Date:
20120831
Docket:
IMM-5924-11
Citation:
2012 FC 1045
Ottawa, Ontario,
August 31, 2012
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice de Montigny
BETWEEN:
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DELIA PATRICIA FLORES GONZALEZ
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT
[1]
This
is an application under subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001 c 27 [IRPA or the “Act”] to judicially review the
decision of an immigration officer (the “Officer”) at Citizenship and
Immigration Canada (CIC) dated August 16, 2011. The Officer refused the
Applicant’s permanent residence application on the basis that, as a member of
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), an organization that has
engaged in acts of terrorism, she is inadmissible as a person described in
paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.
1. Facts
[2]
The
Applicant is a 44 year-old citizen of El Salvador and has been living in Canada since 2002.
[3]
On
August 4, 2002, the Applicant arrived in Canada from the United States of
America (USA) where she had been living illegally with her estranged husband,
Renato Menendez (“Renato”), who is a Canadian citizen. They had been in the USA since 1999, having fled there from El Salvador to escape the Salvadoran civil war.
[4]
Upon
arrival at the Fort Erie port of entry, the Applicant claimed refugee status
because she feared persecution on the basis of her political beliefs. Renato
was not present at the port of entry when she completed a Schedule 1 –
Background Information Form (the “Schedule 1 Form”). In her Schedule 1 Form,
which was completed with the assistance of a Spanish translator, the Applicant
indicated that she had been a member of the FMLN. The Applicant answered “yes”
to the following questions on the Schedule 1 Form:
G.
Have you ever used, planned, or advocated the use of armed struggle or
violence to reach political, religious or social objectives?
H. Have
you ever been associated with a group that used, uses, advocated or advocates
the use of armed struggle or violence to reach political, religious or social
objectives?
[5]
The
Applicant also said in the Schedule 1 Form that she “used to be a member of the
guerilla - FMLN” and that some of the guerillas used force, but she had not done
so. At the bottom of the Schedule 1 Form, the Applicant signed a declaration,
saying that the information she gave in the form was truthful, complete, and
correct, and that she understood all the statements in the Schedule 1 Form
“having asked for and obtained an explanation on every point that was not clear
to [her].” She also declared that she would immediately inform CIC if any of
the information in the form changed.
[6]
To
support her refugee claim, the Applicant submitted a Personal Information Form
(PIF) to the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board
(RPD). The PIF she completed indicates on the first page that the information
provided must be complete, true, and correct; it also required the Applicant to
notify the RPD if any of the information in it changed. She completed the PIF
with Renato’s help and he signed the interpreter’s declaration indicating that
he had accurately interpreted the contents of the form for her.
[7]
In
her PIF narrative, reproduced at page 44 of the Applicant’s Record, the
Applicant wrote that she first sympathized with the FMLN guerillas in her teen
years. At that time, she believed that one option for changing El Salvador was revolution. She also wrote that, in 1985, she met people in FMLN and
learned methods for collecting information on people who disagreed with the
guerillas. She also learned how to use a gun for protection, and participated
by preparing propaganda, organizing strikes, and gathering intelligence.
Further, the Applicant sheltered guerillas in her home after they made attacks
in two of El Salvador’s major cities.
[8]
On
May 9, 2005, the RPD declared the Applicant’s refugee claim abandoned. Also in
May of that year, the Applicant applied for a Permanent Resident Visa with
Renato as her sponsor. The Certified Tribunal Record (CTR) does not include
her application form related to this application and does not show if she
disclosed her membership in FMLN at that time.
[9]
On
January 6, 2006, Renato was convicted of uttering threats to the Applicant. As
a term of his probation for this offence, Renato was forbidden from having
contact with the Applicant. He wrote to CIC on December 20, 2007, declaring
that he wanted to withdraw his sponsorship of the Applicant. He stated in this
letter that they had been separated for three years, since 2004.
