Docket:
IMM-8552-12
Citation: 2013 FC 777
Ottawa, Ontario, July 11,
2013
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Russell
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BETWEEN:
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BISWAJIT BANIK
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application under subsection 72(1) of
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 (Act) for
judicial review of the decision of a Visa Officer (Immigration Officer) of the
Consulate General of Canada in Sydney, Australia, dated 25 June 2012
(Decision), which refused the Applicant’s application for permanent residence
in Canada because his son’s health condition might reasonably be expected to
cause excessive demand on social services, thus rendering the Applicant
inadmissible to Canada.
BACKGROUND
[2]
The Applicant is a 43-year-old citizen of Bangladesh. The Applicant’s wife and son are also citizens of Bangladesh. The Applicant and
his wife were trained in the medical field in Bangladesh. They have been
studying in Australia since 2007, and reside there on student visas. In
February, 2007, the Applicant submitted an application for permanent residence
in Canada under the Federal Skilled Worker Category, with his wife and son
listed as dependants. The Applicant’s son, Arkojeet, is 9 years old and has Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD).
[3]
After applying for permanent residence, the
Applicant received a letter from the Immigration Officer dated 12 April 2011,
expressing concerns that Arkojeet’s health condition might reasonably be
expected to cause excessive demand on social services in Canada (Applicant’s Record, page 30). The letter said that Arkojeet would likely be identified as a
High Needs Student, and the cost of his special education would range from
$12,000 to $27,000 per year. Respite care for the parents would likely be from
$2,000 to $4,000 per year. Arkojeet would also require a psychological
assessment which would cost between $2,500 and $3,000. The Immigration Officer stated
that, before a final decision was made, the Applicant could submit additional
information, including information on the Applicant’s use of social services in
Canada for the next five years, and an individualized plan to ensure that no
excessive demand is imposed on Canadian social services. The letter stated that
the Applicant must have a reasonable and workable plan, along with the
financial means and intent to implement it.
[4]
In response to this letter, the Applicant
submitted a package on 16 July 2011 detailing his financial resources and
setting out a plan for caring for Arkojeet over the family’s first five years
in Canada (Applicant’s Record, page 35). The Applicant included a chart listing
the anticipated costs related to concerns identified by the Immigration
Officer, measured against the family’s available assets.
[5]
In the Applicant’s plan, he noted that he and
his wife are both medically trained, and his wife has received special training
in dealing with children who experience developmental delays. The Applicant has
$262,423 in available funds, which includes a gift from his parents of
$154,969, in the form of fixed deposits and savings certificates at different
financial institutions in Bangladesh. The estimated cost of Arkojeet’s needs
ranged from $72,500 to $158,000, but even taking the maximum projected cost,
the Applicant says he will be financially capable of meeting it. The family
would also have the financial support of the Applicant’s parents, should it be
necessary. The Applicant’s sister-in-law resides in Ottawa, and would provide
any required financial and other support to the Applicant, as the family
intends to reside in Ottawa.
[6]
The Applicant also requested that humanitarian
and compassionate (H&C) factors be considered. He pointed out that he has
been waiting for a decision since January, 2007, and that the special education
Arkojeet requires is not available in Bangladesh. The Applicant submitted that
Arkojeet has been doing well at his Australian school, and provided copies of
his progress reports. Arkojeet has been attending a special school in Australia and has never used any publicly funded services there. The Applicant and his wife
are both highly educated, and would be able to make valuable contributions to
Canadian society. Further, the Applicant has significant family support.
[7]
By letter dated 25 June 2012, the Immigration
Officer concluded that Arkojeet is inadmissible to Canada because he might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on social services, and
refused the application.
DECISION UNDER REVIEW
[8]
The Decision under review in this application
consists of the Exclusion Letter dated 25 June 2012 and the Officer’s Global
Case Management Systems notes (Notes).
[9]
In the Notes dated 25 June 2012, the Immigration
Officer noted that the Applicant’s submissions on his plan for Arkojeet’s care
had been sent to a medical officer (Medical Officer) at Overseas Health
Management Services in Singapore for review. The Medical Officer found that the
Applicant’s submissions did not modify the initial inadmissibility finding for
excessive demand on social services.
[10]
The Applicant provided copies of communications
between him and a school in Ottawa, but the representative of the school said
that without an assessment she was unsure what would be the most appropriate
placement for Arkojeet. The Immigration Officer noted that the Applicant did
not provide any information on the cost or availability of private schooling if
Arkojeet is not accepted into one of the special education public schools.
