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The Crown … submitted that “municipal service” is only intended to apply to a service provided by a federal or provincial government when that government is acting as a municipal authority. ... Section 21 … does not provide that a “municipal service” will only be a service provided by a government acting as a municipal authority. Webb JA then stated (at paras 23, 24 and 25): [The Crown’s] argument is essentially that a municipal service can only be a service that a municipality (and not the federal or provincial government) is obligated to provide. … Applying this interpretation to the national park example would mean that for any residents of a national park, for whom no municipality is obligated to provide services, the services provided by the federal government would not be “municipal services” for the purpose of section 21, even though such services would normally be provided by a municipality. … In my view, this result is not the result that Parliament intended and does not take into account that section 21 applies to services provided by a government or a municipality. … Words and Phrases municipal service ...

. … By adopting detailed provisions dealing with representation in the Act, the legislator limited the TCC’s implied power to control who may represent the corporation in their courtroom, especially in proceedings subject to the General Procedure. … [T]he common law/civil law concept that a corporation cannot appear in person because of its very nature strongly suggest[s] that under section 17.1 [of the TCCA], a party who is a corporation must be represented by counsel as defined by subsection 17.1(2). ... First, … there is nothing in section 20 of the Act dealing with this…. ... Even if this were so, … the very first version of this Rule did not attempt to define “in person” vis-à-vis a corporation; rather, it completely rules out the notion of a corporation being able to appear in person Furthermore, even if I assumed that the GP Rule 30(2) as amended in 1993 could be interpreted as meaning that only an officer of the corporation could personify a corporation within the meaning of section 17.1, the TCC Rules Committee could not then subdelegate its jurisdiction to each individual judge by making a right presumably granted unconditionally by the legislator subject to a leave to be granted only “in special circumstances”. … The GP Rule 30(2) in its latest iteration, which appears to enable any individual (including one outside of the corporation, such as its regular accountant) to represent it on leave, could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered a definition of the words “in person” in section 17.1. ...

., drivers) and intercorporate loans – and entered into cross-currency and interest rate swaps with an arm’s length bank to effectively convert much of its income stream into fixed rated Canadian-dollar interest. ... After noting (at para. 55) that the Canadian Pioneer case ([1980] 1 S.C.R) had found that the meaning of “banking … should be based on a formal, institutional approach rather than a substantive approach, in the sense of the functions of banking” so “that the use of the term ‘bank’ in the name of the entity, and whether it is regulated, are factors to be considered, rather than the actual activities that are conducted”, Woods JA found that the Tax Court had erred in finding that there was an implied requirement in “banking” that the receipt side of the business have an element of competition and that “the exclusion does not apply if a business simply manages its own funds “ (para. 57) and, indeed “Parliament has not explicitly required competition as an element of the foreign bank exclusion” para. 60). ... In finding that the receipt side i.e., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” she stated (at paras. 84-85): Applying the meaning of “business,” there is no reason to conclude that the capital invested by the Loblaw group would have occupied the time and attention of Glenhuron in any meaningful way. … [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...

. … In this appeal, there is no dispute that the non-capital losses as claimed for the January 1992 taxation year were valid non-capital losses and could be claimed in that year. … The Minister simply did not make the adjustment as requested by Bakorp for the January 1992 taxation year. … [T]his disagreement between Bakorp and the Minister in relation to the application of subsection 152(4.3) of the Act in this case should have been resolved by Bakorp making an application to the Federal Court for judicial review of this decision of the Minister. … Since Bakorp did not seek judicial review of the decision of the Minister, this decision to not make the adjustments for the January 1992 taxation year stands. ...

She recognized that First Vancouver had found that this deemed trust did not apply to “ bona fide purchasers for value” of the tax debtor’s property (so that the trust attached to the sales proceeds rather than following the sold property) – but found that this exception did not apply to the payment of the sales proceeds to the Bank as a secured creditor. The Bank’s mortgage was not excluded (under ETA s. 222(4) – similar to ITA s. 227(4.2)) as a “prescribed security interest” from the deemed trust rule because it was registered after the deemed trust arose in the tax debtor’s hands. Respecting the implications of this decision, she stated (at para. 85): [S]ecured lenders … may identify higher risk borrowers (which might include persons operating sole proprietorships), require borrowers to give evidence of tax compliance, or require borrowers to provide authorization to allow the lender to verify with the Canada Revenue Agency whether there are outstanding GST liabilities then known to the Agency. ...

