Date: 20101208
Docket: IMM-2185-10
Citation: 2010
FC 1246
Ottawa, Ontario,
December 8, 2010
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Kelen
BETWEEN:
|
SEZGIN KARADENIZ
|
|
|
Applicant
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
|
|
Respondent
|
|
|
|
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT AND
JUDGMENT
[1]
This is an
application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board), dated March 22, 2010,
concluding that the applicant is not a Convention refugee or person in need of
protection pursuant to sections 96 or 97 of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c.27 (the Act) because the applicant does not
have a well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey on a Convention ground, nor
would his removal to Turkey subject him personally to a risk to his life, or to
a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a risk of torture.
FACTS
Background
[2]
The
applicant is a 26 year-old citizen of Turkey.
He arrived in Canada with his cousin in August
2008 and claimed refugee protection based upon his religion and his political
and social views and activities. The applicant’s claim was initially joined
with his cousin’s but was disjoined at the hearing because his cousin had
returned to Turkey.
[3]
The
applicant and his family are members of the Alevi religion and supporters of
the Labour Party, a leftist political party in Turkey. The persecution faced by the family on
account of their Alevi religion caused the applicant’s brother to flee Turkey to Canada in 2002, where he was granted refugee
protection.
[4]
The
applicant became politically engaged after completing his compulsory military
training in 2005. The discrimination that he experienced in the military caused
him to become more conscious of the plight of minorities in Turkey, including Alevis and Kurds.
In March 2006, the applicant and his cousin joined an Alevi group called the
Pirsultan Abdal Cultural and Solidarity Association and joined the Labour Party.
[5]
In
connection with their membership in these two organizations, the applicant and
his cousin attended a number of cultural celebrations and political
demonstrations. On seven occasions, the applicant and his cousin were arrested
while attending such events, and it is the applicant’s treatment on these seven
occasions that ultimately drove him from Turkey. In brief, the applicant’s account of
the seven arrests is as follows:
1. On March 21, 2006, the
applicant and his cousin were arrested at a Kurdish New Year celebration in
Istanbul and held for two days at the police station, where the applicant was
abused and interrogated about his relationship with the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (the PKK), to which the applicant says he is unaffiliated.
2. On March 21, 2007, the
applicant and his cousin were again arrested at a Kurdish New Year celebration
in Istanbul and the applicant was again interrogated
about his connection to the PKK. Knowing about his previous arrest, the police
threatened the applicant with serious physical harm should he be found at a
pro-PKK demonstration in the future.
3. In November of 2007, the
applicant and his cousin attended a political demonstration organized by the
Labour Party and some other leftist organizations in Alanya. The applicant and his
cousin photographed the demonstration, including police abuses during the
ensuing raid. They were arrested, had their photographs confiscated, and were ultimately
interrogated and held for four days. Upon their release, they were warned
against participating in future demonstrations in Alanya.
4. Two days later, they were
re-arrested and interrogated about passing information about the police to
foreigners. They were detained for three days and subsequently fired from their
jobs because their manager did not want problems with the police.
5. On March 22, 2008, the
applicant and his cousin went to Ankara to join in a large protest organized by
the Labour party in response to a government crackdown on Labour Party and
leftist leaders in Turkey. The applicant and his cousin
were arrested while photographing a police raid on Labour Party headquarters.
The applicant and his cousin were detained for ten days, and mistreated while
in custody.
6. On May 1, 2008, the applicant
and his cousin attended a May Day celebration in Istanbul, following which they helped distribute
flyers criticizing the government. The cousins were arrested and interrogated
in the anti-terror branch of the Security Directorate, where they were detained
for ten days. Upon their release, they were warned that if they were ever
caught inciting people against the state again, they would be held permanently
in custody.
7. On July 2, 2008, the cousins
attended an Alevi commemoration event in Istanbul. The cousins were again arrested on a
police raid, and held for fifteen days. They were threatened with death and
told that they could easily be framed as being involved in a notorious plot to
overthrow the government.
[6]
Following
these incidents, the applicant feared for his life and fled to Canada. His family informs him that
the police have been looking for him and that some of his family members have
been arrested for their own political activities. In addition, the applicant
stated that his cousin was arrested by Turkish police at the airport upon his
return to Turkey on February 12, 2010, and has
not been heard from since the arrest.
