Citation: 2019 TCC 161
Date: 20190802
Docket: 2016-2904(IT)G
BETWEEN:
KEYBRAND FOODS INC.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Jorré D.J.
Introduction
[1]
This appeal relates to three deductions claimed by the Appellant with respect to its 2011 and 2012 taxation years.
[2]
First, the Appellant claimed an allowable business investment loss (“ABIL”) of close to $10 million in relation to shares in Vidabode Group Inc. (“Vidabode”). This loss has been denied by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”) on the basis that at the time of acquisition the fair market value (“FMV”) of the shares was nil and that the two companies were not dealing at arm’s length. As a consequence, the Minister takes the position that there is no loss to deduct because paragraph 69(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act (the “Act”) applies.
[3]
In its opening statement the Appellant stated that it was not contesting the Minister’s FMV but was contesting the conclusion that the two companies were not dealing at arm’s length.
[4]
The key question to be determined with respect to the ABIL is whether or not, factually, the Appellant was dealing at arm’s length with Vidabode, a Nova Scotia company, when it acquired shares of Vidabode in December 2010.
[5]
Second, the Appellant borrowed funds to acquire the shares in December 2010. In its returns for the 2010 and 2011 taxation years the Appellant deducted, and the Minister disallowed, interest paid by the Appellant on those borrowed funds on the basis that the funds were not used for the purpose of earning income.
[6]
Third, in October 2010 the Appellant made a loan to Vidabode of $500,000 and, in 2011 it claimed a capital loss in relation to the loan. The Minister denied the loss on the grounds that it was not made for the purpose of earning income.
[7]
The key portions of the relevant provisions of the Income Tax Act read as follows:
With respect to the ABIL:
69(1) Inadequate considerations — Except as expressly otherwise provided in this Act,
(a) where a taxpayer has acquired anything from a person with whom the taxpayer was not dealing at arm’s length at an amount in excess of the fair market value thereof at the time the taxpayer so acquired it, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have acquired it at that fair market value;
. . .
251(1) Arm’s length — For the purposes of this Act,
(a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length;
. . .
(c) in any other case, it is a question of fact whether persons not related to each other are, at a particular time, dealing with each other at arm’s length.
With respect to the interest expense:
20(1) Deductions permitted in computing income from business or property — Notwithstanding paragraphs 18(1)(a), 18(1)(b) and 18(1)(h), in computing a taxpayer’s income for a taxation year from a business or property, there may be deducted such of the following amounts as are wholly applicable to that source or such part of the following amounts as may reasonably be regarded as applicable thereto:
. . .
(c) interest — an amount paid in the year or payable in respect of the year . . . , pursuant to a legal obligation to pay interest on
(i) borrowed money used for the purpose of earning income from a business or property . . .
(ii) an amount payable for property acquired for the purpose of gaining or producing income from the property or for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business . . .
. . .
or a reasonable amount in respect thereof, whichever is the lesser;
With respect to the capital loss claimed:
40(2) Limitations — Notwithstanding subsection 40(1),
. . .
(g) [various losses deemed nil] — a taxpayer’s loss, if any, from the disposition of a property . . . , to the extent that it is
. . .
(ii) a loss from the disposition of a debt or other right to receive an amount, unless the debt or right, as the case may be, was acquired by the taxpayer for the purpose of gaining or producing income from a business or property . . .
. . .
is nil;
The Facts
[8]
B.W. Strassburger Ltd. (“BWS”) is the sole owner of the Appellant. The shareholders and directors of BWS are Mr. Bernhardt Strassburger and his three siblings.
[9]
BWS was started by Mr. Strassburger’s father and is active in the restaurant and food service industry.
[10]
The Appellant, Keybrand Foods Inc., was created originally to provide certain prepared food to BWS’s restaurants and later became a supplier to a wide variety of other customers.
[11]
The Appellant is wholly owned by BWS.
[12]
Mr. Strassburger was president, secretary-treasurer and sole director of BWS as well as president and sole director of the Appellant.
[13]
One of Mr. Strassburger’s siblings first brought to his attention a company operating in Nova Scotia and incorporated in Nova Scotia called Vidabode Group Inc. Vidabode held the patents in a new concrete product called Vidacrete as well as a production system for Vidacrete.
