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In the result, he extracted $2M from the corporate group, of which approximately half corresponded to the deemed dividend received by him, and the other half, corresponding to the “soft” ACB of the shares was received free of tax – even though the PUC and “hard” ACB of the shares was nominal. ... In confirming the decision below to uphold this assessment, Noël CJ stated (at paras. 65, 77, 79 TaxInterpretations translation): The logic underlying this adjustment [in s. 84.1] rests on the fact, discussed above, that the paid-up capital and the ACB of the shares concerned reflect only the amounts which have been subjected to tax. … The object and spirit of this provision, or its rationale, is to prevent amounts which have not been subjected to tax to serve in extracting surplus of a corporation free of tax. ... To this end, subparagraph 84.1(2)(a.1)(ii) requires going beyond the ACB of the shares concerned – or of the shares for which they are substituted – and enquiring as to the source of the funds which constituted them in order to ascertain if they were subjected to tax. … This rationale was circumvented by the plan implemented by the appellant. ...

ITA 231.2(3) and ETA s. 289(3) for Roofmart to disclose various particulars for all of its customers who in the past 4 ½ years had made purchases of construction materials from Roofmart exceeding $20,000 or $10,000 per annum, depending on the year. ... The statutory criteria are not altered by the size of the request. … … The existence of some customers who may be of no interest to the Minister for the purposes of verifying compliance cannot determine whether an order should issue. ... That the group in this case is ascertainable is a finding of mixed fact and law, and the appellant has demonstrated no error that would warrant interference He also stated (at paras 45): GMREB established that a pending or existing tax audit of a particular individual is not a precondition to the exercise of power under subsection 231.2(3) …. ...

. … By adopting detailed provisions dealing with representation in the Act, the legislator limited the TCC’s implied power to control who may represent the corporation in their courtroom, especially in proceedings subject to the General Procedure. … [T]he common law/civil law concept that a corporation cannot appear in person because of its very nature strongly suggest[s] that under section 17.1 [of the TCCA], a party who is a corporation must be represented by counsel as defined by subsection 17.1(2). ... First, … there is nothing in section 20 of the Act dealing with this…. ... Even if this were so, … the very first version of this Rule did not attempt to define “in person” vis-à-vis a corporation; rather, it completely rules out the notion of a corporation being able to appear in person Furthermore, even if I assumed that the GP Rule 30(2) as amended in 1993 could be interpreted as meaning that only an officer of the corporation could personify a corporation within the meaning of section 17.1, the TCC Rules Committee could not then subdelegate its jurisdiction to each individual judge by making a right presumably granted unconditionally by the legislator subject to a leave to be granted only “in special circumstances”. … The GP Rule 30(2) in its latest iteration, which appears to enable any individual (including one outside of the corporation, such as its regular accountant) to represent it on leave, could not by any stretch of the imagination be considered a definition of the words “in person” in section 17.1. ...

Laskin JA found that VISA was supplying an exempted financial service and not an administrative service, stating (at para. 63): [C]onsistent with the Tax Court judge’s findings … Visa’s services “form an essential part of the ability for CIBC to offer credit card based services to their clients," … they "[give] CIBC customers the ability to purchase goods and services anywhere in the world without CIBC having to individually contact each merchant to set up payment arrangements with them," and that "[i]f CIBC was forced to create such a payment network on its own, even if technically feasible, this network would invariably be much less widely accepted than the one offered by Visa." … I would add that Visa’s services relieve CIBC and other issuers of the need to investigate and analyze the risk profile and solvency of the merchants that accept credit cards in payment for goods and services. To describe the benefit that CIBC obtained from Visa’s services … as "quintessentially administrative," does not … adequately recognize the reality of the benefit that CIBC derived. ...

The taxpayer then argued that the Year 19 reassessment was invalid because it did not satisfy s. 152(5), which prohibits the Minister from reassessing beyond the normal reassessment period to include income that “was not included in computing the taxpayer’s income for the purposes for an assessment, reassessment or additional assessment made … before the end of [that] period.” ... Savics was reassessed in [Year 7], the initial assessment … was still an assessment that was made before the end of his normal reassessment period. … I do not accept that the purpose of subsection 152(5) … is to prevent the Minister, in reassessing a taxpayer under subsection 165(3) … from restoring a taxpayer to their original filing position by reinstating a particular source and amount of income that had been reported by the taxpayer, assessed as filed, and then subsequently deleted as a result of a reassessment. ...