[10]
CIC
denied the Applicant’s 2005 permanent residence application (CTR page195) on
February 26, 2008. The officer who denied that application said that she was
not satisfied that the Applicant’s marriage to Renato was not entered into
primarily for immigration purposes. That officer noted that they had ceased to
cohabit before she submitted her application for permanent residence and said
that the Applicant attempted to gain permanent resident status through misrepresentation.
[11]
The
Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) informed the Applicant on December 10,
2008, that she was eligible to apply for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA).
She applied for a PRRA on December 22, 2008. On her PRRA application form, she
indicated that she had not been a member of a paramilitary organization or
involved in armed conflict.
[12]
The
Applicant also referred to her counsel’s submissions in response to the
direction on her PRRA application form to set out all significant events which
had caused her to seek protection outside of El Salvador. In these submissions,
the Applicant said that she left El Salvador because of the ongoing strife in
that country. She also said that Renato had abused her during their
relationship and that she largely followed the instructions of her husband as
to immigration matters in Canada. Finally, she stated that Renato had filled
out the PIF on her behalf because she trusted him, but that she did not
understand its contents. At the bottom of the PRRA form, the Applicant signed a
declaration that the information within that form was truthful, complete, and
correct.
[13]
On
November 3, 2008, the Applicant also submitted an application for permanent
residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds under subsection 25(1) of
the Act (an “H&C Application”). The form she filled out for the H&C
Application asked her to list all the organizations she had belonged to since
her eighteenth birthday, including political and social organizations. In
submissions she made with her H&C Application, the Applicant again stated
that Renato had completed her PIF and that she did not understand its contents.
She also reiterated her position that she had not questioned him about its
contents and had signed it on his instructions. The Applicant did not disclose
her FMLN membership in her H&C Application. She declared that the
information in the H&C Application form and her submissions was truthful,
complete, and correct (CTR page 208).
[14]
CIC
informed the Applicant by letter dated September 9, 2009, (the “Interim
Letter”) that her H&C Application was approved in principle. The Interim
Letter informed her that CIC had approved an exemption under section 25 of the
Act. It also informed her that she would need to meet all other statutory requirements
of the Act and that her application could be refused if she did not meet those
requirements. The CBSA informed the Applicant on September 9, 2009, that her
PRRA file was closed because her H&C Application was approved in principle.
[15]
The
Applicant made additional submissions in support of her H&C Application on
March 22, 2011, (CTR page 140) including an updated application form. This form
was the same as the one she had completed in 2008. She again did not mention
her FMLN membership and declared that this information was also truthful,
complete and correct.
[16]
On June 2, 2011,
the Officer requested the Applicant’s file from the RPD, including her PIF and
any documents entered as evidence. He wrote to the Applicant on June 13, 2011,
to inform her that he believed she might be inadmissible under subsection 34(1)
of the Act (the “Fairness Letter”). The Officer invited the Applicant to attend
an interview at CIC in order to address these concerns. He said that
information indicated that she may have been an FMLN member, and included with
his letter documents on the FMLN and its activities.
[17]
The
Officer interviewed the Applicant on August 4, 2011. He began by explaining
that the interview was to discuss her admissibility under section 34 of the
Act. The Officer asked the Applicant if the information in her PIF was correct,
to which she replied that Renato had completed it. She confirmed that it was
her signature in the declaration portion of her PIF. When asked about the FMLN
membership, the Applicant said she was never involved with them, had no role in
the organization, and that she had no opinion on the events which occurred in El Salvador while the FMLN was a terrorist organization. The Applicant also said she had
not seen combat and did not know what the FMLN was fighting for, though she
knew that the current President of El Salvador was a member of the FMLN. The
Applicant told the Officer that what she said to him was the complete truth.
[18]
The
Officer wrote to the Applicant again on August 16, 2011 (the “Refusal Letter”).
In this letter, he told her that it appeared she was inadmissible under
paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act because of her involvement with the FMLN. The
Officer wrote that he had considered the information in her application along
with the results of her interview. The Officer refused the Applicant’s
permanent residence application on the grounds of inadmissibility described
under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act.
2. The impugned
decision
[19]
The
decision in this case consists of the Refusal Letter and the Officer’s
memorandum to the Intelligence Directorate of the CBSA’s Enforcement Branch.
