Docket: IMM-5640-13
Citation:
2014 FC 1094
Toronto, Ontario, November 19, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Diner
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BETWEEN:
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RAPHAEL ELLER DE MELO
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
Raphael Eller De Melo, the Applicant, is a
citizen of Brazil applying for judicial review of a decision of a senior
immigration officer at Citizenship and Immigration Canada [CIC] who conducted a
pre-removal risk assessment [PRRA] and found that he was not a person in need
of protection according to the criteria specified in section 97 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act (SC 2001, c 27) [IRPA, Act]. The application
was commenced pursuant to section 72(1) of IRPA.
[2]
The Applicant contends that CIC misapprehended
the evidence before it in determining that Mr. De Melo was precluded
from section 97 protection due to his failure to access state protection in Brazil. In the alternative, he argues that section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms [Charter] mandates CIC assess more than the risk to his
life or the risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment that section 97
proscribes – it requires an analysis balancing his interests upon removal against
that of Canadians.
[3]
Having found CIC’s decision on state protection
to be a reasonable one, and for the reasons below, I find it unnecessary in
this case to address the submissions on the precise parameters of section 7 as
it applies to section 97.
II.
Facts
[4]
Mr. Eller De Melo is a homosexual man who fears
being returned to his country due to the persecution he would face in Brazil as a consequence of his sexual orientation.
[5]
Originally from Belo Horizonte, Brazil, the Applicant moved to the United States as a student when he was 20. He overstayed his
visa, and in an effort to visit his mother and friends after four years, he
returned to Brazil. He was unsuccessful in his attempt to return to the United States, as immigration officials caught him trying to re-enter the country using a
fraudulent passport. He eventually entered the United States from Mexico without authorization, and with the assistance of smuggling agents.
[6]
While in the United States, he began working as
an escort, and then a booker and manager for an escort agency called La
Bella Girls. In August 2006, he was arrested for his involvement in the
agency and pled guilty to the following offences before the Federal Court of
the United States, district of Massachusetts, in June 2007: (i) criminal conspiracy;
(ii) inducing travel in interstate commerce for prostitution; (iii) inducing
illegal aliens to reside in the United States and (iv) illegal re-entry to the
United States after deportation. After spending 14 months in jail, he was
deported back to Brazil in October 2007.
[7]
In 2009, Mr. Eller De Melo
obtained a student visa to enter Canada. He did not disclose his criminal
history in his visa application. On July 20, 2010, he applied for refugee
protection. On June 18, 2012, the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada [IRB] found that the Applicant was
excluded from refugee protection under Article 1(F)(b) of the Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees [Convention] for having committed a
serious non-political crime. The Applicant challenged this decision in the
Federal Court, but leave was denied. His two motions seeking re-consideration
of the Order dismissing leave were also dismissed.
[8]
The Applicant subsequently filed a PRRA on April
10, 2013. In its June 5, 2013 PRRA decision, CIC found that the Applicant would
not be subject to risk of torture, risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual
punishment if returned to Brazil because of his failure to establish a
personalized risk and rebut the presumption of state protection. While further
evidence was filed by the Applicant on July 4, 2013 and July 27, 2013, CIC
confirmed its decision in letters dated July 22, 2013 and July 31, 2013.
III.
Decision
[9]
CIC based its conclusions on the following
analysis:
a.
While CIC received letters from the Applicant’s
friends and family describing homophobic attitudes in Brazil and incidents of violence, none of them had witnessed any incidents or targeted
attacks involving the Applicant firsthand, and no supplementary evidence such
as a police report was provided. The support letters were found unreliable in
establishing that the Applicant had suffered homophobic attacks in Brazil. The writers’ fear that the Applicant would be victimized amounted to supposition.
b.
While the Applicant cited an experience
involving a violent robbery and attempted kidnapping in Brazil as evidence of his risk, there was little to demonstrate the criminals were
motivated by homophobia and no objective or reliable evidence verifying the
event was submitted.
c.
While there is much progress to be made, Brazil is widely recognized for its openness to the LGBT community. High level politicians
have come out against homophobia and the country recognizes civil unions of
same sex-couples. The Applicant did not demonstrate reasonable attempts to
obtain protection during his time in Brazil, and could not provide clear and
convincing evidence that state protection would not be forthcoming.
IV.
