Date: 20110502
Docket: T-1172-10
Citation: 2011
FC 507
Toronto, Ontario, May 2, 2011
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Campbell
BETWEEN:
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TEVA CANADA LIMITED
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF HEALTH AND
SANOFI-AVENTIS CANADA INC.
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Respondents
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REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1]
The present
Application raises three issues important to the innovator and generic drug
manufacturer industries in Canada: what is the content of the authority
provided to the Minister of Health (the Minister) as the entity charged with
maintaining a Register of Innovative Drugs (the Register) pursuant to C.08.004.(9)
of the Food and Drug Regulations (C.R.C., c. 870) (the Regulations);
is judicial review available to hold the Minister accountable for decisions made
in exercising the authority; and what is the correct interpretation of the term
“approved” in the definition of “innovative drug” in C.08.004.1(1) of the Regulations?
[2]
In maintaining the
Register, the Minister extends an open invitation to innovators and generics to
make a request of the Minister with respect to the Register, and commits to
supply a response to each request. Given this invitation, by letter dated March
19, 2010, the generic manufacturer Teva Canada Ltd. (Teva) wrote to the
Minister requesting that the June 15, 2007 authorization issued to the
innovator manufacturer sanofi-aventis Canada, Inc. (Sanofi) pursuant to
C08.004.1 to sell the “innovative drug” ELOXATIN be deleted from the Register. The
definition of this term is stated in C08.004.1(1) :
“innovative drug” means a drug that
contains a medicinal ingredient not previously approved in a drug by the
Minister and that is not a variation of a previously approved medicinal
ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer, solvate or polymorph. (drogue
innovante)
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« drogue innovante » S’entend de toute
drogue qui contient un ingrédient médicinal non déjà approuvé dans une drogue
par le ministre et qui ne constitue pas une variante d’un ingrédient
médicinal déjà approuvé tel un changement de sel, d’ester, d’énantiomère, de
solvate ou de polymorphe. (innovative
drug)
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Thus,
to be authorized to sell ELOXATIN as an innovative drug it was necessary for
Sanofi to establish that the drug does not contain a medicinal ingredient that
has been “previously approved” by the Minister. The history with respect to
approval of ELOXATIN is that on June 15, 2007, the Minister issued a “Notice of
Compliance” (NOC) for the drug and, in a separate decision on or about that
date, the Minister listed ELOXATIN on the Register. Prior to that time,
ELOXATIN had neither an NOC nor a Drug Identification Number (DIN). In granting
Sanofi the authorization to sell ELOXATIN as an innovative drug, the Minister
determined that the medicinal ingredient in the drug, being oxaliplatin, had not
been previously approved in a drug, meaning that the safety and efficacy of
oxaliplatin had not been established by the rigorous testing process dictated
by the Regulations. In the present Application, Teva’s primary argument
is that ELOXATIN had been the subject of a previous “approval” on a factual
basis prior to June 15, 2007 and the Minister’s failure to include this form of
approval in reaching the decision of June 21, 2010 constitutes an error in law.
[3]
In 1999, Sanofi was
authorized to sell ELOXATIN for the treatment of life-threatening colorectal
cancer pursuant to the “Sale of New Drug for Emergency Treatment” provision found
in C.08.010(1) of the Regulations, which is known in the
pharmaceutical industry as the “Special Access Program” (the SAP). A drug authorized
for sale under the SAP is exempt from the requirements of C08.004.1 of the Regulations
meaning that the safety and effectiveness of ELOXATIN was not required to be established
pursuant to the Regulations prior to an SAP authorization being granted.
[4]
It is the evidence of
Sanofi’s wide-scale and high volume sale of ELOXATIN under the SAP between 1999
and 2005 that grounds Teva’s arguments that, by authorizing those sales, the
Minister approved the safety and efficacy of the drug, and, thus, the Minister
erred in law in granting Sanofi the innovative drug status. After providing procedural
fairness to Sanofi, in June 2010, the Minister rejected Teva’s request on a
finding that no error in law had been made.
[5]
To challenge the
Minister’s decision, on July 22, 2010, Teva launched the present judicial
review Application. Prior to the hearing of the Application the positions taken
by Sanofi on the one hand, and Teva and the Minster on the other, were
diametrically opposed on the preliminary issues of: whether the Minister has the
authority to make the decision in issue; whether the decision is subject to
judicial review; and whether Teva has standing to bring the present
Application. As a result, interlocutory motions were filed by the parties on
each issue. At the hearing of the present Application, Teva and the Minister
argued in favour of a positive result on each of the preliminary issues which
would allow the judicial review Application to proceed to hearing, a position
which Sanofi opposed. As to whether the Minister was correct in the legal
finding made in rejecting Teva’s request, assuming the Application would
proceed to hearing, Sanofi and the Minister argued that the Minister was
correct in finding no error of law was made, a position which Teva opposed. Determination
of the motions is merged into the present reasons.
[6]
For the reasons which
follow, I agree with Teva and the Minister on each preliminary issue to find no
impediment to reaching the present decision on the Application, and with respect
to the merits, I agree with Sanofi and the Minister that the decision was not
made in reviewable error.
I. What is
Content of the Minister’s Authority as the Person Charged with
Maintaining the Register?
[7]
With
respect to this issue, C.08.004.1(9)
of the Regulations expresses the delegation of authority:
(9) The Minister shall maintain a
register of innovative drugs that includes information relating to the
matters specified in subsections (3) and (4).