[11]
The Applicant said he may be able to acquire
private health insurance at a cost of $120 a month, but no documentation was
provided from health providers, so the Immigration Officer was unable to
determine what this insurance would cover. No details were provided about the
costs of other therapies.
[12]
The Applicant stated that during year 2 of his
5-year plan he intends to work part-time to care for his son while his wife
enrols in a university program in either nursing or physiotherapy. The Applicant
indicated that he would be financially dependant on his family during his
initial relocation period to Canada.
[13]
The Applicant said that the family intends to
live in Ottawa, where his wife’s sister resides. The Applicant provided a
Letter of Assurance from the sister, who said that she would provide the family
with accommodation and financial support. However, the Applicant made enquiries
of the University of Regina, McGill University, and McMaster University, all of which are outside the Ottawa region. The Applicant did not account for the
additional cost if one parent is required to be away from Ottawa.
[14]
The Immigration Officer found that the
Applicant’s submissions did not change the determination that Arkojeet might
reasonably be expected to cause excessive demand on social services. Thus, the
Applicant remained inadmissible.
ISSUES
[15]
The Applicant raises the following issues in
this application:
a.
Should the reasons provided in the medical
inadmissibility proceedings include the reasons of the Medical Officer?
b.
Did the Medical Officer and the Immigration
Officer err in failing to provide adequate reasons?
c.
Did the Medical Officer and the Immigration
Officer err in failing to conduct an individualized assessment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[16]
The Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 held that a standard of review analysis need not be
conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable
to a particular question before the court is well-settled by past
jurisprudence, the reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only
where this search proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a
consideration of the four factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[17]
The first issue was discussed by the Federal Court
of Appeal in Sapru v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FCA 35 [Sapru]. The Court of Appeal characterized the obligations
of the Medical Officer as a question of law and as involving matters of
procedural fairness (Sapru at paragraphs 24-27). As such, this issue is
reviewable on a correctness standard.
[18]
Both parties agree that the standard of review
applicable to a decision on medical inadmissibility is reasonableness (Sapru).
In Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, the Supreme Court of Canada held at
paragraph 14 that the adequacy of reasons is not a stand-alone basis for
quashing a decision. Rather, “the reasons must be read together with the
outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a
range of possible outcomes.” Thus, any issue that may arise as to the adequacy
of reasons will be considered in a context of the reasonableness of the
Decision.
[19]
When reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness,
the analysis will be concerned with “the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also
with] whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.” See Dunsmuir,
above, at paragraph 47, and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at paragraph 59. Put
another way, the Court should intervene only if the Decision was unreasonable
in the sense that it falls outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.”
[20]
The Supreme Court of Canada emphasized in Hilewitz
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 557 [Hilewitz]
that medical inadmissibility must be considered in an individualized manner.
Justice Luc Martineau recently found in Sökmen v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 47 at paragraph 3 that whether or not
an officer’s assessment was individualized is an issue that is determined on a
standard of correctness.
[21]
In Canadian Union of Public Employees
(C.U.P.E.) v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29, the Supreme
Court of Canada held at paragraph 100 that it “is for
the courts, not the Minister, to provide the legal answer to procedural
fairness questions.” Further, the Federal Court of Appeal in Sketchley
v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404 at paragraph 53 held that the “procedural fairness element is reviewed as a question of
law. No deference is due. The decision-maker has either complied with the
content of the duty of fairness appropriate for the particular circumstances,
or has breached this duty.” The standard of review applicable to the issue in
this application is correctness.
STATUTORY PROVISONS
[22]
The following provisions of the Act are
applicable in this proceeding:
Application before entering Canada
11. (1) A
foreign national must, before entering Canada, apply to an officer for a visa
or for any other document required by the regulations. The visa or document
may be issued if, following an examination, the officer is satisfied that the
foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act.
[…]
Health grounds
38. (1) A
foreign national is inadmissible on health grounds if their health condition
(a) is likely to be a danger to public
health;
(b) is likely to be a danger to public
safety; or
(c) might reasonably be expected to cause
excessive demand on health or social services.
[…]
Inadmissible family member
42. A
foreign national, other than a protected person, is inadmissible on grounds
of an inadmissible family member if
(a) their accompanying family member or,
in prescribed circumstances, their non-accompanying family member is
inadmissible; or
(b) they are an accompanying family
member of an inadmissible person
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Visa et documents
11. (1)
L’étranger doit, préalablement à son entrée au Canada, demander à l’agent les
visa et autres documents requis par règlement. L’agent peut les délivrer sur
preuve, à la suite d’un contrôle, que l’étranger n’est pas interdit de
territoire et se conforme à la présente loi.
