Date: 20110119
Docket: A-394-09
Citation: 2011 FCA 19
CORAM: EVANS
J.A.
DAWSON
J.A.
STRATAS
J.A.
BETWEEN:
ROBERT KANE
Appellant
and
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
Respondents
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
EVANS J.A.
A. INTRODUCTION
[1]
It is an
essential precept of the federal public service that appointments are based on
merit. The merit principle as previously understood was modified by the Public
Service Employment Act, S.C. 2003, c. 22 (PSEA), part of a package of
legislative measures to modernize employment and labour relations in the public
sector.
[2]
In
particular, the PSEA removes the previous statutory distinction between
comparative and individual merit, and confers more discretion on management to
appoint on the basis that a person is qualified for an appointment, without
having to consider whether he or she is necessarily the best qualified. In this
way, the PSEA aims to introduce more flexibility and reduce delay in federal public
service staffing and appointment decisions.
[3]
A key
distinction now made by the PSEA is between an advertised and a non-advertised
internal appointment process. Thus, section 33 confers an unencumbered
discretion on the Public Service Commission (Commission), and its delegates, to
decide whether to make an appointment on the basis of an advertised or a
non-advertised internal appointment process. A disappointed candidate may
complain to the Public Service Staffing Tribunal (Tribunal) of an abuse of authority
by the employer in the exercise of this discretion.
[4]
Although
Robert Kane had been a federal public servant for thirty years, he was not
appointed to the position that he was occupying in a temporary capacity. He
complained to the Tribunal that the Deputy Head of Service Canada, as part of
the Department of Human Resources and Social Development (Deputy Head), had
abused her authority by making the appointment from a pool of candidates,
selected as a result of an advertised internal competition, and by not
appointing him. He alleged that the decision to advertise was based on the
erroneous view that the position in question was newly created, whereas in fact,
he maintained, it was a reclassification of the position that he had occupied.
[5]
The Tribunal
dismissed Mr Kane’s complaint in a decision dated August 3, 2007: 2007 PSST
0035. It concluded that, given the breadth of the discretion conferred by
section 33 over the appointment process, whether the position was newly created
or reclassified was irrelevant. Mr Kane’s application for judicial review to
set aside the Tribunal’s decision was dismissed by the Federal Court: 2009 FC
740. He appeals that decision to this Court.
[6]
The
principal question to be decided in this appeal is whether it was unreasonable
for the Tribunal to proceed on the assumption that the choice of an internal
appointment process on the basis of an incorrect fact cannot constitute
an abuse of authority. In my view, for the employer to base an exercise of
discretion on an incorrect fact is prima facie unreasonable and can thus
constitute an abuse of authority, if the fact in question is material and
relevant. Thus, in assessing whether the employer’s decision in this case was
an abuse of authority, the Tribunal cannot ignore Mr Kane’s complaint that the
employer based its decision to advertise on an erroneous finding that the
position was new, a matter which section 33 permits, but does not require, the
employer to consider.
[7]
Accordingly,
I would allow the appeal and remit the matter to the Tribunal for
re-determination.
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[8]
In
September 2005, the Government of Canada created Service Canada within the
Department of Human Resources and Social Development. Its purpose was to
facilitate Canadians’ access to federal services and benefits through the
provision of “one-stop shopping”. In preparation for the launch of Service
Canada, the Newfoundland and Labrador Region had announced in May of that year
an interim organizational structure to provide for region-wide business line
management, and set up an In-Person and Community Services (IPCS) business line
which would be supported by a new regional unit.
[9]
On August
30, 2005, the position of Service Delivery Manager for the IPCS business line
was created at the PM-05 level. On September 1, 2005, Mr Kane was deployed in a
lateral move to fill the position, without a competition. He was given only a
generic work description, from which he was asked to identify the duties and
functions of the position for inclusion in an up-to-date work description.
[10]
On
February 14, 2006, the Regional Management Board (RMB) approved an
organizational structure for the Regional Headquarters office, including a
Regional Manager position for the IPCS business line at the PM-06 level,
supported by a staff of six, including two PM-05 positions. The PM-06 Regional
Manager position would replace the PM-05 Service Delivery Manager position
occupied by Mr Kane, who was asked to continue in this position pending the
classification of the Regional Manager position.
[11]
At about
the same time, an advertised appointment process was started to establish a pre-qualified
pool of candidates to fill these and other PM-06 and PM-05 positions. Early in
February 2006, Mr Kane applied to enter the competition.
[12]
On March
1, 2006, the RMB informed employees that, if the Regional Manager position was
classified at the PM-06 level, it would be filled from the pre-qualified pool
of candidates selected after the internal competition. On May 1, 2006, Mr Kane
was advised that he would not be considered further for a PM-06 position,
because he had failed one component of the standardized tests taken by
candidates for inclusion in the pre-qualified pool.
[13]
On June
15, 2006, the classification review process concluded that the Regional Manager
position should be classified at the PM-06 level. Mr Kane agreed to fill the
position in an acting capacity. He testified that the duties and functions of
the Regional Manager position were not materially different from those that he
had been performing since his deployment to the IPCS business management line
for Newfoundland and Labrador in September 2005.
[14]
Following
the classification of the position of Regional Manager at the PM-06 level, Mr
Kane claimed a retroactive PM-06 salary increase, on the ground that he had
been performing the functions and duties of Regional Manager during his entire
deployment. He was granted the increase, not to September 2005 as he requested,
but to February 14, 2006, when the RMB decided to create the Regional Manager
position at the PM-06 level.
[15]
In August
2006, Mr Kane was offered a PM-05 position in IPCS after his previous position
had been declared redundant. He was also asked to continue as acting Regional
Manager until either the end of September or the position was filled, whichever
happened first. On September 11, 2006, he filed his complaint of abuse of
authority with the Tribunal on the appointment of the Regional Manager.
C. LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
[16]
The nature
of the merit principle before the enactment of the PSEA is indicated by the
following provisions of the Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-33 (the former Act). Merit was normally, but not always, comparative, and
competitions were the norm.
10. (1) Appointments to or from
within the Public Service shall be based on selection according to merit,
as determined by the Commission, and shall be made by the Commission,
at the request of the deputy head concerned, by competition or by such
other process of personnel selection designed to establish the merit of
candidates as the Commission considers is in the best interests of the
Public Service.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1),
selection according to merit may, in the circumstances prescribed by the
regulations of the Commission, be based on the competence of a person being
considered for appointment as measured by such standard of competence
as the Commission may establish, rather than as measured against the
competence of other persons.
|
10. (1) Les nominations internes ou
externes à des postes de la fonction publique se font sur la base d’une
sélection fondée sur le mérite, selon ce que détermine la Commission, et
à la demande de l’administrateur général intéressé, soit par concours,
soit par tout autre mode de sélection du personnel fondé sur le mérite des
candidats que la Commission estime le mieux adapté aux intérêts de la
fonction publique.
(2) Pour l’application du paragraphe
(1), la sélection au mérite peut, dans les circonstances déterminées par
règlement de la Commission, être fondée sur des normes de compétence fixées
par celle-ci plutôt que sur un examen comparatif des candidats.
|
[17]
The Public
Service Employment Regulations, 2000, SOR/2000-80, made under
the former Act, set out the circumstances in which a selection could be made on
individual rather than comparative merit pursuant to subsection 10(2) of the
former Act:
5. (2) A
selection referred to in subsection 10(2) of the Act may be made in any of
the following circumstances:
…
(b) when an
employee is to be appointed to their reclassified position and
(i) the position has been reclassified as a result of a
classification audit or grievance,
(ii) the position is one of a group of similar occupied
positions in the same occupational group and level within the same part of an
organization that have all been reclassified to the same occupational group
and level, or
(iii) there are no other similar occupied
positions in the same occupational group and level within the same part of
the organization;
|
5. (2) La
sélection au mérite visée au paragraphe 10(2) de la Loi peut se faire dans
l'une ou l'autre des circonstances suivantes :
[…]
b) la nomination d'un fonctionnaire à son poste après
reclassification, si l'une des situations suivantes existe :
(i) la reclassification résulte d'une
vérification ou d'un grief en matière de classification,
(ii) le poste fait partie d'un groupe de
postes semblables, qui sont pourvus, qui sont des mêmes groupe et niveau
professionnels au sein du même secteur de l'organisation et qui ont tous été
reclassifiés aux mêmes groupe et niveau professionnels,
(iii)
il n'y a aucun autre poste semblable qui est pourvu et qui est des mêmes
groupe et niveau professionnels au sein du même secteur de l'organisation;
|
[18]
The
current PSEA sets out a version of the merit principle that emphasizes
individual, rather than comparative merit.
30. (1) Appointments by the Commission
to or from within the public service shall be made on the basis of merit and
must be free from political influence.
