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The two upper units (9092 and 9094, each representing 23% of the triplex), had been rented out by him to third parties until 2007, but he took the position that thereafter they represented personal use property of the taxpayer – although, for 14 months, he rented out one of the units to a friend at his stated cost of $400 per month- and, with the stated objective of improving the salability of the triplex, in 2011 he announced that 9094 was available for rent and leased it shortly before the sale of the triplex. ... Each must not be a distinct and autonomous unit; each must instead complement the other and lose to some extent its separate identity for the benefit of the whole. … [N]o transformation or modification of much significance was made to the Triplex in order for the three units to be linked in some manner to each other. … The units preserved their distinct character…. ...

However, Mobile and the ARQ subsequently signed a protocol reaffirming the points in contention for all the reassessed years – and subsequently to that, the notice of appeal was amended to reference the second notice of reassessment (no. 1386). ... He further stated (at para. 34): [F]rom the receipt of the notice of reassessment, the taxpayer had 90 days to object to it, not in order to contest something new … but to reiterate his contesting of the subject of the notice no. 1144, being the assessment already under appeal. In finding that, in light inter alia of the signed protocol, Mobile should be considered to have objected to the second reassessment (no. 1380), Cameron JCQ stated (at para. 44): The Minister … not only had acknowledged receipt of the written statement of the intention of the taxpayer to object to the assessment in force in 2012, but he agreed with the opposing party and with the Court to bring the debate to an early hearing on its subject matter. ...

However, it was precluded by statute from going back more than three years with its refund claims – but there was no such time limitation where a repayment of VAT was claimed based on there being “a decrease in consideration for a supply.” Before rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that its change in calculating the consideration for its supplies involved a “decrease in consideration,” so that it could go back more than three years, Lord Legatt stated (at para. 30) that it was “clear that there can be only one correct method of calculating the taxable element of fees charged to customers for playing cash bingo and … this was the session by session method and not the game by game method.” ... In this regard, he stated (at para. 39): I recognise that the fact that a single composite price is charged is not decisive and there may be cases in which it better reflects commercial reality to regard customers who pay a single price as intending to purchase two or more distinct services …. ...

Power was admissible), Gogan J stated (at paras. 83, 84, 87, 93): … None of Power’s work can be characterized as de facto investigation. ... In this case, I am satisfied that any evidence obtained came as a result of Power’s audit inquiries.... … I find that the predominant purpose of the investigation did not turn to criminal or penal liability until after the completion of Power’s interviews with each of the accused. … ...

Accordingly, Taxation Act s. 99 (equivalent to the ½ step-up rule in ITA s. 13(7)(e)) did not apply to reduce the capital cost to 501 of the acquired software. ... The fact that a deduction, in the abstract, could have been allowed in respect of a property cannot, however, permit that property to be characterized as a purely depreciable property to SherWeb, when the evidence demonstrated that it had lost that character by reason of the various expenditures on programmers' salaries, and the SR&ED credits that were accorded to it year after year. … One cannot escape the fact that, to SherWeb, the Software has never been treated as a depreciable asset, and so continually until the time "immediately before the transfer" to the respondent. Regarding an ARQ submission that the Reg. 1102(1)(d) equivalent was intended only to preclude a double deduction (for SR&ED and CCA) and not to avoid the ½ step-up rule, the Court stated (at para. 34): Regarding the appellant's position that the deduction of salaries over the years as an expense does not preclude the Software being depreciable property, it must be remembered that the salaries were deducted as an expense paid to maintain the profitability of the business activities which were, as such, an expense on income account even though the sums spent on the initial creation of the Software could have qualified as capital costs. ...

