Docket: T-1948-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1035
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Fredericton, New Brunswick, September 2, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Bell
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BETWEEN:
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CANADIAN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION
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Applicant
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and
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SYNDICAT DES
COMMUNICATIONS DE RADIO-CANADA (FNC-CSN)
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Nature of the matter
[1]
This is an application pursuant to section 18.1 of
the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F‑7, for judicial review
of a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (Commission), in
accordance with paragraph 44(3)(a) of the Canadian Human Rights Act,
RSC 1985, c H-6 (Act), to request the Chairperson of the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal (Tribunal) to institute an inquiry into a portion of the
complaint filed by the respondent on April 28, 1999.
II.
Facts
[2]
The facts giving rise to this application for
judicial review go back to 1995. At that time, the Syndicat des communications
de Radio-Canada (SCRC) had recently been certified by the Canadian Labour
Relations Board and represented the salaried employees of the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in Quebec and in the City of Moncton, New Brunswick.
The SCRC then found an alleged wage differential between the employees who
belonged to five supposed occupational groups (production assistants and assistant
directors; closed captioning employees; documentation employees; research
employees; and assignment assistants) and one comparison group (level 9 technicians
represented by the Syndicat des technicien(ne)s et artisan(e)s du réseau
français). The alleged wage differential was in favour of the comparison group,
which was composed of primarily male staff, whereas the group represented by
the SCRC was composed of primarily female staff.
[3]
Over the next five years, various exchanges took
place between the Commission, the SCRC and the CBC regarding the complaint. On
April 5, 2004, the Commission decided to refer the complaint to the Tribunal. Subsequently,
CBC filed an application for judicial review of that decision. On April 12,
2005, the Federal Court allowed the application for judicial review. Justice
Shore stated in his reasons that “[t]he matter is
referred to the Commission so that it can resume its investigation of the
complaint, with regard to a comparative evaluation of the duties concerned and
the question of whether the groups compared are part of the same establishment
within the meaning of the Act”, see: Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v
Syndicat des communications de Radio-Canada (FNC-CSN), 2005 FC 466 at para
52.
[4]
On November 24, 2008, further to an investigation,
a report was prepared by Sylvie St‑Onge (St-Onge Report). That
report, which was more than thirty pages long, recommended that the Commission request
the Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry into the complaint. Between
January and April 2009, the SCRC and the CBC sent the Commission their submissions
on the St-Onge Report.
[5]
In January 2012, the Commission retained the
services of a consultant, Paul Durber, to complete an analysis of the comparator
group. He rendered his report on March 15, 2012 (Durber Report), and it
was submitted to the parties in December 2012. In the report, Mr. Durber found
that the primarily male comparison groups that made up the comparison group did
not constitute just one occupational group. He found that six primarily male occupational
groups should be grouped together as one comparator group. Between March and
September 2013, the parties sent various submissions to the Commission concerning
the Durber Report.
[6]
In February 2014, the Commission received a
supplementary report, prepared by Nathalie Dagenais (Supplementary Report).
The objective of the Supplementary Report was [translation]
“to provide the Commission with the additional
information collected further to its decision dated February 22, 2010,
requesting a more in-depth investigation” and to provide [translation]
“a chronology of subsequent events”. Following a
summary of the relevant facts and an analysis, Ms. Dagenais recommended that
the Commission request the Chairperson of the Tribunal [translation] “to institute an
inquiry into the portion of the complaint that pertains to the “research” group
because: having regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry
into the complaint by the Tribunal is warranted”. Between April and June
2014, the parties provided various submissions to the Commission concerning the
Supplementary Report.
[7]
On August 13, 2014, the Commission rendered the
impugned decision. The decision consisted of only the following:
[translation]
Before making this decision, the Commission studied
the reports that were previously submitted to you as well as all of the subsequent
submissions made in respect thereof. After reviewing that information, the
Commission has decided, under paragraph 44(3)(a) of the Canadian
Human Rights Act, to request the Chairperson of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
to institute an inquiry into the portion of the complaint pertaining to the
“research” group because:
having
regard to all the circumstances of the complaint, an inquiry into the complaint
by a tribunal is warranted.
III.
Issues
[8]
The following two issues arise in this case:
(1)
Did the Commission provide adequate reasons for its
decision?
(2)
If it did provide adequate reasons for its
decision, is the decision reasonable?
IV.
Standard of review
[9]
The applicant challenges the Commission’s
decision on the ground that it does not contain adequate reasons. It contends
that the decision consists in only one sentence and fails to explain how the Commission
came to the decision to request the Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an
inquiry into a portion of the complaint. Consequently, it argues that the lack
of explanation contravenes the key rules of justice and procedural fairness. In
these circumstances, the case law of this Court states that the correctness standard
of review applies; see: Dubé v Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
2015 FC 78 at para 23, Attaran v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 1132
at para 39, Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 and Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404
(Sketchley) at para 53.
[10]
The reasonableness standard of review applies to
the second issue, see: Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human
Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 SCR 364 (Halifax)
at para 17; Dupuis v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FC 511 at
para 10.
V.
Analysis
A.