(2) An appointment is made on the basis
of merit when
(a) the Commission is satisfied
that the person to be appointed meets the essential qualifications for the
work to be performed, as established by the deputy head, including official
language proficiency; and
…
(4) The
Commission is not required to consider more than one person in order for an
appointment to be made on the basis of merit.
|
30. (1) Les nominations – internes ou
externes – à la fonction publique faites par la Commission sont fondées sur
le mérite et sont indépendantes de toute influence politique.
(2) Une nomination est fondée sur le
mérite lorsque les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
a) selon la Commission, la
personne à nommer possède les qualifications essentielles – notamment la
compétence dans les langues officielles – établies par l’administrateur
général pour le travail à accomplir;
[…]
(4) La Commission n’est pas tenue de
prendre en compte plus d’une personne pour faire une nomination fondée sur le
mérite.
|
[19]
In order to achieve
more flexibility
in staffing and appointment decisions, the PSEA confers an unencumbered
discretion on the Commission, and its delegates, in selecting between
advertised and non-advertised appointment processes, as well as in the design
of instruments for assessing competence.
33. In making an appointment, the
Commission may use an advertised or non-advertised appointment process
…
36. In making an appointment, the
Commission may use any assessment method, such as a review of past
performance and accomplishments, interviews and examinations, that it
considers appropriate to determine whether a person meets the qualifications
referred to in paragraph 30(2)(a) …
|
33. La Commission peut, en vue d’une
nomination, avoir recours à un processus de nomination annoncé ou à un
processus de nomination non annoncé.
[…]
36. La Commission peut avoir recours à
toute méthode d’évaluation – notamment prise en compte des réalisations et du
rendement antérieur, examens ou entrevues – qu’elle estime indiquée pour
décider si une personne possède les qualifications visées à l’alinéa 30(2)a)
…
|
[20]
The PSEA
creates administrative institutions and mechanisms for dealing with complaints
about staffing and appointment decisions. For present purposes, the Public
Service Staffing Tribunal is of particular importance.
88. (1) The Public Service Staffing
Tribunal is continued, consisting of between five and seven permanent members
appointed by the Governor in Council and any temporary members that are
appointed under section 90.
(2) The mandate of the Tribunal is to
consider and dispose of complaints made under … sections … 77… .
(3) In order to be eligible to hold
office as a member, a person must
…
(b) have knowledge of or
experience in employment matters in the public sector.
…
95.
…
(2) The
Chairperson may retain on a temporary basis the services of mediators and
other experts or persons having technical or special knowledge to assist
the Tribunal in an advisory capacity and, subject to the approval of the
Treasury Board, fix their remuneration.
…
98. (1) A
complaint shall be determined by a single member of the Tribunal, who shall
proceed as informally and expeditiously as possible.
….
99.
…
(3) The Tribunal may decide a complaint
without holding an oral hearing.
|
88. (1) Est maintenu le Tribunal de la
dotation de la fonction publique, composé de cinq à sept membres titulaires
nommés par le gouverneur en conseil et des membres vacataires nommés en vertu
de l’article 90.
(2) Le Tribunal a pour mission
d’instruire les plaintes présentées en vertu … ou des articles … 77 … .
(3) Il faut, pour être membre du
Tribunal :
[…]
b) avoir de l’expérience ou des
connaissances en matière d’emploi dans le secteur public.
[…]
95.
[…]
(2) Le président peut retenir
temporairement les services de médiateurs et d’autres experts chargés
d’assister le Tribunal à titre consultatif, et, sous réserve de
l’approbation du Conseil du Trésor, fixer leur rémunération.
[…]
98. (1) Les plaintes sont instruites
par un membre agissant seul qui procède, dans la mesure du possible, sans
formalisme et avec célérité.
[…]
99.
[…]
(3) Le Tribunal peut statuer sur une
plainte sans tenir d’audience.
|
[21]
Employees
may complain to the Tribunal that there has been an abuse of authority in the
making of specified decisions. The following is the provision relevant to this
appeal.
77. (1) When
the Commission has made or proposed an appointment in an internal appointment
process, a person in the area of recourse referred to in subsection (2) may
... make a complaint to the Tribunal that he or she was not appointed or
proposed for appointment by reason of
…
(b) an abuse of authority by the Commission in
choosing between an advertised and a non-advertised internal
appointment process; or
…
|
77. (1) Lorsque la
Commission a fait une proposition de nomination ou une nomination dans le
cadre d’un processus de nomination interne, la personne qui est dans la zone
de recours visée au paragraphe (2) peut … présenter à celui-ci une
plainte selon laquelle elle n’a pas été nommée ou fait l’objet d’une
proposition de nomination pour l’une ou l’autre des raisons suivantes :
[...]
b) abus de pouvoir de la part de la
Commission du fait qu’elle a choisi un processus de nomination interne
annoncé ou
non annoncé, selon le cas ;
[…]
|
[22]
The PSEA
does not provide a comprehensive definition of “abuse of authority”. However,
it does contain the following provision “for greater certainty”.
2. (4) For greater certainty, a
reference in this Act to abuse of authority shall be construed as including
bad faith and personal favouritism.
|
2. (4) Il est entendu que, pour
l’application de la présente loi, on entend notamment par « abus de
pouvoir » la mauvaise foi et le favoritisme personnel.
|
[23]
The PSEA
sets out the remedial powers of the Tribunal when it upholds a complaint. They
do not include a power to order either the Commission or a deputy head to make
a new appointment or to conduct a new appointment process.
81. (1) If the Tribunal finds a
complaint under section 77 to be substantiated, the Tribunal may order the
Commission or the deputy head to revoke the appointment or not to make the
appointment, as the case may be, and to take any corrective action that the
Tribunal considers appropriate.
…
82. The Tribunal may not order the
Commission to make an appointment or to conduct a new appointment process.
|
81. (1) S’il juge la plainte fondée, le
Tribunal peut ordonner à la Commission ou à l’administrateur général de
révoquer la nomination ou de ne pas faire la nomination, selon le cas, et de
prendre les mesures correctives qu’il estime indiquées.
[…]
82. Le Tribunal ne peut ordonner à la
Commission de faire une nomination ou d’entreprendre un nouveau processus de
nomination.
|
[24]
Decisions
of the Tribunal are protected by a preclusive clause.
102. (1) Every decision of the
Tribunal is final and may not be questioned or reviewed in any court.
(2) No order may be
made, process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of
injunction, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise, to
question, review, prohibit or restrain the Tribunal in relation to a
complaint.
|
102. (1) La décision du Tribunal est
définitive et n’est pas susceptible d’examen ou de révision devant un autre
tribunal.
(2) Il n’est admis
aucun recours ni aucune décision judiciaire — notamment par voie
d’injonction, de certiorari, de prohibition ou de quo warranto — visant à contester, réviser, empêcher ou limiter l’action du
Tribunal en ce qui touche une plainte
|
[25]
In
addition to the right of employees to complain to the Tribunal of abuse of
authority, employees who are informed during an internal appointment process
that they have been eliminated from consideration for an appointment may ask
the Commission to discuss that decision with them. As a result of that informal
discussion, or otherwise, the Commission, or the deputy head to whom the power
to make internal appointments has been delegated, may revoke an internal
appointment and take corrective action, on being satisfied that an error, an
omission, or improper conduct affected an appointment.
47. Where a person is informed by the
Commission, at any stage of an internal appointment process, that the person
has been eliminated from consideration for appointment, the Commission may,
at that person’s request, informally discuss its decision with that person.
15. (3) Where the
Commission authorizes a deputy head to make appointments pursuant to an
internal appointment process, the authorization must include the power to
revoke those appointments and to take corrective action whenever the deputy
head, after investigation, is satisfied that an error, an omission or
improper conduct affected the selection of a person for appointment.
67.
(1) The Commission may investigate an internal
appointment process, other than one conducted by a deputy head acting under
subsection 15(1), and, if it is satisfied that there was an error, an
omission or improper conduct that affected the selection of the person appointed
or proposed for appointment, the Commission may
(a) revoke the appointment or not make the
appointment, as the case may be; and
(b) take any corrective action that it considers
appropriate.
…
|
47. À toute étape du processus de nomination
interne, la Commission peut, sur demande, discuter de façon informelle de sa
décision avec les personnes qui sont informées que leur candidature n’a pas
été retenue.
15. (3) Dans les cas où la
Commission autorise un administrateur général à exercer le pouvoir de faire
des nominations dans le cadre d’un processus de nomination interne,
l’autorisation doit comprendre le pouvoir de révoquer ces nominations — et de
prendre des mesures correctives à leur égard — dans les cas où, après avoir
mené une enquête, il est convaincu qu’une erreur, une omission ou une
conduite irrégulière a influé sur le choix de la personne nommée.
67. (1) La Commission peut
mener une enquête sur tout processus de nomination interne, sauf dans le cas
d’un processus de nomination entrepris par l’administrateur général dans le
cadre du paragraphe 15(1); si elle est convaincue qu’une erreur, une
omission ou une conduite irrégulière a influé sur le choix de la personne
nommée ou dont la nomination est proposée, la Commission peut :
a) révoquer la nomination ou ne pas faire la
nomination, selon le cas;
b) prendre les mesures correctives qu’elle
estime indiquées.
