Search - 包建铎违纪违法案件以案促改以案促治专题组织生活会 个人对照检查

In turning to ADFT’s argument, Lederman J found that there was a valid waiver pursuant to the Ontario Act for purposes of waiving the normal reassessment period, stating (at paras. 32, 34): The word “purporting” means “signify, imply, profess to be … appear ostensibly to be”…. ... In this way, it implies or purports to be a prescribed form. … The prescription imposed by the Minister is sufficiently evidenced by the …indicia on the form. ...

He stated (at para 17): … If the original notice does not constitute notification of no tax payable in all provincial or territorial jurisdictions, then a taxpayer receiving such a notice, could be assessed for income taxes in any other province or territory indefinitely. … He also indicated that it was contradictory to treat the same (2012) Notice as a reassessment of Alberta tax and as an original assessment of Ontario tax. ...

. … In particular, a supply must be regarded as ancillary to a principal supply if it does not constitute for customers an end in itself but a means of better enjoying the principal service supplied…. ... …Stock ‘94 itself acknowledges …, not having authorisation to act as a credit institution, it could not grant loans to the integrated producers without their being intended for the purchase of its current assets. ...

Before declaring that the taxpayer was supplying “taxi travel,” Griffiths J stated (at paras. 135, 138): … I consider that the words in s 195-1 should be given their ordinary, everyday meanings and not a trade or specialised meaning (including one which reflects what Dr Abelson describes as a “regulatory concept”). I accept …that the ordinary meaning of the word “taxi” is a vehicle available for hire by the public and which transports a passenger at his or her direction for the payment of a fare that will often, but not always, be calculated by reference to a taximeter. … The fact that his car did not have a taximeter installed in it is not determinative…. ...

It is clear … the Commissioner dealt with TD’s request on the basis that her discretion was circumscribed by the extraordinary-circumstances exception. … By doing so, she fettered the broad discretion given to her by s. 24(1) of the IBAA, and her decision is, therefore, unreasonable. ...

The taxpayer submitted that he had ceased to be a limited partner by virtue of s. 2244 of the Civil Code- which provided that a limited partner “may not negotiate any business on behalf of the partnership or act as mandatary or agent for the partnership” – on the basis of his involvement in the business of SEC including negotiating with suppliers and making various purchases. ... Breault JCQ also stated that he shared the conclusion in an article (quoted at para. 87) that: We are in complete disagreement with the position…that the control exercised by a limited partner or limited partners over the corporate general partner suffices to engage liability of the limited partners by the combined application of articles 317 and 2244 of the C.c.Q. … [I]t is only in the common law provinces that the control of the internal management of a limited partnership gives rise to liability of the limited partners…. ...

.' In my view, those words describe the … Society. The supervision is provided by the conductor of the band or choral group. ... Although the … Society is a registered charity, the right of its members to the supervision of a conductor in their recreational activity falls within paragraph 2(j) of Part VI Schedule V. ...

. … Neither the applicant, nor Mr Lewski on her behalf, took any step to disclaim the distribution before 15 December 2015. In these circumstances … we consider the conclusion that the applicant was taken to have had knowledge of, and to have accepted, the gifts before 15 December 2015 to be consistent with the cases and principles discussed above. ...

. … [A] requirement certainly cannot be used to disguise a seizure made without judicial authorization. In such circumstances, section 8 of the Charter … was infringed by the ARQ…. ...

In rejecting this position, Vaillancourt JCQ stated (at paras. 32-34, TaxInterpretations translation): The plaintiff … recognized having received the amounts from Groupe Norbourg without any right thereto, which constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to her argument that she paid the interest on a loan. … [T]he plaintiff paid the interest to RSM for the sole purpose of buying time to repay the receiver the sums which she had received without any right thereto. ...