Ihenyen v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 1143

Date: 20260910

Docket: IMM-24575-24

Citation: 2026 FC 1143

Calgary, Alberta, September 10, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Aylen

REASONS AND JUDGMENT

[1] In August 2021, the Applicant applied for permanent residence under the Temporary public policy to facilitate the granting of permanent residence for foreign nationals in Canada, outside of Quebec, who used an alternative format to apply to the Temporary Pathway to Permanent Residence and whose applications were received in excess of the application intake cap (TR to PR Pathway): International Graduates category [Policy].

[2] At the time he submitted his application, the Applicant held a valid work permit. His work permit expired on November 20, 2023, at which point he lost his temporary resident status.

[3] Just over a year later, on December 4, 2024, an Officer reviewed his application and refused it because the Applicant did not meet the requirement of the Policy to have valid temporary resident status (or to be eligible to restore their status) on the date the application is approved.

[4] On this application for judicial review, the Applicant asserts that the Officer’s decision was both unreasonable and procedurally unfair.

[5] The parties agree and I concur that the standard of reasonableness applies to assessing the merits of the Officer’s decision. When reviewing for reasonableness, the Court must take a “reasons first” approach and determine whether the decision under review, including both its rationale and outcome, is transparent, intelligible and justified [Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at paras 8, 59]. A reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and one that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker [Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 15, 85]. The Court will intervene only if it is satisfied there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision such that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency [Adeniji-Adele v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 418 at para 11].

[6] The Applicant asserts that the Officer’s decision was unreasonable because the Officer misinterpreted the requirements of the Policy. The Applicant asserts that the Policy only required that he have valid status in Canada at the time that he applied. At the time that his application was assessed, he asserts that he was only required to be resident in Canada, which he was.

[7] The Applicant argues that the language of selection criterion “f” is clunky, ambiguous and open to more than one interpretation. Criterion “f” provides:

f. Reside in Canada with valid temporary resident status (or be eligible to restore their status) and be physically present in Canada on the date on which the application for permanent residence is received and when the application is approved;

[8] The Applicant asserts that the proper interpretation of criterion “f” is that valid status in Canada was only required at the time of submission of the application. In support of his argument, the Applicant relies on other language in the Policy related to a different selection criterion, which provides:

g. Have submitted an application for permanent residence which was received within the timeframe communicated to the applicant by the Department further to their request for accommodation due to a disability, using the forms provided by the Department for this public policy and which must include at the time of the application all proof necessary to satisfy an officer that the applicant meets the conditions (eligibility requirements) of this public policy, except for evidence required to demonstrate physical presence in Canada at the time of application approval;

[9] He states that criterion “g” contradicts criterion “f” because it states that the only requirement to be met post-application is the requirement to show proof that you are physically present in Canada.

[10] There is no merit to the Applicant’s argument. The Policy language of criterion “f” is clear, requiring an applicant to be resident in Canada with valid temporary status at both the time the application is received and when it is approved. The clarity of this requirement is reinforced by Guide 5069 – Temporary public policy: Temporary Resident to Permanent Resident Pathway (TR to PR Pathway), which provided detailed instructions on the assessment of applications under the Policy. The Guide provides that applicants under the Policy must have valid temporary resident status in Canada on the date on which the application for permanent residence is received and when it is approved:

1. Proof of Entry and Status in Canada

When you apply, you will need to prove that you have valid status, and are living in Canada when you submit your application and when IRCC makes a final decision on your application.

To prove your status in Canada you must submit a copy of your most recent immigration document such as work permit, or study permit.

[11] Moreover, the language of criterion “g” is of no assistance to the Applicant. Criterion “g” is an additional mandatory criterion and does not remove the requirement to meet criterion “f”. Criterion “g” makes no reference to, and in no way qualifies, criterion “f”. Criterion “g” sheds no light on the interpretation of criterion “f”, nor do the two criteria result in any mixed messaging being provided to applicants regarding the mandatory criteria that must be met at the time that an application under the Policy is approved.

[12] Contrary to the Applicant’s assertion, I find that criterion “f” is not open to more than one interpretation. The Policy required the Applicant to have valid temporary resident status on the date a decision was made on his application, which he did not have. As such, the Officer’s determination that he did not meet this mandatory requirement of the Policy was reasonable.

[13] The Applicant asserts that the Officer’s decision is also unreasonable because he did not conduct the necessary analysis before concluding that the Applicant did not have temporary resident status. However, the fact that the Applicant did not have valid status is not disputed. His work permit expired on November 20, 2023, and he did not hold any other valid temporary resident status in December 2024. There was no analysis for the Officer to undertake, such that the Officer’s statement that the Applicant was without valid temporary resident status was sufficient.

[14] The Applicant asserts that the Officer fettered their discretion by not requesting updated documents from the Applicant regarding his expired work permit and by not waiving the requirement to reside in Canada with valid temporary resident status at the time of approval. There is no merit to this argument. The Officer was not obligated to request updated documents from the Applicant regarding his status in Canada and, even if he had made such a request, there were no updated documents to provide as the Applicant had no valid status in Canada in December 2024. Moreover, criterion “f” is mandatory and the Officer had no discretion to ignore or waive this requirement [Bello v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1094 at para 45; Entezami v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 38 at para 24].