SOR/95-411, s. 6; SOR/2006-241, s. 1.
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(9) Le ministre tient un register des
drogues innovantes,
lequel contient les renseignements
relatifs à l’application des paragraphes (3) et (4).
DORS/95-411, art. 6; DORS/2006-241,
art. 1.
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[8]
At the
operational level, in maintaining the Register, the Minister invites innovator
and generic manufacturers to engage in the dialogue as outlined in the
Minister’s “Guidance Document on Data Protection” (Guidance Document):
[…] a drug is eligible for
listing on the Register of Innovative Drugs if it meets the definition of an
innovative drug. Protection for the innovative drug applies only where an
innovative drug has received an NOC and is marketed in Canada. If the listing is questioned on either
of these grounds, the letter of inquiry should provide details. The OPML will
confirm to both the originator of the inquiry and in innovative company that
the drug’s status has been questioned. […] The OPML will provide the results of
the assessment to both parties and will provide 30 days to each party to make
representations. After consideration of any representations received, the OPML
will endeavour to make its decision available to both parties within 30 days.
(Application Record of the
Applicant, p. 913)
With respect to the scope of
the Minister’s authority to provide the response of June 21, 2010 to Teva’s
request of March 19, 2010, the
Minister takes the following firm position with which Teva agrees:
As to the first subject, the Minister
regards Health Canada’s letter to the parties of June 21, 2010
as constituting the decision here under review. That letter was essentially a
refusal of the Applicant’s request to remove ELOXATIN from the Register of
Innovative Drugs. The refusal was not based on any position that the Minister
had no authority to remove it. Rather, it was based on the fact that
notwithstanding Teva’s representations, the Minister’s officials were not
persuaded that ELOXATIN is not an “innovative drug”. It therefore qualified for
continued inclusion on the Register.
Had the Minister’s officials been
persuaded that ELOXATIN is not an “innovative drug”, no explicit authority
would have been required for its removal from the Register. The Minister has a
duty to “maintain” the Register under subsection C.08.004.1(9) of the Food
and Drugs Regulations. Such a duty clearly implies a power both to add and
to delete information from the Register, as appropriate.
Further, the initial decision to include
information on the Register does not represent the kind of situation in which functus
officio principles have any place. Those principles concern the finality of
judgments, and the jurisdiction of a Court or administrative tribunal to reopen
a matter in which it has made a final ruling. Such is not the situation here.
Rather than a process involving anything akin to a hearing and a resulting
final decision, this matter involves ongoing dynamics. Under subsection
C.08.004.1(3), the Minister has a continuing duty, for the specified time
period, not to accept or approve a generic drug submission made on the basis of
a comparison to an “innovative drug”. If, for example, the Minister becomes
aware of circumstances indicating that in a particular case the comparison is
made to a drug that is not an “innovative drug”, the Minister must (assuming
all other requirements are satisfied) accept and approve the submission (under
sections C.08.002.1 and C.08.004).
In this regard, it should be noted that
parties other than the innovator, including other drug manufacturers, have no opportunity
to participate in the initial decision to place information on the Register of
Innovative Drugs. Indeed, any interest that those parties have may not even
arise until well after that decision.
Thus, the Minister may, for example,
entertain a request to remove a drug from the Register. Similarly, if the
request is refused, and was made by a person who would have standing under the Federal
Court Act, the refusal may be subject to judicial review.
[Emphasis in the original]
(The Minister’s Supplemental Argument,
April 5, 2011)
[9]
As mentioned, Teva’s
concern in making the March 19, 2010 request was directed to the correctness of
the 2007 decision in which the Minister authorized ELOXATIN to be placed on the
Register as an “innovative drug” based on its own interpretation of the meaning
of the word “approved”. Teva did not challenge the 2007 decision by way of
judicial review but, in the present Application, has challenged the June 21,
2010 decision as a “fresh decision” on the correctness of the 2007
authorization. The Minister accepted the obligation to answer the request, and
takes the position that it is a fresh decision subject to judicial review. Sanofi makes the following
broad and detailed objection to the Minister’s “fresh decision” position:
The Minister’s letter of June
21, 2010 does not constitute a “fresh decision” with respect to any previous
actions taken by the Minister.
The eligibility of Eloxatin
for listing on the register was determined by the Minister’s June 15, 2007
decision. The June 15, 2007 decision has not been challenged by way of a proper
application for judicial review to the Federal Court.
In its letter of March 19,
2010, Teva did not assert that it had identified any new facts subsequent to
the June 15, 2007 decision by which a “fresh decision” was said to be required
or authorized. A “fresh decision” cannot be triggered merely because a party
writes a letter to a decision maker in order to provoke a reply, with the
intention that the reply will thereby be reviewable on the very issue considered
in the original decision. At minimum, new facts other than the mere exchange of
correspondence is required.
To hold otherwise would permit
for the circumvention of the finality of administrative decisions outside of
the usual judicial review framework and time limits.
Moreover, a “fresh decision”
can only be found where the Minister had the authority to issue one. A clear
grant of statutory authority is required to give the Minister the power to
revisit or reopen her decision of June 15, 2007 in relation to the grounds
asserted by Teva. No such grant of authority exists in relation to the request
of Teva by its letter of March 19, 2010.