[…]
|
D. DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
[26]
The
Tribunal stated that, because of the broad discretion conferred by section 33,
a complaint of abuse of authority could not be based simply on the fact that a
position had been filled after an advertised internal appointment process. It
noted that the RMB had decided to adopt an advertised process before both the
classification review of the Regional Manager position had been completed, and
the results of the standardized tests were known.
[27]
The
Tribunal agreed with the employer that neither the PSEA nor any applicable policy
mandates the internal appointment process to be followed, regardless of whether
the position to be filled is newly created or a reclassified existing position.
Further, unlike the former Act, section 33 explicitly confers broad discretion
over the selection of an advertised or a non-advertised appointment process.
Hence, the jurisprudence arising from the former Act is not relevant.
[28]
The Public
Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada Guidelines (Guidelines)
deal with, among other things, the criteria for distinguishing between a new
and a reclassified position. The Tribunal held that these are not law, because
they were not made in the exercise of a delegated statutory power. Hence, it
wrote, even if the Commission had based its decision to advertise on a
misinterpretation of the Guidelines, its decision would not constitute an abuse
of authority as being erroneous in law, and therefore, presumably, not an abuse
of discretion.
[29]
As for Mr
Kane’s complaint that he was not appointed Regional Manager, the Tribunal
stated that section 36 of the PSEA gives the Commission an unfettered
discretion to choose the assessment method that it considers appropriate to
determine if a person is qualified for a position. Mr Kane was not appointed
because he failed one of the standardized tests taken by candidates for a PM-06
position. Accordingly, the Tribunal concluded, even if the decision to
advertise constituted an abuse of authority, he had failed to establish that it
caused him not to be appointed.
E. DECISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
[30]
The Judge
identified the principal substantive issue as whether the Tribunal had erred in
law in regarding as irrelevant to Mr Kane’s complaint of abuse of authority the
characterization of the PM-06 Regional Manager position as either new or
reclassified.
[31]
First,
though, she held on the basis of Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Dunsmuir), that unreasonableness was the
applicable standard of review. She noted that: the Tribunal’s decisions are
protected by a strong preclusive clause; the Tribunal is a specialized body
created to adjudicate public service employment disputes; and whether an abuse
of authority had occurred was essentially a factual question within the
expertise of the Tribunal.
[32]
After
noting the shift in the PSEA from comparative to individual merit, and the
absence of any statutory criteria limiting the choice of an advertised or a
non-advertised internal appointment process, the Judge discounted the relevance
of jurisprudence arising under the former Act. She said (at para. 40):
The question is not whether
the Regional Manager PM-06 position was properly characterized as new rather
than reclassified but whether the employer abused its authority in determining
that the position would be staffed by an advertised process following the
creation of a pool of candidates.
[33]
She found
that Mr Kane had not proved that it was the practice in the Newfoundland and
Labrador region to appoint incumbents to their positions after they had been reclassified,
and that the RMB decided to fill the Regional Manager position through an
advertised process before it knew either the result of the classification
review or that Mr Kane had not passed a standardized test.
[34]
In view of
the evidence and the statutory framework, the Judge was not persuaded that the
Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable, and dismissed Mr Kane’s application for
judicial review.
F. ISSUES AND ANALYSIS
[35]
Three
issues must be decided in this appeal. First, what is the standard of review
applicable to the Tribunal’s decision? Second, did the Tribunal err in deciding
that the decision to fill the Regional Manager position on the basis of an
advertised internal appointment process was not an abuse of authority? Third,
if there was an abuse of authority in the choice of an advertised process, did
the Tribunal err in finding that Mr Kane had failed to prove that the decision
not to appoint him as Regional Manager was caused by the abuse of authority?
Issue 1: Standard of
review
[36]
The questions
in dispute in this appeal principally concern the scope of the term “abuse of
authority” in section 77 of the PSEA and its application to the facts of this
case. I see no basis for departing from the presumption established in Dunsmuir
(at paras. 53-54) that specialized tribunals’ interpretation and application of
their enabling statutes are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.
[37]
Experience
or knowledge of employment matters in the public sector is a qualification for
appointment to the Tribunal: PSEA, paragraph 88(3)(b). Thus, while
undoubtedly having a legal aspect, the questions in dispute also concern the
internal appointment process to fill a position, and are thus within the scope
of the Tribunal’s expertise. I also note in this context that subsection 95(2)
empowers the Chairperson to retain experts as advisors to the Tribunal,
including, presumably, lawyers.
[38]
The
existence of finality and strong privative clauses in section 102 puts the
matter beyond doubt: Dunsmuir at para. 52. The effect of the “no certiorari”
provision in subsection 102(2) is to exclude judicial review on the
“non-jurisdictional” grounds set out in subsection 18.1(4) of the Federal
Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7. Consequently, since no statutory
adjudicator is authorized to make unreasonable decisions, the Tribunal’s
decision, if unreasonable, may be set aside under paragraph 18.1(4)(a)
as beyond its jurisdiction.
[39]
Unlike the
Federal Court in Lavigne v. Canada (Justice), 2009 FC 684, 352 F.T.R. 269 at para. 46 (Lavigne),
I do not think that the term abuse of authority in section 77 raises a question
of law “of central importance to the legal system” and outside the scope of the
Tribunal’s expertise: the term merely defines conduct on which a federal public
service employee may base a complaint to the Tribunal about specified
employment decisions. That its scope may incidentally determine whether an
employee can only pursue a particular complaint directly in the Federal Court
through an application for judicial review, rather than through the Tribunal,
does not, in my view, elevate it to a question of “central importance” to the
Canadian legal system.
[40]
Consequently,
I agree with the Judge’s conclusion that reasonableness is the applicable standard
of review in this case.
Issue 2: Was it
unreasonable for the Tribunal to decide that the selection of an advertised
internal appointment process for filling the position of Regional Manager could
not be an abuse of authority?
[41]
This issue
needs to be unpacked because it involves four related inquiries: the basis of
Mr Kane’s complaint of abuse of authority; the relevance of administrative
guidelines and policy in the employer’s decision-making; the scope of the term
“abuse of authority”; and the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s conclusion that
Mr Kane’s complaint could not constitute an abuse of authority.
(i) Mr Kane’s complaint
[42]
Mr Kane
complained to the Tribunal under paragraph 77(1)(b) that, on the facts
of his case, the employer abused its authority by advertising the Regional
Manager position, and by not appointing him to it. The Tribunal may only grant
a remedy for breach of paragraph 77(1)(b) after determining that the
complainant has proved that the Commission or its delegates committed an abuse
of authority in choosing between an advertised and a non-advertised internal
appointment process under section 33.
[43]
Mr Kane
argues that the employer treated the “newness” of the Regional Manager position
as relevant to the decision to advertise. However, he says, the position was
not new, but his old position reclassified. For the employer to base an
exercise of discretion under section 33 on a relevant fact, when that fact does
not exist, can constitute an abuse of authority. Administrative decisions based
on unreasonable findings of material fact are an arbitrary exercise of the
statutory power under which they are made. Hence, Mr Kane submits, for the
Tribunal to conclude that such a decision was incapable of amounting to an
abuse of authority would be unreasonable.
(ii) Statutory discretion,
guidelines and policy
[44]
The PSEA
does not link the choice of internal appointment process under section 33 to
whether a position is new or reclassified. Unlike the former Act, section 33
does not require the employer to take into account whether a position is new or
reclassified before deciding which internal appointment process to adopt.
Nonetheless, the breadth of the discretion conferred by section 33 is such that
whether a position is new is a factor that the employer may consider. The
newness or otherwise of a position is thus relevant to the exercise of the
statutory discretion conferred, in the sense that it is a factor that the
employer may lawfully take into account, but is not one that it must
take into account if the section 33 discretion is to be exercised lawfully.
[45]
That the
newness of a position is relevant in the above sense is underlined by the
Guidelines and a Service Canada Policy (Criteria for Non-Advertised
Appointment Processes Policy) (Policy), which point decision-makers to this
consideration when exercising their discretion under section 33. The Guidelines
were promulgated before the PSEA was enacted, but were in force when the
decision was taken to advertise the Regional Manager position. Counsel did not
suggest that either the Guidelines, or the subsequently issued Policy, were unlawful
as being inconsistent with the PSEA, or that it would be improper in this case
for the employer to base an exercise of discretion under section 33 on them.
[46]
Although primarily
concerned with job classification, the Guidelines state (Appeal Book, p. 123):
The appointment process will differ
depending on whether the classification action involves a reclassification or
the establishment of a new position. Human resources advisors and managers
should consult with their staffing advisors in advance of the classification
action in order to understand the consequences of the proposed appointment
process.