[20]
The
Officer briefly reviewed the Applicant’s immigration history. He then reviewed
the documents that had been sent to the Applicant with the Fairness Letter, as
well as sections 33 and 34 of the Act. The Officer informed himself regarding
the test for inadmissibility under paragraph 34(1)(f) of the Act. He said that
he needed to have reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant was a member
of a group that there are reasonable grounds to believe engaged, engages, or
will engage in acts of terrorism. He noted that, although the test involves a
subjective assessment, it requires objective evidence.
[21]
The
Officer also reviewed the legal definitions of “terrorism” and “member.” He
noted that the Supreme Court of Canada defined terrorism in Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para 98
as follows:
[Any]
act intended
to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a
situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.
[22]
The
Federal Court of Appeal reviewed the notion of membership in Poshteh v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85, [2005] FCR
487, and said that, based in part on the availability of an exemption from the
operation of paragraph 34(1)(f) in appropriate circumstances under subsection
34(2) of the Act, “the term ‘member’ under the Act should continue to be
interpreted broadly” (at paragraph 29).
[23]
As
for the FMLN, the Officer found that it was a Marxist-Leninist group that was
founded in 1980 with the goal of overthrowing the El Salvadoran government. The
FMLN had used violence in its attempt to achieve its goal and had destroyed a
suspension bridge, attacked El Salvador’s electricity infrastructure, and
detonated a bomb in a market in San Salvador which killed nine civilians and
two soldiers. The Officer concluded that, although the FMLN had become an
official political party, he was satisfied that there were reasonable grounds
to believe it was an organization that has engaged in acts of terrorism.
[24]
Having
determined that the FMLN was a terrorist organization, the Officer examined the
Applicant’s ties to the group. In her PIF, she made several statements that
suggested her involvement to the Officer.
[25]
The
Officer also noted that the Applicant had not indicated that she was a member
of the FMLN in the H&C forms she completed in 2011. He further noted her
denial at the interview of the statements made in her PIF, her statement that
Renato had completed the PIF on her behalf, and the fact that she had confirmed
the declaration at the bottom of the PIF. The Officer noted that the Applicant
said she had become aware of the PIF content at a hearing in 2009 and that she
had not read it until a week prior to the interview because her English was
poor.
[26]
At
the interview, the Officer also asked the Applicant why, if her PIF was not
true, she had said at the port of entry that she was an FMLN member. She
answered that Renato had told her what to say and that Renato told her to lie,
as this was a sure way to get into Canada. When confronted at the interview
with the statements from her PIF, she said she did not support the FMLN cause,
did not know any FMLN members, and had not collected information on behalf of
the FMLN. She also denied participating in propaganda activities, sheltering
guerillas, or receiving weapons training. When asked why she left El Salvador, the Applicant said she left to obtain a better education for her daughters.
[27]
The
Officer noted that the Applicant did not dispute that the FMLN was a terrorist
organization, though she denied involvement with the group. He found that she
was downplaying her role in FMLN because she learned that it would be an
obstacle to obtaining status in Canada. The Officer found that it was not
reasonable to believe that she first learned of the contents of her PIF in
2009. He found that the statements she made in her PIF about being a member of
FMLN were true in light of similar statements made previously at the port of
entry.
[28]
The
Officer found that the Applicant, by her own admission, was a member of FMLN
for fifteen years. During that time, she had attended meetings, collected
information about the FMLN’s opposition, organized strikes, circulated
propaganda, and received weapons training. The Officer found that these
activities met the threshold for membership as they were more than casual in
nature. The fact that she had received weapons training suggested that she
knowingly put herself in danger through her support of the FMLN.
[29]
The
Officer found that the Applicant had joined the FMLN of her own free will and
would have been aware of the group’s violent activities. On all the facts
before him, the Officer was satisfied that the Applicant was a member of the
FMLN. The Officer denied the Applicant’s permanent residence application on
that basis.
