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However, TSI filed a Notice of Discontinuance on May 2, 2016 and the appeal was deemed to be dismissed on June 24, 2016 pursuant to s. 16.2(2) of the Tax Court of Canada Act (the “ TCC Act”). ... After noting (at para. 35) the appellants’ submission that s. “152(1.7) … only binds the partners with respect to the correctness of the amounts determined by the Minister,” D’Auray J indicated (at para. 38): I agree with the appellants that taking into account the wording of subsection 152(1.7) … it is not clear that this provision binds the appellants with respect to the procedural provisions of the ITA, namely the stature-barred issue. … ...

It was the taxpayer’s position that the space trip was intended to be, and was in fact, used to help promote the 2009 launch of Cirque du Soleil’s first show in Russia – although none of the costs of the space trip were charged to the marketing budget for the Russia show. ... For that reason I could conclude that an allocation in the range of 0 to 10% of the cost of the space trip would be a reasonable charge to Cirque du Soleil. … I am fixing the amount of the business-related portion of the cost at the top of that range at- $4.2 million. … [T]he remaining 90% of the cost of the trip, being $37.6 million, was the amount of the benefit conferred on and enjoyed by M. ... I have found that this space trip falls into the latter category …. ...

. … [T]here is no indication in subsection 111(5) that it was meant to prevent the acquiring party from using its own losses against post-acquisition income allocable to that acquiring corporation indirectly due to its acquisition of the target corporation. … In finding that there also was no abuse of the provisions of the Act for allocation of partnership income (ss. 103 and 96), he stated (at paras. 99, 101, 109): In this case, the allocation scheme in the HLP partnership agreement had not changed since the creation of the partnership. … There is no indication that this scheme was chosen for tax purposes or that it was unreasonable. … It was open to the Respondent to argue that the combination of paragraph 96(1.01)(a) and section 103 demonstrate a general policy against profit trading between new and former members; having failed to do so, it is not for me to expand the lis of the parties. … [N]othing in the partnership regime prevents a partnership agreement from basing its allocation of income on the membership at its fiscal year-end. … He acknowledged that the transactions entailed an indirect transfer of property from the LP to the Holdcos from a s. 160 perspective, but did not consider that there had been any receipt of property on other than FMV terms. ...

In finding that the profits of the taxpayer were business rather than property income (as would be the case for a Ponzi scheme), Graham J stated (at paras 16, 20): … [P]articipants in a Ponzi scheme normally believe that they are making an investment that is, in turn, generating profits for them. … By contrast, while participants in a pyramid scheme may not realize the full nature of the pyramid scheme …, they are aware on some level that they are buying into a structure whereby they receive profits through the recruitment of new people into that structure. … In simple terms, a participant in a Ponzi scheme is conned by the promoter into investing in something fake. ...

Nor was there an abuse of the partnership income allocation provisions of ss. 103 and 96 – it was totally conventional that close to 100% of the income of the LP was allocated to the corporation (Nuinsco) which was the limited partner at the partnership (HLP) year end. In this regard, he stated (at paras. 99, 109): In this case, the allocation scheme in the HLP partnership agreement had not changed since the creation of the partnership. … There is no indication that this scheme was chosen for tax purposes or that it was unreasonable. … [N]othing in the partnership regime prevents a partnership agreement from basing its allocation of income on the membership at its fiscal year-end. … ...

In denying their claims for the clergy residence deduction, on the basis that they were not in charge of or ministering to a congregation, Campbell J stated (at para. 124): [I]n Fitch, Bowman J. narrowed the scope of “ministering” by specifically carving out an exception pertaining to teachers of religious studies [stating;] [T]eaching may well- and frequently does- form a component of ministering, but teaching in itself is not ministering …. Nor do I think that a group of students can be said to be a congregation in the sense of an assemblage or gathering of persons to whom a minister provides spiritual counselling, advice, illumination and inspiration. … (Emphasis added) Campbell J further found (at para 167, before again quoting Fitch, and at 199): Even if I had been persuaded that the Appellants’ activities and duties at the VHA constituted “ministering”, I could not conclude that a class of elementary school students gathered for Jewish religious education and instruction would be a “congregation” within the meaning of paragraph 8(1)(c)(ii) of the Act. … …[T]he VHA, as an elementary day school, cannot be categorized as a “place of worship”, nor can its students be viewed as gathering there for the purposes of religious worship. Even though the Appellants led students in prayer services … [t]he primary character of the VHA is that of a school that conforms to the requirements of the British Columbia Ministry of Education. ...