[emphasis added]
|
Le processus de nomination
utilisé sera différent selon que la mesure de classification se rapporte à
une reclassification ou à l’établissement d’un nouveau poste. Les conseillers
en ressources humaines devraient consulter leurs conseillers en dotation et
les gestionnaires avant de prendre la mesure de classification afin de
comprendre les conséquences du processus de nomination proposé.
[non souligné dans
l’original]
|
[47]
The Policy
came into effect with the PSEA in order to provide guidance to deputy heads and
managers on the exercise of discretion under section 33. It states (Appeal
Book, p. 329):
The objective of the policy is to
provide a common framework and objective criteria to guide managers and
sub-delegated officials in deciding when to use a non-advertised appointment
process to conduct staffing. In deciding between a non-advertised and
advertised process they must respect the appointment values of fairness,
access and transparency. The decision must respond to the need for
flexibility, efficiency and affordability in staffing and support Service
Canada in meeting its operational requirements.
|
L’objectif de la ligne directrice vise
à offrir aux gestionnaires et aux cadres subdélégués un cadre commun et des
critères pour décider quand utiliser un processus de nomination non annoncé.
Le choix du processus doit être fait de manière à respecter les valeurs liées
à l’équité, l’accessibilité et la transparence dans les nominations tout en
répondant aux besoins de souplesse, d’efficacité et d’économie et à aider
l’organisation à répondre à ses besoins opérationnels.
|
[48]
In other
words, the Policy is aimed at ensuring a degree of consistency, coherence, and
accountability in managerial decision-making under section 33. Thus, the Policy
sets out (Appeal Book, p. 330) “circumstances in which a non-advertised process
might be justified.” The criteria for non-advertised appointment processes
include (Appeal Book, p. 335):
Appointment of an employee following
the reclassification of their position in accordance with the policies and
guidelines of the Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada
(PSHRMAC) and the PSC.
|
Nomination d’un employé à la suite de la reclassification
de son poste en vertu des politiques et des lignes directrices de l’Agence de
gestion des ressources humaines de la fonction publique du Canada (AGRHFPC)
et de la CFP.
|
[49]
In my
view, these extracts are an acknowledgement by the employer that the newness of
a position can be relevant to the exercise of the broad discretion under
section 33. This is the important point for the purpose of this appeal. Indeed,
the Guidelines go further by stating that the appointment process will differ
depending on how the position is characterized. The Policy, however, is more
nuanced.
[50]
Whether a
failure to have regard to the Guidelines or Policy (including their provisions
on the appointment process consequences of characterizing a position as new or
reclassified) would constitute an abuse of authority is not a question that
arises here. As the following extracts from the record show, the employer
regarded the Regional Manager position as new and, consistently with the
Guidelines and Policy, took this consideration into account in deciding to
advertise.
[51]
In a
memorandum of March 1, 2006, the regional Executive Head, writing on behalf of
the RMB, advised staff in the Newfoundland and Labrador region that the
position of Regional Manager, IPCS, was being sent for classification review
and, if it was classified at the PM-06 level, it would be filled from the pool
of candidates who were successful in the competition then in progress. The
classification of the position at the PM-06 level was confirmed on June 15,
2006.
[52]
On June
20, 2006, the Director of IPCS for the region had advised Mr Kane (Appeal Book,
p. 204) that “the new PM 6 position has been established” (emphasis
added), and that approval had been given for him to act in the position until
it was filled on a permanent basis.
[53]
On August
9, 2006, the Director responded as follows to a request by Mr Kane for
clarification of the method of staffing for the Regional Manager position
(Appeal Book, p. 206):
There is no doubt that the
work you did during the past several months was significant and contributed
greatly to the organizational structure that was recommended and approved at
the February 14 RMB meeting. Having said that, approval to staff the
manager’s role at the PM 6 position required the establishment of a new
position at that level. Since it was a new position at a higher level, it was
deemed fair and appropriate to provide all managers with the opportunity to
compete versus making an appointment via non-advertised process. (Emphasis
added)
[54]
Further,
in a letter to the Tribunal, dated October 17, 2006, an Assistant Deputy
Minister, People and Culture Branch, Service Canada, wrote (Appeal Book, p. 210):
The respondent followed the
above mentioned Guidelines for Reclassification and deemed the position to be a
new position. In this particular circumstance, the Director responsible for the
unit decided to run an internal advertised process to allow employees the
opportunity to apply.
[55]
The principal
justification given by the employer for advertising was that the position was
new. Accordingly, if Mr Kane could establish that there was no rational basis on
which the Regional Manager position at the PM-06 level could be classified as
“new”, rather than “reclassified”, he might succeed in demonstrating that the
decision to use an advertised appointment process was arbitrary. This is
because the decision would have been based in large part on an unreasonable
conclusion about a fact relevant to the exercise of discretion under section 33.
[56]
Like the Guidelines, the Policy is not binding in
law, and management is entitled to depart from it. Indeed, the Policy itself
purports only “to provide a common framework and objective criteria to guide
managers” in deciding when to use a non-advertised appointment process, and is
far from prescriptive. Nonetheless, its function is to promote “fairness,
access and transparency” in decision-making under section 33 (Appeal Book, p.
329). Since fairness includes consistency and treating like alike, the
objectives of the Guidelines and Policy will not be achieved if decisions made
in accordance with them, but based on unreasonable findings of relevant facts,
are allowed to stand.
(iii) Abuse of authority
[57]
Counsel
for the respondents argued that, although not defined in the PSEA, the term
“abuse of authority” in section 77 has a narrow scope. It is limited to serious
misconduct that carries a moral stigma, and requires a mental element akin to
that in the tort of misfeasance in public office. Thus, the respondents submit
in their memorandum of fact and law (at para. 62) that “abuse of authority”
connotes
… an intentional element of
bad faith, personal favouritism, discrimination, corruption, serious
carelessness or recklessness, gross negligence or misfeasance of a similar
egregious nature.
[58]
The
respondents reject the position taken by the Tribunal in many cases: namely,
that the concept of abuse of discretion in administrative law, particularly as
explained by David Phillip Jones and Anne S. de Villars, Principles of
Administrative Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2009), pp. 174, 204, is an
appropriate guide to the scope of abuse of authority in section 77. See, for
example, Tibbs v. Canada (Deputy Minister of National Defence), 2006
PSST 8 at paras. 68-74; Bowman v. Canada (Deputy Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 PSST 12 at para 81; Chiasson v. Canada (Deputy
Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2008 PSST 27 at para. 36; Jacobsen v.
Canada (Deputy Minister of Environment), 2009 PSST 8 at paras. 46-48.
Counsel for the respondents advanced two arguments in favour of a narrower
interpretation of the term.
[59]
First, it
must be interpreted in light of subsection 2(4) of the PSEA, which states that
“abuse of authority” includes “bad faith and personal favouritism”. The
respondents say that the limited class, or ejusdem generis, presumption
of statutory interpretation confines abuse of authority to conduct analogous to
these examples.
[60]
I do not
agree. The limited class presumption is normally applied when a general term follows
a list of items that have something in common; the scope of the general term is
presumptively limited to items that share the feature common to the listed
items. However, there is authority for the proposition that the presumption
does not apply to provisions where, like subsection 2(4), specific items are
stated to be included in a preceding general term. See Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan
on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada
Inc., 2008) at 237-239; Glasgow v. Canada (Deputy Minister of Public
Works and Government Services), 2008 PSST 7 at paras. 36-40.
[61]
Professor
Sullivan points out (at 239) that Parliament may provide that a general term
includes particular items for reasons other than to indicate the narrowness of
the intended scope of the preceding general term, such as providing assurance
that items likely to be of particular concern are indeed included in the
general term.
[62]
This
interpretation is consistent with the French text of subsection 2(4), which
reads: « …
on entend notamment par « abus de pouvoir » la mauvaise foi et
le favoritisme. »
Like the adverbs
“particularly” or “especially”, « notamment » may connote the relative
importance of something: see Le Nouveau Petit Robert 2010, where the
synonyms given for « notamment » are
« particulièrement, singulièrement, spécialement ».
[63]
Second,
the respondents say that “abuse of authority” must be interpreted in light of
the power of the Commission and deputy heads to take corrective action when
satisfied that “an error, an omission or improper conduct” affected an
appointment decision (PSEA, subsections 15(3) and 67(1)). They argue that a
ground on which a decision may be corrected under these provisions cannot also
constitute an abuse of authority under section 77. Thus, in Lavigne the
Federal Court stated (at para. 62): “abuse of authority requires more than
error or omission or even improper conduct.” For the following reasons, a
comparison of these provisions is not, in my opinion, particularly helpful in
interpreting the scope of section 77.
[64]
First, the
categories, abuse of authority on the one hand, and errors, omissions, and
improper conduct on the other, overlap. All abuses of authority involve
improper conduct and error, while some instances of error, omission, and
improper conduct may also be an abuse of authority. In my opinion, the fact
that not every error or omission, or every instance of misconduct, is sufficiently
significant to constitute an abuse of authority does not shed much light on the
latter’s scope.