[…]
Motifs sanitaires
38. (1)
Emporte, sauf pour le résident permanent, interdiction de territoire pour
motifs sanitaires l’état de santé de l’étranger constituant vraisemblablement
un danger pour la santé ou la sécurité publiques ou risquant d’entraîner un
fardeau excessif pour les services sociaux ou de santé.
[…]
Inadmissibilité familiale
42. Emportent,
sauf pour le résident permanent ou une personne protégée, interdiction de
territoire pour inadmissibilité familiale les faits suivants :
a) l’interdiction de territoire frappant
tout membre de sa famille qui l’accompagne ou qui, dans les cas
réglementaires, ne l’accompagne pas;
b) accompagner, pour un membre de sa
famille, un interdit de territoire.
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[23]
The following provisions of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-27 are applicable in this
proceeding:
Definitions
1. (1) The
definitions in this subsection apply in the Act and in these Regulations.
[…]
“excessive demand” means
(a) a demand on health services or social
services for which the anticipated costs would likely exceed average Canadian
per capita health services and social services costs over a period of five
consecutive years immediately following the most recent medical examination
required under paragraph 16(2)(b) of the Act, unless there is evidence that
significant costs are likely to be incurred beyond that period, in which case
the period is no more than 10 consecutive years; or
(b) a demand on health services or social
services that would add to existing waiting lists and would increase the rate
of mortality and morbidity in Canada as a result of an inability to provide
timely services to Canadian citizens or permanent residents.
“health services”
“health services” means any health
services for which the majority of the funds are contributed by governments,
including the services of family physicians, medical specialists, nurses,
chiropractors and physiotherapists, laboratory services and the supply of
pharmaceutical or hospital care.
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Définitions
1. (1) Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la Loi et au présent règlement.
[…]
« fardeau excessif » Se dit :
a) de toute charge pour les services
sociaux ou les services de santé dont le coût prévisible dépasse la moyenne,
par habitant au Canada, des dépenses pour les services de santé et pour les
services sociaux sur une période de cinq années consécutives suivant la plus
récente visite médicale exigée en application du paragraphe 16(2) de la Loi
ou, s’il y a lieu de croire que des dépenses importantes devront probablement
être faites après cette période, sur une période d’au plus dix années
consécutives;
b) de toute charge pour les services
sociaux ou les services de santé qui viendrait allonger les listes d’attente
actuelles et qui augmenterait le taux de mortalité et de morbidité au Canada
vu l’impossibilité d’offrir en temps voulu ces services aux citoyens
canadiens ou aux résidents permanents.
« services de santé » Les services de
santé dont la majeure partie sont financés par l’État, notamment les services
des généralistes, des spécialistes, des infirmiers, des chiropraticiens et
des physiothérapeutes, les services de laboratoire, la fourniture de
médicaments et la prestation de soins hospitaliers
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ARGUMENTS
The Applicant
Preliminary
Matter
[24]
As a preliminary matter, the Applicant raises
the question of whether the reasons provided under Rule 9 of the Federal
Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules, SOR/93-22 (Rules) ought to
have included the Medical Officer’s reasoning. The Applicant submits that the
reasons of the Medical Officer are essential in assessing whether a decision of
medical inadmissibility is reasonable. It may also save judicial resources,
because if full reasons are provided, litigation may not be necessary.
[25]
In Sapru, above, the Federal Court of
Appeal highlighted the importance of a medical officer’s reasoning at paragraph
41:
Having reviewed the
respective roles of the immigration and medical officers, it follows from the
obligation placed on an immigration officer to review the reasonableness of a
medical officer's opinion that a medical officer must provide the immigration
officer with sufficient information to enable the immigration officer to be
satisfied that the medical officer's opinion is reasonable.
[26]
The Applicant submits that he ought to have
access to the Medical Officer’s opinion, and that this issue goes beyond the
mere adequacy of reasons. The Medical Officer’s notes have now been submitted
by the Respondent as part of the Affidavit of Stephanie Dodds, however, the
Applicant submits that Rule 9 requires disclosure of both Officers’
reasons and that waiting to provide the Medical Officer’s reasons until after
leave is granted is unacceptable.
The Reasonableness of the Decision
The Adequacy of Reasons
[27]
The Applicant submits that the reasons provided
must allow the reviewing court to ascertain whether a decision is reasonable.
