Search - 哈尔滨到北京 公里数

Bocock J was asked to address the Rule 58 question: Are sections 207.05 and 207.06 … unconstitutional as a consequence of Parliament having improperly delegated the rate-setting element of that tax to the Minister of National Revenue in contravention of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 …. In finding no such unconstitutionality “because no improper delegation occurred” (para. 103), Bocock J stated (at paras. 85, 99-100): A plain reading of the criteria [in s. 207.06(2)] reveals specific and mandatory guidance for the Minister’s exercise of discretion, with flexibility to allow the Minister to serve the overarching purpose of providing relief where just and equitable. … There is no unfettered discretion vested in the Minister’s agents to relieve from tax or refuse to relieve from tax under the TFSA Waiver [in s. 207.06] in the absence of comprehensible reason. … [T]he presumption of consistent expression and similar language between the TFSA Charge [in s. 207.05] and TFSA Waiver, when viewed with other unchallenged charging and relieving provisions in Part XI.01 of the Act, support the conclusion that the provisions, inter se, are distinct tax and relief provisions. ...

In finding that the taxpayer was liable under s. 116(5) for failure to withhold from the purchase price, based on a failure to establish that “after reasonable inquiry the purchaser had no reason to believe that the [Vendor] was not resident in Canada,” Russell J first noted (at para. 12) that the purchase agreement was in the standard Ontario Real Estate Association form and, thus, provided that there was to be no withholding “if Seller delivers on completion the prescribed certificate or a statutory declaration that Seller is not then a non-resident of Canada” and then, dismissing the appeal, found (at paras 21, 23 and 24): … Mr. ... …I conclude that what happened in this case did not constitute “reasonable inquiry”. … Simple questions such as what was the Vendor’s permanent address as opposed to “address for service” and provision of a copy of the Vendor’s driver’s license, would have done much to bring clarity to this situation without undue further efforts. … [S]ubsection 116(5)(a), calls for and deserves more than a brief, baldly stated affidavit or solemn declaration when there are factual red-flags potentially suggestive of non-residency. … If I should be wrong on this point in deciding there was not “reasonable inquiry” in this case then I would conclude for similar reasons as above that here the purchaser did have, in the words of paragraph 116(5)(a), “reason to believe that the [Vendor] was not resident in Canada”. … ...

. … [I]ncome earned from qualified investments, being investments that are not “non-qualified investments”, will accrue on a tax-exempt basis but not so if the annuitant has somehow managed to use the contributions or accumulated assets in the RRSP to operate a business that is not at arm’s length. … [T]he acquisition by the RRSP Trust of 99% of the units of the Income Funds defeated the object, spirit and purpose of the provision and was contrary to the Parliament intention that a mutual fund trust was to be widely held. It was certainly not within the contemplation of Parliament that a mutual fund trust that was a qualified investment for RRSP purposes would effectively become one investor’s alter ego. … [T]he Appellant sought to abuse the RRSP regime and the provisions of the Act by establishing the Income Funds …. After finding that the Minister’s assessment of the taxpayer respecting the RRSP income pursuant to s. 56(2) was unsupported by the wording of that provision, Smith J went on to indicate that he would have upheld the reassessments of the taxpayer in those amounts on the basis of the GAAR, but for this resulting “in a duplication of the tax which the Minister has also sought to impose on the RRSP Trust pursuant to subsection 146(10.1)” – which could not “be considered ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ as contemplated in subsection 245(5)” (para. 623). ...

The Queen, 2010 DTC 1015 [at at 2602], 2009 TCC 261-- summary under Subsection 15(1) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 15- Subsection 15(1) benefit conferred when shareholder receives unconditional right thereto, rather than when such right subsequently exercised On September 18, 1998, the two taxpayers agreed that they would incorporate a company (the “Company” – to be owned equally by them) to purchase land from a third party (Desjardins Trust) and that the Company would accord them the right (the “Options”), to transfer ½ of the lands to each of them at the Company’s cost. ... Indeed, the Company acquired a right as soon as its offer was accepted by Desjardins Trust, and, consequently, at the same moment, the Appellants acquired rights from the Company — rights that they could therefore assign to third parties, since no provision of the Agreement prohibited them from assigning their rights. In addition, it is my view that no benefit was conferred on the Appellants on November 21, 1999, when they became the owners of their parcels as contemplated in the Agreement, since the Company merely gave the Appellants what they were entitled to. … No benefit is conferred if a company merely complies with an undertaking that it made earlier under a genuine commercial transaction (in this instance, the Agreement). ...