Submissions of the Parties
[10]
The Applicant contends that CIC did not properly
assess all the risks captured by section 7 of the Charter, basing its
decision entirely on the factors set out in section 97 of IRPA. He
submits that since the PRRA is the vehicle through which section 7 is given
effect in the removals process, pursuant to the Federal Court of Appeal’s
judgment in Hernandez Febles v Canada (MCI), 2012 FCA 324 at para 69
[Febles FCA],
all rights captured by section 7 (as opposed to merely the risk of torture, to
life or to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment) must be assessed prior to
the removal of refugee claimants who are excluded pursuant to Article 1(F)(b).
The state protection findings in this case are not determinative because they
were gauged relative to the risks laid out in section 97, and not to the full
range of risks the Applicant was entitled to have assessed in accordance with
section 7.
[11]
According to subsection 172(4) of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations (SOR/2002-227) [Regulations], CIC
officers do not have the jurisdiction to consider factors outside of those
enumerated in section 97 of IRPA. The Applicant argues that the
provision should be declared inoperative pursuant to section 52 of the Constitution
Act, 1982 to the extent the regulation impedes an evaluation of all rights
and interests protected by section 7 of the Charter.
[12]
Second, by commenting on whether “specific persons” are pursuing the Applicant, CIC took
an unduly restrictive approach to the requirement of personalization under
section 97. A proper analysis, according to the Applicant, should have
determined whether the nature and degree of risk was different than that faced
by the population at large.
[13]
Third, CIC’s state protection findings are
flawed, contends the Applicant - while there may be efforts underway to provide
protection to homosexuals, this has not resulted in actual, effective
protection. The evidence demonstrates that homophobic violence in Brazil has deteriorated in recent years. As the Supreme Court held in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, where state protection
would not be “reasonably forthcoming”, the failure
to approach the state will not defeat a claim.
[14]
Fourth, while the Applicant invoked the “compelling reasons” exception pursuant to s. 108(4)
of the Act, the officer did not address whether, notwithstanding that
there may not be a further prospective risk, the conduct faced by the Applicant
in the past was so “appalling or atrocious” so as
to give rise to compelling reasons for a grant of protection.
[15]
The Respondent counters by submitting that state
protection is determinative of the disposition of the application. Adequate
state protection is presumed and deference is owed to this finding. The officer
acknowledged that Brazil struggles with homophobic attitudes and violence, but
weighed these elements against contrary evidence of protection, support
services and Brazil’s openness to the LGBT community. This Court has held that
where there is a reasonable state protection finding, there is no need to
address any other issue, Rosas Maldonado v Canada (MCI), 2011 FC 1183 at
para 19. The Applicant cannot rebut the presumption above merely on a
subjective reluctance to engage the state.
[16]
The Respondent further asserts that by referring
to “specific persons” in its reasons, CIC was
simply assessing whether the Applicant was being targeted, not making a finding
that the perpetrators of the violence needed to be individually identified. In
any event, the findings on state protection would be determinative of the application.
[17]
The “compelling reasons”
exception argument submitted by the Applicant fails because the exception only
applies in the context of cessation of Convention refugee status, according to
the Respondent. In other words, it applies when circumstances abroad have
changed, but there are compelling reasons to allow the refugee claimant to stay
in Canada. The Applicant in this case was excluded from refugee protection and
therefore not eligible for such an assessment.
[18]
Finally, the Respondent submits that section 7
protection would only be engaged if there was a finding of inadequate state
protection in Brazil. Alternatively, an inquiry conducted under section 97 of IRPA
is sufficient to fulfill the requirements of section 7 in this case. The case
at bar can be distinguished from Suresh v MCI, 2002 SCC 1, because the
broader section 7 interests engaged in that case were in the context of a right
to non-refoulement under international law. As demonstrated by the Federal
Court of Appeal in Covarrubias v MCI, 2006 FCA 365, where the applicant
claimed a violation of section 7 on the basis of inadequate medical care in the
country of origin, a section 7 assessment should not be divorced from
principles of non-refoulement.
[19]
The Respondent underlines that the decision in Febles
FCA confirmed that the removal of persons facing risks to life or
torture requires a balancing of personal and societal interests, and that
nothing in Febles FCA expanded the duty to assess risk in a PRRA
application beyond what is outlined in sections 96 and 97 of IRPA. Since
the applicant in this case does not require surrogate international protection,
the balancing mentioned above is not required.
V.
Issues
[20]
In my view, the substance of this matter turns
on the following issues:
1.