Decision Under Review
[7]
On March
22, 2010, the Board dismissed the applicant’s refugee claim because he did not
have a well-founded fear of persecution for Convention grounds nor was he a
person in need of protection because his removal to Turkey would subject him to a risk to his life,
or to cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to torture.
[8]
The
Board’s reasons turned upon its credibility findings. In particular, the Board found
that the applicant failed to provide credible evidence to support his fear of
persecution upon his return to Turkey. The Board found that the
applicant had failed to show, on a balance of probabilities, the allegations of
material fact upon which his claim was based – namely, the persecution he
suffered upon his arrest on seven separate occasions.
[9]
The Board
cited three reasons for its rejection of the applicant’s evidence. First, the
Board found that the applicant’s description of his arrests was inconsistent
with documentary evidence regarding country conditions in Turkey. Second, the Board drew a
negative inference from the absence of any corroborative documentation
regarding the various arrests. Third, the Board questioned the plausibility of
the applicant and his cousin being subjected to the exact same treatment on
each of the seven arrests.
[10]
With
regard to inconsistencies between the objective documentary evidence regarding
country conditions in Turkey and the applicant’s evidence
regarding his arrests, the Board stated that Turkish law mandates that a
suspect may usually be detained for only 24 hours, with prosecutorial
discretion to extend the detention to 48 hours. Detainees are entitled to an
attorney and one will be provided by the state in the event that a detainee
cannot afford his own.
[11]
The Board
recognized that the documentation reveals that these regulations are
irregularly enforced. At para. 8 the Board stated:
¶8. . . . There is a significant
problem with the physical abuse of detainees. The police detained and harassed
members of human rights organizations media personnel and human rights
monitors. Demonstrators were often detained for a few hours at a time….
[12]
However,
the Board further found that, especially in urban areas, detainees are
usually able to consult with an attorney shortly after being detained, and are
generally allowed prompt access to family members. The Board questioned the
likelihood that on seven separate occasions the applicant would be arrested and
detained, without charge, by the police, and never once have the regulations
properly observed by the police:
¶8. . . . The only times the
authorities in part complied with the law was on the first two detentions when
the claimant states that he was able to communicate with his family. Other than
this each of the seven detentions themselves, occurring without a warrant, were
illegal according to Turkish law, the length of detention was well outside of
what was permitted, he was never offered legal counsel though five of these
alleged detentions occurred in the largest cities in Turkey, urban areas where
the Bar Associations indicate detainees are provided with legal counsel, during
the last five detentions including the last three more lengthy detentions he
was not allowed to communicate with his family, again in contrast to what the
lawyers and human rights monitors state occurs. . . .
[13]
The Board
asked the applicant why he had never requested a lawyer, but was not persuaded
by his explanations. The Board concluded in the same paragraph:
¶8. . . . . Now if only a few of
these alleged arrests had been inconsistent with the documentation it would
have been easier for me to accept as credible such anomalies, however as
indicated all seven arrests of both the claimant and his cousin appear
inconsistent. I also find it hard to accept as credible the claimant’s evidence
with respect to never requesting or consulting a lawyer. The claimant presents
a profile of himself as someone who is a strong supporter of leftist political
parties and someone who has worked to support the Alevi community by denouncing
and demonstrating against abuse and discrimination. However when the claimant
and his cousin are subjected to one illegal detention after another he never
asserted his right for legal counsel even once. Furthermore on each occasion
after he was released he did not take any action to publicize or protest how he
and his cousin had been treated.
[14]
With
regard to the absence of evidence to support the applicant’s allegations, the
Board found that given that on at least some of the occasions the applicant
seems to have been arrested while engaging in high-profile activities – for
example, the arrest that occurred while photographing the police raid on the
headquarters of the Labour Party and the arrest of its leader – the absence of
any mention of the arrest of a photographer in media reports of the incidents
is suspicious. Finally, the Board found that because the applicant stated that
the Labour Party was aware of his detentions and abuses, some corroborating
letter or indication of support for the applicant from the Labour Party would
be expected. The Board concluded at para. 10 that “[c]umulatively, the lack of
any corroborative documents further undermines the claimant’s credibility.”
