Search - 微信撤回和删除的区别 官方

After referring (at para. 36) to the Marshall v Kerr principle that “because one must treat as real that which is only deemed to be so, one must treat as real the consequences and incidents inevitably flowing from or accompanying that deemed state of affairs, unless prohibited from doing so," Henderson LJ stated (at paras. 39, 42): The unambiguous effect of the deeming in section 15(2) is … that the performance by Mr Fowler of the relevant diving activities is treated as the carrying on by him of a trade, giving rise to trading income …. This treatment entirely displaces the charge to tax on employment income …. ... My approach does not depend to any significant extent on the provisions of article 3(2) … however, I would accept … that the purpose of article 3(2) is to anchor the provisions of the treaty … to the domestic tax law of the Contracting State which is applying the treaty. ...

And the identification of what (if anything) is to be acquired by an outgoing ultimately requires … a comparison of the expected structure of the business after the outgoing with the expected structure but for the outgoing, not with the structure before the outgoing. ... If a once-and-for-all payment is made for the acquisition of an asset of enduring advantage which, once acquired, forms part of the profit-earning structure of the business, the payment is incurred on capital account. … It was necessary for the Trustee to purchase the GMEs in order to continue to carry on its business as it had done up to that point. But the purchase price was a once-and-for-all payment for the acquisition of an asset of enduring advantage – the 18 GMEs – which once acquired formed part of the profit-earning structure of the Trustee's business. ...

. … A repo with a reasonable return in the form of dividends does not defeat the OSP [object, spirit and purpose] of Section 127.6. … KQI is taking advantage of … a mismatch between the tax treatment of its income (the dividends from Kone US are not taxable because they are paid out of its exempt surplus) and its expense (the interest in pays to Kone Canada is deductible). … However, the mismatch arises from the Taxation Act and the policies underlying it …. ...

In finding that s. 231.2(3)(a) was not satisfied, he stated (at paras. 78, 98, TaxInterpretations translation): Where the group is generic without a link to the ITA, and where one can require information without a link to the ITA (as in the case of the commercial customers of a public utility), there is no limitation on a fishing expedition … The invasion of the private life, the right to not be importuned by the state … is not restricted. … The plaintiff has indiscriminately created a group which has no actual factual foundation respecting the administration or enforcement of the ITA for that group. ...

. … [T]he Administration Fee was charged on a one-time only basis and would only be charged if a Loan was not repaid within the specific time frame. ... However, after stating (at para. 22) that he accepted the conclusion in Sherway Centre that “an amount paid as compensation for the use of money for a stipulated period can be said to accrue day-to-day,” McEwen J found that the Discount Fee constituted interest, stating (at para. 45): … [I]t is my view … the Discount Fee meets the three … elements of interest: it is consideration or compensation for the use or retention of money owed to ClearFlow; it related to the principal amount; and, it accrued over time (literally day-to-day). ... In this regard, he stated (at para. 53): Formulas can be confusing and even misleading. … The requirement of an express statement does away with this type of dispute and uncertainty, particularly where in this case there are multiple loans, which may roll-over. ...

Before providing such declaration, Davies J stated, based on the expert testimony (at para. 17): Under European law, Luxembourg law and Dutch law, pursuant to the principle of universal succession … all liabilities of LMGI to tax, including under foreign law (that is, the relevant Australian tax acts), will transfer to LMA by operation of law pursuant to the principle of universal succession upon completion of the merger, as will the rights and obligations of LMGI in respect of such tax liabilities …. ... Regarding her acceptance in this regard of “Luxembourg law and Dutch law [which] apply the same principle of universal succession to cross-border mergers” (para. 22), she stated (at paras. 21- 22): Where a question arises under Australian law as to the status of foreign entity, Australian common law choice of law rules look to the law of incorporation of the entity to determine questions of the entity’s status … Metliss [1958] AC 509 …. ... Moreover, LMA, as the “taxpayer” under s 175A of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) … will be entitled to object against assessments which have been issued to LMGI, or which are issued to LMA in its place, and will be “the person” entitled to appeal … in relation to objections from those assessments …. ...

Before voiding the search warrant for the law firm premises and ordering the related documents to be returned, Hilton JCA stated (at paras. 43, 44, 47, 48, 51): Justice Arbour reminded…in Lavalee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada … [2002] 3 S.C.R. 209 [para. 49]: …Before searching a law office, the investigative authorities must satisfy the issuing justice that there exists no other reasonable alternative to the search. … The Agency had an affirmative obligation, which it disregarded, to demonstrate that there was no other alternative solution, and the judge could not ignore this. … [T]he simple fact that a Trimax representative had mentioned that there were documents at his lawyer did not establish that such documents could not be found elsewhere. … The absence of an alternative solution was not at all addressed in the information and the judge could not satisfy her formal review obligation respecting such absence on the basis of other alleged facts. … [I]t would appear that it was ease and convenience which motivated the request for a search warrant for the law firm…. ...

Respecting ITA s. 159, Little J stated (at paras 53, 54): … Parliament could have chosen to make all beneficiaries of the estate liable as well but chose not to do so. … [T]hat is sensible – the beneficiaries have no control over when or how much is distributed. Presumably for similar reasons, Parliament chose not to deal with whether a legal representative could seek indemnity from beneficiaries. … Little J further found that the Respondents were under no obligation to indemnify the Applicant for any income tax or penalties imposed on the Applicant as a result of her failure to obtain a clearance certificate before distributing the estate, stating (at paras 61-63): … Ms. ...

. … [T]he VAT Directive … must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings …. ...

Before reversing the decision below to confirm these reassessments, the Court of Appeal stated (at para. 13, TaxInterpretations translation): The appellant was not required to make out a prima facie case that the 7.89% rate was unreasonable but, rather, that the assumption, on which the respondent relied in assessing it, that the 10% interest rate deducted from its income for the taxation years in issue was not "reasonable in the circumstances," … was prima facie … unsound. ... Giguère testified to for the purpose of unsecured financing of vehicle inventories …. ...