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In rejecting the Crown’s position that the appellant was not entitled to the rebate because he had acquired the condo from the Assignor (who was not the “builder”) rather than from West Harbour, Jorré DJ stated (at paras 23, 24): Given that there was no sale from West Harbor to the Assignor, given that the Appellant made all the payments due to West Harbour under the purchase agreement arising after he signed the assignment agreement, … given the … emails showing acceptance by West Harbor of a direction coming from the office of the Appellant’s lawyer that title would be in the Appellant’s name and given the land registry records showing the transfer from West Harbor to the Appellant, it is clear from its conduct that the vendor, West Harbor, waived any unfulfilled conditions regarding the assignment, accepted the assignment and sold the property to the Appellant. ...

In finding that such CCA claims could not be treated as having been revised, Webb JA indicated (at para. 32) that the “administrative practice [in IC 84-1] is not binding on this Court, nor can it amend the Act, noted (at para. 36) that “ Nassau Walnut … drew a distinction between an election and a designation” and found (at para. 41) that “the comments in Nassau Walnut with respect to an election, and the inability of a taxpayer to change an election absent a specific provision in the Act permitting such a change, are applicable in this case.” ...

This does not alter the fact that there was only one joint venture agreement entered into and signed by all the … joint venturers. … There was no intention on the part of the legislator to provide for the existence of more than one joint venture, nor to calculate inputs according to the participation of each of the joint venturers. ...

In applying Deans Knight to reverse the Tax Court finding that there was no abuse of s. 111(5), Monaghan JA stated (at paras. 34-35): The object, spirit and purpose of subsection 111(5) – its rationale – is “to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct their unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders”. ...

In applying Deans Knight to reverse the Tax Court finding that there was no abuse of s. 111(5), Monaghan JA stated (at paras. 34-35): The object, spirit and purpose of subsection 111(5) – its rationale – is “to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct their unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders”. ...

He went on to indicate (at para. 49) that in any event, the daughter could be considered to be “subject to tax” (or “liable for tax” to use his preferred translation, and also essentially the phrase considered in Crown Forest): … The income tax legislation … applies to all Canadian residents … because they may, in one year or another, earn business income in Quebec…. ...

CRA took the view that Iris, contrary to its claims, had not experienced a significant decline in its qualifying revenues, and denied the claims – initially on the basis of exercising its discretion under s. 164(1.6), which provides that the Minister, before the time for filing the taxpayer’s return for the year, “may refund to the taxpayer all or any part of the [deemed CEWS] overpayment” arising under s. 125.7(2). ... Whether the Minister erred in determining that there was no overpayment is to be adjudicated in the Tax Court; whether the Minister erred in refusing to refund an overpayment is for the Federal Court to decide. … The relief sought makes clear that the essential character of the notice of application is a challenge to the correctness of the finding that no “amount” is payable by way of a refund under subsection 125.7(2) and to vacate the notice of determination. … Subsection 152(1.2) … provides for objection and appeal rights following a notice of determination, and Parliament has directed that those proceedings are to be in the Tax Court of Canada …. ...

. … The Applicant … failed to explain in any meaningful way why it would be just and equitable for the Minister to do so. … I find that it would have been reasonable, on this basis alone, for the Minister to have rejected the amendment requests, without even considering the various other factors detailed in the information circulars [IC 76-19R3 and IC 07-01]. ... Aylen J further stated (at para. 53): [W]hile the Applicant alleges that the conclusion that the Applicant was attempting to take advantage of section 66.7 of the ITA is illogical and not rational, the Applicant made little effort in its submissions … to explain this allegation. As such, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has demonstrated any error by the Minister’s delegate in his finding that the amendment requests constituted an attempt to circumvent the successor rule stipulated in section 66.7 …. ...

Shaker), Walker J stated (at para. 30): Trust property is not available to the creditors of a trustee where the debt in question is the trustee’s personal debt …. ... To conclude otherwise would improperly and adversely impact the interests of the third-party beneficiaries of the VSI Trust. … The common law recognizes a distinction between legal and beneficial ownership. A person having beneficial ownership in property can enforce their beneficial ownership rights against the holder of legal title. … Justice Brown … observed that a trustee holds trust property solely for the beneficiaries’ enjoyment and cannot profit personally from their dealings with the trust property or with the beneficiaries of the trust [2018 SCC 8] at para 17). ...

He further stated (at para. 75): [I]n Ver, Justice Bowman indicated that the question of whether an expenditure was made for a business or a personal purpose is a matter of judgment, and not the subject of a misrepresentation within the meaning of subparagraph 152(4)(a)(i) …. I adopt that view, except to the extent that either of the Appellants has acknowledged, or it is patently obvious, that a particular expenditure was incurred for a personal purpose, or was not incurred for a business purpose …. ... Accordingly, the reassessments were statute-barred except to the extent that they “were clearly personal, as distinct from those whose determination may have been ‘matters of judgment’ of the type discussed … in Ver ” (para. 105). ...