[15]
Finally,
the Board doubted the plausibility of the applicant’s claim that the seven
incidents of illegal arrest that he suffered were suffered in the exact same
way by his cousin. The Board concluded at para. 10:
¶10. . . . While I could accept as
credible that the claimant and his cousin experienced many similar incidents
the allegation that all seven arrests occurred as alleged is outside the realm
of what I believe could be reasonably expected given the totality of the
evidence and bearing in mind prevailing country conditions. . . .
[16]
The Board
therefore rejected the applicant’s evidence, and found that he did not provide
reasonable explanations to assuage the Board’s concerns.
[17]
The Board
also found that the applicant’s Alevi identity alone would not support a
positive determination of his refugee claim. The Board held that although
members of the Alevi minority face some forms of discrimination in Turkey, there was insufficient
evidence before the Board to support a claim of persecution based solely on
membership in the religious group.
LEGISLATION
[18]
Section 96
of the Act, grants protection to Convention refugees:
96.
A Convention refugee is a person who, by reason of a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion,
(a)
is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each
of those countries; or
(b)
not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of their former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to
return to that country
|
96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses
opinions politiques :
a)
soit se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou,
du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de
ces pays;
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte,
ne veut y retourner.
|
[19]
Section 97
of the Act grants protection to persons whose removal would subject them
personally to a danger of torture, or to a risk to life, or to a risk of cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment:
97.
(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or
countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality,
their country of former habitual residence, would subject them
personally
(a)
to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within
the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or
(b)
to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment if
(i)
the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themself
of the protection of that country,
(ii)
the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is
not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country,
(iii)
the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed
in disregard of accepted international standards, and
(iv)
the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate
health or medical care.
|
97.
(1) A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
a)
soit au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à
la torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la
torture;
b)
soit à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
(i)
elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de ce
pays,
(ii)
elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que d’autres personnes
originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont généralement pas,
(iii)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions légitimes — sauf celles
infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et inhérents à celles-ci
ou occasionnés par elles,
(iv)
la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité du pays de fournir des
soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
|
ISSUES
[20]
The applicant
submits that the Board erred in arriving at its credibility determination. In
particular, the applicant submits that the Board’s credibility determination
raises three issues:
1. Did the Board err by making
unreasonable implausibility findings?
2. Did the Board err by making
unreasonable credibility findings?
3. Did the Board err by making an
adverse credibility finding based on the absence of corroborative documents?
As the first two issues largely overlap, I shall consider
them together.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[21]
In Dunsmuir
v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, 2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, the Supreme Court of
Canada held at paragraph 62 that the first step in conducting a standard of
review analysis is to “ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already
determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of (deference) to be accorded
with regard to a particular category of question”: see also Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, per
Justice Binnie at para. 53.
[22]
As I
recognized in Wu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 929, at para. 17,
credibility and plausibility determinations are factual in nature. Post-Dunsmuir
jurisprudence has established that the appropriate standard of review
applicable to these factual determinations is reasonableness: see also, for
example, Saleem v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 389, at para. 13; Malveda
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 447 at paras. 17-20;
Khokhar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 449 at paras. 17-20,
and my recent decision in Dong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 55, at para. 17.
[23]
The
standard of review is therefore reasonableness. In reviewing the Board's
decision using a standard of reasonableness, the Court will consider “the
existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the
decision-making process” and “whether the decision falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law”: Dunsmuir, supra, at paragraph 47; Khosa, supra,
at para. 59.
ANALYSIS
Issues No. 1 & 2: Did the Board err by
making unreasonable implausibility or credibility findings?
[24]
The
applicant notes that the Board made several implausibility findings in its
determination that the applicant was not credible. In particular, the Board
found it implausible that the applicant did not ever request a lawyer, that the
applicant and his cousin were both treated identically on all seven occasions
in which they were arrested, and that the applicant did not take any action to
publicize or protest how he and his cousin had been mistreated in custody.
[25]
The
applicant submits that none of these implausibility findings were supported by
the evidence before the Board. The Board must presume that a refugee claimant’s
allegations are true unless there are reasons to doubt their truthfulness. In
contrast, the applicant submits that the Board may only make plausibility
findings where “the facts presented are outside the realm of what could
reasonably be expected”: Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)
[2001] F.C.J. No. 1131 at para. 7. In this case, the applicant submits that the
evidence provided by the applicant to the Board was not outside the realm of
what could reasonably be expected, and, thus, the plausibility findings made by
the Board were not adequately supported by the evidence.
