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In dismissing the Crown’s appeal, Woods JA stated (at paras. 35, 37-39, and 42): … Parliament’s intent must override O.A. Brown where legislative intent is clear as it is in the provisions applicable in this case. … The particular circumstances of this case clearly call into question the application of O.A. ... Further, the property has only one use – to move teeth or jaws. It is also relevant that the appliances provided to patients are almost invariably accompanied by orthodontic services. … [T]he listing of orthodontic appliances in Schedule VI would have very limited application if the Crown’s position were correct. ...

In rejecting the second submission, Pelletier JA stated (at paras. 30-32): … Judicial comity is a doctrine which seeks to promote uniformity and predictability in the law. ... As a result, the use of the expression “horizontal stare decisis ” to refer to judicial comity is misleading precisely because judicial comity is not enforced by courts of appeal while stare decisis is. As a result, the Federal Court committed no legal error when it declined to follow the Lin case. … The Federal Court came to its own conclusion that the necessary criteria had been satisfied by reference to the documents themselves. ...

She stated (at paras. 54, 56 and 62): The Impugned Provisions … are similar to information automatically provided to the CRA for regulatory purposes (e.g., T4s by employers, T5s by financial institutions, and taxpayers’ annual disclosure of foreign holdings). … It is difficult to see how a seizure contemplated by the Impugned Provisions significantly intrudes into privacy interests, as the appellants appear to suggest. Accordingly, I see no reason in this case to revisit the comment in Jarvis that the entire ITA is a regulatory statute. … Quite simply, the Impugned Provisions are an example of international cooperation in the administration of income tax laws. … ...

The Crown … submitted that “municipal service” is only intended to apply to a service provided by a federal or provincial government when that government is acting as a municipal authority. ... Section 21 … does not provide that a “municipal service” will only be a service provided by a government acting as a municipal authority. Webb JA then stated (at paras 23, 24 and 25): [The Crown’s] argument is essentially that a municipal service can only be a service that a municipality (and not the federal or provincial government) is obligated to provide. … Applying this interpretation to the national park example would mean that for any residents of a national park, for whom no municipality is obligated to provide services, the services provided by the federal government would not be “municipal services” for the purpose of section 21, even though such services would normally be provided by a municipality. … In my view, this result is not the result that Parliament intended and does not take into account that section 21 applies to services provided by a government or a municipality. … Words and Phrases municipal service ...

. … By adopting detailed provisions dealing with representation in the Act, the legislator limited the TCC’s implied power to control who may represent the corporation in their courtroom, especially in proceedings subject to the General Procedure. … [T]he common law/civil law concept that a corporation cannot appear in person because of its very nature strongly suggest[s] that under section 17.1 [of the TCCA], a party who is a corporation must be represented by counsel as defined by subsection 17.1(2). ... First, … there is nothing in section 20 of the Act dealing with this…. ... Even if this were so, … the very first version of this Rule did not attempt to define “in person” vis-à-vis a corporation; rather, it completely rules out the notion of a corporation being able to appear in person Furthermore, even if I assumed that the GP Rule 30(2) as amended in 1993 could be interpreted as meaning that only an officer of the corporation could personify a corporation within the meaning of section 17.1, the TCC Rules Committee could not then subdelegate its jurisdiction to each individual judge by making a right presumably granted unconditionally by the legislator subject to a leave to be granted only “in special circumstances”. … The GP Rule 30(2) in its latest iteration, which appears to enable any individual (including one outside of the corporation, such as its regular accountant) to represent it on leave, could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered a definition of the words “in person” in section 17.1. ...

., drivers) and intercorporate loans – and entered into cross-currency and interest rate swaps with an arm’s length bank to effectively convert much of its income stream into fixed rated Canadian-dollar interest. ... After noting (at para. 55) that the Canadian Pioneer case ([1980] 1 S.C.R) had found that the meaning of “banking … should be based on a formal, institutional approach rather than a substantive approach, in the sense of the functions of banking” so “that the use of the term ‘bank’ in the name of the entity, and whether it is regulated, are factors to be considered, rather than the actual activities that are conducted”, Woods JA found that the Tax Court had erred in finding that there was an implied requirement in “banking” that the receipt side of the business have an element of competition and that “the exclusion does not apply if a business simply manages its own funds “ (para. 57) and, indeed “Parliament has not explicitly required competition as an element of the foreign bank exclusion” para. 60). ... In finding that the receipt side i.e., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” she stated (at paras. 84-85): Applying the meaning of “business,” there is no reason to conclude that the capital invested by the Loblaw group would have occupied the time and attention of Glenhuron in any meaningful way. … [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...

. … In this appeal, there is no dispute that the non-capital losses as claimed for the January 1992 taxation year were valid non-capital losses and could be claimed in that year. … The Minister simply did not make the adjustment as requested by Bakorp for the January 1992 taxation year. … [T]his disagreement between Bakorp and the Minister in relation to the application of subsection 152(4.3) of the Act in this case should have been resolved by Bakorp making an application to the Federal Court for judicial review of this decision of the Minister. … Since Bakorp did not seek judicial review of the decision of the Minister, this decision to not make the adjustments for the January 1992 taxation year stands. ...

She recognized that First Vancouver had found that this deemed trust did not apply to “ bona fide purchasers for value” of the tax debtor’s property (so that the trust attached to the sales proceeds rather than following the sold property) – but found that this exception did not apply to the payment of the sales proceeds to the Bank as a secured creditor. The Bank’s mortgage was not excluded (under ETA s. 222(4) – similar to ITA s. 227(4.2)) as a “prescribed security interest” from the deemed trust rule because it was registered after the deemed trust arose in the tax debtor’s hands. Respecting the implications of this decision, she stated (at para. 85): [S]ecured lenders … may identify higher risk borrowers (which might include persons operating sole proprietorships), require borrowers to give evidence of tax compliance, or require borrowers to provide authorization to allow the lender to verify with the Canada Revenue Agency whether there are outstanding GST liabilities then known to the Agency. ...

ITA 231.2(3) and ETA s. 289(3) for Roofmart to disclose various particulars for all of its customers who in the past 4 ½ years had made purchases of construction materials from Roofmart exceeding specified thresholds. ... Blackmore. … The notice of application is signed by counsel for the Attorney General, who is referred to in the notice of application as “counsel for the applicant”, with the applicant clearly stated as being the Minister.... Roofmart’s argument confounds the authority to bring the application, which rests with the Minister or their delegate, with the role of the person who swore the affidavit filed in support of the Minister’s application. … The fact that Mr. ...

She further stated (at paras. 54, 56 and 62-63): The Impugned Provisions are clearly regulatory in nature … [and] are similar to information automatically provided to the CRA for regulatory purposes (e.g., T4s by employers, T5s by financial institutions, and taxpayers’ annual disclosure of foreign holdings). … It is difficult to see how a seizure contemplated by the Impugned Provisions significantly intrudes into privacy interests, as the appellants appear to suggest. Accordingly, I see no reason in this case to revisit the comment in Jarvis that the entire ITA is a regulatory statute. … Quite simply, the Impugned Provisions are an example of international cooperation in the administration of income tax laws. … Moreover, the appellants have not demonstrated that the Impugned Provisions are more intrusive than is necessary to be effective, or that Canada could have achieved a more favourable outcome for affected persons. ...