ITA 231.2(3) and ETA s. 289(3) for Roofmart to disclose various particulars for all of its customers who in the past 4 ½ years had made purchases of construction materials from Roofmart exceeding specified thresholds. ... Blackmore. … The notice of application is signed by counsel for the Attorney General, who is referred to in the notice of application as “counsel for the applicant”, with the applicant clearly stated as being the Minister.... Roofmart’s argument confounds the authority to bring the application, which rests with the Minister or their delegate, with the role of the person who swore the affidavit filed in support of the Minister’s application. … The fact that Mr. ...

She further stated (at paras. 54, 56 and 62-63): The Impugned Provisions are clearly regulatory in nature … [and] are similar to information automatically provided to the CRA for regulatory purposes (e.g., T4s by employers, T5s by financial institutions, and taxpayers’ annual disclosure of foreign holdings). … It is difficult to see how a seizure contemplated by the Impugned Provisions significantly intrudes into privacy interests, as the appellants appear to suggest. Accordingly, I see no reason in this case to revisit the comment in Jarvis that the entire ITA is a regulatory statute. … Quite simply, the Impugned Provisions are an example of international cooperation in the administration of income tax laws. … Moreover, the appellants have not demonstrated that the Impugned Provisions are more intrusive than is necessary to be effective, or that Canada could have achieved a more favourable outcome for affected persons. ...

Canada (National Revenue), 2021 FCA 101-- summary under Stare Decisis Summary Under Tax Topics- General Concepts- Stare Decisis stare decisis does not apply horizontally In connection with finding that there is no reversible error of a Federal Court judge in not following a prior decision of a colleague, Pelletier JA stated (at paras. 30-31): … Judicial comity is a doctrine which seeks to promote uniformity and predictability in the law. Litigants and appellate courts expect that judges will consider the decisions of their colleagues carefully and, if they choose to differ, will explain why. … But the failure to do so, or to do it convincingly, while regrettable, is not a basis for appellate intervention. As a result, the use of the expression “horizontal stare decisis ” to refer to judicial comity is misleading precisely because judicial comity is not enforced by courts of appeal while stare decisis is. ...

The … distinctions made by the regulations based on the area of voyages taken cannot be supported by the bare language of the section …. ... Either the Court can sever and annul the impugned portion where it can be determined that that portion was intended by the legislator to be cumulative, not dependent on other provisions, and was "enacted distributively and not with the intention that either all or none should come into force" …. ... However, he concluded (at para. 41) that “for the same rationale as prevailed in Schachter [[1992] 2 S.C.R. 679], the best solution would appear to be a delayed declaration of the invalidity of the Ships Stores Regulations ” so as to “enable the Governor in Council to devise a scheme which is legally defensible given the terms of its regulation-making authority under the Excise Tax Act.” ...

. … [T]he use of the phrase “directly or indirectly” evidences Parliament’s intent “to capture any and all methods through which a transaction could increase” the fair market value of a TFSA The TCC had allowed the appeals for the 2010 and 2012 taxations years on the basis that the phrase “directly or indirectly” in s. 207.01(1)(b) should be narrowly interpreted; and that the increase in the fair market value of the TFSA in 2010 and in 2012 was not attributable to the swap transactions, but rather to favourable market conditions in those years. In allowing the Crown’s cross-appeal for those years, Dawson JA stated (at paras 75, 77 and 82): [T]he Tax Court’s concern about “when or how far into the future an advantage … will be considered as attributable to” abusive transactions did not justify a restrictive interpretation of the definition of advantage. … The ability to waive an advantage tax and reset an individual’s unused TFSA contribution room are the mechanisms intended to address the future impact of abusive transactions. … The anti-avoidance purpose of sections 207.01 and 207.05 supports a broad interpretation of the definition of “advantage”. … [W]hile the increase in value in the TFSA in 2010 and 2012 was directly attributable to the performance of the shares held in the TFSA each year, it was indirectly attributable to the swap transactions which increased the number of shares held in the TFSA and their value. ...