[65]
Second, an
employee’s right of access to the Tribunal on the one hand, and, on the other,
a managerial discretion to take corrective action, with or without a prior
informal discussion with a concerned employee, are sufficiently different kinds
of recourse that the scope in which one operates should not be viewed as
mutually exclusive of the other.
[66]
It would
be inappropriate for the Court to attempt to formulate a comprehensive
definition of abuse of authority as that term is used in section 77 of the
PSEA. I recognize that by limiting the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate
employees’ complaints to instances of abuse of authority, Parliament no doubt
intended to reduce the staffing delays, and overly intrusive surveillance,
associated with what was effectively do novo appellate review under the
former Act.
[67]
Nonetheless,
I reject the narrow meaning of abuse of authority advanced by the respondents
as a suitable basis on which to consider the reasonableness of the Tribunal’s
decision to dismiss Mr Kane’s complaint. Such a limited interpretation is
supported by neither the statutory text nor, as I explain further at paragraphs
74-77 of these reasons, its statutory context and the objectives of the
legislation.
(iv) Was the Tribunal’s
decision unreasonable?
[68]
The
reasonableness of an administrative tribunal’s decision is determined by
reference to its reasons and the outcome. A reviewing court must decide if the
tribunal’s reasons for decision demonstrate justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process, and if the decision itself
falls within the range of possible acceptable outcomes that are defensible on
both the facts and the law: Dunsmuir at para. 47.
[69]
This case
is about whether it was unreasonable for the Tribunal to preclude any
consideration of whether the Regional Manager position at the PM-06 level was
new, on the ground that section 33 does not require the employer to take
this into consideration, but leaves the choice of appointment process to the discretion
of the deputy head. The Tribunal regarded any breach of the Guidelines as
immaterial, reasoning that, because they are not law, a misinterpretation of
them cannot constitute an abuse of authority. Neither the Tribunal nor the
Federal Court found it necessary to articulate an interpretation of the term
“abuse of authority”, but regarded the case as involving a largely factual
question.
[70]
Paragraph
77(1)(b) provides that the choice between an advertised and a
non-advertised appointment process may constitute an abuse of authority.
Parliament thus envisaged that although the scope of the discretion under
section 33 is broad, its exercise can form the basis of a complaint to the
Tribunal of abuse of authority.
[71]
The
question of law raised by this appeal is whether the Tribunal committed a
reviewable error when it regarded as irrelevant to a complaint of abuse of
authority under 77(1)(b) the distinction between new and reclassified
positions, when the employer gave the newness of the Regional Manager position
as the principal reason for the decision to advertise. In my view, the Tribunal
erred.
[72]
Its error was
to proceed on the assumption that, because section 33 does not require the
employer to take into account whether the position was new or reclassified, the
employer’s characterization of the position as new was incapable of grounding a
complaint of abuse of authority. This error rendered the Tribunal’s resulting
decision unreasonable because it precluded Mr Kane from attempting to establish
that the employer’s characterization of the position as new had no rational
basis.
[73]
In my
opinion, it was unreasonable for the Tribunal, in effect, to conclude that a complaint
under paragraph 77(1)(b) could not be substantiated, even if the
employer decided to use an advertised internal appointment process because the
position to be filled was new, and Mr Kane could show that it clearly was not. A
decision pursuant to section 33 is arbitrary if based on an irrational finding
of a material fact which the employer may consider in the exercise of
the power. That the distinction between a new and a reclassified position is
relevant to the exercise of the power (in the sense that the employer may
lawfully take it into account) is confirmed by the Guidelines and the Policy.
[74]
As
Justices Bastarache and LeBel noted (at para. 42) when writing for the majority
in Dunsmuir: “It is also inconsistent with the rule of law to
retain an irrational decision.” If the Regional Manager position at the PM-06
level was not new, the employer’s decision to advertise was prima facie irrational
because its basis was unfounded and, to that extent, would be inconsistent with
values motivating the PSEA: fairness, accountability, and transparency. For the
Tribunal to proceed on the basis that such a decision could not support a
finding of abuse of authority is unreasonable.
[75]
If courts
do not permit irrational decisions to stand because they are inconsistent with
the rule of law, it is not reasonable for the Tribunal to exclude from the scope
of the term “abuse of authority” decisions under section 33 that are based on
facts that have no rational support in the material before the managerial
decision-maker.
[76]
That
Parliament could not reasonably be taken to have intended to exclude irrational
decisions from the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under section 77 is also supported
by the statutory context: Mr Kane’s complaint is the kind for which adjudication
by an expert and independent administrative tribunal is ideally suited. It
would also run counter to a rational allocation of functions under the PSEA
regarding employees’ grievances to interpret “abuse of authority” so narrowly
that Mr Kane’s only remedies would be to request management to exercise its
power to correct its mistakes (PSEA, subsections 15(1) and 67(3), and section
47), or to make an application for judicial review directly to the Federal
Court, which would not have the benefit of a decision by the specialized
Tribunal. Parliament cannot have intended such a result.
[77]
The PSEA
was intended to introduce more flexibility into appointment and staffing
decisions. However, these objectives do not require an interpretation of the
Act that would preclude employees from pursuing an effective remedy for
managerial arbitrariness in the exercise of a statutory discretion.
[78]
In the
present case, the Tribunal did not decide that the Deputy Head based her decision
on the mistaken view that the Regional Manager position was new, rather than a
reclassified position. The Tribunal did not get this far, because it concluded
that the distinction between new and reclassified was not relevant to Mr Kane’s
complaint of abuse of authority in the exercise of the Deputy Head’s discretion
under section 33.
[79]
However, for
the reasons given in paragraphs 72-75 above, it was unreasonable for the
Tribunal to hold that it could not be an abuse of authority under paragraph
77(1)(b) for the Deputy Head to decide to advertise because the position
to be filled was new, even if, as Mr Kane maintains, it clearly was not. It was
therefore unreasonable for the Tribunal to have declined to determine whether
the decision to advertise was, as Mr Kane alleges, made on the basis of a
finding of relevant fact for which there was no rational support in the facts
or the applicable criteria, namely, the characterization of the Regional
Manager’s position as new.
[80]
Of course,
it is not the Court’s role in this appeal to express an opinion on whether the
Regional Manager position at the PM-06 level is new or a reclassification of
the position previously occupied by Mr Kane. As already noted, he says that the
duties are the same, which indicates a reclassification. On the other hand, the
organizational structure of the unit has changed, so that there are now two
PM-05s reporting to the Regional Manager, which may suggest that the PM-06
position is new: see Guidelines at Appeal Book, p. 123. However, this is
something for the Tribunal, not this Court, to decide.
[81]
Accordingly,
I would remit the matter to the Tribunal to re-determine Mr Kane’s complaint
under paragraph 77(1)(b) on the basis that, since the employer principally
justified its decision to advertise on the ground that the Regional Manager
position at the PM-06 level was newly created, the Tribunal must decide if this
characterization was rationally supportable. If the Tribunal decides that it
was not, it would be open to it, after considering all the circumstances, to
conclude that the decision to fill the position on the basis of an advertised
appointment process was an abuse of authority.
[82]
Conversely,
if Mr Kane does not persuade the Tribunal that it was unreasonable for the
employer to treat the Regional Manager position at the PM-06 level as new,
rather than reclassified, it will dismiss his complaint.
Issue 3: Was it
unreasonable for the Tribunal to dismiss Mr Kane’s complaint because he had
failed to prove that, even if the decision to advertise constituted an abuse of
authority, it was not the reason why he was not appointed?
[83]
The
Tribunal held that Mr Kane was not appointed Regional Manager because he failed
one component of the standardized tests administered to candidates for
appointment to positions at the PM-05 and PM-06 levels. In other words, even if
there had been an abuse of authority in the exercise of the section 33
discretion, he had failed to prove that it was the cause of his
non-appointment, as is required before the Tribunal can uphold a complaint
under paragraph 77(1)(b).
[84]
I do not
agree. The Tribunal’s reasoning assumes that, absent an abuse of authority in
deciding to fill the position on the basis of an advertised internal
appointment process, the Deputy Head would still have used the same methods to
assess whether Mr Kane had the necessary skills and qualifications to fill the Regional
Manager position on a permanent basis.
[85]
This, with
respect, is pure speculation. If Mr Kane is correct and the Regional Manager
position at the PM-06 level is not new but is a reclassification of his former
position, the employer might well not have followed an advertised process. It
is accordingly unreasonable to assume that, even if no competition was held, the
standardized evaluative tools used in a competition would necessarily be used
to assess if Mr Kane was qualified to continue in the particular job, despite
the broad discretion in the choice of methods of assessment conferred on the
employer by section 36.