[26]
The burden
of establishing a claim for refugee protection lies upon the claimant. The Board
is the primary fact-finder and is in the best position to evaluate the
credibility of the claimants. This includes findings of credibility based on
plausibility findings. As stated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Aguebor
v. M.E.I. (1993), 160 N.R. 315 at paras. 3 and 4:
¶3. It is correct, as the Court
said in Giron, that it may be easier to have a finding of implausibility
reviewed where it results from inferences than to have a finding of
non-credibility reviewed where it results from the conduct of the witness and
from inconsistencies in the testimony. The Court did not, in saying this,
exclude the issue of the plausibility of an account from the Board's field of
expertise, nor did it lay down a different test for intervention depending on
whether the issue is "plausibility" or "credibility".
¶4. There is no longer any doubt
that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete
jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better
position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and
to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the
tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings
are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the Court merely observed
that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be
more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on
the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the
burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the
Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the
appellant has not discharged this burden.
[27]
In its
reasons, the Board considered the applicant’s evidence on these points. At the
hearing, the Board asked the applicant why he never requested an attorney
despite knowing he was legally entitled to one. As the Board stated at para. 8
of its reasons, “No explanation was provided as to why he never considered
requesting a lawyer during any of these detentions or at any time afterward.” The
Board explicitly considered the applicant’s answers regarding why on all seven
occasions the law would have been so seriously disobeyed by the arresting
authorities, and how he and his cousin would have been subjected to precisely
the same arrests and treatment on all seven occasions. At para. 8 the Board
found:
¶8. . . . For a number of reasons I
am not persuaded by the claimant’s explanations. Firstly the documents before
me appear to provide information of what is in fact happening in Turkey. The sources consulted in the
US Department of State report and the United Kingdom’s Operational Guidance
note include human rights monitors, human rights activists and attorneys
operating in Turkey. I therefore take these documents to be a reflection of the
reality in Turkey not the presented façade. Now
if only a few of these alleged arrests had been inconsistent with the
documentation it would have been easier for me to accept as credible such
anomalies, however as indicated all seven arrests of both the claimant and his
cousin appear inconsistent. I also find it hard to accept as credible the
claimant’s evidence with respect to never requesting or consulting a lawyer.
The claimant presents a profile of himself as someone who is a strong supporter
of leftist political parties and someone who has worked to support the Alevi
community by denouncing and demonstrating against abuse and discrimination.
However when the claimant and his cousin are subjected to one illegal detention
after another he never asserted his right for legal counsel even once.
Furthermore on each occasion after he was released he did not take any action
to publicize or protest how he and his cousin had been treated.
[28]
The
Board’s reasons therefore demonstrate that the Board engaged with the
applicant’s evidence and explanations for his actions. It was open to the Board
to draw inferences based upon its knowledge and on common sense. While the
Court agrees with the applicant that the Board ought not to have implied that
it expected the applicant to be able to explain why he had been repeatedly
treated poorly by police, the Board’s reasons demonstrate that it neither
ignored nor misconstrued the evidence before it.
[29]
The Board
specifically refers to the documentary evidence that supports the applicant’s
position, and specifically references the applicant’s explanations for areas of
concern to it. It is not the role of this Court on judicial review to reweigh
the evidence, nor to substitute its decision for that of the Board. In this
case, the Board’s treatment of the evidence falls within the range of reasonable
outcomes in accordance with the facts and law. The plausibility and credibility
determinations made by the Board are reasonable.
Issue No. 3: Did the Board err by
making an adverse credibility finding based on the absence of corroborative
documents?
[30]
With
regard to the documentary evidence, the applicant further submits that the
Board erred by drawing an adverse credibility finding from the fact that there
was no documentary evidence to support the applicant’s refugee claim. The
applicant submits that while documentary evidence can be helpful in bolstering
a claim, its absence alone cannot undermine an applicant’s credibility. There
is no legal requirement for a refugee claimant to corroborate his sworn
testimony. By demanding documentary evidence, the applicant therefore submits
that the Board was imposing an erroneously high evidentiary burden on the
applicant.