The Federal Court of Appeal affirmed that this applies to a medical officer at
paragraphs 42-43 of Sapru:
…a medical officer
may provide adequate reasons in a report to the immigration officer. However,
adequate reasons could also be provided orally if the immigration officer records
the oral advice in the CAIPS notes, or in a combination of written and oral
communications where the oral advice is recorded in the CAIPS notes. Thus, a
medical officer might transmit his or her notes reflecting the medical
officer's review and assessment of all of the relevant information, or an
immigration officer might record in the CAIPS notes the relevant observations
and conclusions of a medical officer made during the course of the
collaborative process between the officers contemplated by Operational Bulletin
063. In every case, an immigration officer may seek clarification from a
medical officer and record the response of the medical officer in the CAIPS
notes. The reasons of a medical officer may be conveyed to an immigration
officer by a combination of these or other methods.
What is important is
that at the time the immigration officer makes his or her decision on
admissibility, the immigration officer must have sufficient information from
the medical officer to allow the immigration officer to be satisfied that the
medical officer's opinion is reasonable.
[28]
The Applicant says that there is no indication
in the Decision that the Medical Officer provided an explanation to the
Immigration Officer as to why, after receiving the response to the procedural
fairness letter, his or her opinion was not changed. The Immigration Officer
simply summarizes the Applicant’s submissions and then concludes that “Having
carefully considered all the documentation provided it did not change this
assessment of PA’s family member’s health condition, which has now become
final…”
[29]
The Applicant says that it is unclear, based on
the above, which Officer actually arrived at the conclusion that Arkojeet’s
health condition is likely to constitute an excessive demand on social
services. The decision in Sapru clearly states that it is an immigration
officer’s duty to review the reasonability of the medical officer’s opinion,
and not the reasonability of the applicant’s response. There is no indication
on the record as to what the Medical Officer’s reasoning was, or how his
analysis contributed to the ultimate conclusion.
[30]
The Applicant points out that there is no way to
evaluate whether or not the Medical Officer did, in fact, conduct the required
re-assessment. Had both Officers undertaken their respective duties, there
ought to have been some explanation as to why the Medical Officer’s opinion had
not been altered after receiving the Applicant’s materials. In the absence of
this, the Applicant submits that the assessment and reasons provided are
inadequate.
[31]
The Supreme Court of Canada stated in Hilewitz,
above, at paragraph 55 that medical officers must consider both medical and
non-medical factors. As such, the Medical Officer had an obligation to assess
the reasonability of the Applicant’s care plan, and his ability and intent to
minimise the demand on social services. There is no indication that the Medical
Officer considered any non-medical factors, such as the Applicant’s financial
position. The reasons simply state that the evidence did not change the Medical
Officer’s opinion of Arkojeet’s “health condition.”
[32]
The Applicant submits that had the Medical
Officer adequately considered all medical and non-medical factors, this
assessment would have appeared in the reasons for the Decision. Specifically,
the Applicant’s submissions spoke to the lack of available educational options
for Arkojeet in Bangladesh, and the significant progress that he has made at
his specialized school in Australia. There is no way to know if this was
considered at all in the Medical Officer’s opinion. The Applicant submits that
the reasons provided are lacking in transparency and are wholly unreasonable.
The Role of the Officers
[33]
The Applicant says that section 20 of the
Regulations and sections 29-34 of the Act clearly delineate the roles of a
medical officer and an immigration officer – the medical officer is to
determine whether the applicant or his dependants has a health condition likely
to cause excessive demand, and the immigration officer is to assess whether the
medical officer’s determination is reasonable (Sapru at paragraph 36).
[34]
In this case, the Medical Officer left the
Immigration Officer to assess the Applicant’s financial ability and intent. In Hilewitz
at paragraph 68, the Supreme Court of Canada was critical of the medical
officer in that case doing the same thing. As such, the Applicant submits that
the Medical Officer failed to discharge his legislated responsibility, and that
because of this the Immigration Officer rendered an unreasonable decision.
Individualized Assessment
[35]
In Hilewitz, the Supreme Court stated
that officers must conduct “individualized assessments;” it is not enough to
simply set forth what services a particular individual may have access to. They
must assess the cost of the services that the person is likely to require:
56 This, it seems
to me, requires individualized assessments. It is impossible, for example, to
determine the “nature”, “severity” or probable “duration” of a health
impairment without doing so in relation to a given individual. If the medical
officer considers the need for potential services based only on the classification
of the impairment rather than on its particular manifestation, the assessment
becomes generic rather than individual. It is an approach which attaches a cost
assessment to the disability rather than to the individual. This in turn
results in an automatic exclusion for all individuals with a particular
disability, even those whose admission would not cause, or would not reasonably
be expected to cause, excessive demands on public funds.
[36]
It is clearly stated at paragraph 58 of Hilewitz
that “The threshold is reasonable probability, not remote possibility.”