[86]
Mr Kane
says that the duties of the Regional Manager do not differ materially from
those of the Service Delivery Manager, and that the position is therefore a
reclassification of the position that he occupied. If this is correct, an
assessment of Mr Kane’s ability to do the job can reasonably be expected to
include, as a significant component, his performance in the twelve months of
his deployment to IPCS, first as Service Delivery Manager in the interim
organization, and then as acting Regional Manager.
[87]
Indeed,
section 36 of the Act specifically includes “a review of past performance and
accomplishments” as a basis for determining whether a person meets the
qualifications for a job. The review in the record of Mr Kane’s performance
during his deployment to the IPCS business line is positive (Appeal Book, p.
206), and there are no suggestions that his work had been unsatisfactory. A
discrepancy between the performance assessments and the results of tests may
cause management to examine the appropriateness of the tests in this context.
Needless to say, Mr Kane’s incumbency did not entitle him to be appointed to
the Regional Manager position.
[88]
Thus, if,
when the Tribunal re-determines the matter, it concludes that there was an
abuse of authority in the exercise of the discretion conferred by section 33,
it must also decide if the abuse caused Mr Kane not to be appointed Regional
Manager.
[89]
Finally,
Mr Kane believes that he was arbitrarily “singled out” by being made to compete
for his own job, and not being appointed to it. To the best of his knowledge as
an experienced federal public service employee in the Newfoundland and Labrador
region, incumbents in the region have, for years, always been appointed to
their positions after reclassification.
[90]
I agree
with the Federal Court that the Tribunal could reasonably conclude that, even
though not contradicted, Mr Kane’s assertion is not enough to discharge the burden
upon him, as the complainant, to prove that it was a consistently followed
practice in the region to appoint incumbents to their position after
reclassification. He has not challenged the Tribunal’s refusal to require the
employer to provide information on this topic.
G. CONCLUSIONS
[91]
For these
reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs here and below, set aside the
decision of the Federal Court, grant Mr Kane’s application for judicial review,
set aside the decision of the Tribunal, and remit the matter to the Tribunal,
differently constituted, to re-determine in accordance with these reasons Mr
Kane’s complaint that he was not appointed Regional Manager by reason of an
abuse of authority by the employer in choosing an advertised internal appointment
process. The re-determination shall be conducted on the basis of the existing
record, although the Tribunal may permit the parties to supplement it, and to
make oral submissions.
“John M. Evans”
“I
agree
Eleanor
R. Dawson J.A.”
STRATAS J.A. (Dissenting
reasons)
[92]
I agree
with my colleague’s statement of the facts and issues. I agree that the
standard of review of the Tribunal’s decision is reasonableness. However, my
colleague has held that the Tribunal’s decision fails under that standard and
should be set aside.
[93]
I
disagree. In my view, the Federal Court was correct: the Tribunal’s decision
was reasonable and should be upheld.
[94]
Our
disagreement is not based on differing views of facts or differing subjective
assessments of the reasonable standard. Instead, we differ at the level of
fundamental principle on how courts should conduct reasonableness review.
A. My colleague’s
approach
[95]
Distilling
my colleague’s reasons to their essence, my colleague says that the Tribunal’s
decision is unreasonable because the Tribunal failed to take into account a
consideration relevant to the determination of “abuse of authority” under
paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Public Service Employment Act, S.C.
2003, c. 22 (the “Act”). The relevant consideration (the “Newness
Consideration”) is that the employer thought that the PM-06 position was new
and saw “newness” as a reason to advertise and hold a competition for the
position, but the position might not be new at all.
[96]
The
Tribunal upheld the employer’s staffing decision and found no “abuse of
authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b)
of the Act. The Tribunal held that the Newness Consideration was irrelevant to
whether there was an “abuse of authority.” As we shall see, those holdings were
reasonable. But my colleague disagrees. In his view, the Newness Consideration
is relevant to whether there was an “abuse of authority” and the Tribunal had
to consider the Newness Consideration. Its failure to do so invalidated its
decision.
[97]
My
colleague finds that the Newness Consideration is relevant – based not on the
legal and factual findings made by the Tribunal, but rather on factual and
legal findings he himself makes. My colleague finds as a fact that “[t]he
employer’s principal justification for advertising [the PM-06 position] was
that the position was new” (at paragraph 55), but the position may not be new. My
colleague finds as a legal matter that newness of the PM-06 position is
relevant to the employer’s decision under section 33 of the Act: he states that
“…the newness…of a position is thus relevant” (at paragraph 44), “the breadth
of the discretion conferred by section 33 is such that whether a position is
new is a factor that the employer may consider” (at paragraph 44), and “the
newness of a position can be relevant to the exercise of the broad discretion
under section 33” (at paragraph 49). If the position were not new, my colleague
concludes, as a legal matter, that “the employer’s decision to advertise was prima
facie irrational because its basis was unfounded” (at paragraph 74) and so
the employer may have committed an “abuse of authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b)
of the Act (at paragraphs 75-79). In his legal view, “abuse of authority” under
paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act must include “[employer] decisions that
are based on facts that have no rational support in the material before the
[employer]” (at paragraph 75). Finally, turning to the Tribunal’s decision
itself, he finds that it failed to take into account the Newness Consideration.
To my colleague, that is the end of the matter – the Tribunal’s decision is
unreasonable for that reason alone and so it must now reconsider the matter
taking into account the Newness Consideration.
[98]
That is no
longer the accepted approach. No longer do we automatically invalidate
decisions because they failed to take into account a relevant consideration.
Instead, today, our role is to engage in truly deferential reasonableness
review, nothing more.
B. The movement
away from my colleague’s approach
[99]
My
colleague’s approach harkens back to a time long ago when courts would
interfere much more readily with tribunal decisions. Courts would fasten onto a
certain type of error, such as a failure to take into account a consideration
that the reviewing court itself deems relevant, and then use that error to
quash a tribunal decision.
[100] Today, we recognize that such an
approach often leads to quite intensive, non-deferential review of tribunal
decisions. In this case, my colleague, based on his own view of the facts and
the law, determines that the Newness Consideration is relevant to “abuse of
authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b), examines whether the Tribunal took
the Newness Consideration into account, and then finds the Tribunal’s decision
wanting. Under my colleague’s approach, the Tribunal’s own assessments of what
is or is not relevant do not fall for scrutiny, even deferential scrutiny. Put
another way, this sort of approach “seems to leave little room for deference of
respect for decision-maker appreciation of those factors or considerations that
were relevant to the interpretation of a particular statutory provision or the
exercise of a particular statutory power”: David J. Mullan, “Deference from Baker
to Suresh and Beyond – Interpreting Conflicting Signals,” in David
Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) at page 24.
[101] In recent years, the Supreme
Court has moved us toward a different approach: truly deferential reasonableness review. No longer is
it “sufficient
merely to identify a categorical or nominate error” or to “slot a particular
issue into a pigeon hole of judicial review,” such as the failure to take into
account a relevant consideration: Dr. Q v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British
Columbia, 2003 SCC 19 at paragraphs 22 and 25,
[2003] 1 S.C.R. 226
per McLachlin C.J.C. and see also Baker v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),
[1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 and Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. Instead, “[r]eview of the conclusions of
an administrative decision-maker must begin by applying [the reasonableness
standard of review]”: Dr. Q., supra at paragraph 25; David J.
Mullan, “Establishing the Standard of Review: The Struggle for Complexity”
(2004), 17 Can. J. Admin. L. & Prac. 59 at
page 65.
[102] Under the Supreme Court’s approach, we do not determine
what considerations are relevant and then impose our determinations of
relevance on the tribunal. Rather, the tribunal is given “substantial leeway…in
determining the…‘relevant considerations’ involved in a given determination,”
and then we engage in reasonable review of what the tribunal has done: Baker,
supra at paragraph 56. Reasonableness review is supposed to be truly deferential review: Dunsmuir, supra
at paragraph 47.
C. Truly deferential reasonableness
review
[103] As explained by the Supreme
Court, truly deferential reasonableness review requires us to assess whether
the Tribunal’s conclusions fall within a range of outcomes that are defensible
on the facts and the law: Dunsmuir, supra, at paragraph 47. Our
posture must be one of deference; interference by us must be rare.
[104] In order to engage in truly deferential reasonableness
review, we must have
front of mind a proper understanding of our role.
[105] There are certain realities in
the case at bar that remind us of our role. In the Act, Parliament has assigned
the tasks of finding the facts, interpreting the legislation, arriving at
conclusions and awarding appropriate relief to the Tribunal – not to us. For
good measure, Parliament has forbidden us from questioning or reviewing any
decision of the Tribunal: Act, section 102.
[106] Of course, the normal rule is
that courts must obey Parliament’s law. However, the constitution is a higher
law and courts have a “constitutional duty to ensure that public authorities do
not overreach their lawful powers”: Dunsmuir, supra at paragraph 29; Crevier v. Quebec (A.G.),
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 220 at page 234; U.E.S., Local 298 v. Bibeault, [1988] 2
S.C.R. 1048 at page 1090. In
the case at bar, this duty allows us to review decisions of the Tribunal
despite Parliament’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Tribunal and despite
the privative clause in section 102.
