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Ellis “as partial compensation for the termination of the Group Life Plan” and (at para. 103) that such payment “providing partial compensation the loss of the status of being a member of the Group Life Plan …constituted a benefit,” Sommerfeldt J stated (at paras. 121, 124): As explained by Bowman J in … Tsiaprailis … where, in addition to the general provision in paragraph 6(1)(a), there is “a specific [statutory provision] containing detailed conditions for the inclusion of an amount in income that would not otherwise be income” … the general provision cannot be used “to fill in all the gaps left by” the specific provision…. I have concluded that subsection 6(4) of the ITA and Part XXVII of the ITR are specific provisions designed to include in income certain amounts in respect of insurance coverage under a group term life insurance policy. … As those specific provisions have not captured the distributions paid in 2011 by the HWT to Ms. ...

The transitional provision indicated that the reduced rate applied inter alia “to any supply … made on or after January 1, 2008.” ... (para. 45) In any event, ETA s. 133 (which, in approximate terms, deems supplies of property to occur when the agreement for their supply is entered into) deemed the agreements to be supplies of the condos, with D’Arcy J. noting in this regard that “[t]he application of section 133 is also not contingent on the existence of the Condo Units at the time the parties entered into the … Agreements ….” (para. 58) D’Arcy J. also accepted the Crown’s alternative argument that the appellant had in fact collected GST at the 6% rate (and thus, would have been required to remit tax at the 6% rate under the s. 225(1) formula, which included "all other amounts collected by the person … on account of tax,” even if the 5% rate applied under the transitional rule), noting that the 6% rate was referenced in the statements of adjustments at the closings, and that the buyers claimed the new housing rebates on the basis of a 6% rate. ...

. … The OECD Commentary on Article 4 … confirms that … [t]he object and purpose of the provision, “is to exclude persons who are not subject to comprehensive taxation (full liability for tax) in a State.” … I am of the view that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the Appellant was subject to comprehensive taxation in the Netherlands. ... …[W]here a person considers that the action of one or both of the States will result in … double taxation, an application in writing may be filed with “the competent authority of the State of which he is a resident … to resolve the issue by mutual agreement with the competent authority of the other State.” ... The Appellant was formally notified of the Minister’s decision to reassess … on July 3, 2013. ...

In 2012, the taxpayer accepted (in connection with waiving any right of appeal pertaining to the 1995 and subsequent years) a settlement agreement which provided that much of the LP losses allocated to the investors would be allowed and that related interest and carrying expenses personally incurred by them also would be allowed and that capital gains from the dispositions of their units would be included in the computation of their income – but was silent as to the treatment of the gains that had been allocated to them by the LPs. ... Savics’ income for 1998 was, for the purposes of … the Minutes … a consequential adjustment. It would be inconsistent to recognize the existence of the Partnerships and to deduct the losses allocated by the Partnerships, but not to include the gains allocated by the Partnerships. … Furthermore, given that “ Galway precludes a taxpayer and the Crown from arriving at a settlement that has no basis in the ITA ” (para. 43), and in light of the valid existence of the LPs, “a settlement that did not recognize the inclusion of those gains in his income for 1998 would be indefensible on the facts” (para. 45). ...

In affirming the Minister’s assessment, which treated the amounts paid out to the taxpayer under the first two policies as s. 9 income, Favreau J stated (at paras. 28-31, TaxIntepretations translation): [T]he insurance benefits under dispute were paid for the purpose of reimbursing the appellant for part of the general expenses of her clinic during her period of illness and that were essential for the appellant’s clinic to continue being carried on …. ... Consequently, as the source of the insurance benefits was the business of the appellant, the insurance benefits paid to the appellant were required to be included in the computation of her business income. … These benefits were not of a personal nature …. The surrogatum principle … is applicable. By virtue of this principle, the tax treatment of sickness insurance benefits depends on what such benefits are intended to replace being, in this case, the general expenses of carrying on the dental clinic. ...

In rejecting their submissions that the dividends paid to them were partial consideration for such services so as to oust the application of s. 160 to the dividends, Monaghan J stated (at paras 15, 17, 19): The evidence that the dividends … were partial consideration for their services … was not very strong. … However, even if I accept that the Valovics reduced the amount of employment income and increased the amount of dividends, and that all payments were made because of the services they provided, the appeals must fail. … [T]his Court and the Federal Court of Appeal have consistently rejected the argument that consideration may be given for dividends, including in the context of section 160. These decisions accepted and endorsed the view expressed in Neuman that dividends relate to shareholding and rejected the argument that there was consideration for the dividends. … …Having decided to transform what the Valovics now wish to characterize as consideration for services rendered into a dividend for any reason, including tax advantages, the Valovics must accept the consequences of that decision. … ...

Before confirming the resulting reassessments that treated the $1.50 of the ticket prices as being zero-rated consideration for the honey or other food products, and the balance as consideration that was subject to tax, Boyle J referred to s. 153(2), and stated (at paras. 8. 19, TaxInterpretations translation): The cost of admission to … the … forest must be reasonably divided between access to the labyrinth and other activities, and the mandatory purchase of a coupon to be exchanged for a honey or maple food product. The appellant called the coupon received at the entrance the coupon for the purchase of basic products. … Appellant was unable to present any valid reason why the value of the initial coupon should be other than $1.50, which is what it charged for the same coupons when purchased individually. ...

DTI was found by Russell J to bear the costs of the diesel fuel for the trips through the use by the drivers on its behalf of « T-Chek » cards (enabling the participating Shell or other station to receive payment out of a prepaid balance made by DTI) and to bear the costs of maintenance of the trucks. ... After all, by then the diesel, substantially if not completely, would no longer even exist – having in the meantime been expended through operation of the contract truckers’ vehicles. ...

" See summaries under s. 9 – timing, s. 9 – compensation payments and s. 9 – computation of profit. ...

The Queen, 2018 TCC 119 (Informal Procedure)-- summary under Subsection 16.2(2) Summary Under Tax Topics- Other Legislation/Constitution- Federal- Tax Court of Canada Act- Section 16.2- Subsection 16.2(2) notice of discontinuance could not be reversed even with Crown consent The unrepresented taxpayer filed a notice of discontinuance for her appeal of the denial of the new housing rebate after being advised by Crown counsel that her appeal was unlikely to succeed – but a day later, was informed by Crown counsel that she would be allowed the rebate. ... After referring to s. 16.2(2) and Scarola, 2003 FCA 157, Smith J stated (at paras. 10, 12): …[T]he FCA concluded that “Parliament has chosen to legislatively determine the legal consequences of a notice of discontinuance”, rather than leaving it to judicial discretion (para. 18). … The FCA went on to find that a discontinuance under subsection 16.2(2) “produces the same effect as a judgment of dismissal by the Court” (para. 21). … The FCA … noted: …I believe section 16.2 by its plain meaning took away any inherent or residual jurisdiction in the Court to allow for withdrawals of notices of discontinuance. ... Smith J dismissed the taxpayer’s motion to set aside the notice of discontinuance, but added (at para. 14): … I leave it to the Minister to consider the appropriateness of a reassessment to implement the terms of the consent, possibly pursuant to subsection 298(2) …. ...