[37]
As per paragraph 55 of Hilewitz, the
Applicant states that the Medical Officer was required to (1) assess cost
estimates, (2) determine whether the cost estimates were reasonable, and (3)
assess the “willingness and ability of the applicant or his or her family to
pay for the services.” The Applicant submits that all the Medical Officer said
was that the Applicant had “provided some estimates of the cost of Arkojeet’s
education,” and that this did not meet the standard set out in Hilewitz.
Not only that, but the cost estimates mentioned by the Medical Officer were the
maximum costs from the procedural fairness letter.
[38]
The Applicant submits that the Immigration
Officer committed the same errors discussed in Hilewitz. The Immigration
Officer’s notes provide that the Applicant and his wife “would be eligible for
respite services” and that the services would “typically be in the range of
$2,000 to $4,000 per year.” In response to this, the Applicant provided a plan
and financial documentation to demonstrate his ability to offset any excessive
demand, should this be required. There is no discussion as to why the Officers
believed the Applicant and his wife would make use of such services,
considering they have not done so in the past. The Applicant submits that this
demonstrates that a generic methodology, as discussed in Hilewitz at
paragraph 56, was applied.
[39]
Further, the maximum cost of special education
for Arkojeet was determined to be $27,000 per year. In response, the Applicant
confirmed his commitment to pay this amount, and demonstrated his financial
capacity to do so. The Applicant is a citizen of Bangladesh, with limited
knowledge of the Canadian education system, but clearly communicated his
intention to offset the costs of public schooling. The e-mail response to the
Applicant from the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board said: “You mentioned
that your child will not qualify for government funding and you would have to
pay for education. Is this included in the information you received from
Citizenship and Immigration Canada? Could you please send us a copy of the information
you received to this effect.” The Applicant submits that this indicates clearly
that he had no intention for Arkojeet’s education costs to be paid for by the
government, and that he was simply unaware that he could not pay into the public
school system.
[40]
Further, the family has been privately funding
Arkojeet’s education in Australia for the past several years. In light of this,
it was reasonable for the Applicant to believe that his statement that he was
willing and able to pay for Arkojeet’s education in the highest amount proposed
by the Officer, together with proof of his financial resources, would be sufficient
to alleviate this concern.
[41]
The reasons do not indicate that the Immigration
Officer had concerns about the Applicant’s willingness or ability to assume the
costs as set out. The Applicant’s intention to contribute $27,000 annually
towards Arkojeet’s education was clearly set out, regardless of whether it
would be spent in the public or the private school system.
[42]
The Applicant submits that his particular
circumstances and intentions were not acknowledged and assessed. The
Immigration Officer even noted that the Applicant “has made great efforts to
research both opportunities for himself and the care of his son.” The Applicant
submits that the Immigration Officer’s failure to assess his particular
circumstances was an error.
The Respondent
The
Reasonableness of the Decision
Adequacy
of Reasons
[43]
The Respondent submits that the Sapru
decision does not support the Applicant’s argument that in every case an
immigration officer must include the detailed reasons of a medical officer
(particularly when the medical officer’s position has not changed). Sapru held
that the prospective immigrant must be provided with a “fairness letter” that
sets out all relevant concerns and provides a true opportunity for the person
to meaningfully respond to all the government’s concerns.
[44]
A medical officer must provide the immigration
officer with sufficient information to permit the immigration officer to be satisfied
that the medical officer’s opinion is reasonable. The Respondent submits that
this was complied with in this case. As the Federal Court of Appeal said in Sapru,
an applicant is not the focus as far as adequacy of reasons is concerned:
54 To conclude on
this issue, when considering the inadequacy of the reasons of a medical officer
the primary concern is not whether at the end of the day the appellants
received adequate reasons. The concern is whether the inadequacy of the reasons
prevented the immigration officer from assessing the reasonableness of the
medical officer’s opinion.
[45]
The record indicates the Medical Officer
reviewed all the Applicant’s materials. The Immigration Officer would have been
aware that the Medical Officer’s decision was based on having reviewed all the
evidence presented by the Applicant.
[46]
The basis of the Immigration Officer’s decision
echoed the rationale described by the Medical Officer. Both decisions turned on
the insufficiency of the Applicant’s evidence and deficiencies in the proposed
plan. The Applicant even acknowledged that his plan was deficient when it came
to special education costs for his son. He stated in his covering letter that
he believed the exact amount could only be determined after the family became landed
immigrants and a psychological assessment was done. The Respondent submits that
it is unreasonable for the Applicant to take issue with the medical assessment
and then acknowledge that he did not provide the Officers with the information
they requested in order to have a reasonable basis on which to avoid a medical
inadmissibility finding.