. … [T]he cost of legal services to chase after directors, who the Appellant claims have absconded with its money, is a need that would have been fulfilled regardless of where the funds emanated from. … [T]here is no commercial expectation that directors on winding up a corporation will abscond with funds and that the cost of such contingency is somehow worked into the cost of the supply. … The business of Look was effectively wound up before there was any activity necessitating the acquisition of legal services. … He added (at para. 26): [T]his is not an issue of timing. ...

Before finding that s. 191.1 applied, so that such output tax instead was based on the higher costs, Jorré J stated (at para 22): The critical question to be decided can be stated as: Whether, at the time of the self supply, High Crest could expect to receive an amount of money from the government of Nova Scotia “ for the purpose of making residential units in the [20 bed addition] available to individuals” (emphasis added). Jorré J further stated (at para 61): … High-Crest would not have made such a large and risky investment in the construction of the addition, a construction with a fair market value upon completion that was substantially less than its cost, if it did not expect the service contract to come into operation and be renewed for many years. … After quoting from the Department of Finance Explanatory Notes, he stated (at para. 76): …[T]he scheme of the section indicates a clear purpose … to deny a net tax refund on the self supply by bumping up the output tax where there is government support for the provision of residential accommodation to the groups of individuals described in the section. ...

(l), Pizzitelli J stated (at paras 18 and 20): …[T]he brokers’ main duty was to find a potential buyer for the business, and not specifically for the shares of the appellant, and … once a potential buyer was found, such person was parked with the Appellant or his attorney who negotiated, drafted and documented the transaction of purchase and sale and the transfer of the shares in question. … [T]he ultimate purchaser provided a written offer to purchase the assets, [and] the brokers had no idea at that point or any control over whether a binding agreement for either assets or shares could be finalized as it was then out of their hands. … …[T]he brokers were basically putting out the word that the business was for sale amongst their contacts. Clearly, they had no authority to enter into any contracts on behalf of the Appellant or bind him in any way nor to hire and instruct counsel and see a transaction through to the end. … [T]he brokers were not registered business or securities brokers in any event. ...

Although the Audit Committee of Inc. had approved the receipt of a loan from Black, the relationship between the independent directors of Inc. and Black deteriorated, and the alleged loan by him to Inc. was never formally documented – and following subsequent litigation, all of Black’s alleged rights in that regard were extinguished in a settlement in which he agreed to pay damages to Inc. Rossiter CJ accepted Black’s position that the borrowed money had been used by Black to make a loan to Inc., so that Black was entitled to an interest deduction on his borrowed funds, stating: (at paras. 114, 128-129): A reasonable observer would conclude that Black and Inc. intended for there to be a loan agreement, and the key players thought there was a binding loan agreement. … Black and Inc. had [orally] agreed that the essential terms or repayment would match the Quest Loan so as to ensure Black was not out-of-pocket after stepping up to help Inc. … Black and Inc. reached an agreement on the essential terms of the loan and left the details to be worked out at a later date. The fact that a formal document outlining those essential terms was to be prepared later on and signed … does not alter the validity of the earlier contract. ...

. … [V]ariable E of the formula refers to “the total depreciation allowed to the taxpayer… before that time”. … Once a taxpayer claims a deduction for CCA under paragraph 20(1)(a), variable E of the formula operates on a purely mechanical basis. He then stated (at paras. 17, 20): The Appellant … now seeks to adjust its Initial CCA Claim after the fact. ... If the carry-over period expires, a taxpayer could unilaterally pick and choose which discretionary deductions would be adjusted downward to avoid the impact of this rule. … This result would be extremely difficult for the Canada Revenue Agency to audit. ...

. … [However] this right does not extend to legal argument in support of the existence of the policy and its application to the taxpayer’s transaction(s). In addition, while the Appellant is entitled to disclosure of the policy relied upon by the Minister to apply the GAAR to know the case that the Appellant must meet, this disclosure is likely not admissible at trial because the existence or non‑existence of the policy is a question of law …. ... Consequently, the documents considered by the GAAR Committee in making the first decision are in effect the basis for the CRA’s subsequent decision to assess the Appellant …. ...