[15] The Applicant asserts that, at the time a decision was made on his application, he also met the selection criteria under a supplemental policy enacted by the Minister in April 2022 entitled Temporary public policy for the issuance of permanent resident visas for foreign nationals, who have been refused under the “Temporary Resident to Permanent Resident Pathway” [Supplemental Policy]. He asserts that the Supplemental Policy would have remedied the contradictory statements presented in the Policy and that, pursuant to the Supplemental Policy, the Applicant’s application should have been approved.

[16] There is no merit to this argument. First, the Applicant did not apply under the Supplemental Policy. It was only after the Officer rejected his application under the Policy that the Applicant requested that his application be reconsidered under the Supplemental Policy. Any such reconsideration decision (to the extent it was made) is not the decision at issue on this application for judicial review.

[17] The Applicant further asserts that, at the time the Officer rendered their decision, IRCC was, of its own initiative, considering existing applications made under the Policy pursuant to the Supplemental Policy. He asserts that the Officer should therefore have considered his application under the Supplemental Policy without being prompted by the Applicant to do so. While the Applicant cites no authority for this proposition, I fail to see how the Applicant’s application would have been successful even if it had been considered under the Supplemental Policy.

[18] The Supplemental Policy sets out the reason for its enactment as follows:

Each of [the TR to PR Policies] included a provision requiring applicants to reside in Canada with valid temporary resident status (or be eligible to restore their status), and be physically present in Canada at the time the application for permanent residence is received and when the application is approved. Given longer than anticipated processing times and the opening of borders for international travel, it is recognized that applicants who are awaiting a final decision may need to travel outside of Canada. Being outside Canada at the time of decision as the sole reason for the refusal of these applications, is inconsistent with the overall intent, and as such it is desirable to facilitate the issuance of permanent resident visas to these applicants to enable their return to Canada for the purpose of being granted permanent resident status.

[19] However, the Applicant’s application under the Policy was not refused because he was outside of Canada at the time a decision was made on his application. Rather, the sole reason given for the refusal of his application was because he did not have valid temporary resident status at the time the decision was rendered. While the Applicant attempts to argue for a more expansive reading of the Supplemental Policy to include those applicants without temporary resident status at the time their applications were decided, I find that his reading is not supported by the language of the Supplemental Policy nor the clear rationale for enacting the Supplemental Policy.

[20] Accordingly, I find that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Officer’s decision was unreasonable.

[21] Turning to the second issue, breaches of procedural fairness in administrative contexts have been considered reviewable on a correctness standard or subject to a “reviewing exercise […] ‘best reflected in the correctness standard’ even though, strictly speaking, no standard of review is being applied” [Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54]. The duty of procedural fairness is “eminently variable,” inherently flexible and context-specific. It must be determined with reference to all the circumstances, including the Baker factors [Vavilov at para 77]. A court assessing a procedural fairness question is required to ask whether the procedure was fair, having regard to all of the circumstances [Canadian Pacific Railway Company at para 54]

[22] The Applicant alleges that given the contradiction between criteria “g” and “f”, he did not know the case to be met. He states that IRCC represented that after submitting a complete application, the only assessment left was that of physical presence in Canada, as confirmed by criterion “g” and a number of internal IRCC documents entitled “Temporary Resident to Permanent Resident Pathway – DN Standard Operating Procedures – CR-04, PM-01 and PM-03”.

[23] The Applicant argues that IRCC had indicated that he had passed his eligibility assessment and he was led to believe that all he had to show was proof of physically being in Canada at the time of approval. He asserts that the conduct of IRCC breached his legitimate expectations as to what was required from him under the Policy and when his temporary resident status would be assessed.

[24] The doctrine of legitimate expectation is an extension of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness. The doctrine provides that, where a government official makes representations within the scope of their authority to an individual about an administrative process that the government will follow, and the representations said to give rise to the legitimate expectations are clear, unambiguous and unqualified, the government may be held to its word, provided the representations are procedural in nature and do not conflict with the decision-maker’s statutory duty [Mount Sinai Hospital Center v Quebec (Minister of Health and Social Services), 2001 SCC 41 at paras 29–30; Moreau-Bérubé v New Brunswick (Judicial Council), 2002 SCC 11 at para 78; C.U.P.E. v Ontario (Minister of Labour), 2003 SCC 29 at para 131]. Generally speaking, government representations will be considered “clear, unambiguous and unqualified” where, had such representations been made in the context of a private law contract, they would be sufficiently certain to be capable of enforcement [Canada (Attorney General) v Mavi, 2011 SCC 30 at paras 68–69].

[25] There is no merit to the Applicant’s legitimate expectation argument. The Applicant has not pointed to any clear, unambiguous and/or unqualified representation made by IRCC that he was not required to have valid temporary resident status at the time his application was determined. To the contrary, the language of the Policy and the language of the Guide clearly provide that the Applicant was obligated to have valid temporary resident status at the time his application was submitted and at the time it was determined. While the Applicant attempts to rely on excerpts of IRCC internal documents to support his argument, the excerpts cannot constitute representations made to the Applicant as they are sourced from internal IRCC documents. In any event, I do not find that those excerpts cast any doubt on the temporary residence status requirements of the Policy as asserted by the Applicant. As such, I find that the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that his procedural fairness rights were breached.

[26] As the Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the Officer’s decision was unreasonable or that his procedural fairness rights were breached, the application for judicial review shall be dismissed.

[27] Neither party proposed a question for certification and I agree that none arises.

JUDGMENT in IMM-24575-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. There is no question for certification.

“Mandy Aylen”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: