The
Chief
Justice
(judgment
delivered
from
the
Bench,
per
curiam):—
In
these
two
appeals
the
question
is
whether
the
Trial
Division
erred
in
upholding
assessments,
under
Part
I
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
of
profits
made
from
the
purchase
and
sale
of
land.
There
was
one
purchase
of
a
parcel
of
land
by
two
persons
jointly.
The
appeal,
as
I
understand
it,
is
based
upon
the
view
that,
in
respect
of
each
of
those
persons,
the
sole
reason
for
the
purchase
was
to
have
an
undivided
part
of
that
land
available
as
a
site
for
a
business,
and
that
its
resale,
after
it
became
clear
that
the
land
would
not
be
required
by
either
of
them
for
that
purpose,
was
therefore
a
sale
of
a
capital
asset.
I
adopt
the
statement
of
facts
as
set
out
in
the
learned
trial
judge’s
reasons
for
judgment
as
fairly
representing
the
facts
as
established
by
the
evidence
in
all
significant
respects.*
I
also
agree
with
the
reasoning
whereby
the
learned
trial
judge
reached
his
result.
In
my
view,
the
problem
raised
by
the
appeals
is
one
in
respect
of
which
the
applicable
principles
were
aptly
stated
by
Noel,
J
(as
he
then
was)
in
Racine,
Demers
et
Nolin
v
MNR'.'f
To
give
to
a
transaction
which
involves
the
acquisition
of
capital
the
double
character
of
also
being
at
the
same
time
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade,
the
purchaser
must
have
in
his
mind,
at
the
moment
of
the
purchase,
the
possibility
of
reselling
as
an
operating
motivation
for
the
acquisition;
that
is
to
say
that
he
must
have
had
in
mind
that
upon
a
certain
type
of
circumstances
arising
he
had
hopes
of
being
able
to
resell
it
at
a
profit
instead
of
using
the
thing
purchased
for
purposes
of
capital.
Generally
speaking,
a
decision
that
such
a
motivation
exists
will
have
to
be
based
on
inferences
flowing
from
circumstances
surrounding
the
transaction
rather
than
on
direct
evidence
of
what
the
purchaser
had
in
mind.
In
this
case,
the
learned
trial
judge,
after
making
a
finding
that
“one
of
the
motivations
of
Revzen
and
Burnstein
in
acquiring
the
land
was
to
have
a
hedge
against
the
possibility
that
the
land
would
be
needed
in
the
event
that
the
existing
scrap
metal
and
foundry
sites
would
cease
to
be
available
to
them’’,
went
on
to
find
that
“there
was
also
another
motivation
inducing
Revzen
and
Burnstein
to
acquire
the
land,
namely,
their
feeling
that
they
could
sell
it
at
a
profit
if
they
would
not
need
it
for
their
businesses”.
In
my
opinion
there
was
evidence
on
which
this
finding
could
be
made
and
no
reason
has
been
shown
why
it
should
be
disturbed.*
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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