[47]
Jurisprudence of the Federal Court has confirmed
that when a prospective immigrant claims the identified health condition will
not create “excessive demand” because they have a plan to mitigate the likely
demand, the plan must be “choate,” in the sense of complete, developed and
certain (Chauhdry v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 22 [Chauhdry] at paragraph 49; Sharma v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 398 at paragraphs 16, 18; Rounta v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 384 at paragraph 15).
[48]
Specifically, in Sapru the Federal Court
of Appeal said that “when an applicant submits a plan for managing the
condition, the medical officer must consider and advise the immigration officer
about things such as the feasibility and availability of the plan.” The
Immigration Officer in the present case recognized the Applicant’s sincerity in
putting together a plan which he believed would be sufficient, but the
Applicant’s failure to adequately research the availability and cost of private
school special education simply left both Officers without sufficient evidence
to reasonably approve the plan. The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s
plan was inchoate and therefore it was reasonably rejected.
[49]
The Applicant simply accepted the cost estimates
made by the Medical Officer and asserted he had the financial resources to pay
for any services required out of his own resources. What he failed to do was
investigate what is and is not available for his son in the Ottawa area. The
onus is on the prospective immigrant to research his or her options and submit
a detailed and realistic plan (Chauhdry at paragraph 50). An immigration
officer must make a decision based on the information put forward by the
applicant.
[50]
Instead of acknowledging that he misunderstood
the Canadian educational system, the Applicant points to an email from the
Ottawa-Carlton School Board in an effort to demonstrate that he anticipated
paying for his son’s school privately. This is the sort of “indirect” evidence
the Medical Officer made reference to, and it was not the sort of information
requested of the Applicant.
[51]
The Applicant has acknowledged that he made a
mistake by not providing information about private schools in Canada that provide special education. A “reasonable and workable plan” must be based on information
that is correct, yet despite this significant error the Applicant believes that
his plan is still somehow “reasonable and workable,” and that his “financial
means and intent to implement this plan” should have been enough to satisfy the
Officer.
[52]
The Applicant tries to rely on the leading
jurisprudence concerning medical inadmissibility, but this case law is of no
assistance to him because his plan of care was bereft of any information that
directly responded to the Officers’ concerns. The inadequacy of the plan of
care hampered the Officers’ ability to assess non-medical factors such as the
Applicant’s financial ability and intent to implement the plan.
[53]
The Respondent submits there is no evidence that
Hilewitz and Sapru were not complied with just because the
Immigration Officer did not include the Medical Officer’s reaction to the
Applicant’s fairness materials in the reasons or the Notes. Furthermore, the
Applicant asserts that his response was not sent to the Medical Officer, when
the Notes clearly indicate that the response was sent. In this case, the two
Officers did in fact “operate in tandem to assess admissibility on health
grounds.”
[54]
Furthermore, the Respondent submits that the
Medical Officer did understand the scope of his responsibilities. The Medical
Officer made the preliminary inadmissibility finding, which then caused the
Immigration Officer to send out the procedural fairness letter. The Medical
Officer then considered the Applicant’s submissions, made a final
determination, and sent it to the Immigration Officer for review.
[55]
The Applicant submits that the Medical Officer
did not properly assess the Applicant’s “ability or intent to offset excessive
demand,” but this was because the Applicant did not provide the Medical Officer
with the relevant information he needed. Thus, any assessment would have been
meaningless because it would have been based on incomplete information (Sapru,
paragraph 36).
[56]
In the alternative, if the Court does find that
there was a breach of procedural fairness, the Respondent submits that this
type of error does not necessarily require the Decision to be redetermined.
There is a line of jurisprudence from this Court standing for the proposition
that a breach of natural justice is important only if it is material to the
claim. Recently, the Court held in Phillip v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2012 FC 242 at paragraph 29:
29 In reaching
this conclusion, Justice Mactavish relied on previous jurisprudence that only
breaches of natural justice that affect the result will warrant a decision
being set aside (see for example Mughal v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2006 FC 1557, [2006] FCJ no 1952 at paras 39-41; Fontenelle
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 1432, [2006]
FCJ no 1796 at para 15; Yassine v Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration), (1994), 27 Imm LR (2d) 135, [1994] FCJ no 949 at para 11
(FCA); Mobile Oil Canada Ltd et al v Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum
Board, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 202; [1994] SCJ no 14 at para 53).
[57]
The Respondent submits that the Applicant was not
prejudiced by the breach of procedural fairness that he alleges occurred in the
assessment of his application. Even if both Officers carried out their roles
perfectly, it would not have remedied the fundamental flaw in the Applicant’s
submission – that he did not provide proper information in regards to
Arkojeet’s education in Canada. The final determination would have been the
same; the application would have been rejected.