[14]
Vidacrete had a number of very positive characteristics which appeared to give it great potential. Broadly, the basic business model of Vidabode was this. It would build a production plant in Nova Scotia and produce some of the product. The plant and product could be shown to clients. This plant was subsequently completed. Vidabode also built in a 1800 ft.² home using Vidacrete next to the completed plant to demonstrate what could be done with Vidacrete.
[15]
Vidabode planned to sell master licensing agreements for the production plant technology for $7.5 million dollars and collect royalties per cubic metre of cement produced. In addition, the licensee would have to pay something like $12 million for the manufacturing equipment and setting it up. The licensee would also have to acquire the land and the buildings for the plant themselves. Vidabode also wanted to sell the Nova Scotia plant but intended to keep the Vidabode head office at the Nova Scotia site.
[16]
Notwithstanding a recommendation by Mr. Strassburger not to invest, the other siblings voted to go ahead and the family invested in Vidabode in various ways.
[17]
Regrettably things did not go well resulting in financial losses and the dispute before this Court.
[18]
The family’s involvement in Vidabode started in 2006 when Twincorp Inc., a company 100% owned by Mr. Strassburger, made two loans totaling $500,000; Vidabode issued promissory notes for $500,000 to Twincorp. In 2007, BWS loaned $4 million to Vidabode. In 2007, BWS also bought non-voting Vidabode class C preferred shares from treasury; those shares cost $1,025,000. In 2007, Dorothy Strassburger, Mr. Strassburger’s mother, bought non-voting Vidabode class B preferred shares from treasury; her shares cost $300,000.
[19]
Subsequently, BWS bought 2,500,000 shares of Vidabode from treasury at the beginning of June 2008. As we shall see below, in 2008 the Appellant, as well as other related family companies, became a guarantor of certain loans made by GE Capital to Vidabode. The Appellant did not become a shareholder of Vidabode until late 2010 when it acquired the shares in respect of which it is claiming the allowable business investment loss that is in issue in this appeal.
[20]
As of June 2008, BWS owned about 25% of the voting shares of Vidabode, and about 25% of the votes.
[21]
In early 2008, Vidabode obtained financing of up to $23,450,000 from GE Capital under three different agreements. Vidabode and the other investors had not lined up any financing to pay for the equipment for the plant in Nova Scotia and they asked Mr. Strassburger to do it. He had previously worked with GE Capital to obtain financing and over a period of six months he obtained the financing package.
[22]
2090810 Ontario Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of BWS; Mr. Strassburger was the president of 2090810 Ontario.
[23]
The Appellant became involved in the financing of Vidabode when the loan agreements were made with GE Capital. In the agreement for $2.2 million in mortgage financing, the Appellant was the guarantor. The mortgage was on the Nova Scotia real estate where the cement plant was located. In the other two agreements Vidabode, BWS and 2090810 Ontario were the guarantors of the two loans. These two loans were secured by real estate in four locations in Ontario, one of which was owned by the Appellant, two of which were owned by BWS and one of which was owned by 2090810 Ontario.
[24]
The Appellant did not receive any fee for providing its guarantees. BWS soon started making further loans to Vidabode.
[25]
The GE Capital loans were used to pay off a mortgage on the Nova Scotia property, to buy equipment, to pay off $4 million loaned by BWS, to pay off some loans by Twincorp and as operating capital. The financial statements for 2008 and 2009 show the balance owed by Vidabode on Promissory Notes held by BWS as $2,150,000 on 31 December 2008 and $6,441,394 on 31 December 2009.
[26]
Subsequently, BWS acquired 1,600,000 shares in September 2009 that were transferred to it by one of the other shareholders, Atlantic Aboriginal Capital Inc. (“
AACI”
) This was in return for BWS guaranteeing a loan to Vidabode by Banc Developments Limited (“Banc”)
.
[27]
As a result of the acquisition of the additional 1,600,000 shares, BWS had about 41% of the common shares and about 41% of the votes with the consequence that it was now the largest shareholder of Vidabode. The second largest shareholder was AACI. which had about 34% of the votes.
[28]
In September 2009, there was also an amendment to the shareholders’ agreement between all the shareholders of Vidabode. Clauses 2 and 3 of the amending agreement provide i) that BWS shall nominate two of the four directors of Vidabode, ii) that BWS shall have the right to nominate one of its directors as chairman of the board and iii) that the chairman nominated by BWS will have a casting vote. AACI had the power to name the two other directors.