Was CIC unreasonable in rejecting the PRRA on
the grounds of adequate state protection?
No.
2.
Does section 7 of the Charter require a
more comprehensive analysis upon removal than that mandated by the text of
section 97 of IRPA?
This
issue need not be decided in light of the reasonable finding on state
protection.
VI.
Analysis
A.
The Legislative Framework
[21]
The right of citizens and permanent residents to
enter Canada is entrenched in section 6 of the Charter. For foreign
nationals, the Act remains the primary source of immigration and refugee
law in Canada. To those fleeing persecution and danger in their country of
origin, sections 96 and 97 of IRPA are of vital significance.
[22]
Section 96 of IRPA incorporates the 1951 Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Canada is a signatory, into Canada’s domestic legislation. Section 97 offers what is known in international parlance as
“complimentary” or “subsidiary”
protection in incorporating Canada’s treaty obligations under the Convention
Against Torture [CAT] and International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights: Martin Jones and Sasha Baglay, Refugee Law (2007), at p.
166. In other words, even though they are not Convention refugees, s. 97 can
accord persons in need of protection refugee protection.
[23]
At the heart of the refugee protection accorded
to protected persons is the principle of non-refoulement, articulated in
Article 33 of the Convention and section 115 of IRPA. In essence,
non-refoulement seeks to prevent the direct or indirect removal of protected
persons to a territory where they run a risk of being subjected to human rights
violations: Németh v Canada (Justice), 2010 SCC 56 at para 19.
[24]
As noted above, Mr. De Melo was found
not to be a Convention refugee by the RPD. The validity of that decision is not
at issue in this judicial review. What is at issue is whether CIC was
unreasonable in its conclusion that Mr. De Melo is not a person in
need of protection as per the requirements of s. 97, and if not, whether such a
finding is sufficient to engage removal without further analysis.
B.
Standard of Review
[25]
PRRA decisions are reviewed deferentially, on a
standard of reasonableness. In deciding whether a particular risk assessment is
reasonable, the Court looks to see whether there is “justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” and
that the decision “falls within a range of possible,
acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”:
Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47. This means that I
cannot interfere with a PRRA decision merely because I disagree with it, or
would have come to a different conclusion: Burton v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 910 at para 35.
C.
State Protection
[26]
The starting point in an analysis of state
protection is that absent a breakdown of the state, nations are presumed
capable of protecting their citizens. The more democratic the country is, the
greater the onus on the applicant to seek out the protection of his or her home
state: Hinzman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 171 at
paras 43-45.
[27]
CIC acknowledged in its decision that although Brazil is a democratic country, its “…government has not been perfect
in curbing homophobic violence and discrimination in the population.”
Violent crimes have been committed against sexual minorities and discriminatory
attitudes continue among some members of the public, police, judiciary and
military. However, as also noted by the officer and found in the documentary
evidence on record, it is a country widely recognized for its openness to the
LGBT community. Its largest city, San Paulo, holds the world’s largest pride
parade; unions of same-sex couples are recognized and high level politicians,
including a former President, have denounced homophobia; a “Brazil without Homophobia Program” was created to
provide legal, psychological and social services to sexual minorities; and
security projects such as “System of Goals and Results
Tracking”, “Pacifying Police Units”, “Stay Alive” and “Pact for Life”,
have been implemented to curb the criminal violence that plagues the country.
[28]
It is clear from the record that there is
evidence for and against the proposition that Brazil adequately protects its
homosexual citizens. As noted above, it is CIC’s role to consider all of this
information, and deference must be accorded to the decision-maker if the
conclusion is within a range of reasonable options. The officer, in coming to a
conclusion, is not required to address every aspect of evidence that
contradicts the findings in the decision: Newfoundland and Labrador
Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at
para 16.
[29]
The reasons and record in this case provide a
sufficient basis for the conclusion that state protection would be forthcoming
to the Applicant. This Court recently came to a similar conclusion regarding Brazil’s state protection apparatus in Aggi de Oliveira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness), 2013 FC 488. It is trite law that the test for state
protection is one of adequacy, not perfection: The Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration v Flores Carillo, 2008 FCA 94.