3. The issues
[30]
This
application for judicial review raises the following three issues:
i) Did the
Officer err by failing to adequately consider all of the evidence?
ii) Did the
Officer err procedurally by failing to consult with the National Security
Division prior to rendering his decision?
iii) Did the
Officer err procedurally by failing to exercise his discretion to refer the
matter to a delegated authority to assess whether, on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds, the Applicant should be exempted from the
inadmissibility determination?
4. Analysis
Preliminary
issue
[31]
Before
addressing the substantive issues raised by this application, a word must be
said about the motion for non-disclosure brought by the Respondent pursuant to
section 87 of IRPA. The CTR was filed with this Court on January 4, 2012. The
cover letter accompanying the CTR indicated that certain pages or portions
thereof had not been disclosed on the grounds that disclosure would be
injurious to national security or to the safety of any person, or on the
grounds that the information consisted of third-party information unrelated to
this case. By letter dated January 26, 2012, the Respondent forwarded another
letter to this Court and to the parties, advising that certain pages that had
previously been redacted in their entirety were now being fully disclosed. In
addition, one page was modified so that certain portions of the page were no
longer black-lined.
[32]
In
support of the motion for non-disclosure of information, the Respondent
presented to this Court a classified affidavit that included the information
which the Respondent does not want disclosed to the public or to the Applicant
and her counsel. Having carefully reviewed that affidavit and the information
redacted, and having heard the Respondent in an in camera hearing held
on March 22, 2012, I indicated that the motion for non-disclosure would be
granted, for the following reasons.
[33]
First
of all, the information redacted is not substantial and does not prejudice the
Applicant in making her case. Moreover, that information is not material to
the issues raised on the application for judicial review and the Respondent
does not rely on the confidential information for the purpose of responding to
the Applicant’s application for judicial review. Finally, counsel for the
Applicant consented to the Respondent’s motion.
[34]
Secondly,
I am satisfied that the disclosure of the redacted information could have a detrimental
effect on the ability of investigative agencies to fulfil their mandates in
relation to Canada’s national security. If released, that information would be
injurious to the national security of Canada or endanger the safety of
persons. Therefore, it ought not be disclosed to the public or to the
Applicant and her counsel.
Standard
of review
[35]
The
Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008]
1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir], held that a standard of review analysis need not
be conducted in every instance. Where the standard of review applicable to a
particular question before the court is well-settled by past jurisprudence, the
reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. Only where this search
proves fruitless must the reviewing court undertake a consideration of the four
factors comprising the standard of review analysis.
[36]
In
Naeem v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 123,
[2007] 4 FCR 658, Justice Eleanor Dawson held at paragraph 40 that the standard
of review on an admissibility decision under section 34 of the Act was
reasonableness simpliciter. Justice Frederick Gibson made a similar
finding in Naeem v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 1375, [2008] FCJ no 750, at paragraph 19. Further, Justice Anne Mactavish
held at paragraph 35 of Hagos v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 1214, [2011] FCJ no 1484, that the standard of review
on an admissibility finding under section 34 was reasonableness. Accordingly,
the standard of review on the first issue is reasonableness.
[37]
When
reviewing a decision on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis will be
concerned with “the existence of justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process [and also with] whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (see Dunsmuir, above, at
para 47, and Khosa v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009
SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 at para 59). Put another way, the Court should
intervene only if the decision was unreasonable in the sense that it falls
outside the “range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in
respect of the facts and law.”
[38]
On
the second and third issues, Justice Judith Snider held in Zaki v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1066, [2005]
FCJ no 1314 at para 14, that the fettering of discretion is an
issue of procedural fairness. Justice Richard Mosley made a similar finding in Benitez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2006 FC 461, [2007] 1 FCR 107 at para 133. Finally, the Federal Court of Appeal
held in Thamotharem v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2007 FCA 198, [2008] 1 FCR 385 at para 33, that the standard of review with
respect to fettering
of discretion
is correctness. The standard of review on these issues, therefore, is
correctness.
i) Did the Officer err by failing to
adequately consider all of the evidence?
[39]
The
Applicant does not take issue with the finding by the Officer that the FMLN
is/was a terrorist organization. The Applicant only takes issue with the
finding by the Officer that she was a member of the FMLN.