Individualized
Assessment
[58]
Contrary to the Applicant’s arguments, the
Respondent asserts that both Officers did perform individualized assessments
for what services, and their associated costs, would likely be required. Both
Officers noted the contents of a report by a specialist, which outlined exactly
what Arkojeet’s challenges are, as well as the Applicant’s evidence of the
needs of his son. Neither Officer considered services that were a remote
possibility, but pointed out services and needs for the Applicant’s son that
were based on a reasonable probability, in compliance with Hilewitz.
The Applicant’s Reply
[59]
The Applicant submits that the Medical Officer’s
notes, attached in the Affidavit of Stephanie Dodds, do not provide an answer
to the Applicant’s concerns. The notes are merely a recitation of the
Applicant’s submissions, with the Medical Officer only commenting on the
Applicant’s error of approaching the public school board. It was the
Immigration Officer’s duty to assess the reasonability of the Medical Officer’s
conclusions. In order to do this the Immigration Officer should have been
provided with the Medical Officer’s reasoning, not merely a statement that the
original opinion has not changed since the Applicant did not identify the
correct school.
[60]
The Applicant continues to submit that the
Medical Officer was required to provide “adequate reasons” to the Immigration
Officer (Sapru at paragraphs 42, 54), and the Immigration Officer was
required to assess the reasonability of those reasons. In respect to the
Medical Officer’s notes, the Applicant is particularly concerned with the
conclusion that the “assessment of the applicant’s ‘ability and intent’ I leave
to the visa officer to assess.” The Medical Officer must assess both medical
and non-medical factors; in not considering all the submissions provided, the
Medical Officer in this case failed to perform that duty.
Procedural Fairness
[61]
The Applicant clearly believed he would be
required to pay the amount set forth in the procedural fairness letter and
provided evidence that he could do so. The Applicant continues to maintain that
in failing to review all the evidence provided, the Officer did not conduct an
individualized assessment.
[62]
The Respondent is critical of the Applicant for
not having researched private schooling in Canada for Arkojeet, and speaks of
the “onus” resting with the Applicant. Although the Applicant contacted the
public school board, he clearly believed that his son would “not qualify for
government funding.” The Applicant submits that this was a legitimate
misapprehension. The Officers knew of this mistake for over a year before
refusing the application, and the Applicant states that fairness dictates that
they should have given his plan more consideration and disabused him of the
misapprehension.
ANALYSIS
[63]
In my view, and taking into account the evolving
submissions of the parties, the gravamen of the Applicant’s complaint is that
the Immigration Officer in this case rendered an unreasonable decision by
relying upon the opinion of the Medical Officer who failed to discharge his
duty of assessing excessive demand. The Applicant also now says that it was
obvious that he had misapprehended the need to provide information and a viable
plan regarding private education and support for Arkojeet, so that it was
procedurally unfair not to alert him that such information was required, and
not to give him an opportunity to make further submissions on point.
[64]
In the present case, the Applicant says that the
Medical Officer provided an opinion that did not address the Applicant’s
individual circumstances and specifically left considerations of financial
ability and intent to the Immigration Officer. In other words, he says, the
Medical Officer failed to discharge his legal duty to assess excessive demand
on the basis of the individualized circumstances of this case, so that, in
relying upon the Medical Officer’s opinion, the Immigration Officer rendered an
unreasonable Decision.
[65]
I agree that the Medical Officer was obliged to
conduct an individualized assessment that would take into account both medical
and non-medical factors, “such as the availability, scarcity or cost of
publicly funded services, along with the willingness and ability of the
applicant or his or her family to pay for the services.” See Hilewitz,
above, at paragraphs 43 and 44.
[66]
As the record before me shows, the Medical
Officer made a preliminary inadmissibility finding and the Applicant was given
the opportunity to submit a detailed individualized plan “along with the
financial means and intent to implement this plan.” As the Applicant points out
in his affidavit submitted with this application, he did not understand that he
should have addressed private school costs:
Had we known that we
could only pay for private school, we would have gladly researched private
school options and covered these costs.
In my view, this
is a clear acknowledgment that the plan submitted by the Applicant was
deficient in this highly material respect.
[67]
The plan submitted by the Applicant did not
provide information about the private education that Arkojeet might require in Canada. This information was needed to directly address the Medical Officer’s concerns and,
without it, the Medical Officer could not have assessed the non-medical factors
such as the Applicant’s financial ability to implement the plan, which the
jurisprudence says the Medical Officer was obliged to assess. When the Medical
Officer reviewed the documentation submitted by the Applicant, he noted that
the Applicant had not addressed his concerns.