[30]
The officer noted that there was no evidence
that the Applicant made reasonable efforts to seek state protection in this
case. Although Mr. De Melo suffered an unfortunate incident of
robbery during his time in Brazil, the officer found “there
is little to demonstrate that the criminals were likely motivated by
homophobia. I also note no objective, or more reliable, evidence in support of
this event on file.” Furthermore, the Applicant filed letters from friends
and family in support of his contention that he faced credible death threats
and harassment, but there was no objective evidence before the decision maker
to indicate he had gone to the authorities to address these issues. The
officer’s conclusions are bolstered by the evidence that in 2004, Mr. De Melo
voluntarily left the United States to return to Brazil, and that he lived in Brazil for two years (October 2007 to August 2009) where he found employment as an English
teacher, and went to college. The fact that he was not a victim of homophobic
attacks during this period also assisted the officer in his decision, which
this Court finds reasonable, in light of all the evidence.
D.
The Impact of s. 7 of the Charter on s. 97 of
IRPA
[31]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh was
called on to decide whether the deportation of a Convention refugee to
potential torture would violate s. 7 of the Charter. It held that
determining whether such a deprivation was in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice required a balancing approach:
45. The principles of fundamental justice are
to be found in “the basic tenets of our legal system”: Burns, supra, at para.
70. “They do not lie in the realm of general public policy but in the inherent
domain of the judiciary as guardian of the justice system”: Re B.C. Motor
Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at p. 503. The relevant principles of
fundamental justice are determined by a contextual approach that “takes into
account the nature of the decision to be made”: Kindler, supra, at p. 848, per
McLachlin J. (as she then was). The approach is essentially one of balancing.
As we said in Burns, “[i]t is inherent in the . . . balancing process that the
outcome may well vary from case to case depending on the mix of contextual factors
put into the balance” (para. 65). Deportation to torture, for example, requires
us to consider a variety of factors, including the circumstances or conditions
of the potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians
or the country’s security, and the threat of terrorism to Canada. In contexts in which the most significant considerations are general ones, it is likely
that the balance will be struck the same way in most cases. It would be
impossible to say in advance, however, that the balance will necessarily be
struck the same way in every case.
[32]
Mr. De Melo argues that s. 7 requires
a similar approach to balancing to be conducted in his case. In other words,
his interests in staying in the country would have to be balanced against the
interests of Canadians in his removal.
[33]
To the extent the Applicant asserts that s. 7 of
the Charter requires a CIC officer to balance the risks faced by Mr. De Melo
and the interests of Canadians, I disagree. After the hearing in the case at
bar, the Supreme Court of Canada released a judgement dismissing Mr. Febles’
Appeal in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68 [Febles
SCC]. The claimant in Febles was a rehabilitated Cuban citizen who
had been excluded under Article 1(F)(b) for serious criminality, who sought to
have his rehabilitation taken into account by the RPD.
[34]
Chief Justice McLachlin, for the majority in Febles
SCC, makes it clear that balancing upon removal occurs once the risk to the
applicant has been established:
[10] Finally, even where a refugee
protection claim is rejected by application of s. 98 and a removal order is
issued, a claimant may still apply to the Minister for protection against a
removal order. In determining whether to stay the removal order, the Minister
must balance any danger to the public in Canada against the risk that a
claimant would face death, torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment
if removed from Canada to the place designated in the removal order (ss. 97, 112,
113 (d)(i) and 114(1) (b) of the IRPA ).
[35]
The Respondent contends that the determination
of whether such balancing is required is unnecessary in this case because a
finding of state protection is determinative of the matter. I am inclined to
agree.
[36]
Refugee protection exists as surrogate
international protection, not a means of immigration. Justice LaForest
elaborated on this notion of surrogacy in the seminal case of Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at p. 709:
International refugee law was formulated to
serve as a back-up to the protection one expects from the state of which an
individual is a national. It was meant to come into play only in situations
when that protection is unavailable, and then only in certain situations. The
international community intended that persecuted individuals be required to
approach their home state for protection before the responsibility of other
states becomes engaged. For this reason, James Hathaway refers to the refugee
scheme as “surrogate or substitute protection”, activated only upon failure of
national protection; see The Law of Refugee Status (1991), at p. 135.
[37]
Although Ward was argued under what is
now s. 96 of IRPA, these principles regarding state protection apply in
equal force to those applying under s. 97, and I see nothing in either the
Febles SCC or Febles FCA judgements which alters the role
state protection plays in a refugee and person in need of protection
determinations.