[40]
The
Applicant argues that the Officer did not examine all the evidence which was
before him when he concluded that she was inadmissible under paragraph 34(1)(f)
of IRPA. According to the Applicant, the only time she said she was an FMLN
member was in her PIF, which Renato completed for her. She made no mention of
the FMLN in her 2005 application for permanent residence, her 2008 H&C
Application, or the supplementary H&C Application form she submitted in
2011. While this would tend to show that she was not trying to minimize her
involvement with the FMLN in order to gain status in Canada, and that she was
consistent since at least 2008 in asserting that she did not know the contents
of her PIF, this is inconsistent with the statements made by the Applicant at
the port of entry.
[41]
The
Applicant also contended, however, that the Officer did not consider the
abusive nature of the Applicant’s relationship with Renato. This would explain
why the Applicant signed her PIF without knowing its contents, blindly trusted
his advice and followed his advice in answering the questions at the port of
entry as she did.
[42]
After
carefully reviewing the file and considering the oral and written submissions
from both counsel, I find that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the
Officer ignored any evidence or improperly considered the evidence when he
assessed the credibility of the Applicant’s assertion that she was not a member
of the FMLN. She clearly indicated that she had been a member of the FMLN when
she answered questions set out in the Schedule 1 Form at the port of
entry. Renato was not present when she completed this form. The entire form
was interpreted for her. The Officer found it difficult to believe her story
that she could have no idea of the contents of her PIF given that she had made
similar statements at the port of entry.
[43]
Her
explanation that she was unaware that her husband had said she was a member of
the FMLN until she became apprised of the content of her PIF in 2009, does not
address the fact that at the port of entry she claimed to be a member of the
FMLN. She cannot claim that she did not know about this statement, as she made
it in the presence of an interpreter. I agree with the Respondent that the
Officer’s reliance upon this noted contradiction is reasonable and well within
the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of
the facts and of the law.
[44]
I
also agree with the Respondent that the Applicant’s abusive relationship with
Renato is immaterial to the Officer’s findings and is not relevant to the credibility
of her explanation that she did not know what was written in her PIF. The
abusive relationship cannot explain the fact that she must have known about her
claim of membership in the FMLN even prior to completing the PIF since this was
the statement she made at the port of entry while she was assisted by an
interpreter.
[45]
If
the Applicant’s assertion that she was coached into misrepresenting her role
with the FMLN to obtain refugee status in Canada were to be accepted, questions
arise as to why the Applicant persisted in misrepresenting herself to the
Respondent, even after having separated from her husband in 2004. If she had
truly been coached, one might have expected the Applicant to take steps to
rectify her prior fraudulent representations in subsequent applications or
correspondence. The fact that she made no such attempt and made no express
mention of her membership in the FMLN in her 2005 permanent residence
application or in any subsequent forms or correspondence with CIC undermines
the credibility of this claim.
[46]
With
these considerations in mind, it was reasonable for the Officer to conclude
that the Applicant lacked credibility and modified her story so as to secure a
status in Canada. The Officer made a reasonable decision when he rejected her
explanation for not disavowing membership sooner, and it was open to him to
disbelieve her later disavowal of that membership.
ii) Did the Officer err
procedurally by failing to consult with the National Security Division prior to
rendering his decision?
[47]
The
Applicant alleges that the Officer, though not bound to follow Operational
Manuals, acted in a manner contrary to section 5 of ENF 2/OP 18:
Evaluating Inadmissibility by failing to consult with the CBSA’s
National Security Division prior to deciding on her inadmissibility. According
to the Applicant, this has the double implication that the Officer did not
apply the law in a consistent manner, carry out his duties “with prudence” or
establish his reasons “with the utmost clarity” (see Daud v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 701, [2008] FCJ no 913 at
para 8).