While the Minister has a broad
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to the health and safety of the public, Teva’s
letter is not said to relate to this authority.
As regards the data protection
regime of section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations, the
legislative grant describes situations where the Minister could be seen to be
authorized to render a “fresh decision” in the face of new facts. By way of
example, support could be found for the removal of a drug from the register if
the drug is no longer marketed in Canada
(section C.08.004.1(5)).
However, there is no provision
in the Food and Drugs Act and the Food and Drug Regulations that
would provide the Minister with the authority to revisit or reopen the June 15,
2007 for the reasons asserted by Teva and in the absence of new facts.
The Health Canada Guidance
Document on Data Protection does not provide a legislative grant of
jurisdiction, although it describes a mechanism by which a party may make an
inquiry. As noted in the Foreword to the Guidance Document on Data
Protection “Guidance documents are administrative instruments not having
force of law and, as such, allow for flexibility in approach.”
A broad authority to reopen
the June 15, 2007 decision for the reasons asserted by Teva does not arise from
section C.08.004. 1(9) that provides that the Minister “shall maintain a
register of innovative drugs that includes information relating to the matters
specified in subsections (3) and (4)”.
Such authority cannot be found
by analogy with the legislative regime of the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations (“PMNOC Regulations”), which provides a
clear grant of statutory authority to the Minister to revisit an earlier
decision to list a patent on the Patent Register. Section 3(2) of the PMNOC
Regulations authorizing the Minister to maintain a patent register states
that “To maintain the register, the Minister may refuse to add or may delete
any patent or other information that does not meet the requirements of that
section.” That language was added to the PMNOC Regulations by
amendments introduced in 1998.
No such language is found in
section C.08,004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations, notwithstanding
that this section was introduced some eight years after the amendments to the
express scope of the Minister’s powers to “maintain” under section 3(2) of the PMNOC
Regulations. Had the Legislator intended to provide for such broad
authority with regard to data protection, similar language would have been
used.
In addition, the application
of Teva raises matters which are not justiciable at the request of Teva.Whether
the problem is expressed as a lack of standing by Teva to challenge the
decision, or rather that the decision raises issues which are not justiciable
at the request of Teva, the outcome is the same: Teva cannot raise these
matters in an effort to attack the decision of the Minister.
[Emphasis in the original]
(Sanofi’s Supplemental
Argument, April 5, 2011)
The Minister’s response specifically with respect to
Sanofi’s argument that no legislative approval exists to substantiate the
Minister’s position draws a parallel to the conduct of the patented medicines
regulatory regime:
In its supplementary representations,
Sanofi refers to the specific language used in subsection 3(2) of the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, permitting the Minister to
add or delete information to or from the Patent Register “maintained” under
those Regulations. Sanofi notes that the language is not repeated in section
C.08.004.1(9) of the Food and Drug Regulations.
That language was added to the PM(NOC)
Regulations in 1998. However, as Teva has noted, the Federal Court had
previously decided (in Merck Frosst Canada v. Canada (1997), 74 C.P.R.
(3d) 307) that the duty to “maintain” the Register implies authority both to
add and to delete information to or from the Register. The amendment in 1998
was clearly made simply for greater certainty.
(The Minister’s Supplemental Argument,
April 7, 2011)
[10]
I find
that, because by statutory authority the PMNOC Regulations detail the content
of the authority provided to the Minister to maintain the Patent Register and
the Regulations presently under consideration do not, the PMNOC
Regulations are not a comparator for interpreting the Minister’s authority
under the Regulations. However, I also find that no basis exists in the
present record to support Sanofi’s argument that, because similar statutory
authority does not appear in the Regulations, the Regulations
should not be interpreted to provide the Minister with authority to add and
delete from the Register. In my opinion, logic dictates the correct result.
[11]
It is not
logically possible for the Minister to maintain the Register without an open
dialogue with the innovator and generic manufacturers based on the
understanding that, in an appropriate case, the Minister would take action to
amend the Register.
[12]
In the
April 7, 2011 supplemental argument advanced in opposition to the Minister’s
position, Sanofi makes the observation that the Guidance Document only
describes a mechanism for making an inquiry, and, with one noted exception,
implies that any reply that the Minister might give can lead to no action. I do
not accept this general proposition because, if accepted, it establishes a
situation which renders the Register a dead directory and the Minister a
passive apologist. If this were the result, no matter how serious the concern
about an entry, and how obvious it is that action should be taken with respect
to the entry, it would be an exercise in futility to talk to the Minister about
it because he or she would say that nothing can be done. In my opinion, this
assertion does not allow for the proper maintenance of the Register.
[13]
The one
exception that Sanofi does acknowledge is that, if new facts are
presented to the Minister which directly affects an authorization on the
Register, then the Minister’s consideration of the new facts and determination
on them, is capable of being considered a “fresh decision” which can have legal
force and effect in amending the Register. The example which exposes this
possibility as reasonable is new evidence that an entry made on the Register
was gained by fraud. It seems that Sanofi would not object to the removal of
the entry if the new evidence is accepted by the Minister as establishing new
facts. In my opinion, the principle of what is required to maintain the
Register should not be limited to this obvious example; the same logic can be
applied, at the very least, to an argument that an entry on the Register is
contrary to law as is argued by Teva in the present case.
[14]
As a
result, I agree that the Minister had authority to issue the “fresh decision”
of June 21, 2010.
