Search - 阿里拍卖 司法拍卖

. … Maréchaux [noted] that it is "self-evident that a person who has the use of borrowed money, repayable in twenty years’ time, without having to pay interest has thereby received a significant benefit” [and that] "the ‘put option’ was a significant benefit provided to the donor by the lender in return for the payment. ... " "Therefore, whether the civil law or common law meaning of the word “gift" in 118.1 is used, the result would be the same in these cases because none of the Appellants had the requisite donative intent with respect to the cash portion of the amounts transferred to the Foundation. ... " ...

The benefit is …. 10% of construction costs of $259,293 or, $25,929. This is clearly an advantage not available to regular customers …. ... The Queen, 2009 TCC 588 that: None of [the cited cases], however, support the appellant’s proposition that adjustments to the expenses of a previous fiscal period, and concomitant changes to the income of the employee for a previous year, may be made on a retroactive basis …. ...

Hogan J found that the gain of the s.à r.l.was exempted from Canadian capital gains tax by virtue of the exclusion in Art. 13(4) of the Canada-Luxembourg Treaty which provided that the Alta Canada shares were not deemed immovable property (and thus not subject to Canadian capital gains tax) if the Alta Canada licences qualified as property of Alta Canada “in which the business of the company … was carried on.” ... It is certainly not the role of the Court to disturb their bargain …. ... There is also nothing in the Treaty that suggest that a holding corporation, resident in Luxembourg, should be denied the benefit of the Treaty because its shareholders are not themselves residents of Luxembourg. … The rationale underlying the carve-out is to exempt residents of Luxembourg from Canadian taxation where there is an investment in immovable property used in a business. ...

In confirming the disallowance of the taxpayers’ deduction under s. 8(1)(b) for one of their taxation years, Russell J first noted (without apparently being aware of the extended definition of “salary or wages” in s. 248(1)) that the amendment of s. 8(1)(b) to replace “salary or wages” by "subdivision a" income “has some effect” (para. 18), but then concluded a discussion of the many parallels between this case and Fenwick with the statement (at para. 27): …[T]he FCA …found that it was reasonably open … [to deny] relief to the taxpayer on the basis that the claim he was defending against extended beyond the basis of the employee/employer relationship. Likewise …, the claims the appellants are defending against arise quite differently- from allegations of unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary obligations. He also stated (at paras. 21-22): [T]he FCA justice did accept … that the provision should be applicable not just for a taxpayer seeking payment of salary or wages from an employer or former employer, but as well in situations where the employer or former employer was seeking return of such income. ...

In our case, that is the car buyer who buys the insurance product and he would clearly and objectively know he was buying insurance, not the expertise or training, or commercial efficacy or profitability of the Dealer or its staff as the predominant elements of the transaction, notwithstanding that such services … may have an ancillary role to play in his decision making process…. There is simply no merit to the Respondent’s argument that the services or duties under the Dealer Agreement that may be said to be owed to Walkaway from the Appellant constitute the predominant element of the services to be provided under the Dealer Agreement…. … The bottom line is that the Appellant’s compensation is based and only arises on a sale of the Insurance Products. … I find that the predominant element of the Appellant’s service was the arranging for the sale of insurance which falls within the definition of a “financial service”, notwithstanding that some of the ancillary services provided by the Appellant could be considered promotional or administrative…. ...

The Respondent concludes … that it “would be unfair for this Court to allow him to reduce his taxable income in future years while never having paid taxes on the excess contribution as taxable income.” ... Moreover … the Court does not make decisions on the basis of fairness (Barel v The Queen, 2009 TCC 156 and Lapierre v The Queen, 2019 TCC 18) …. ...

Mikhail “could not tie a particular purchase for the pharmacy to a gift card or prepaid credit card,” thereby making it difficult to satisfy CRA that the rebates had been used by the Corporation to purchase supplies for use in its business, Monaghan J found (at paras 25 and 26): … I am satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the In-Kind Rebates were used to purchase items for the Corporation and its pharmacy and that the Mikhails’ decision to include the unreported Rebates as income personally was motivated by the desire to resolve the issue in a way that made it easy for the CRA to accept. … [T]he In-Kind Rebates were not deposited in his and his wife’s personal accounts, but rather had been included in their personal income tax returns as income to make it easy for the CRA to get its taxes and allow him to move on. … I conclude that the unreported In-Kind Rebates were not received or otherwise enjoyed by the Mikhails personally and accordingly their appeals should be allowed. ...

After the assessment was vacated pursuant to a consent judgment, CRA issued a Notice of Reassessment showing the cancellation of the penalty and a refund of the $1M but denying any refund interest on the basis that s. 164(3) requires a taxation year to be specified in order for interest to be paid – and a s. 163.2 penalty is not calculated by reference to any particular taxation years. ... In rejecting the Crown’s argument that this naming of a taxation year in the Notice of Reassessment was an error, Diner J referred to s. 152(8), indicated (at para. 86) that it applies “equally to reassessments as it does to assessments,” and then stated (at para. 87): Therefore, on a strict reading of the text of the statute, the 2016 Reassessment is presumed to be valid and binding …. ... But it is another for the Minister to then herself claim that the minor error undermines the validity of her own document to avoid adherence to it, when all other data points of the form are entirely accurate …. ...

Ng – so that he had satisfied the occupancy requirements of ETA s. 254(2)(g). ... Ngai was not a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 of the ETA. … In my view, only an individual who is a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 is eligible to apply for the new housing rebate. … In going on to find that the Ontario rebate was not available, Webb JA noted that under ETA s. 126(2) and the referenced ITA provisions “a nephew is not related to his aunt or uncle and therefore, Mr. ...

. … [T]he contention of the appellant could lead to absurd consequences. ... Similarly, he stated (at para. 55): [T]here is no doubt that broad expressions such as “taxable supply” and “commercial activity” … must be interpreted irrespective of considerations of lawfulness, public order or morality. That among other things is the reason that income derived from prostitution or the sale of drugs are taxable …. ...