[48]
As
the Applicant herself conceded, it is trite law that policy guidelines are not
legally binding on immigration officers. The policy itself states that
officers “should not” refuse an application based on subsection 34(1)
allegations without first consulting the CBSA’s National Security Screening
Division. It is true that the opening paragraph of section 5 of that
Operational Manual states that “[s]hould CIC officers encounter security
issues, they must seek guidance from the appropriate section of the National
Security Division at the CBSA, NHQ.” In the case at bar, however, the facts did
not require the Officer to consult with the National Security Division as the Applicant
had clearly admitted on at least two occasions to being a member of the FMLN,
which, incidentally, she concedes to be an organization that has engaged in
terrorism. Any request for guidance in those circumstances would have been
superfluous.
iii) Did the
Officer err procedurally by failing to exercise his discretion to refer the
matter to a delegated authority to assess whether, on humanitarian and
compassionate grounds, the Applicant should be exempted from the
inadmissibility determination?
[49]
Counsel
for the Applicant submitted that the Officer erred because he fettered his
discretion by not considering, on his own initiative, an H&C exemption from
paragraph 34(1)(f) of IRPA. In support of this conclusion, the Applicant
points to the fact that the Officer does not address any H&C factors such
as, for example, the best interests of the child or establishment in Canada. Once again, I must disagree with the Applicant.
[50]
When,
as in the case herein, the Applicant has not made a specific request to be
exempted from an inadmissibility finding, the decision to consider H&C
grounds for exemption from the inadmissibility determination is wholly
discretionary. Applicants remain responsible for requesting such an exemption,
as is made clear by sections 5.25 and 5.27 of the CIC Operational Bulletin IP
5 – Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian and Compassionate
Grounds, which state as follows:
5.25
[…]
If the applicant did not specifically request an
exemption and the inadmissibility was discovered during the application
process, the officer can refuse the application.
[…]
5.27
[…]
When the applicant does not directly request an
exemption, but facts in the application suggest that they are requesting an
exemption for the inadmissibility, officers should treat the application as
if the exemption has been requested. [Emphasis in the original]
[…]
[51]
Counsel
for the Applicant relied on my decision in Rogers v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 26, 339 FTR 191 [Rogers],
for the proposition that the Officer erred by failing to consider exempting the
Applicant on H&C grounds from her inadmissibility. The Applicant’s
reliance on Rogers, however, ignores an important statement that I made
at paragraph 41 of that case:
The respondent is no doubt correct in stating that
no breach of procedural fairness is established on the mere basis that the
immigration officer did not put the applicant’s case forward for consideration
for an exemption on his own initiative. Although the Bulletin contemplates
situations in which an immigration officer may consider putting an applicant’s
case forward for an exemption in the absence of a request from an applicant, it
cannot mandate an officer to do so.
[52]
Moreover,
Rogers was fact specific and can easily be distinguished from the
present one. In Rogers, the applicant was self-represented and he
filled out an application for permanent residence that contained no information
on presenting an H&C claim. It is in that context that the Court concluded
that the Officer should have considered whether there were sufficient grounds
to grant an exemption.
[53]
In
the case at bar, on the other hand, the Applicant had the benefit of both legal
counsel and new permanent residence application forms that instruct applicants
that they must clearly indicate that they wish to be considered for an
exemption to overcome an inadmissibility, thus bringing the form in line with
the CIC Operational Bulletin IP 5. As a result, the Officer was not
required to consider an H&C exemption without a proper request. Not only
has the Applicant never explicitly requested an exemption from an
inadmissibility finding, but she never even implicitly alluded to that
possibility. The Applicant knew that the basis of the interview in 2011 was to
consider whether she was inadmissible. She could have made a request for an
exemption; however, she did not do so, choosing instead to go to great lengths
to convince the Officer that she was never at any given time a member of the
FMLN. In those circumstances, the Officer cannot be faulted for not having
considered that possibility.
[54]
In
light of all the foregoing reasons, I find that this application for judicial
review ought to be dismissed. Of course, the Applicant is still entitled to
make an application for ministerial relief under subsection 34(2) of IRPA.
JUDGMENT
THIS
COURT’S JUDGMENT is that this application for judicial review is
dismissed. No question was proposed for certification, and none arises.
"Yves de
Montigny"
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