[107] When do “public authorities…
overreach their lawful powers” and trigger our duty to interfere? In Dunsmuir,
we are told that one situation is where a tribunal reaches an outcome that is
indefensible on the basis of the law and all of the evidence, even taking into
account the particular expertise and policy appreciation of the tribunal. Such an outcome, in the words of Dunsmuir,
falls outside of the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (at paragraph 47). We interfere
because the tribunal has reached an outcome based on an indefensible
interpretation, application or exercise of Parliament’s law. We do not
interfere simply because the tribunal has failed to consider something that we
happen to think is relevant.
[108] To be sure, this holistic
approach to judicial review results in considerable deference, much more than
my colleague’s approach. But given our narrow role, this is the correct
approach.
[109] In this case, unless there is
an indefensible interpretation, application or exercise of Parliament’s law – a
decision outside of the range of acceptable outcomes – we cannot interfere. We
must keep within our narrow role. We must mind our place.
D. Subjecting the Tribunal’s
decision to truly deferential reasonableness review
[110] Does the Tribunal’s decision fail
truly deferential reasonableness review? Is it indefensible in the sense that I
have described? In my view, no. The Tribunal has adopted a defensible
interpretation, application and exercise of Parliament’s law. We cannot
interfere.
[111] The case at bar concerns an
employer in a special employment sector, the public service. The employer made
a discretionary judgment call about how to go about staffing a particular
public service position in a particular staffing structure. The employer’s
judgment call was placed before the Tribunal. The Tribunal is a public service
staffing tribunal comprised of persons who “must…have knowledge of or
experience in employment matters in the public sector” (subsection 88(3) of the
Act). It had to consider whether, in these particularly unusual circumstances,
the employer committed an “abuse of authority” within the meaning of paragraph
77(1)(b) of the Act, a statute governing public service employment. This
case rests at the bull’s-eye of the exclusive mandate Parliament has given to
the Tribunal, not us.
[112] The facts before the Tribunal
were unusual. Before the Tribunal was an interim staffing situation, in flux
and evolving towards a more permanent structure. At the outset, the employer established
a “new interim organizational structure” (Tribunal reasons, paragraph 4). It
deployed the appellant, without open competition, into this new interim
structure, as a Service Delivery Manager, PM-05 level.
[113] One month later, the employer
informed all staff that it was reviewing the new interim structure. Within a
couple of months, the employer had finished its review. It announced a revised
and finalized staffing structure. In that structure was a new position, a
higher level PM-06 position. It was quite similar to the PM-05 position the
appellant briefly held in the interim structure, but was within a different
staffing and reporting structure.
[114] How should the higher level
PM-06 position be staffed? The employer had two options to choose from:
(a) No
advertisement and no competition for the higher level position. Under this
option, assuming the appellant met the requirements of the final, higher level
position, the employer would automatically promote the appellant from the PM-05
position he briefly held, into the final, higher level position.
(b) Advertisement
and open competition for the higher level position. Under this option, the
employer would advertise the higher level position and hold an open competition
involving the appellant and other qualified employees.
[115] Section 33 authorizes the
employer to choose between “an advertised or non-advertised process,” i.e.,
either of the two above options. The section contains no words of limitation
and, as the Tribunal found, it gives the employer much latitude. Alongside
section 33, however, is a purpose-laden preamble clause in the Act, a clause
that guides the employer’s discretion. It provides, among other things, that
the public service is to “strive for excellence” and “achieve results for
Canadians.” The preamble also sets out other important principles such as (in
no particular order) diversity, linguistic duality, non-partisanship, “fair,
transparent employment practices,” “effective dialogue,” “respect for
employees,” and giving employers the “flexibility” to hire the person that will
deliver “services of highest quality to the public.”
[116] On these facts and within this
overall statutory context, the employer chose to advertise and run an open
competition. The employer offered three reasons for this: the higher level
position was new, it was a “position at a higher level,” and “it was fair and
appropriate to provide all managers with the opportunity to compete” for it.
[117] The employer advertised the
position and the appellant entered the competition. He lost and, as a result, he
was not promoted to the higher level position. Another candidate performed
better in the competition and received the position.
[118] After the competition was held,
the appellant complained that he should have been promoted to the higher level
position by virtue of his brief incumbency: in his view, the PM-06 position was
a reclassification of his old, albeit interim, PM-05 position and was not new.
The appellant went to the Tribunal, alleging that in these circumstances and
within this statutory context, the employer committed an “abuse of authority”
under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act.
[119] As my colleague notes (at
paragraph 66), in 2003 Parliament added the requirement of “abuse of authority”
into paragraph 77(1)(b) to prevent “overly intrusive surveillance
associated with what was effectively de novo appellate review under the
former Act.” It is not every employer mistake or misstatement or questionable
judgment call that merits redress before the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s task
under paragraph 77(1)(b) is to look at all of the facts, understand the
breadth of section 33 of the Act and the Act’s purposes, apply its knowledge
and experience concerning public service staffing, and reach a conclusion about
whether the employer abused its authority. In carrying out this task, the
Tribunal decided that the employer did not abuse its authority in making the
choice it did.
[120] Specifically, the Tribunal
made the following specific findings that, in my view, were defensible on the
law and all of the evidence:
(a) The
Tribunal found that the current Act, passed in 2003, “makes no distinction
between a new or reclassified position,” unlike the old, pre-2003 Act (Tribunal
decision, at paragraph 66).
The Tribunal’s finding is
defensible. The plain wording of section 33 supports it. Further, under the
old, pre-2003 legislation (Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c. P-33 and the Public Service Employment Regulations, 2000,
SOR/2000-80), an employer sometimes had to consider whether a position was new
or reclassified: see section 10 of the old Act and paragraph 5(2)(b) of
the old Regulations. Under the old legislation, in certain circumstances, a
reclassified position could not be advertised and subject to open competition.
Provided an incumbent met the requirements for the position, in many
circumstances the incumbent could simply be slotted into the position, even a
higher position, whether or not he or she was the best person for the job. In
2003, Parliament did away with the new/reclassified distinction. In its place
was section 33, which, as the Tribunal observed, gives the employer a broad
discretion to make an appropriate choice in all the circumstances. Also in
2003, Parliament enacted the preamble clause and the Tribunal’s finding is
consistent with many of the objectives in it.
(b) The
Tribunal found that the employer’s discretion to advertise under section 33 of
the Act does not turn on whether the position was new or reclassified. An
advertised or a non-advertised appointment process can be used in either case (Tribunal
decision, at paragraphs 64 and 65).
This
is a defensible interpretation supported by the broad wording of section 33,
the preamble clause, and Parliament’s abolition in 2003 of the new/reclassified
distinction.
(c) The
Tribunal found that no administrative policies or guidelines require the use in
this case of a non-advertised process (Tribunal decision, at paragraphs 64 and
65).
This
is a defensible finding. The Tribunal did not identify any particular policy
statements, but my colleague does (the “Policy” and the “Guidelines”). The
Guidelines are out of date: as my colleague mentions (at paragraph 45), they
were drafted under the old legislation before Parliament abolished the
new/reclassified distinction. As for the Policy, it only lists “internal
appointment situations that might lend themselves to a non-advertised
process” and adds that “[a]dditional circumstances may be considered”
[emphasis added]: the Policy could be fairly read as providing no guidance on
the matter. Finally, in the end result, a tribunal must have regard to
Parliament’s law, here section 33 and paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act, not
administrative policies. That is exactly what the Tribunal did.
(d) The
Tribunal found that “[t]he mere choice of conducting an advertised or non-advertised
process is not abuse of authority in itself as it is specifically allowed in
the [Act]” (Tribunal decision, at paragraph 60). In its view, the employer
exercised its authority within the ambit of section 33 of the Act. Therefore,
it did not commit an “abuse of authority.”
This too is defensible,
particularly on the unusual factual record in this case. An interim staffing
structure was modified after a couple of months and a higher level position was
created. The appellant held the PM-05 position for a very brief time. Section
33 is very broad, it was enacted as part of a reform that abolished the
new/reclassified distinction, and many of the Act’s purposes set out in the
preamble supported the employer’s choice of option in this case. In the latter
regard, where the Tribunal reaches an outcome that is arguably consistent with
the purpose of the legislative scheme, its decision is more likely to be found
to be reasonable, than one which is not: Montreal (City) v. Montreal Port
Authority, 2010 SCC 14, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 427 at paragraph 42.
E. Particular areas where my
colleague’s approach has resulted in insufficient deference
[121] It is true that, at paragraph
47 of Dunsmuir, my colleague sets out the classic statement about the
reasonableness standard being a standard of deference. However, his approach in
this case to review is not deferential at all. As I have said above, and as I
shall further demonstrate below, this is because he has fastened onto the
“nominate error” or “pigeon hole” of “failing to take into account a relevant
consideration,” rather than engaging in truly deferential reasonableness
review.
