Madison Pacific – Tax Court of Canada finds that two companies acted in concert to effectively acquire control of and transform a Lossco so as to access its losses contrary to s. 245(4)

The appellant (“MPP”) was an insolvent, publicly traded, mining company with accumulated net capital losses of $72.7 million. In order for two companies (“Madison” and “Vanac,” which dealt with each other and MPP at arm’s length) to access those losses and shelter gains from portfolios of rental properties, transactions were implemented, which first entailed the existing MPP mining business being transferred to a subsidiary, whose shares were effectively spun-off to the existing shareholders. Now that MPP was an empty shell, Madison and Vanac transferred respective portfolios of rental properties to MPP in consideration for the assumption of liabilities and for the issuance of a mixture of Class B voting shares and Class C non-voting shares (with the same attributes other than being generally non-voting) so that Madison and Vanac collectively held (and in equal proportions, after giving effect to some catch-up transactions to equalize those holdings) 46.6% of the voting rights and 92.8% of the equity of MPP. This transaction deliberately overvalued the shares that were so issued by MPP to Madison and Vanac so as to effectively transfer around $2.8 million of equity value to the existing public Class B common shareholders of MPP, thereby paying them for the losses. Taking into account the Class B shares held by friendly parties, such as directors, Madison and Vanac effectively had more than half the voting rights and, conversely, a significant portion of the public shareholders did not exercise their voting rights.

Regarding the denial of MPP’s losses under s. 245(2), MPP argued that it had received no tax benefit from the use of non-voting shares because, even if Madison and Vanac each had received only shares in the form of Class B voting shares, each would have acquired 46.4% of the MPP equity, so that neither would have acquired de jure control of MPP. Graham J rejected this submission on the basis that Madison and Vanac had been acting in concert in the transactions, so that, under this alternate scenario, there would have been an acquisition of control of MPP by a group of persons, thereby resulting in the application of s. 111(4). In particular, they had acted together to execute a sophisticated and artificial series of transactions to achieve the objective of gaining access to the MPP losses while effectively controlling it.

Regarding the abuse test under s. 245(4), Graham J concluded:

Subsection 111(4) is supposed to prevent a corporation from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct its unused net capital losses against new capital gains for the benefit of its new shareholders. The series of transactions completely frustrated that purpose.

In this regard, after having noted that “the majority in Deans Knight highlighted that, while there had been no acquisition of control, there had been ‘the functional equivalent of such an acquisition of control’ by the company who effected the series of transactions (Matco)”, he indicated:

[T]he Madison-Vanac Group fundamentally transformed the Appellant. … They structured the series of transactions in a way that ensured they would receive substantially all of the benefit from the application of those losses to a completely new business. Finally, they selected the share compensation that they received in a way that ensured that, absent very unlikely circumstances, they could control the Appellant as if they had de jure control without actually taking that control.

Neal Armstrong. Summaries of Madison Pacific Properties Inc. v. The King, 2023 TCC 180 under s. 245(4) and s. 111(4).