CAAA (“RCAAA”) status to be granted, the Minister was required “to make certain findings of fact and mixed fact and law,” which was “not the same as having a broad discretion to refuse the registration of a particular organization” (para. 33), he went on to state (at para. 34): Since the comments in Stemijon... that administrative guidance cannot change the law are applicable when the Minister has discretion, they are also applicable when the Minister does not have the broad discretion under the Act to refuse the registration of a CAAA as a RCAAA, other than when the conditions in subsection 149.1(25) of the Act are satisfied. … The guidance as previously drafted by the CRA cannot bind the Minister nor can it alter the provisions of the statutory definition of a CAAA. ...

In declining the Applicants’ request for judicial review, Walker J paraphrased (at para. 32) the Guidelines in Policy Statement P-255 on accepting late-election, including a requirement that “both corporations must have filed all GST/HST returns as required,” noted (at para. 33) that “[a]s long as the Minister does not fetter her discretion and improperly limit the scope of her analysis, she may rely on the factors identified in the Guidelines in making her decision,” and then stated (at paras. 40, 58): [S]ubsection 238(1) provides that all registrants (registered or not) “shall file a return with the Minister for each reporting period …”. The fact that a registrant may have a nil return does not exempt them from the requirement to file returns. … The filing of the Billing Agent Election and the assumption by Castle of the administrative tasks of collection, reporting and remittance of CBS’s GST/HST does not affect the status of CBS as the supplier of the goods and services in respect of which the tax is collectible. ... She concluded (at para. 88): The [CRA] Decision is reasonable when read within the Vavilov framework for intelligibility and justification, taking into account “the evidence before the decision maker, the submissions of the parties [and] publicly available policies or guidelines that informed the decision maker’s work […]” (Vavilov at para 94). ...

In finding that it was an EBP, he cited Oldman (at para. 29) for the proposition inter alia that “[o]rdinarily … an Act of Parliament must prevail over inconsistent or conflicting subordinate legislation,” and then stated (at para. 30): In this case, it is not possible to reconcile the two provisions as they apply to the D2L Employee Trust. … [S]ince the definition of a prescribed trust is set out in the Regulations, the paramountcy of the definition of an employee benefit plan in the Act must govern. ... Webb JA further rejected the taxpayers’ argument that, because a prescribed trust was specifically carved out from the s. 108)1) – trust- para. ...

. … Rather, what one finds in reviewing the DOA and ADOA are clauses providing for the payment of lump sums and the payment of additional amounts based on sales of the Software. To the extent that it is useful to characterize the sales agreements in this case … they are clearly "earnout" agreements. The fact that both the DOA and the ADOA provided for a maximum with respect to the total payments that could be received by the Appellant does not alter this conclusion. … [T]here is nothing in the wording of paragraph 14(1)(b) to suggest that it should be accorded precedence over paragraph 12(1)(g). ...

In finding that the vendors, and Abacus and NH Properties, were not dealing with each other at arm’s length, Boyle J stated (at paras. 155, 161): Given the agreement for Abacus to pay a premium to the co-owners to purchase the co-owners’ interests … the steps and the amounts in the series of transactions cannot be considered to reflect ordinary commercial dealings. … Harvard Properties, Abacus and NH Properties clearly acted together to dictate [the] Newcos’ actions from their inception and throughout the closing of this series of transactions. In finding that the cash proceeds received by Harvard Properties exceeded the FMV of the Newco shares sold by it, Boyle J found (at para. 166) that Harvard Properties had failed to establish any value for the shares, stating (at para. 174): There appears to be little to no chance that any arm’s length party unrelated to these transactions would agree to accept, much less pay for, the HP Newco shares at the relevant time as the Newcos would moments in time later have no assets, no business, and the possibility of a significant liability for their roles in these transactions …. ...

A New York LLC (“Wolfbend”) was established for the purpose of collecting profits earned under the Manufacturing & License Agreement between the taxpayer and Davis Aircraft Inc. and allocating those profits to its members, being the taxpayer, his brother and Davis family members. ... Ouimet J stated (at paras 59, 60-61): …[P]roviding engineering services is a business and, therefore, the income of CAD$26,244 earned in Canada was generated by an “active” commercial activity. … [T]he income generated by manufacturing activity is also from an “active” business. ... Therefore … the revenues from all three sources qualify as “active business” revenues. ...

. … We emphasize that this "pursuit of profit" source test will only require analysis in situations where there is some personal or hobby element to the activity in question.... ... As such, a source of income by definition exists, and there is no need to take the inquiry any further. … In summary, the issue of whether or not a taxpayer has a source of income is to be determined by looking at the commerciality of the activity in question. ...

. … CAIL filed the Plan under the CCAA which released it of its liabilities arising before March 24, 2000. ... But in the absence of provisions in the Act spelling out when such limitation is lifted, such finding is best left for another day – perhaps in a collection forum.... ...