Did the Commission provide adequate reasons for
its decision?
[11]
I am of the view that the Commission did provide
adequate reasons for its decision in light of the wording of the Act and of the
case law of the Federal Courts. The wording of the Act does not impose on the
Commission an obligation to provide reasons for its decision to request the Tribunal
to inquire into the complaint. Subsections 44(3) and 44(4) of the Act read in
part as follows:
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44 (3) On receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1), the
Commission
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44 (3) Sur réception du rapport d’enquête prévu au paragraphe (1),
la Commission :
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(a) may
request the Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry under section
49 into the complaint to which the report relates if the Commission is
satisfied
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a) peut demander au président du
Tribunal de désigner, en application de l’article 49, un membre pour
instruire la plainte visée par le rapport, si elle est convaincue :
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(i) that, having regard to all the circumstances of the
complaint, an inquiry into the complaint is warranted, and
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(i) d’une part, que, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à
la plainte, l’examen de celle-ci est justifié,
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(ii) that the complaint to which the report relates should not be
referred pursuant to subsection (2) or dismissed on any ground mentioned in
paragraphs 41(c) to (e); or
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(ii) d’autre part, qu’il n’y a pas lieu de renvoyer la plainte en
application du paragraphe (2) ni de la rejeter aux termes des alinéas 41c)
à e);
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. . .
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…
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(4) After receipt of a report referred to in subsection (1),
the Commission
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(4) Après réception du rapport, la Commission :
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(a) shall
notify in writing the complainant and the person against whom the complaint
was made of its action under subsection (2) or (3); and
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a) informe par écrit les parties à
la plainte de la décision qu’elle a prise en vertu des paragraphes (2) ou (3);
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[Emphasis added.]
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(Non souligné dans l’original.)
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[12]
The Act imposes on the Commission only the obligation
to inform the parties of its decision concerning the complaint. Justice
Martineau noted the following in Dupuis at paragraph 12:
The Commission’s role is well known.
Essentially, it is to assess the sufficiency of the evidence prior to referring
a complaint to the Tribunal. The Commission’s role is very modest: it is not to
determine whether the complaint has merit, but, rather, whether an inquiry is
warranted having regard to all the facts. . . .
At that stage, the
Commission’s role is to determine whether there are grounds for referring the
complaint for an inquiry.
[13]
Furthermore, the case law of the Federal Court
of Appeal confirms that the reasons in the investigator’s report (in this case,
the Supplementary Report) are the Commission’s reasons: see, Sketchley at
paragraph 37. The Federal Court has followed this case law a number of times; see:
Dubé, at para 15; Din Ali v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 30
at para 20, upheld by 2014 FCA 124.
[14]
A reading of the letter dated August 13, 2014, shows
that the reports presented in the framework of the complaint process, including
the Supplementary Report, were taken into account. Furthermore, the fact that
the Commission cited the recommendation in the Supplementary Report word for
word as grounds justifying an inquiry into the complaint testifies to the fact
that it relied on that report to make its decision.
B.
If it did provide adequate reasons for its
decision, is the decision reasonable?
[15]
The Supreme Court of Canada’s comments in Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Dunsmuir), at
paragraph 47, are helpful with respect to our analysis of “reasonableness”:
In judicial review, reasonableness is
concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned
with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[16]
That key passage of Dunsmuir must be read
in the context of Halifax. It suffices that the Commission “is satisfied that, having regard to all circumstances of the
complaint, an inquiry thereinto is warranted”; see: para 21. In
determining the reasonableness of the Commission’s decision, the Commission is
not required to make “[an] explicit finding[s] on each
constituent element” of its reasoning; see: Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, at
paragraph 16.
[17]
With these parameters in mind, I point out that
the person who wrote the Supplementary Report noted in her analysis that
she considered, inter alia, the initial investigation report, the 2010
decision, the additional report as well as the submissions of the parties
throughout the investigation process in order to arrive at her final
recommendation.
[18]
In Cooper v Canada (Human Rights Commission), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 854, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the limited role of the Commission at that stage of the complaint investigation
process. In the majority reasons, Chief Justice Lamer stated the following at paragraph
53:
[53] The
Commission is not an adjudicative body; that is the role of a tribunal
appointed under the Act. When deciding whether a complaint should proceed to be
inquired into by a tribunal, the Commission fulfills a screening analysis
somewhat analogous to that of a judge at a preliminary inquiry. It is not
the job of the Commission to determine if the complaint is made out. Rather its
duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted
having regard to all the facts. The central component of the Commission’s role,
then, is that of assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before it.
[Emphasis added.]
[19]
Although the applicant disagrees with the Commission’s
decision to refer the complaint for inquiry, it is, in my opinion, reasonable
in the circumstances. Certainly, there may be contradictions in the evidence;
however, those contradictions will be considered by the Tribunal that
institutes an inquiry into the matter. It is not up to the Commission to
determine whether the complaint has merit, but, rather, whether there is
sufficient evidence to refer the complaint to the Tribunal.
[20]
As a result of the finding that the impugned decision
of the Commission contained adequate reasons and was reasonable, the
application for judicial review is dismissed.