II. Is Judicial Review Available to Hold the
Minister Accountable
for
the Decision of June 21, 2010?
[15]
In its letter
of March 19, 2010, Teva made a request for a legal determination, and the Minister
made a determination; but not the determination that Teva requested. Given that
the Minister has the authority to make the legal finding expressed in the
decision of June 21, 2010, the issue is whether judicial review is available to
Teva to question the decision, and whether Teva can take advantage of it if it is
available. The Minister does not object to being held accountable before this
Court (see: Minister’s Letter, March 21, 2011, p. 2).
[16]
Teva is
not a passive observer of the Register. It is a generic manufacturer which has
a public as well as an economic interest in selling generic drugs into the marketplace
in Canada. In bringing the Application,
Teva advances the former interest and does not deny the latter interest. In its
letter of March 19, 2010, Teva asserts that “to maintain ELOXATIN on the
Register not only undermines the purpose and intent of the Data Provisions, but
also imposes a significant hardship on Canada’s health care system with a
corresponding unjust enrichment of Sanofi” (Application Record of the
Applicant, p. 716). The hardship that Teva is referring to is that, by the
registration of ELOXATIN
as an “innovative drug” pursuant to C.08.004.1(1), Sanofi is protected from
generic competition by operation of the “Data Protection Provisions” of C.08.004.1(3) of the Regulations (see paragraph
21 of these reasons for a full description of the “data protection” operation
of C.08.004.1(3)). This enduring obstacle placed in Teva’s path towards
entering the marketplace with its generic version of ELOXATIN, is,
understandably, of
utmost interest to it. The question is whether this interest is sufficient to
give Teva standing to bring the present Application.
[17]
Generally,
there is no disagreement among the parties to the present Application that
judicial review is available to provide the opportunity to question a decision
of the Minister made within authority. However, in the initial arguments of the
parties filed in November and December 2010, the Minister and Sanofi objected to
Teva’s “standing” to bring the present Application essentially for the reason
that Teva is not someone “directly
affected by the matter in respect of which relief is sought” which is a requirement to
bring the present Application pursuant to s. 18.1(1) of the Federal Courts
Act. Both the Minister and Sanofi took the position that in order to prove
that it is directly affected, Teva must have justified its interest in the decision
presently under review by having made an attempt to enter the market by filing an
Amended Abbreviated New Drug Submission (ANDS). This argument was made even
though the ANDS would most certainly be rejected because of the protection provided
by C.08.004.1(3).
[18]
Nevertheless,
it is important to note that, well prior to the hearing of the present
Application, on January 17, 2011, Teva did attempt to file an ANDS which was
rejected by the Minister. As a result of the attempt to file, the Minister formally
abandoned the objection to Teva’s standing to bring the present Application (see:
Minister’s Letter, March 21, 2011, p. 2). However, at the hearing of the
present Application, Sanofi maintained the argument that in order for the ANDS
to have effect on Teva’s standing it must have been in place prior to the
present Application being launched. Acceptance of this argument would mean that
to challenge the Minister’s decision, Teva would have to abandon the present
Application and commence a new application with all the same arguments being
reintroduced, but for Sanofi’s argument on standing. In my opinion, this course
of action would do nothing to improve delivery of justice to any party to this
Application, but would only produce delay and lost costs for no good purpose. Therefore,
I dismiss Sanofi’s objection, and find that, by attempting to file an ANDS, in
any event of its rejection, Teva has perfected its standing to bring the
present Application.
[19]
One
evidentiary issue initiated by Teva on which motions were crossed, and not
otherwise dealt with in these reasons, concerns whether evidence not before the
Minister can be added to the judicial review record. The additional affidavit evidence
initially sought to be added by Teva included substantiations concerning
Sanofi’s activity in the SAP program which was intended by Teva to establish
that ELOXATIN had gained widespread use.
Since this evidence already existed in the contents of Teva’s March 19, 2010
letter to the Minister, at the hearing of the Application, Teva abandoned its evidentiary
motion, but with one exception. Teva continues to maintain that a “monograph”
of ELOXATIN is relevant to the present
review. Because this piece of evidence was not in the record upon which the
Minister made the decision presently under review, and because the document is
intended to prove the safety and efficacy of ELOXATIN and, therefore, is not background
information, I dismiss the motion for its admission.
III. What is the correct interpretation of
“approved” in the definition of “innovative drug” in s. C.08.004.1(1) of the Regulations?
[20]
Sanofi
supports the Minister’s position on this issue.
[21]
With
respect to how C.08.004.1 works within the scheme of the Regulations, the
Minister takes the position that safety and effectiveness are the considerations
with respect to a drug approved for public use, and that proof that a drug
meets these considerations guides the administration of the Regulations.
The Minister provides the following summary of the factors in play:
This application requires
consideration of four aspects of the legislated framework within which drugs
are regulated. They relate to drug submissions for new drugs, to submissions
for Drug Identification Numbers (“DIN”), to the Special Access Programme, and
to data protection.
Drug Submissions for New Drugs
A new drug may not be marketed
in Canada unless its manufacturer has
first obtained a notice of compliance (“NOC”) pursuant to Part C, Division 8 of
the Regulations. The manufacturer files a submission, and if the Minister finds
that the information in it satisfies him that the drug is safe and effective,
she issues an NOC.
A new drug submission (“NDS”)
is filed under section C.08.002, typically by a brand name drug manufacturer.