[29]
Throughout its history, Vidabode was only able to generate modest revenues. The company had considerable losses particularly in the years ending 31 December 2008 and 2009. In those years, the company lost some $7 million and some $8.6 million, respectively.
[30]
In late 2009, Vidabode provided a projection of $51 million in profits over 5 years. Mr. Strassburger had some concerns and sent his own Chief Financial Officer, Mr. Bunty, to Nova Scotia for 10 days to look over the company and make his own evaluation. Mr. Bunty came back having concluded that it was possible for Vidabode to have an operating income of around $40 million over five years. This was based on four plant sales which appeared to have a good chance of closing at the time.
[31]
As a result of certain problems with the previous President of Vidabode, Mr. Strassburger became President and Secretary Treasurer of Vidabode at the end of August 2010.
[32]
The directors of Vidabode were Ms. Wanda Arnold, Mr. Robin Googoo, Mr. Strassburger and Mr. David MacDonald. Ms. Arnold and Mr. Googoo were the directors named by AACI. The Board had monthly meetings except in summer.
[33]
Mr. MacDonald first brought Vidabode to the attention of Mr. Strassburger’s brother. That eventually led to Mr. Strassburger and his family investing in Vidabode. In return for bringing in the Strassburger family Mr. MacDonald acquired 1 million shares, about 10% of the voting share, at the same time as BWS. Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Strassburger also became partners in an unincorporated entity called Davenport Industries that was one of the sales agents for Vidabode.
[34]
In 2010, the financial situation of Vidabode was clearly problematic. Prior to the 2008 fiscal year, its annual revenue had never exceeded $5,060. In 2008, it recorded revenues of $848,845 and in 2009, $108,932. By the end of 2009, the accumulated deficit shown on the balance sheet was some $17,700,000.
[35]
Because one of the loans had a final balloon payment of about $3 million at the end of September 2010 and because another of the loans would be due in mid-2011, Mr. Strassburger had started speaking to GE Capital in the late spring of 2010. He was informed by GE Capital that they would be calling all the other loans in the middle of 2011.
[36]
This was of great concern to Mr. Strassburger. Members of his family instructed him that neither BWS nor the Appellant were to pay the $3 million balloon payment. He tried to see if the other shareholders would fund the payment. While the AACI representatives said they would look into that at the August board meeting AACI did not come up with funding.
[37]
GE Capital would not postpone the payment deadline and Vidabode defaulted on the balloon payment. That resulted in GE Capital calling in all the loans.
[38]
Mr. Strassburger started working with TD Bank to get funding to cover repayment of GE Capital. He obtained an extension to the end of November provided that GE Capital received a $500,000 payment at the end of October. The Appellant made the payment of the $500,000 on behalf of Vidabode and received the $500,000 promissory note, the loss on which is the third issue in this appeal. The note was issued 29 October 2010 and bore interest at 10% per year, calculated monthly.
[39]
Around this time, in order to cut the rate at which the company was burning cash, Vidabode decided to lay off most of the staff and keep the plant in shutdown mode. The plant would still be available to show potential customers and employees could be recalled if needed to reopen the plant.
[40]
Mr. Strassburger kept working with TD Bank and, eventually, in December 2010, the Appellant obtained the financing that would be necessary to repay GE Capital.
[41]
Once the TD financing was complete Mr. Strassburger started looking at what was the best way to pay off GE Capital. Based on advice from legal, accounting and tax professionals, he was told that the Appellant should take shares. The Appellant subscribed, on or about 22 December 2002, to 19,343,493 common shares of Vidabode at a par value of one dollar each. On or about 29 December 2010, the Appellant borrowed $14,452,515 that were used to buy 14,452,515 of the shares.
[42]
With this purchase the Appellant and BWS become the owners of about 80% of the shares.
[43]
Given that the Minister assumed that the fair market value of those 19,343,493 common shares was nil and that the Appellant chose not to contest that finding I must proceed on the basis that the fair market value of those shares was nil.
[44]
The Minister also assumed and the Appellant admitted at the start of the hearing that, at the time the Appellant subscribed to the Vidabode shares, Vidabode was unable to meet its financial obligations and Vidabode’s liabilities far exceeded its assets.
[45]
As of the end of 2010 Vidabode had not yet made a sale. The closest that it had come to a sale was receiving some non-refundable deposits in 2008.