. … The jurisprudence is clear (and abundant) that courts should not decide constitutional cases in a factual vacuum. … … [L]egislation which, on its face, contains Charter violations may yet be found to be constitutional on the basis of contextual facts and the balancing of interests pursuant to section 1 of the Charter. … In the present case, there are no facts in support of the Friedmans’ constitutional arguments; there are merely hypothetical possibilities which may or may not arise. … [I]t was conceded that there was no basis for alleging a disguised criminal investigation. ...

CRA took the view that Iris, contrary to its claims, had not experienced a significant decline in its qualifying revenues, and denied the claims – initially on the basis of exercising its discretion under s. 164(1.6), which provides that the Minister, before the time for filing the taxpayer’s return for the year, “may refund to the taxpayer all or any part of the [deemed CEWS] overpayment” arising under s. 125.7(2). ... Whether the Minister erred in determining that there was no overpayment is to be adjudicated in the Tax Court; whether the Minister erred in refusing to refund an overpayment is for the Federal Court to decide. … The relief sought makes clear that the essential character of the notice of application is a challenge to the correctness of the finding that no “amount” is payable by way of a refund under subsection 125.7(2) and to vacate the notice of determination. … Subsection 152(1.2) … provides for objection and appeal rights following a notice of determination, and Parliament has directed that those proceedings are to be in the Tax Court of Canada …. ...

In the course of reversing the finding below that Emergis could not deduct such tax pursuant to s. 20(12) because such tax could (in accordance with the exception at the end of s. 20(12)) “reasonably be regarded as having been paid by a corporation [Emergis] in respect of income from a share … of a foreign affiliate [the LLC],” Webb JA and Goyette JA stated (at paras. 32, 35-36): … Envision Credit Union … noted that when the ITA considers the assets held by a corporation to be the assets held by the shareholders, it does so explicitly …. … The income from the shares of LLC was paid to NSULC. ...

In rejecting the Bank’s position, Woods JA indicated: Given that “Parliament seeks certainty, predictability and fairness in tax legislation … [i]f Parliament did not intend to impose interest when a loss carryback is claimed as a result of an audit adjustment, it is likely that Parliament would have provided for this with explicit language” (para. 39). ... It was “likely that Parliament knew that subparagraph (b)(iv) could function in a manner similar to a penalty … [and] that substantial interest could accrue under subparagraph (b)(iv) if the carryback request resulted from an audit” (para. 50). Although the Crown’s position could “result in different treatment between loss carrybacks and …. loss carryforwards … Parliament enacted a specific provision dealing with loss carrybacks, and it chose not to adopt an analogous provision for loss carryforwards” (para. 53). ...

., drivers) and intercorporate loans – and entered into cross-currency and interest rate swaps with an arm’s length bank to effectively convert much of its income stream into fixed rated Canadian-dollar interest. ... After noting (at para. 55) that the Canadian Pioneer case ([1980] 1 S.C.R) had found that the meaning of “banking … should be based on a formal, institutional approach rather than a substantive approach, in the sense of the functions of banking” so “that the use of the term ‘bank’ in the name of the entity, and whether it is regulated, are factors to be considered, rather than the actual activities that are conducted”, Woods JA found that the Tax Court had erred in finding that there was an implied requirement in “banking” that the receipt side of the business have an element of competition and that “the exclusion does not apply if a business simply manages its own funds “ (para. 57) and, indeed “Parliament has not explicitly required competition as an element of the foreign bank exclusion” para. 60). ... In finding that the receipt side i.e., “the capital investments by the Loblaw group [,] were not part of Glenhuron’s conduct of business” she stated (at paras. 84-85): Applying the meaning of “business,” there is no reason to conclude that the capital invested by the Loblaw group would have occupied the time and attention of Glenhuron in any meaningful way. … [T]his approach is consistent with long-standing jurisprudence which draws a distinction between “capital to enable [people] to conduct their enterprises” and “the activities by which they earn their income” …. ...