It usually contains voluminous clinical trial data and detailed studies. These
form the basis on which the drug is approved for sale.
An abbreviated new drug
submission (“ANDS”) is available under section C.08.002.1 to generic drug
manufacturers who wish to copy a marketed drug without having to provide
clinical data demonstrating safety and effectiveness. The manufacturer must
show instead that the generic drug is bioequivalent to a Canadian reference
product, based on pharmaceutical and, where necessary, bioavailability
characteristics.
Demonstrating bioequivalence
by a comparison to a Canadian reference product permits a generic drug
manufacturer to establish the safety and effectiveness of its product without
making a direct assessment on the basis of clinical studies. In doing so, the
generic drug manufacturer is relying on the information established about the
Canadian reference product as filed in the NDS by the brand name drug
manufacturer, which provides the primary knowledge about the safety and
effectiveness of the drug and its conditions of use.
Drug Identification Number
Submissions
No manufacturer may sell any
drug unless a drug identification number (“DIN”) has been assigned to it. A DIN
is an eight-digit numerical code that identifies drug product characteristics
including manufacturer, brand name, medicinal ingredient, strength of the
medicinal ingredient, pharmaceutical form, and route of administration. Through
the DIN, a drug can readily be tracked or recalled in the event of an adverse
drug reaction in the population.
In the case of a new drug, a
drug submission filed pursuant to Division 8 of the Food and Drug Regulations
serves as an application for a DIN. When a drug is not “new” (as that term is
defined), it is not subject to the requirements of Division 8. In that case,
the application for a DIN is made through a DIN submission, and the drug is
regulated primarily under Part C, Division 1 of the Regulations. To receive a DIN, a
drug manufacturer must file sufficient data to allow the Minister to evaluate
the safety and efficacy of the drug for its intended use, and the Minister may
refuse to issue a DIN where he believes the drug to be unsafe or ineffective.
After receiving a DIN, a
manufacturer may make changes to the drug or to the information associated with
it by filing a new DIN submission or a notification for changes. The Minister
will assess the proposed change and may require the filing of an NDS if the
change is deemed to bring the drug within the definition of “new drug”. In such
cases, the requirements for an NOC under Division 8 of the Regulations must be met.
The Special Access Programme
The Special Access Programme,
or “SAP”, is provided for in the
Regulations under the heading
“Sale of New Drug for Emergency Treatment” [C.08.010 and C.08.011].
Thus, the SAP involves
exceptional emergency situations, and is explicitly an exception to the
requirements of the Regulations. A drug administered under the SAP is, when
sold in accordance with its conditions, exempt from the requirements of the
Regulations and, specifically, is exempt from the requirements of section
C.08.002.
[…]
The operation of the SAP has
recently been summarized by the Federal Court of Appeal [in Hospira
Healthcare Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 345] as follows:
¶4 …the Director (Assistant
Deputy Minister, Health Products and Food Branch, Health Canada) may authorize
the sale of a new drug to a physician under the Special Access Programme
(“SAP”) for the emergency treatment of a patient
¶10 When requesting Health Canada for an authorization under
the SAP, a physician must: (i) describe the patient’s medical condition; (ii)
explain why the medicine is the best choice for treating the condition; and
(iii) provide data on the use, safety and efficacy of the medicine requested.
If granted, an SAP authorization authorizes, but does not require, a manufacturer
to sell a specified quantity of the medicine to the requesting physician for
the emergency treatment of a specified condition of a named patient under the
care of the physician. The physician must report to Health Canada on the use of the medicine,
including any adverse effects.
¶11 SAP authorizations…are
normally granted for serious or life-threatening conditions when conventional
treatments have proved ineffective or are not suitable for the particular
patient. Typically, medicines authorized under the SAP are treatments of last
resort and are not subject to the same level of scrutiny for safety and
efficacy as medicines for which an NOC has been issued. Nonetheless, Health Canada reviews the SAP request and
any other available data on the new medicine in order to “manage the risk” of
its use.
Data Protection
The amended “data protection”
provisions in section C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations came
into force on October 5, 2006.
As specified in subsection
C.08.004.1(2), these provisions apply to the implementation of Article 1711 of
the North American Free Trade Agreement and of paragraph 3 of Article 39
of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement.
Under these commitments, generally speaking, where a person submits undisclosed
data for approval of a pharmaceutical product, and the product utilizes a new
chemical entity, signatories are to prevent other persons from making “unfair
commercial use” of the data and (for a reasonable time) from relying on the data
in their own applications for approval.
Accordingly, to summarize
section C.08.004.1, a generic drug manufacturer may not file a submission on
the basis of a comparison to an “innovative drug” within the first six years of
the eight-year period after the drug has received an NOC. In addition, the
Minister may not issue an NOC to the generic drug manufacturer before the end
of the eight-year period’. It is these prohibitions that result in what is
known as “data protection”.
An “innovative drug” is defined
in subsection C.08.004.l(1) as “a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not
previously approved in a drug by the Minister and that is not a variation of a
previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester, enantiomer,
solvate or polymorph.”
The administration of the data
protection provisions by the Office of Patented Medicines and Liaison (“OPML”)
is outlined in Health Canada’s guidance document entitled
Data Protection under C.08.004.1 of the Food and Drug Regulations.