[46]
While the Appellant’s injection of an additional $14 million in cash into Vidabode through its acquisition of treasury shares solved the problem of paying off the debts owed to GE Capital, it did not solve the problem of paying an amount of $1 million to $2 million in outstanding payables to other creditors as of the end of December 2010. The amount was probably closer to $2 million based on the claims listed when Vidabode went into receivership.
[47]
At the December 22, 2010 board meeting Mr. Strassburger made it quite clear that neither BWS, nor the Appellant, nor TD Bank, were going to put in any additional funding to cover payables or any other future costs. The other owners would have to put in money or there would have to be sales of cement plants.
[48]
Mr. Strassburger estimated that Vidabode needed around $20,000 a month to keep going.
[49]
It is very clear that the injection of an additional amount of about $14 million in cash by the Appellant was driven by the need to repay GE Capital. While everyone had been aware of the balloon payment coming up in September the rest of the loans should normally have continued for longer. However, as previously stated, once the balloon payment was missed, GE Capital called in all the loans precipitating a crisis.
[50]
The Appellant, BWS and 2090810 Ontario were all guarantors of the loans and had no choice but to come up with the money to honour the guarantees given that no one else was coming up with cash for Vidabode to repay the loans.
[51]
Even when the problem was only the $3 million balloon payment in September 2010 no one had come up with the money. As we have seen prior to the late August 2010 board meeting Mr. Strassburger’s family had instructed him that BWS and the Appellant were not to pay the $3 million. At the August board meeting the AACI representatives said they would see if they could come up with anything but nothing came of that.
[52]
It is clear that Keybrand's advisors were considering and preparing for the possibility of the insolvency of Vidabode prior to the December 22, 2010 board meeting. A letter from BWS to BDO Canada Limited (“BDO”)
appointing BDO as receiver was signed by Mr. Strassburger on the 5th day of January 2011, a Wednesday and exactly one week after the Appellant paid the $14 million to Vidabode. Based on the fact that it was dated on the 15th day of December 2010 on the first page it is reasonable to conclude that it was prepared on or about 15 December 2010. An email dated January 5, 2011 asked that a $25,000 cheque for BDO’s retainer be prepared.
[53]
Presumably there was some delay in BDO accepting the appointment because it was on or about 14 April 2011, that BDO became the receiver of Vidabode. On or about 6 May 2011, Vidabode filed for bankruptcy.
Analysis
[54]
It is useful to again set out part of subsection 251(1) of the Act:
For the purposes of this Act,
(a) related persons shall be deemed not to deal with each other at arm’s length;
. . .
(c) in any other case, it is a question of fact whether persons not related to each other are, at a particular time, dealing with each other at arm’s length.
[55]
The Appellant and 2090810 Ontario are both wholly owned by BWS. Mr. Strassburger is the President of all three corporations and is the sole Director of BWS and the Appellant. BWS can elect all the Directors of the Appellant and 2090810 Ontario with the result that they are controlled by BWS.
[56]
Without reviewing the definition of “related persons” in subsection 251(2) of the Act, I would simply note that the definition includes persons who are related by blood relationship, marriage and adoption as well as corporations where one corporation controls the other.
[57]
The Appellant, BWS and 2090810 Ontario are related within the meaning of subsection 251(2) and, accordingly, do not deal at arm’s length with each other.
[58]
As we saw earlier, paragraph 251(1)(c) says:
(c) in any other case, it is a question of fact whether persons not related to each other are, at a particular time, dealing with each other at arm’s length.
[59]
In the Canadian Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning is:
2 far enough to avoid to avoid undue familiarity or influence
[60]
In the Oxford English Dictionary, the relevant meanings are:
d.
(a) at arm’s length.
(i) . . .
. . .
(ii) Law. Of two parties: without legal obligations to each other, esp. fiduciary obligations; (also more generally) in an independent or impartial position; conducted by independent or impartial parties.
. . .
(b) . . .
arm’s-length adj. Conducted or agreed by independent parties not able to coerce or control each other; characterized by distance, independence, or impartiality.
[61]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Canada v. McLarty, states:
[62] The Canada Revenue Agency Income Tax Interpretation Bulletin IT‑419R2 “Meaning of Arm’s Length” (June 8, 2004) sets out an approach to determine whether the parties are dealing at arm’s length. Each case will depend on its own facts. However, there are some useful criteria that have been developed and accepted by the courts: see for example Peter Cundill & Associates Ltd. v. Canada, [1991] 1 C.T.C. 197 (F.C.T.D.), aff’d [1991] 2 C.T.C. 221 (F.C.A.). The Bulletin provides:
22. . . . By providing general criteria to determine whether there is an arm’s length relationship between unrelated persons for a given transaction, it must be recognized that all-encompassing guidelines to cover every situation cannot be supplied. Each particular transaction or series of transactions must be examined on its own merits. The following paragraphs set forth the CRA’s general guidelines with some specific comments about certain relationships.
