The Chief Justice:—We are all of opinion that the motion to quash should be granted with costs. And this is the judgment of the Court.

Heald, J:—This is an appeal from a reassessment by the respondent of the appellant for the taxation years 1960 to 1967 inclusive, involving gains realized from the sale of real estate located in Canada.

Cattanach, J:—This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Review Board whereby it was held that a gain of $545,570 realized by the respondent on the sale of land was not a profit from an adventure or concern in the nature of trade within the

Bastin, DJ (judgment delivered from the Bench, per curiam):—This is an appeal from a decision of the Trial Division dismissing the appeal of the appellant from a notice of reassessment in respect of the 1965 taxation year. The appeal

Pratte, J:—This is an appeal from a decision of the Tax Appeal Board allowing an appeal from the reassessments of the defendant’s income tax for the 1965, 1966 and 1967 taxation years. The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the defendant is

The Chief Justice (judgment delivered from the Bench, per curiam):— In these two appeals the question is whether the Trial Division erred in upholding assessments, under Part I of the Income Tax Act, of

Thurlow, J (concurred in by Sweet, DJ):—The issue in these appeals is whether the income tax returns of a defunct company, which I shall refer to as Pelon, for the years 1964, 1965 and 1966, upon which the income tax assessments of the

Heald, J:—This is an appeal from the reassessment of the plaintiff by the defendant for the taxation year 1971 on the basis that the plaintiff was an officer or servant of Canada within the meaning of subparagraph 139(3)(c)(i) of the Income

Cattanach, J:—These are appeals from a judgment of the Tax Review Board, dated June 12, 1972 whereby appeals by the defendant herein from assessments to income tax for the defendant’s 1965, 1966, 1967 and 1968 taxation years were allowed.

Sheppard, DJ:—The issue is whether the payment of $30,000 to the appellant in the taxation year 1966 was a retiring allowance within subparagraph 6(1)(a)(v), as defined in paragraph 139(1)(aj) as alleged by the respondent, or is a capital allowance as