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., the Commissioners had been “enriched” only by £75), Lord Reed stated (at paras 29-30): … [T]he Managers could not both claim reimbursement of the output tax which they had paid to the Commissioners…on the basis that their supplies were exempt from VAT, and simultaneously assert an entitlement to retain the amounts which they had deducted as input tax, on the basis that their supplies were taxable. The Commissioners were not, therefore, enriched by the Managers’ retention of the notional £25, and the Managers have, in principle, no defence to a claim by the Lead Claimants for the restitution of that amount. … On the first issue, Lord Reed first noted (at para 33), respecting the requirement that the enrichment be at the claimant’s expense: The Lead Claimants owed no money to the Commissioners. Furthermore, the payment of the tax element of the invoices submitted by the Managers to the Lead Claimants was not the cause of the payment of tax by the Managers to the Commissioners: …the Managers were liable to account for tax to the Commissioners once they had supplied the relevant services He then found (at paras 71-73):...There was a transfer of value, comprising the notional £100, from the Lead Claimants to the Managers, under the contract between them. … There was a subsequent transfer of value, comprising the notional £75, from the Managers to the Commissioners. … These two transfers cannot be collapsed into a single transfer of value from the Lead Claimants to the Commissioners. … The first transfer did not even bring about the second transfer as a matter of causation.... ...

., Ms Ellison] “because of a court order under the Family Law Act 1975 ” (Australia). ... Jagot J found for the Commissioner (i.e., no rollover relief to Mr Ellison) partly on the basis of her doubts that there had been such a prior transfer (concluding (at para. 164) that “the orders vested statutory rights and a beneficial interest of some kind in Ms Ellison but … I do not consider that interest can be characterised as beneficial ownership.”) ... She made a guarded finding (at para. 148) that a person could have a proprietary interest in a specified portion of a larger pool of fungible assets, stating: [T]he weight of authority is that there can be a valid trust over a fungible pool of assets provided the assets and relevant proportions for the different beneficiaries are identified with sufficient certainty. … If, given the terms of the declaration and the nature of the property, the trustee is constituted as nothing more than a bare trustee on behalf of the beneficiary in respect of the beneficiary’s proportional interest, it may well be that there has been a change of ownership …. ...

In rejecting the appellants’ submission (at para. 32) that “the CCAA filing does not affect the right to accrue interest; it only stays the collection of that interest,” so that the common law “interest stops” rule applied to deny their claim for the post-filing interest, Rouleau JA stated (at paras. 34, 37, 41): [T]he same principles that underpin the conclusion that the interest stops rule is necessary in bankruptcy and winding-up proceedings – namely, the fair treatment of creditors and the orderly administration of an insolvent debtor’s estate- apply with equal force to CCAA proceedings. … [I]f the interest stops rule were not to apply in CCAA proceedings, the creditors who do not have a contractual right to post-filing interest would…have “skewed incentives against reorganizing under the CCAA”…. ...

In confirming a decision of the judge below to refuse to declare that the 2013 documents had retroactive effect to June 6, 2011, Lane JA stated: The Chambers judge...saw the application for a declaration for what it was – an attempt to obtain equitable relief not available from the Tax Court, which is a superior court of record but not a court of inherent jurisdiction, and to thereby attempt to determine the outcome of an assessment appeal by essentially binding the hands of that Court. … [He] recognized the specialized nature of the Tax Court and its jurisdiction to decide the ultimate issue concerning the tax implications of the rollover. ...

Lagotte Succession, 2017 QCCS 330 (Quebec Superior Court)-- summary under Subsection 70(6) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 70- Subsection 70(6) transfer of estate property to a beneficiary ordered to have “occurred, for tax purposes, at an amount equal to its adjusted cost base” A surviving spouse (Picard – who was not one of the residuary beneficiaries of the estate of his wife) argued that it was improper for the executor of the estate to choose for the devise to him pursuant to her will of an apartment building with a low tax basis to occur on a rollover basis under s. 70(6), as this imposed the property’s accrued tax liability on him. In rejecting this submission, Bisson JCS noted that the will specifically accorded the executor with the discretion to make tax elections for the benefit of any one or more legatees or for that of the general estate – so that the executor clearly was within his rights in not making a s. 70(6.2) election. ...

He stated (at paras. 32-35, TaxInterpretations translation): [T]he Agency felt unable to cancel more than the interest portion indicated in … the Interpretation Bulletin of 4% of the uncollected sales tax. ... This decision is … unreasonable. ...

In finding that the ARQ had not exceeded its territorial competence in making this requirement, Hogue JCA stated: Here we are not concerned with … a seizure outside of Quebec which, it is true, could require the seizing party to approach an authority of the foreign State with a view to obtaining its collaboration in order to proceed. … The communication of the requirement to BNC through one of its branches situated outside Quebec is the sole external element that is present here. ...

. … I accept that, when determining the nature of a transaction for VAT purposes, the court must look at the economic purpose of the transaction. However, the starting point is to determine what the parties have agreed. … [T]he court only goes behind the contract if the contract does not reflect the true agreement between the parties. ...

In rejecting her claim that this interest paid was a disposition expense under the Quebec equivalent of ss. 40(1)(a)(i), Vaillancourt JCQ stated (at paras. 32-34, TaxInterpretations translation): The plaintiff … recognized having received the amounts from Groupe Norbourg without any right thereto, which constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to her argument that she paid the interest on a loan. … [T]he plaintiff paid the interest to RSM for the sole purpose of buying time to repay the receiver the sums which she had received without any right thereto. ...

. … Without this requirement, Mr. Pelletier would have had no need to maintain his professional status in order to exercise his employment. He could have instead, as in the case of judges, ceased to pay the dues, which brought him nothing to the extent that he did not act as a lawyer. … This is especially true given the Mr. ...