23. The following criteria have generally been used by the courts in determining whether parties to a transaction are not dealing at “arm’s length”:
× was there a common mind which directs the bargaining for both parties to a transaction;
-
×
were the parties to a transaction acting in concert without separate interests; and
-
×
was there “de facto” control.
[62]
These last three considerations: common mind, acting in concert and “de facto” control have been widely used in the case law. However, it is clear from the opening of paragraph 62 of the Supreme Court’s decision when it says that “Each case will depend on its own facts. However, there are some useful criteria that have been developed and accepted by the courts: ...” that the three considerations are not exclusive and that any relevant consideration can be taken into account.
[63]
The Supreme Court also sets out in the decision the purpose of non-arm’s length provisions in the following passage:
[43] It has long been established that when parties are not dealing at arm’s length, there is no assurance that the transaction “will reflect ordinary commercial dealing between parties acting in their separate interests” . . . The provisions of the Income tax Act pertaining to parties not dealing at arm’s length are intended to preclude artificial transactions from conferring tax benefits on one or more of the parties. Where the parties are found not to be dealing at arm’s length, the taxpayer who has made an acquisition is deemed to have made the acquisition at fair market value regardless of whether the amount paid was in excess of fair market value . . .
[64]
In McGillivray Restaurant Ltd. v. Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal reviews the law regarding control starting with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. Canada.
[65]
It is useful to bear in mind that the Supreme Court of Canada said at paragraph 70 of Duha:
As I have said, the essential purpose of the Buckerfield’s test is to determine the locus of effective control of the corporation. …
[66]
The Federal Court of Appeal in McGillivray notes at paragraph 35:
In Silicon Graphics, Justice Sexton formulated the test as follows:
[67] It is therefore my view that in order for there to be a finding of de facto control, a person or group of persons must have the clear right and ability to effect a significant change in the board of directors or the powers of the board of directors or to influence in a very direct way the shareholders who would otherwise have the ability to elect the board of directors.
(Emphasis added.)
[67]
McGillivray reaffirms that test from Silicon Graphics and then continues to explain that subsequent cases in the Federal Court of Appeal have not overturned that narrow test in Silicon Graphics. Specifically, the Court rejected “…any assertion that the test for control in fact is based on “operational control.”
[68]
Here, we have a situation where BWS has the power to elect two directors one of which shall be the chairman and the chairman has a casting vote. This power arises as a result of the shareholder agreement.
[69]
As a consequence BWS is in a position to control decisions of the Board of Directors as that is understood for the purpose of determining whether someone has control of the corporation. The practical effect of the casting vote is the same as if BWS has the power to name three out of five directors.
[70]
Given this, it seems to me unavoidable that I must conclude that the Silicon Graphics test is met. BWS had de facto control of Vidabode.
It follows that BWS and Vidabode do not deal at arm’s length and, in turn, because BWS and the Appellant do not deal at arm’s length, the Appellant and Vidabode do not deal at arm’s length.
[71]
That is sufficient to determine the first issue.
[72]
Accordingly the Appellant is not entitled to the ABIL claimed.
[73]
I now turn to the second issue; the deductibility of the interest borrowed on the amount of approximately $14 million. The key question here is whether the Appellant borrowed the money for the purpose of earning income as required by paragraph
20(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act.
[74]
I am satisfied that the Appellant would not have borrowed the $14 million were it not for its obligation and the obligation of BWS and of 2090810 Ontario, to honour the guarantee. The basic motivation for the payment was that the Appellant and/or the two related companies would have to had to honour the guarantee to GE Capital in any event.
[75]
The decision to buy shares as opposed to any other way of dealing with the guarantee and the debt to GE Capital was the result of professional advice received by BWS and the Appellant that this was the best way to do this.
[76]
There may, however, be more than one purpose behind the transaction and, for the purpose of the test in paragraph 20(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act it is sufficient if there is an ancillary income earning purpose.
[77]
I am satisfied that the Appellant wanted to earn income from the shares.