[68]
The Applicant argues that the Medical Officer
specifically left assessment of financial ability and intent to the Immigration
Officer. However, the Medical Officer simply did not have all of the
information required to make such an assessment, and this is because the
Applicant had failed to provide relevant information about the availability of
private special education for Arkojeet in the Ottawa area and the costs of that
education. The Applicant provided no information or evidence about private
schools in the Ottawa area where Arkojeet could be enrolled, the curriculum offered,
how any such curriculum would meet Arkojeet’s needs, or the actual costs of
enrollment and associated services. The omission of this information made it
impossible for the Medical Officer to assess the Applicant’s ability to pay,
and the overall feasibility of the Applicant’s plan. Hence, it was not
unreasonable for the Medical Officer to indicate that his initial opinion had
not changed or for the Immigration Officer to rely upon this unchanged
assessment.
[69]
The onus was on the Applicant to establish a
reasonable working plan that the Officers, in their respective roles, could
assess. As the Medical Officer pointed out in his assessment,
In the information
provided by the applicant concerning the demand on Canadian health and social
services that the applicant has not directly addressed the issue of costs as
required nor his/her “ability and intent” to pay for the services.
Note: The applicant
has contacted people in the public school system in Ottawa for advice
concerning resources for the special needs of his autistic and mentally
challenged son and has provided some estimates on the cost of Arkojeet’s
special education. There is however no mention of the private school in which
he would be registered nor the yearly costs of the programs which often include
physiotherapy and occupational therapy.
In order to judge
whether the Applicant has a viable plan, one needs specific information
concerning who the providers are, preferably with letters of intent, and the
yearly costs that would accrue…”
[70]
The Applicant says that this mistake would have
been obvious to both Officers and they should have alerted him to the
deficiencies in his plan and provided him with an opportunity to make further
submissions on point. As the Respondent points out, there was no duty on an
Immigration Officer to advise the Applicant on how to improve his application
after he was provided with a procedural fairness letter. See Ikede v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 1354 at paragraph 23.
[71]
As the Applicant’s affidavit submitted with this
application makes clear, the Applicant was fully aware that the cost of
education was “of most concern to the Officer,” but, not realizing that the
family “cannot pay for education in the Ottawa-Carleton District School Board,”
the family did not research or make submissions on “private school options” and
their costs.
[72]
The procedural fairness letter clearly asks the
Applicant to address the “social services required in Canada for the period
indicated above,” and that the Applicant provide an “individualized plan to
ensure that no excessive demand will be imposed on Canadian social services for
the entire period indicated above, and your signed Declaration of Ability and
Intent.”
[73]
Hence, I do not think the Fairness Letter misled
the Applicant in any way as to what was required. His failure to research
private school options and their costs was, he now acknowledges, his mistake
because he did not realize that the family could not pay for public education
in the Ottawa-Carleton School District. I accept that the Applicant did his
best to address the issues raised in the procedural fairness letter, but he was
represented by an immigration consultant and any mistakes which he or his
counsel made cannot now be disregarded.
[74]
In the end, this case is about the failure of
the Applicant to submit sufficient information on a crucial point of concern to
the Officers. As Justice Roger Hughes pointed out in Sharma, above, at
paragraph 18, “The onus rests on the Applicants to
make out their case, including such factors as may be relevant in setting out a
workable plan. The Officer committed no reviewable error in dealing with the
matter based on the information available.”
[75]
As the Federal Court of Appeal made clear in Sapru,
above, at paragraph 32,
It follows
that I would answer the first certified question as follows:
A medical officer is not obligated to
seek out information about the applicants' ability and intent to mitigate
excessive demands on social services from the outset of the inquiry. It is
sufficient for the medical officer to provide a Fairness Letter that clearly
sets out all of the relevant concerns and provides a true opportunity to
meaningfully respond to all of the concerns of the medical officer.
In my view, the
procedural fairness letter in the present case clearly sets out all of the
relevant concerns and provided the Applicant with a true opportunity to respond
to those concerns. The Applicant’s own affidavit makes it clear that he
understood it was the costs of education that was “of most concern to the
Officer,” and that he failed to fully address this concern because of his own
misapprehension about public education in the Ottawa-Carleton School District. Although I am extremely sympathetic to the Applicant and the lost opportunity
that this case represents, I cannot on the jurisprudence make the Applicant’s
own admitted mistake the responsibility of the Officers, either by finding
procedural fairness or an unreasonable error.
[76]
Counsel agree there is no question for certification
and the Court concurs.