When determining if a drug is
an “innovative drug”, the OPML first considers whether the medicinal ingredient
was previously approved in a drug by the Minister, including a drug that
received a DIN. If it was, the drug is not an “innovative drug”, and is not
eligible for data protection.
[Emphasis in original]
(The Minister’s Memorandum of
Fact and Law, paras. 5 - 21)
[22]
Prior to ELOXATIN
being approved as an innovative drug, Sanofi obtained an NOC for the drug on
the basis of an NDS. As a result, the details of the new drug provisions
of the Regulations are important to consider. A quotation of C.08.004.(1) is next provided,
followed by the opening to C.08.002 to which it refers. The balance of
C.08.002, C.08.002.1, C.08.003, and C.08.005.1 are quoted in the ADDENDUM to
these reasons:
C.08.004. (1) Subject to section
C.08.004.1, the Minister shall, after completing an examination of a new drug
submission or abbreviated new drug submission or a supplement to either submission,
(a) if that submission or supplement
complies with section C.08.002, C.08.002.1 or C.08.003, as the case may be,
and section C.08.005.1, issue a notice of compliance;
or
(b) if that submission or supplement
does not comply with section C.08.002, C.08.002.1 or C.08.003, as the
case may be, or section C.08.005.1,
notify the manufacturer that the submission or supplement does not so comply.
|
C.08.004. (1) Sous réserve de l’article
C.08.004.1, après avoir terminé l’examen d’une présentation de drogue
nouvelle, d’une présentation abrégée de drogue nouvelle ou d’un supplément à
l’une de ces présentations, le ministre :
a) si la présentation ou le supplément
est conforme
aux articles C.08.002, .08.002.1 ou
C.08.003, selon le cas, et à l’article C.08.005.1, délivre un avis de
conformité;
b) si la présentation ou le supplément
n’est pas conforme aux articles C.08.002, C.08.002.1 ou C.08.003, selon le
cas, ou à l’article C.08.005.1, en informe le fabricant.
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C.08.002.
(1) No person shall sell or advertise a new drug unless
(a)
the manufacturer of the new drug has filed with the Minister a new drug
submission or an abbreviated new drug submission relating to the new drug
that is satisfactory to the Minister;
(b)
the Minister has issued, pursuant to section C.08.004, a notice of compliance
to the manufacturer of the new drug in respect of the new drug submission or
abbreviated new drug submission;
(c)
the notice of compliance in respect of the submission has not been suspended
pursuant to section C.08.006; and
(d)
the manufacturer of the new drug has submitted to the Minister specimens of
the final version of any labels, including package inserts, product brochures
and file cards, intended for use in connection with that new drug, and a
statement setting out the proposed date on which those labels will first be
used.
(2)
A new drug submission shall contain sufficient information and material to
enable the Minister to assess the safety and effectiveness of the new
drug, including the following:
[Emphasis added]
|
C.08.002. (1) Il est interdit de vendre
ou d’annoncer une drogue nouvelle, à moins que les conditions suivantes ne
soient réunies :
a) le fabricant de la drogue nouvelle
a, relativement à celle-ci, déposé auprès du ministre une présentation de
drogue nouvelle ou une présentation abrégée de drogue nouvelle que celui-ci
juge acceptable;
b) le ministre a, aux termes de
l’article C.08.004, deliver au fabricant de la drogue nouvelle un avis de
conformité relativement à la présentation de drogue nouvelle ou à la
présentation abrégée de drogue nouvelle;
c) l’avis de conformité relatif à la
présentation n’a pas été suspendu aux termes de l’article C.08.006;
d) le fabricant de la drogue nouvelle a
présenté au ministre, sous leur forme définitive, des échantillons des
étiquettes — y compris toute notice jointe à l’emballage, tout dépliant et
toute fiche sur le produit — destinées à être utilisées pour la drogue
nouvelle, ainsi qu’une déclaration indiquant la date à laquelle il est prévu
de commencer à utiliser ces étiquettes.
(2) La présentation de drogue nouvelle
doit contenir suffisamment de renseignements et de matériel pour permettre au
ministre d’évaluer l’innocuité et l’efficacité de la drogue nouvelle,
notamment :
[Non souligné dans l’original]
|
The list of what must be included in a new drug submission pursuant
to C.08.002.(1) is exhaustive and includes: a list of the ingredients of the
new drug; details of the tests to be applied to control the potency, purity,
stability and safety of the new drug; detailed reports of the tests made
to establish the safety of the new drug for the purpose and under the
conditions of use recommended; and substantial evidence of the clinical effectiveness
of the new drug for the purpose and under the conditions of use recommended.
[23]
There is
ample support for the Minister’s position that, with the exception of approvals
under the SAP, proof of safety and effectiveness is at the base of the approval
process under the Regulations.
[24]
Teva’s
first argument to the Minister was that safety and effectiveness can be proved
by conduct and not by a formal authorization process:
As at June 15, 2007, Eloxatin
was not an “innovative drug” (as defined in the Food and Drug Regulation)
because oxaliplatin had been previously approved by the Minister through the
widespread authorization of the drug under the Special Access Programme (“SAP”).
Eloxatin therefore did not meet the requirements for listing on the Register
(Page 2).