[78]
However, the test is
“…whether, considering all the circumstances, the taxpayer had a reasonable expectation of income at the time the investment was made.”
[79]
For the following reason, unfortunately, I do not see how I could conclude that there was a reasonable expectation of income in December 2010.
[80]
While it is true that a single sale of a cement plant license could have been the start of a turnaround for Vidabode, cumulatively by December 2010, there are enormous difficulties that make a turnaround very unlikely. Let us consider those difficulties.
[81]
As of the end of December 2010 Vidabode had significant payables and little cash. It needed an injection of funds beyond the $14 million quickly or it would necessarily collapse equally quickly.
[82]
Vidabode would have had to obtain at least two $1 million deposits from two sales before it would cover the payables and its modest running costs to stay open for a short period.
[83]
However, in December 2010, even though Vidabode has been pursuing sales for some time, it had still not made a sale and there was no prospect in the pipeline which had paid a deposit. Also, as Mr. Strassburger says at the beginning of the December 22 board meeting, it was difficult for businesses to obtain credit.
[84]
There was no reason to expect that a sale or a deposit would happen quickly enough given that cash needs were truly urgent.
[85]
In August 2010 at the board meeting the representatives of the AACI had said they would look and see if they could do anything to fund the balloon payment; they had come back with nothing even though they had been told by Mr. Strassburger that his family had instructed him that the family companies were not putting in the $3 million due for the balloon payment.
[86]
This resulted in the September default on the balloon payment and as a result GE Capital then called in all the loans causing a financial crisis for Vidabode.
[87]
Notwithstanding this when on 22 December 2010 AACI’s representative and Mr. MacDonald came to the board meeting they had no funding solutions at all to propose.
[88]
The only thing raised by AACI’s Board member was a concern that the proposal would dilute their relative ownership of Vidabode. AACI wanted, and obtained, a period within which they could see if they could find funds with which to maintain their relative share ownership. They obtained a 20 day period during which they could see if they could come up with the money in which case Keybrand would sell AACI the appropriate number of shares. This would be 34% of the 19 million shares that Mr. Strassburger was proposing to have the Appellant take.
Such a share acquisition would have required AACI to put in more than $6 million. Based on the evidence before me that was simply not going to happen.
In addition, although it would have been very beneficial to the Appellant if AACI had taken 34% of the shares that the Appellant was proposing to take, that would not have provided any additional funding for the operations of Vidabode. There is also no suggestion that AACI was considering lending to Vidabode money for it to pay off its payables and keep operating. At the December board meeting Mr. Strassburger does not suggest that Keybrand or BWS would provide funds for payables and operations if AACI put in a significant amount by way of share purchase.
[89]
Even though with the share acquisition the Appellant and BWS acquire approximately 80% of the common shares, the Appellant and BWS were unwilling to put up any funds beyond the amount necessary to pay the guarantees.
[90]
Given that the Appellant, BWS and Mr. Strassburger’s family had no intention of putting any additional money to cover payables or to cover other costs to keep Vidabode open, given that there is no reason to think that the other shareholders of Vidabode would put money in on the necessary scale and given that there was no reason to expect a quick sale of a plant, the reasonable expectation in late December 2010 was that the company would quickly collapse. That is not consistent with a reasonable expectation of income.
[91]
It follows that the Appellant is not entitled to deduct the interest on the money borrowed to acquire the shares.
[92]
The last issue is in respect of the capital loss on the $500,000 loan. The essential question is the same as for the previous issue: was there a reasonable expectation of income?
[93]
The promissory note for the loan dated October 29, 2010 clearly shows that the money was lent at a rate of 10% per annum interest calculated monthly.
[94]
On its face the loan is made to earn income. The loan is made two months before the December board meeting and, at that point, the survival of Vidabode was still a possibility. The situation is not yet that of late December.
Conclusion
[95]
As a result, the appeal for the 2011 taxation year will be allowed but only to the limited extent necessary to allow the recognition of the capital loss on the $500,000 loan and to make any consequential adjustments to the 2012 taxation year.
[96]
Costs are awarded to the Respondent. If the parties cannot agree on costs by September 16, 2019 they shall advise the registry and arrangements shall be made for either written or oral submissions on costs. If it is of assistance to the parties, they should know that based on what I am aware of from the trial I do not see any reason to deviate from the cost rules and the tariff; however, there may be other factors that I am not aware of.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 2nd day of August 2019.
“Gaston Jorré”
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