Revenue and Customs v Blackrock Holdco 5 LLC, [2022] UKUT 199 (TCC), overruled on transfer-pricing analysis but aff'd on other grounds at [2024] EWCA Civ 330-- summary under Paragraph 247(2)(b) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 247- New- Subsection 247(2)- Paragraph 247(2)(b) complete denial of interest deductions under the UK transfer pricing rules because the loan was made without group support covenants The structure for the acquisition by the BlackRock group of the North American management business of Barclays Global Investors (“BGI”) entailed a BlackRock group LLC (“LLC4”) lending US$4 billion to a wholly-owned LLC (“LLC5”) as well as injecting substantial equity into LLC5, with LLC5 using most of those proceeds to subscribe for preferred shares of the transaction Buyco (“LLC6” – which acquired all the shares of BGI). ... In the hypothetical transaction however, the dividend flow would need to be secured so far as possible …. In confirming the denial by HMRC of all of LLC5’s interest deductions on the basis that the loan transaction between the two enterprises (LLC4 and LLC5) was not one which would have been made by arm’s-length enterprises (i.e., it lacked covenants of LLC5 and BGI to ensure the flow of dividends to LLC5 to service the loan), the Tribunal stated (at paras. 75-76): Third-party covenants that were not given as part of or in support of the actual transaction cannot be considered to be part of the hypothetical transaction as this materially changes the surrounding circumstances and alters the economically relevant characteristics of the transactions in question. … [A]n independent lender would not have made a $4 billion loan to LLC5 without such covenants being in place and that important finding should itself have determined that there was no comparable arm’s length transaction. ...

The principal argument of Quintal that the payments received by him from Élan were not includible in his income pursuant to TA s. 87 (similar to ITA s. 12(1)(x)) was that those amounts were not received by him “in the course of earning income from … property”: the intention was that the policy would be cancelled before he had any right to surrender the policy for any positive amount. In rejecting this submission, Gosselin JCQ stated (at paras. 47, 49, TaxInterpretations translation): The TA requires a life insurance policyholder to include in computing income on the disposition of an interest in the policy the amount by which the proceeds of disposition of the interest exceed the adjusted cost basis of the interest. … The Court notes, however, that the cash surrender value actually increased as soon as the first excess premiums were paid to the insurer, which deposited them in the Policy's investment account in search of financial performance resulting in interest on those investments, even though the cash surrender value could not be cashed out by Mr. ... Quintal by Élan were inducement payments since without them … he would never have purchased such an insurance policy at such a cost. ...

This KPMG plan, if it worked, had the tax advantage over the base case of permitting the tax-free distribution of the Gennium surplus to the family members by Satoma Trust – but instead, the Gennium dividends were retained in Satoma Trust for reinvestment. ... A more robust variant of the above tax plan (which apparently was not for the situation in which an asset-protection trust (i.e., FFLP) had already been formed) was reviewed by the KPMG GAAR Committee, who concluded that GAAR should not apply if it could be demonstrated that the s. 75(2) trust was put in place for asset-protection (or other non-tax) purposes – but otherwise it was more likely than not that GAAR would apply. ... Pilon informed of the risk of applying the GAAR did not end in 2005. … Timely advice on CRA's new approach could have led to rectification of the structure and minimized both the risk and the extent of an assessment. ...

Not only was Frigo not informed of the deficiencies relating to the GST of the suppliers … but also the tax authorities knew perfectly well that the registered suppliers had not paid the GST collected and did not ask the appellant any questions or alert it. The respondent authorized and even obliged these defaulting registrants to continue to collect GST on the respondent’s behalf. … I cannot interpret the ETA and the Regulations as imposing an undeclared obligation on every Canadian business purchasing commercial supplies to exercise additional due diligence with respect to each of its duly registered suppliers, which would include, as claims the respondent in this case, the examination of the physical establishment of the new supplier, its agreements with its personnel, its intention to use subcontractors to carry out the supply, and more — all without even being able to know if the duly registered and verified supplier is in arrears in the payment of GST collected, employee withholding taxes or provincial sales tax, or is otherwise not complying with its tax obligations. ...

Perram and Jackman JJ stated (at para. 11) that “where parties to a conveyance have agreed the purchase price for a transfer on sale then the consideration for the transfer is that agreed price” and that the “ordinary meaning of the language used by the parties [in the EBA] … suggests that what was to be paid by the Bottler to PepsiCo/SVC or their nominated seller was a price being paid for the concentrate and therefore ‘as consideration for’ the sale of the concentrate” (para. 13). ... In his reasons, Colvin J stated (at para. 197): [T]he EBAs … are properly construed as agreements to bottle, sell and distribute branded products, not as agreements for the supply of concentrate. It follows … that the amounts provided for by the EBAs as the prices for units of concentrate were partly amounts in consideration for the use of the trade marks which the Bottler was licensed to use. ...