[…]
The Minister would not have
permitted such pervasive use of Eloxatin (and other drugs containing oxaliplatin)
under SAP if she were not satisfied as to the safety and efficacy of Sanofi’s
oxaliplatin products and generic oxaliplatin products. The safety and efficacy of
Sanofi’s oxaliplatin products had been established through the worldwide
approval of Sanofi’s oxaliplatin products, sold under the brand name Eloxatin,
at the relevant time as well as the worldwide approval of generic oxaliplatin
products (Page 6).
[Emphasis added]
(Letter of March 19, 2010)
The Minister rejected this argument:
[…] Contrary to Teva’s
submission, the OPML did not proceed on the assumption that the term
“innovative drug’ is tied to the issuance of a notice of compliance, but
rather, the OPML proceeded on the basis that the term ‘innovative drug” is
defined by reference to the approval of a drug containing the medicinal
ingredient, whether by notice of compliance or otherwise. More specifically,
the OPML is of the position that under the definition of an “innovative drug”,
drugs that contain medicinal ingredients that have been previously approved in
Canada—including drugs that have previously received a notice of compliance
and/or a drug identification number—will not be afforded data protection.
[…] Drugs sold under the SAP
have not undergone full regulatory review and, therefore, have not received
market authorization by the Minister. As such, for the purposes of subsection
C.08.004.1(1) of the Regulations, the OPML was of the view that it could not be
said that a medicinal ingredient authorized for sale under the SAP, such as oxaliplatin,
had been previously approved in a drug by the Minister. The OPML remains of
this view.
[…]
Notwithstanding Teva’s
submissions, the OPML must, in determining the eligibility for data protection
under section C.08.004.1 of the Regulations, determine whether a drug contains
a medicinal ingredient previously approved in a drug in Canada under the Regulations. As
indicated above, drugs sold under the SAP have not received market
authorization (i.e. approval) by the Minister under the Regulations and, as
such, oxaliplatin, despite having been authorized for sale under the SAP, had
not been previously approved in a drug by the Minister prior to the issuance of
the first notice of compliance for ELOXAT1N on June 15, 2007.
[Emphasis added]
(Decision, p. 3)
.
[25]
Teva’s request to the
Minister to remove ELOXATIN
from the Register depends on
the Minister’s acceptance of the proposition that Sanofi’s sales under the SAP can
constitute a finding by the Minister that the medicinal ingredient oxaliplatin is safe and effective, and that this
finding itself is an “approval”. The Minister did not accept this proposition,
which is a result with which I agree. In my opinion, there is no merit to Teva’s
argument given the demands of the Regulations.
[26]
Under the Regulations
the granting of market approval for a drug involves a two-part decision-making
process conducted by the Minister: the evidence presented by an innovator as
proof of the fact that a drug is safe and effective must be accepted by the
Minister as proving that fact, and then, as a result of that proof, the drug is
given market authorization by the Minister. That is, the drug is “approved” for
sale by the issuance of a formal legal determination. Thus, the factual finding is required as a
condition precedent to the making of the legal determination.
[27]
The issue to which
this analysis is applied is whether, in Teva’s argument advanced to
the Minister in the letter of March 19, 2010, it had discharged the evidentiary burden to prove that the
medicinal ingredient oxaliplatin
had been previously approved in a drug by the Minister. To succeed in
this argument it was necessary for Teva to prove that the Minister had made the
factual finding that oxaliplatin
is safe and effective. There is no evidence that such a factual finding
was made; attempting to put words in the Minister’s mouth does not discharge
the burden. In my opinion, the SAP sales record proves nothing about oxaliplatin’s
safety and effectiveness; it proves that many seriously ill people were willing
to take the unapproved ELOXATIN in a hope of getting well.
[28]
Teva’s
second argument to the Minister expressed by letter dated June 2, 2010 was as
follows :
The term “innovative drug” in the Data
Provisions must be interpreted and applied by the Minister with a view to the
purpose of the provisions, which has been stated by the Federal Court in Canadian
Generic Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Canada (Minister of Health) 2007 FC 725 to
be as follows:
The balancing of commercial
considerations between the protection of art innovator drug manufacturer’s
investments in preparing the NOS information in order to obtain an NOC for a
new drug arid the eventual NOC approval of generic drug manufacturer’s ANDS for
a lower cost generic version of the new drug.
The granting of two periods of
exclusivity to Sanofi (as detailed in Teva’s March 19, 2010 letter) distorts
the intended balance between the two competing objectives underlying the Data
Provisions. Therefore, the proposed interpretation of “innovative drug” by OPML
in its March 30, 2010 letter is inappropriate.
It is “a well established principle of
statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd
consequences” (Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed.
(Markham: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) at 303
-304). In its March 30, 2010 letter, the OPML fails to address the following
absurd result produced by listing Eloxatin on the Register of Innovative Drugs,
as set out in Teva’s March 19, 2010 letter:
(i) The listing of Eloxatin on the
Register has resulted in two periods of exclusivity being granted to
sanofi-aventis Canada Inc. (“Sanofi”) in respect of Eloxatin: 1999-2005, under
the Special Access Programme (‘SAP”) and 2007-2015, post-NOC for 8.5 years. This
absurd result is contrary to, and undermines the intent of, the Data
Provisions.
(ii) To maintain Eloxatin on the Register
not only undermines the purpose and intent of the Data Provisions, but also
imposes a significant hardship on Canada’s health care system with a
corresponding unjust enrichment of Sanofi.
Teva states that based on the above,
Eloxatin cannot be correctly designated an ‘innovative drug”.