[31]
The
respondent submits that while the applicant does not have a legal obligation to
provide supporting evidence, he does bear the burden of establishing his claim
to protection on a balance of probabilities. Given the Board’s credibility
concerns, the respondent submits that it was reasonable for the Board to look
for corroborating evidence of the applicant’s story.
[32]
The Court
accepts that the Board may draw adverse credibility findings from a claimant’s
failure to corroborate his claims in cases where credibility is an issue: see,
e.g., Muchirahondo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 546, at para. 18, and Juarez
v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 288, at para. 7.
[33]
Although
the Board may have been clearer on the point, the Court accepts that in this
case the Board had found the applicant’s credibility in issue, and, therefore,
sought corroborative evidence.
[34]
The Court
further finds that the Board’s finding that the applicant should have been able
to provide at least some documentary evidence of his claims was reasonable. The
Board found it implausible that the applicant had neither any media reports or
other documentation regarding any of the arrests, supporting documentation from
the Labour Party or its members, or corroborating letters from a lawyer or from
family members regarding his cousin’s arrest at the airport upon his return to
Turkey prior to the hearing. The Board held at para. 9:
¶9. I am also concerned that there
are no corroborative documents. I think it is reasonable to expect some
documentation given the nature of the allegations the claimant has made.
[35]
The Board
explained that given the applicant’s own description of the high-profile nature
of the applicant’s activities, some of the many media reports of the
demonstrations and their aftermath likely would have mentioned him, if not by
name then as a photographer.
¶9. . . . Given the nature of these
events it is reasonable to expect there to be some reference if not to the
claimant by name then to the fact that a photographer documenting the arrest
was detained. The claimant also alleged that his cousin, the former
co-claimant, was arrested when he returned to Turkey on February 12, 2010, and that he has
not been heard from since. I find it hard to accept that the media would not
have been advised by family or friends of the claimant’s cousin or by others of
this arrest which apparently occurred at the airport as the claimant’s cousin
arrived from Canada. Furthermore the claimant has
indicated that the Labour Party was aware that the claimant and his cousin were
being subjected to these detentions and abuses. There is no letter from the
party to corroborate any of these incidents. The party never protested or
publicized what had happened. Cumulatively, the lack of any corroborative
documents further undermines the claimant’s credibility.
[36]
The Board
was not requiring the applicant to provide any one of the types of
corroborative evidence it suggested. Instead, as the Board stated, it found
that the total absence of any documentation was implausible. The Court finds
that this holding was reasonably open to the Board. The Board’s holding that
the absence of such documentations “further undermines the claimant’s
credibility” does not mean that the Board was using this absence of evidence to
draw an adverse credibility finding. Rather, the Board was recognizing that the
presence of such evidence could have greatly bolstered the applicant’s case. As
described above, the Board had already drawn a negative credibility
determination based upon the applicant’s testimony.
[37]
As
described above, the Board stated that it had three primary concerns: the
inconsistency between the claimant’s description of the arrests and the
documentary evidence before the Board; the absence of corroborative documents;
and the plausibility of the applicant and his cousin receiving identical
treatment on all seven occasions. It was based on these three concerns that the
Board made its ultimate determination.
[38]
The Board
concluded at para. 11:
¶11. As a cumulative result of these
three primary concerns, and absent reasonable explanations, I do not accept on
a balance of probabilities that key events alleged by the claimant in fact
occurred. Most significantly I do not accept that the claimant was subjected to
arrest or detentions in Turkey as a result of his
involvement in Alevi events or the Labour Party. Consequently I find that the
claimant has failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the allegations of
material fact on which his refugee claim is based. . . .
[39]
This
finding was reasonably open to the Board on the evidence before it.
CONCLUSION
[40]
The Court
finds that the Board’s findings regarding the plausibility of the applicant’s
story and the applicant’s credibility were reasonably open to it based upon the
evidence. The Board considered the applicant’s explanations, but was not
ultimately persuaded on a balance of probabilities. As its findings were
reasonable, this Court has no basis for interfering with the Board’s decision.
CERTIFIED QUESTION
[41]
Both
parties advised the Court that this case does not raise a serious question of
general importance which ought to be certified for an appeal. The Court agrees.
JUDGMENT
THIS COURT ORDERS AND ADJUDGES
that:
The application for judicial
review is dismissed.
“Michael
A. Kelen”