. … The Appellant, Paletta International, claims that all of the properties were acquired either to farm or to develop for rental revenue. … I struggle to accept the implication that the Palettas rarely had a secondary intention to profit from the sale of their lands if the retail or industrial opportunities did not pan out. … The Respondent demonstrated a pattern of real estate holdings in the Paletta companies whereby the Palettas accumulate properties outside urban boundaries and hold them for long periods of time. ... The timing of the acquisition, in 1979, is consequential – I accept that at that point in time, farming was of greater significance to the family business than it is currently. ...

The Queen, 2020 TCC 91-- summary under Paragraph 247(2)(a) Summary Under Tax Topics- Income Tax Act- Section 247- New- Subsection 247(2)- Paragraph 247(2)(a) fee earned by Canadian servicer fell within “rough, but … acceptable, range of what an arm’s length service provider might have enjoyed” A Barbados international business corporation (“NewAgco Barbados”), that was a subsidiary of a Canadian company owned by two Canadian brothers, purchased a herbicide in the US and sold it to Canadian farmers, and paid management fees to another Canadian company (“AgraCity”) wholly-owned by one of the two brothers for assisting in making this happen. In rejecting the Crown position that ss. 247(2)(a) and (c) resulted in a transfer pricing adjustment, Boyle J stated (at paras. 99, 116 and 118): There was nothing … that could provide material support for the Respondent’s position that if NewAgco Barbados and AgraCity were arm’s length parties, they would have entered into a Services Agreement on terms and conditions that gave 100% of the ClearOut sales profits to AgraCity and no share whatsoever of those profits to NewAgco Barbados- nor did they provide any data, information or support that would help establish that the service fees payable to AgraCity were different than, or outside the range of, what arm’s length parties would be expected to provide for. … The only evidence the Court has on the point indicates that the amount paid to AgraCity generated a return on its costs that was in the range of what somewhat comparable arm’s length parties earn. … The taxpayer has provided credible, unchallenged, uncontested and unrefuted expert evidence based on available data that confirms the amount reported by AgraCity as its profit over the costs of its services to NewAgco Barbados was well within the somewhat rough, but in my view acceptable, range of what an arm’s length service provider might have enjoyed in circumstances similar to what I have found to be the transactions between NewAgco Barbados and AgraCity. ...

Accordingly, CRA disallowed the corporation’s input tax credit claims – effectively on the basis that there was a single supply of exempt orthodontic services. Before going on to confirm the corporation’s position that it made both exempt and zero-rated supplies to its patients on a 65/35 basis, so that the zero-rated supplies generated ITCs, Wong J stated (at para. 44): … [T]he arrangement itself would fall under the discretionary powers granted to the Minister by subsection 169(5) …. By virtue of the arrangement, the Minister is using her statutory discretion to exempt orthodontists from certain requirements of subsection 169(4), and to specify terms and conditions of the exemption. … ...

Bocock J was asked to address the Rule 58 question: Are sections 207.05 and 207.06 … unconstitutional as a consequence of Parliament having improperly delegated the rate-setting element of that tax to the Minister of National Revenue in contravention of section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867 …. In finding no such unconstitutionality “because no improper delegation occurred” (para. 103), Bocock J stated (at paras. 85, 99-100): A plain reading of the criteria [in s. 207.06(2)] reveals specific and mandatory guidance for the Minister’s exercise of discretion, with flexibility to allow the Minister to serve the overarching purpose of providing relief where just and equitable. … There is no unfettered discretion vested in the Minister’s agents to relieve from tax or refuse to relieve from tax under the TFSA Waiver [in s. 207.06] in the absence of comprehensible reason. … [T]he presumption of consistent expression and similar language between the TFSA Charge [in s. 207.05] and TFSA Waiver, when viewed with other unchallenged charging and relieving provisions in Part XI.01 of the Act, support the conclusion that the provisions, inter se, are distinct tax and relief provisions. ...