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In rejecting the taxpayer’s position, Webb JA stated (para. 18): [T]he appellant … acknowledged that the monies he received were used for his personal and living expenses. He therefore intended to receive monies in excess of the related expenditures … [I]n effect he did have the intention of earning a profit, i.e. the intention of receiving amounts in excess of his expenses. ...

The Queen, 2009 TCC 70, to “enable … more extensive changes to be made to a statutory provision than were permitted by mutatis mutandis ” so that it was “no longer … limited to points of detail,” Evans J.A. remarked (at paras. 53-54): It is reasonable to conclude that when Parliament in 1983 replaced the Latin phrase in subsection 227(10) with "plain" English and French words it merely intended to make the provision more accessible. ...

In dismissing the Attorney General’s appeal of this order, De Montigny JA found (at paras 8 and 11): … While I accept that, generally speaking, the CRA’s treatment of other taxpayers is irrelevant when assessing whether to grant discretionary relief to a given individual, the Judge could reasonably infer … that the CRA’s decision not to recommend remission was premised, at least in part, on the respondent not being in similar circumstances as the SDL employees. Such being the case, the Judge’s finding that the disputed questions were formally and legally relevant and went to the very reasonableness of the CRA’s decision, was open to him. … This case stands for the proposition that a broad view must be adopted in determining whether a proposed disclosure is in respect of proceedings relating to the administration or enforcement of the ITA. ...

Pelletier JA found (at paras 11, 16, 19, 20 and 21): … [T]he reason for the delay was the perceived need to obtain all the relevant documentation prior to filing a notice of appeal, a process which took some time. ... This is an error of law that warrants our intervention. … The evidence is that Mr. Bygrave spent the period between the expiry of the 90 day period and the filing of his application for an extension of time gathering this documentary evidence. … [T]he time to secure those documents [respecting the circumstances surrounding the sale] would be a circumstance explaining the delay in the bringing of the request for an extension of time. ...

To this end, subparagraph 84.1(2)(a.1)(ii) requires going beyond the ACB of the shares concerned – or of the shares for which they are substituted – and enquiring as to the source of the funds which constituted them in order to ascertain if they were subjected to tax. … This rationale was circumvented by the plan implemented by the appellant. ...

Ng – so that he had satisfied the occupancy requirements of ETA s. 254(2)(g). ... Ngai was not a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 of the ETA. … In my view, only an individual who is a “particular individual” for the purposes of section 254 is eligible to apply for the new housing rebate. … In going on to find that the Ontario rebate was not available, Webb JA noted that under ETA s. 126(2) and the referenced ITA provisions “a nephew is not related to his aunt or uncle and therefore, Mr. ...

. … [T]he contention of the appellant could lead to absurd consequences. ... Similarly, he stated (at para. 55): [T]here is no doubt that broad expressions such as “taxable supply” and “commercial activity” … must be interpreted irrespective of considerations of lawfulness, public order or morality. That among other things is the reason that income derived from prostitution or the sale of drugs are taxable …. ...

Thus, Rule 317, as modified by Rule 350, merely required CRA to produce the documents which were in the hands of the decision-maker when the decision was made – and not to provide other requested documents (e.g., the constating documents of all registered CAAAs at the time of the decision). However, the affidavit of the CRA decision maker stated that “all relevant materials upon which the CRA relied … have been produced” (para. 27). ... At a minimum, it does not foreclose the possibility that irrelevant material of this kind was before the Minister when the decision was made. … [G]iven the grounds of appeal and the purpose of rules 317 and 318, the Minister should be required to produce any material apart from that already disclosed that was before her when the decision was made, with the exception of properly redacted information. ...

Canada, 2020 FCA 90-- summary under Paragraph 149(1)(d.5) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 149- Subsection 149(1)- Paragraph 149(1)(d.5) LPIC was not exempt under s. 149(1)(d.5) because its owner, the Law Society, did not provide municipal-type services The Tax Court found that the appellant (“LPIC”) did not qualify under s. 149(1)(d.5) as being owned as to more than 90% by a “municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada” because its parent, the Law Society of Upper Canada, although a “public body,” did not satisfy the test of “performing a function of government ”- it performed various functions in the course of regulating the legal profession, but not in the course of governing people located in Ontario. In dismissing LPIC’s appeal, Mactavish JA noted: “If the scope of the phrase ‘public body performing a function of government in Canada’ … were as broad as LawPRO says it is, it would not have been necessary for Parliament to have included the words ‘a municipal or’ in the phrase ‘a municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada’. “ (para. 52) “The marginal note that accompanies paragraph 149(1)(c) refers to the provision as relating to ‘[m]unicipal authorities’, suggesting that in using the phrase ‘a municipality in Canada, or a municipal or public body performing a function of government in Canada’, Parliament intended to exempt municipalities and ‘municipal-type’ authorities.” ...

In rejecting this submission, Webb JA stated that, under a textual approach (para. 43): … [S]ubparagraph [247(2)(b)(i)] raises the issue of whether the transaction or series of transactions would have been entered into between persons dealing with each other at arm's length (an objective test based on hypothetical persons) not whether the particular taxpayer would have entered into the transaction or series of transactions in issue with an arm's length party (a subjective test). … Furthermore (para. 46): If the Crown's interpretation is correct, then whenever a corporation in Canada wants to carry on business in a foreign country through a foreign subsidiary, the condition in subparagraph 247(2)(b)(i) of the Act would be satisfied. ... In his conclusions, Webb JA stated (at para. 81): …[T]he rules in paragraph 247(2)(b) and (d) … do not allow the Minister to simply reallocate all of the profit of a foreign subsidiary to its Canadian parent company on the basis that the Canadian corporation would not have entered any transactions with its foreign subsidiary if they had been dealing with each other at arm's length. ...