[38]
If the Applicant’s argument is taken to its
logical conclusion – that s.7 requires a balancing of interests prior to the
removal of an applicant, even in the face of a reasonable finding on state
protection – this would require that CIC engage in such an analysis no matter
how democratic and developed the claimant’s country of origin. It would
essentially create two channels of immigration: one utilizing the statutory
methodology of IRPA and the other based on a CIC officer’s PRRA
balancing analysis upon removal. It would, without legislative guidance, dilute
surrogacy’s place in the international framework of refugee protection.
[39]
Moreover, it does not follow, as the Applicant
argues, that a reasonable finding of state protection would have precluded
granting refugee status to the Applicant under s. 96 (were it not for the
application of Article 1(F)(b) in this case), a standard based on a “serious possibility” of persecution, but remain
inoperative under s. 97, which operates on a more onerous standard of “balance of probabilities”: Chan v Canada (Minister
of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593 at para 120; Li v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 1.
[40]
It is not necessary in this case to make a
determination of whether the protections afforded to foreign nationals under
s.7 upon removal are broader than those encompassed by the text of s. 97. This
may, in certain circumstances and under certain factual scenarios, indeed be
the case. However, as in this case, when a reasonable finding of state
protection has been made, the removal of the applicant does not result in
violation of life, liberty or security of the person. As Chief Justice
McLachlin noted in Medovarski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration); Esteban v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 SCC 51:
46 The most fundamental principle of
immigration law is that non-citizens do not have an unqualified right to enter
or remain in Canada: Chiarelli v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711, at p. 733. Thus the deportation of a
non-citizen in itself cannot implicate the liberty and security interests
protected by s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms .
E.
Certification
[41]
The Applicant proposed four questions for
certification:
(1)
Does section 97(1)(b) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act require a claimant to establish that she or he is
currently being sought by specific individuals or groups in order to qualify as
a person in need of protection?
(2)
Does the requirement to address relevant
evidence that contradicts the decision-maker’s conclusions, as set out in Cepeda-Gutierrez
v Canada (MCI), (1998) 157 FTR 35, apply to objective evidence on
conditions in the country in question?
(3)
Is section 172(4) of the Immigration and
Refugee Protection Regulations inconsistent with the requirement to ensure
that PRRA applicants are not removed to a country where their section
7-protected rights may be in jeopardy? If so, what is the appropriate remedy?
(4)
Is a section 97 analysis sufficient to ensure
respect of section 7 rights? (This question was proposed orally at the
hearing.).
[42]
Based on the bulk of the oral and written
submissions from counsel to this Court, it is clear that the substance of the
case was built on arguments addressing the latter two questions. The Court is
not of the view that the first two questions need to be certified because they
are not dispositive of the appeal.
[43]
In my view, the third question is actually a
subset of the fourth, in that if s. 97 is exhaustive of the obligations imposed
by s. 7, section 172(4)(b) of the Regulations (which mandates a
rejection of an application if the elements of s. 97 have not been met) would
pose no inconsistency with IRPA or the Charter. However, as I
illustrate in the reasons below, I do not see the facts of this case warranting
the certification of these questions.
[44]
The Federal Court of Appeal in Zhang v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FCA 168, noted that the test for
certification requires that the question:
(i) be dispositive of the appeal and;
(ii) transcend
the interests of the immediate parties to the litigation, as well as
contemplate issues of broad significance or general importance.
[45]
I exercise my discretion in declining to certify
questions #3 and #4 in this judicial review because, in my view, an answer as
to the precise scope of s.7 relative to s. 97 would not meet the first branch
of the test for certification – it is not dispositive of this appeal. Since I
have held CIC’s finding on state protection in Brazil to be a reasonable one,
and for the reasons I have already canvassed relating to the principles of
surrogate protection and non-refoulement, Mr. De Melo is not entitled
to further protection from removal. Consequently, an analysis of the precise
scope of s. 7 as it applies to s. 97 would be conducted in a factual vacuum, a
circumstance generally inconducive to a proper analysis of the issue: Prophète
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FCA 31, at paras 8-9.
VII.
Conclusion
[46]
Counsel for the Applicant has ably and
diligently raised his concerns regarding Brazil’s ability to protect his
client. While this Court acknowledges that the situation there is far from
ideal and there remains significant progress to be made, it does not find CIC’s
conclusion, that adequate state protection is available to the Applicant, to be
an unreasonable one. As a consequence, it is unnecessary to delve into whether
s. 7 imposes additional requirements pertaining to the assessment of risk under
s. 97 than what has been recognized thus far in the jurisprudence.
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