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After finding that AC made a single supply under the Agreement, and in finding that such single taxable supply was of promotional services rather than (as submitted by CIBC) a supply of “gift certificates” exempted under s. 181.2, Visser J stated (at paras. 32-33): [T]he true nature or raison d'être of the Aeroplan Mile Program, the … Agreement and the resulting Aeroplan Supplies is to market and promote applications for and increased use of participating CIBC credits cards (and other participating CIBC financial products such as mortgages). The wording of both the … Agreement and Aeroplan’s invoices to CIBC makes this clear. … In effect, section 9 of the 2003 Credit Card Agreement explicitly stipulates that the marketing and promotional services (the referral activities) are the predominant element of the Aeroplan Supplies and further provides that all other supplies are incidental thereto.. … …Aeroplan Payments were computed with reference to the number of Aeroplan Miles which were issued in a particular billing period as a convenient method for calculating the value of the marketing and promotional services provided by Aeroplan to CIBC. ...

In reversing the finding below that Emergis could not deduct such tax because such tax could (in accordance with the exception at the end of s. 20(12)) “reasonably be regarded as having been paid by a corporation [Emergis] in respect of income from a share … of a foreign affiliate [the LLC],” Webb JA and Goyette JA indicated: “[I]t would not be reasonable to regard the US Government as imposing a tax in respect of the income from the shares of LLC, as the US Government did not recognize the separate existence of LLC” (para. 28). ... It appeared that s. 20(12) was enacted “(a) because foreign taxes, not being incurred to earn income, are not deductible (paragraph 18(1)(a) …); and (b) to address the limitations in subsection 126(1) …, one of them being the unavailability of a credit when the income on which the tax imposed by the foreign government has no foreign source” – so that here, as Emergis did not have a source of income in the US “[a]llowing it to benefit from the subsection 20(12) deduction would therefore be in line with the purpose of this provision.” ...

. … IHI did not provide any evidence to establish that IHI (rather than RAR) acquired the services provided by Fetherstonhaugh (so as to come within the wording of subsection 169(1) of the ETA), nor did it provide any evidence of an agreement or other contractual arrangement between IHI and Fetherstonhaugh that required IHI to pay for those services. … As noted in Garmeco, to qualify for ITCs, a claimant “must demonstrate … that it acquired the goods and services for consumption or use in the course of its own commercial activity [emphasis added].” ...

Smith J found that CO2 Technologies was “a corporation controlled, directly or indirectly in any manner whatever” by a public corporation (CO2 Public) and, thus, was not a Canadian-controlled private corporation (CCPC) – even before getting to the one-sided terms of the research agreement between the two corporations. ... Furthermore, the research agreement was similar to the development agreement in Aeronautics, which was found in that case to “constitute … a legally-enforceable arrangement capable of establishing de facto control under subsection 256(5.1)” – and the facts here were similar to Lyrtech and Solutions Mindready. ...

. … The submission, dated two weeks after the notice of reassessment, while not perfectly detailed, was sufficient to initiate the objection process responsive to an audit and conclusions already in active dispute. … The Minister has not considered the objection as she should have done. … ...

. … The fact that there was no certainty that the Oxxio business would be sold does not make the expenditure revenue in nature. … Indeed, expenditure on an abortive capital disposal transaction is capital expenditure nonetheless …. ...

While these other factors are indicative of operational control, they are not the result of a legally-enforceable arrangement … [and are] factors that McGillivray determined to be irrelevant …. ... Silva’s ability to make the two companies disregard the terms of the development agreement – as he decided to do when he unilaterally decided that the 5% mark-up [under the Development Agreement] would not be paid to ADC. …[I]t would be difficult to imagine a stronger indicator of a non-arm’s length relationship than the fact that a company is allowed to operate out of another’s facility for free, without a lease. … Words and Phrases supply contract ...

See summaries under Public Service Body Rebate (GST/HST) Regulations, s. 2 – government funding, Sched. ... II, s. 1 – home care services. ...

. … In respect of Fourney, control of Qun was “manifested in the authority” Kwong and Yu-Lian gave her in buying and eventually selling the Markham property for them.... An implied agency simply reflects existence of an agency relationship in the absence of formal or explicit documentation identifying that agency relationship. … Actual conduct rather than existence of formal agency agreement normally governs [a finding of implied agency]. … It was Kwong who obtained the benefit of the Rebate. … The Rebate application was not made by Qun...on her own behalf but rather by her in her capacity as agent for...Kwong…he being titular owner of the Markham property …. ...

Lafleur J rejected an argument that “on the basis of Hickerty, [2007 TCC 482] that where an appellant has taken positive actions to appeal and where that appellant reasonably believes that the appeal has been validly filed, the one‑year grace period had stopped running,” stating (at paras 75, 77 and 84): The Federal Court of Appeal in Carlson … made it clear that the one‑year grace period is strict and cannot be waived. … In view of the doctrine of the Federal Court of Appeal, the fact that the Appellant did not realize before August 2016 that the 2002 Reassessment was not appealed from can have no impact whatsoever on the calculation of the one-year grace period. … The fact that the CRA was mistakenly under the impression that the 2002 Reassessment was being appealed from and did not start collection proceedings before 2016 has no bearing on that conclusion. … The wording of section 167 and paragraph 167(5)(a) of the Act is clear and unambiguous; the language of this paragraph does not allow me to conclude that the time stopped running because the Appellant was under the wrong impression that the 2002 Reassessment was being appealed from. ...