[122] I would identify four
particular areas where my colleague’s approach has resulted in insufficient
deference, contrary to our proper role.
I
[123] To reiterate, the Newness
Consideration that my colleague says the Tribunal failed to take into account
was the following: the employer thought that the PM-06 position was new and saw
“newness” as a reason to advertise and hold a competition for the position, but
the position might not be new at all. In order to establish the relevance of
this consideration, my colleague goes further and wades into the facts, finding
that the newness of the position was the “principal justification” behind the
employer’s decision to advertise and hold a competition (at paragraph 55). The
employer’s other reasons – the fact that the position was higher and the need for other
deserving employees to have a shot at the position (see paragraph 116, above) –
are seen, factually, as subordinate. Further, as I have shown in paragraph 97
above and as I will discuss further below, the Newness Consideration is made
relevant to section 33 and paragraph 77(1)(b) because my colleague
interprets those sections in his own way.
[124] In short, in the manner in
which it was developed and in the relevance assigned to it, the Newness
Consideration is a judicial construction based on judicial views of the
relevant facts and the law, not Tribunal views. Then, with the Newness
Consideration in hand, the Tribunal’s decision is analyzed to see whether that
judicial construction is present. Only at this stage of the analysis are words
of reasonableness review uttered, but by then it is too late: it is plain to
all that the Tribunal did not take the judicially-constructed Newness
Consideration into account. The Tribunal’s decision is then said to be “unreasonable”
because it fits within the “nominate error” or “pigeon hole” of failing to take
relevant considerations into account. This is an approach that the Supreme
Court has told us not to follow. This is not truly deferential reasonableness
review. This is the imposition of the views of the Court over the views of the
Tribunal – the body whose views alone should hold sway, according to the
law-makers in Parliament.
[125] The factual and legal terrain that
my colleague explores was already thoroughly explored by the Tribunal and, as I
have shown in paragraph 120, the Tribunal, based on its own exploration, reached
defensible conclusions. Before the Tribunal, the appellant urged it to find
that the PM-06 position was not new. The Tribunal had evidence suggesting that,
contrary to the appellant’s submission, the position was, in a very real sense,
new (see paragraphs 112-113, above). However, in the end, this factual issue
simply did not matter to the Tribunal. It did not see the new/reclassified
distinction as being relevant to the employer’s discretion to advertise under
section 33 of the Act or the issue of “abuse of authority” under paragraph
77(1)(b) of the Act. As we have seen, the Tribunal’s interpretation was
defensible based on the plain wording of the section, Parliament’s repeal of
the new/reclassified distinction, and the purposes of the Act.
II
[126] My colleague finds that an
employer abuses its authority under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act when
it relies on a fact that is wrong and that might have affected its decision. In
his words, “abuse of authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b) must include
“[employer] decisions that are based on facts that have no rational support in
the material before the [employer]” (at paragraph 75). Here, my colleague is
defining what “abuse of authority” means and he is travelling well down the
road of fact-finding. These are the Tribunal’s tasks, not ours. Parliament has
given the Tribunal the exclusive power to decide whether an employer has abused
its authority and on this it is entitled to deference: Dunsmuir, supra,
at paragraph 47. The Tribunal had all of the evidence before it, including the
appellant’s submission that the position was not new and that it was the very
basis of the employer’s decision. The Tribunal simply did not accept that. On
all of the evidence before it, it found that the employer did not “abuse its
authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act. Following the truly
deferential approach to reasonableness review, I have concluded that the
Tribunal’s finding is defensible based on the law and all of the evidence.
[127] In paragraphs 59-62 of his
reasons, my colleague discusses subsection 2(4) of the Act and whether it means
that “abuse of authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b) covers only severe
matters, as the respondent suggests. My colleague concludes that subsection
2(4) of the Act does not necessary lead to that conclusion. I happen to agree
with him on this. But it is not our job to decide this. Parliament has given it
to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal reaches a defensible conclusion, it
is entitled to decide differently.
III
[128] My colleague finds that if the
employer relied upon a wrong or irrational reason for advertising the position,
it may have committed an “abuse of authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b)
of the Act. In his view, the wrongness of employer reasons can result in an
“abuse of authority,” and whether the employer’s decision was otherwise
appropriate or acceptable is irrelevant. Here again, my colleague is
interpreting “abuse of authority” in paragraph 77(1)(b). This is a
matter for the Tribunal, not for us.
[129] The Tribunal heard the
appellant’s submissions that the position was new and that the employer had
erred, but the Tribunal nevertheless found that on these facts there had been
no abuse of authority because of the broad discretion given to the employer
under section 33. Put another way, the Tribunal implicitly rejected the
proposition that if an employer invokes reasons in support of its decision that
are “wrong,” there is automatically an “abuse of authority” under paragraph
77(1)(b). Given the Tribunal’s defensible interpretation of section 33,
the purposes set out in the preamble clause, and all of the facts of this case,
I cannot say that the Tribunal has done something indefensible here.
IV
[130] My colleague considers the
Policy and Guidelines to be relevant, interprets and applies them, and uses
them to help establish the relevance of the Newness Consideration. He concludes
that they “are an acknowledgement by the employer that the newness of a
position can be relevant to the exercise of the broad discretion under section
33” (at paragraph 49). He finds that a decision by the employer that is “based
on unreasonable findings of relevant facts” will violate the objectives of the
Policy (at paragraph 56). Finally, he notes that the Policy and Guidelines make
the newness of a position relevant to the employer’s discretion under section
33 (at paragraph 73).
[131] But the Tribunal considered
the Policy and Guidelines to be irrelevant and, following the truly deferential
approach to reasonableness review, I have found this to be defensible. It is
for the Tribunal, not us, to decide when there is a violation of administrative
policies in this area, and whether such a violation is relevant to the
commission of an “abuse of authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the
Act.
[132] We must remember that
administrative policies in specialized areas like this are best interpreted and
applied by the administrators. The Tribunal is knowledgeable and expert in
public service staffing matters and is familiar with all relevant
administrative policies in this area. We are not. When we wade into a thicket
of administrative policies, we are armed with legal tools but we lack
specialized knowledge. We may get it wrong. For example, certain guidelines
made by the respondent and probably known to the Tribunal are contrary to the
policies identified by my colleague and are contrary to the conclusions he reaches.
For one thing, they emphasize the irrelevance of the consideration of whether
the position is new or reclassified. See online: http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/plcy-pltq/qa-qr/appointment-nomination/choice-choix-eng.htm
and http://www.psc-cfp.gc.ca/plcy-pltq/qa-qr/appointment-nomination/choice-choix-fra.htm.
I do not rely on these guidelines as support for the reasonableness of the
Tribunal’s decision, as they are not in evidence before us. However, their
existence serves to remind us of something important: it is dangerous for us to
latch onto administrators’ policy statements that counsel happened to put into
the record, make our own pronouncements on them, and then use those
pronouncements as a basis to meddle with the Tribunal’s decision.
F. A final comment
[133] In this case, “abuse of
authority” under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the Act is very broad, and
Parliament has not constrained the Tribunal’s ability to interpret and apply those
words. As a result, as I have explained, given the facts and the law in this
case, it was defensible for the Tribunal to find the way it did.
[134] However, other cases may be
different. They may involve statutes where, expressly or by clear implication, Parliament
has constrained the tribunal’s decision-making in some way. For example,
Parliament might constrain a tribunal by setting out a tightly-worded
definition of a key statutory phrase, requiring that certain prerequisites be
present before the tribunal makes a particular decision, enumerating factors
that the tribunal must consider, or prescribing a particular test to be
followed. The tribunal might not be able to legitimately interpret its way
around or otherwise avoid these constraints. So if the tribunal disobeyed these
constraints, its decision may represent an indefensible interpretation,
application or exercise of Parliament’s law and may have to be set aside: see,
for example, Dalton v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (1982), 36
O.R. (3d) 394 (Div. Ct.); Almon Equipment Ltd. v. Canada (A.G.), 2010 FCA
193, 405 N.R. 193; David J. Mullan, Administrative Law (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2001) at page 115.
[135] I mention this only to make it
clear that a tribunal’s failure to take into account a relevant consideration
can indeed lead to a finding of unreasonability in a particular case. It may
constitute a constraint or requirement that the tribunal cannot defensibly
interpret around or otherwise avoid. But that finding of unreasonability is
made not because of the existence of the “pigeon hole” or “nominate error” of
failing to take into account a relevant consideration, but because, the Court,
engaging in truly deferential reasonableness review, finds the tribunal’s
decision to be an indefensible interpretation, application or exercise of
Parliament’s law.
G. Conclusion
[136] I agree with the Federal Court
that the Tribunal’s decision was reasonable. Therefore, I would dismiss the
appeal, with costs.
“David Stratas”