(Application Record of the
Applicant, pp. 747 - 748)
The Minister dismissed this argument by the statement that “ELOXATIN was
properly added to the Register for a term of eight and one-half years from the
date of the issuance of its first notice of compliance” (Decision, p. 4). It is
obvious that the Minister could not respond to Teva’s “absurd result” argument
except to say that the Data Protection Provisions of the Regulations
were applied to ELOXATIN
as a matter of course as required by a finding that the drug is an “innovative
drug”. In
my opinion, Teva’s argument is, in essence, an attack on the Data Protection
Provisions themselves because they are considered to have a negative impact on generic
manufacturers such as Teva. I find that this argument is misplaced in the
present Application because it is extraneous to the issue of the meaning of the
term “approved” which is the issue for determination. Thus, it is dismissed.
[29]
In the
course of oral argument during the hearing of the present Application, Teva
raised a second purposive approach argument. Teva argues that the purpose of
the Data Protection Provisions is to comply with Article 1711 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement and Article 39, paragraph 3, of the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement as stated in
C.08.004.1(2), and, thereby, to protect “trade secrets”. Teva argues that this
purpose was not taken into consideration when ELOXATIN was authorized as an
innovative drug. The argument relies on the assertion that, since C.08.004.1 is
designed to protect undisclosed data, given that the data sought to be
protected by the innovative drug authorization of ELOXATIN is data arising from
Sanofi’s participation in the SAP, and given that that data was publicly
disclosed and published at the time the authorization was issued in 2007 by the
“monograph” referred to in paragraph 19 of these reasons, the Minister did not
apply the correct legal test in granting the authorization (see Hearing
Transcript pp. 73 – 78).
[30]
In the
present Application the 2007 decision is not under review. The review is
confined to the Minister’s decision of June 21, 2010, and, because Teva’s
second purposive argument just addressed was not advanced to the Minister for
decision, I find it is irrelevant to the present Application.
[31]
Therefore,
I find that the Minister is correct that, both the factual condition precedent
of a finding that a drug
is safe and effective, and a market authorization approved accordingly, are
required for a drug to be “approved” as that term is used in the definition of
an innovative drug in C.08.004.1(1)
of the Regulations.
[32]
Two final
comments are necessary.
[33]
The
Federal Court of Appeal’s decision in Hospira Healthcare Corp. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 345 requires
consideration because both the Minister and Sanofi rely on it in argument. In Hospira
the Minister’s discretion to accept evidence to prove safety and effectiveness was
in issue. In the course of finding that the Minister has discretion, the Court
of Appeal made the following statement at paragraph 6:
In our view, the Minister has
a discretion as to the nature and form of the information that will be accepted
as meeting the requirements of paragraphs C.08.002(2)(g) and (h). It may well
be that in the vast majority of cases, the requirements of those provisions
would and should be met by pre-clinical and clinical data from clinical trials performed
by the party seeking the notice of compliance. However, the Minister has the
discretion to permit the requirements of these provisions to be met by some
other means including, for example, reports of clinical trials conducted by
others. At the same time, we accept the submission of counsel for the Minister
that the safety and efficacy of a drug cannot be established solely on the
basis that its use has been permitted under the Special Access Programme, even
if permission has been given thousands of times as is the case with the drug in
issue.
In my opinion this statement is not relevant to the present Application
because it deals with an issue that is not directly in play. The statement is
with respect to the kind of evidence that the Minister can accept upon which to
find that a drug is safe and effective. On the basis of Teva’s primary
argument, the issue in the present case is whether a finding of safety and effectiveness
was made by the Minister.
[34]
Following
completion of the hearing on the present Application, the decision in CGPA
v. Minister of Health and Glaxosmithkline Inc., 2011 FC 465 has been
released. In that case, Justice de Montigny held that the Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association was not “directly affected” by the Minister’s
decision to maintain the listing of fluticasone furoate on the Register of
Innovative Drugs and, therefore, did not have standing to challenge the
decision by judicial review. The ratio of the decision is that the CGPA did not
have standing, and could not obtain standing, because it is an association
which represents generic drug manufacturers, and, as such, could never file an
ANDS which would either be accepted or rejected by the Minister. Thus, because
Teva is not in this same position, I find that the decision is not relevant to
the present Application.
IV.
Conclusion
[35]
As stated
in Dunsmuir v. New
Brunswick,
2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at paragraph 50, normally questions of law are
reviewed on the standard of correctness:
[…] When applying the
correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision
maker’s reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the
question. The analysis will bring the court to decide whether it agrees with
the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its
own view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask
whether the tribunal’s decision was correct.
In Epicept Corp. v. Canada
(Minister of Health), 2010 FC 956, with respect to questions of statutory
interpretation of the Regulations, while acknowledging that in some
circumstances the standard of reasonableness is the appropriate standard to
apply even to a question of law, and deference to a decision-maker may be
required where the question of law is within the decision-maker’s specialized
area of expertise and is not of central importance to the legal system
generally, Justice Near determined that the Minister is not to be accorded such
deference (paragraph 40).
Therefore, on the basis of the
analysis provided in these reasons, I find that the Minister was correct in
determining the meaning of “approved”, and, as a result, the Minister’s
decision is not made in reviewable error.
ORDER
For the reasons provided, the present Application is
dismissed.
The issue of costs will be
determined in a separate order following submissions by Counsel.
“Douglas
R. Campbell”