Docket: T-629-17
Citation:
2018 FC 11
Ottawa, Ontario, January 9, 2018
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice McVeigh
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BETWEEN:
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BIRCH NARROWS DENE
NATION, AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF JONATHAN SYLVESTRE, BUFFALO
RIVER DENE NATION, AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF EILEEN MORRISON, CANOE LAKE CREE FIRST NATION,
AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF FRANCIS
IRON, CLEARWATER RIVER DENE NATION,
AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF
TEDDY CLARKE, ENGLISH RIVER FIRST NATION, AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF LAWRENCE MCINTYRE, FLYING
DUST FIRST NATION,
AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF JEREMY
NORMAN, MINISTIKWAN FIRST NATION, AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF LESLIE CROOKEDNECK, MAKWA SAHGAIEHCAN FIRST NATION, AS REPRESENTED BY CHIEF RICHARD BEN
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Applicants
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and
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HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN
IN RIGHT OF CANADA AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF INDIGENOUS
AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA, CHRIS RAINER-DIRECTOR GENERAL INDIGENOUS AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA-EDUCATION BRANCH, ODETTE JOHNSTON, JEROME CARDIN-TREMBLAY,
KIRBY KORCHINSKI, CAROLYN
LEHRER
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Respondents
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Introduction
[1]
On March 30, 2017, Indigenous and Northern
Affairs Canada [the Respondent] met with the Meadow Lake Tribal Council [the
Applicant] to discuss their proposal for Transformation Initiative funding (a
program that provides funds for qualifying First Nations School Boards and requires
those School Boards to be incorporated legal entities). During negotiations,
the Respondent took the position that a majority of elected Chiefs and Councillors
could not sit on the Applicant’s Board of Directors as a way to ensure
day-to-day control is separate from political interference. Accordingly, the
Respondent ceased negotiations when the Applicant refused to amend their Bylaws
which allowed a majority of Chiefs and Councillors to sit on the Board of
Directors.
[2]
After both parties refused to change their
negotiation positions, the Applicant applied for judicial review of three
matters that occurred during the March 30, 2017 discussion: first, the Respondent’s
rejection of the proposed Bylaws; second, the Respondent’s refusal to allow the
majority of elected directors of the proposed School Board to consist of Chiefs
and Councillors; and lastly, the Respondent’s refusal to continue negotiations
unless the Applicant changed the proposed Bylaws.
[3]
According to Rule 302 of the Federal Court
Rules, SOR/98-106, an application for judicial review is generally limited
to one matter. After a discussion regarding Rule 302, the one matter the Applicant
asked this Court to judicially review is the Respondent’s prohibition of a
majority of elected officials sitting on the Board of Directors.
[4]
At the start of the hearing, the Court provided
the Applicant and Respondent with an opportunity to consider an alternative
dispute resolution but the Applicant chose to proceed with the hearing.
[5]
Because the impasse in negotiations lacks
justiciability, I will dismiss this application for the reasons that follow.
II.
Background
[6]
In 2011, the Standing Senate Committee on
Aboriginal Peoples released a report which discussed First Nations education [the
2011 Senate Report]. The 2011 Senate Report includes submissions from witnesses
and experts providing information, ideas, and concerns about improving First
Nations education systems. When Bill C-33 (developed to reform existing First
Nations education through the First Nation Control of First Nation Education
Act) was put on hold in May 2014, the Respondent began to explore other
ways to reform First Nations education.
[7]
As part of their exploration into reform, the
Respondent began discussions with interested First Nations. One interested
party was the Applicant’s tribal council, which is made up of nine First Nation
Members. Numerous discussions between the Applicant and Respondent took place.
[8]
In February 2016, the Respondent received a new
mandate called the Transformation Initiative. The purpose of the Transformation
Initiative is to fund new education agreements that lead to First Nation School
Boards. The Transformative Initiative is intended to create stable funding
(which is hoped will lead to desirable outcomes such as improved teacher
recruitment and retention). The Transformation Initiative criteria are unpublished
and partly informed by the 2011 Senate Report. According to the affidavit of Odette
Johnston, Director of Regional Partnerships Directorate, Education Branch,
Education and Social Development Programs and Partnership Sector for the
Respondent, “[o]ne of the required criteria of the
Transformation Initiative is that First Nation education authorities be
incorporated bodies with independent governance that separates day-to-day
operations and decision-making from political organizations.”
[9]
After further discussions, a progress
report dated July 6, 2016 was issued. This progress report discussed School Board
structures and said “participating communities would
appoint a non-office holding member of their community as their School Board
representative.”
[10]
The Applicant and Respondent continued
discussions about establishing an education authority called the Meadow Lake
First Nation Education Authority Inc. The Respondent sent an email to the
Applicant on July 28, 2016 advising:
… a First Nation
Education Authority/School Board would be ‘an incorporated legal entity and
governed by a Board of Directors comprised of members of communities that are
part of the Education Authority/School Board, with mechanisms that maintain
accountability to their communities.’
[11]
On August 24, 2016, the Applicant mandated a
group to negotiate with the Respondent. This group, (the Education Transfer
Working Group [ETWG]), is composed of four Chiefs from the Meadow Lake Tribal
Council: Chief Lawrence McIntyre, Chief Jonathan Sylvestre, Chief Francis
Iron, and Chief Richard Ben. In addition, three education consultants and the
Senior Director of Education for Meadow Lake Tribal Council also work for the
ETWG.
[12]
Throughout the fall of 2016, the discussions,
including discussions about corporate structure, continued.
[13]
On December 1, 2016, the Respondent sent an
email regarding governance structure (a topic further discussed during meetings
on December 8 and 9, 2016). Among other matters that were addressed, this email
stated:
There are no parameters for whom the member
communities choose to represent them on the Board, i.e. Chief, Councillor,
Education Director, Parent, etc. However, should the Board of Directors be
comprised of a majority, or entirely, of Chiefs and/or Councillors, the school
board/education authority will be required to provide legal and/or financial
advice as to how this entity will meet the reporting criteria as directed by
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
[14]
Based on these discussions, on December 19, 2016
the Applicant submitted a draft education authority proposal, including its
proposed Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws setting out a 10 member Board of
Directors. The Bylaws stipulated that only Chiefs could fill two positions on
the Board of Directors: the Chairperson of the Board and Vice-Chairperson of
the Board. According to these proposed Bylaws, the remaining positions could be
filled by a number of different people including, but not limited to Chiefs and
Councillors.
[15]
The Applicants later submitted a draft
governance model to the Respondent during meetings that took place on January
16 and 17, 2017. After reviewing these documents, the Respondent concluded that
the draft structure tethered control and advised the Applicant that “Chiefs and/or Councillors of the First Nation Applicants
could not form a majority on the Board of Directors, in the event that a
majority of First Nation Applicants chose to have a Chief or Councillor
represent them on the Board of Directors.”
[16]
The Respondent communicated these concerns a
number of times: during meetings on February 9 and 10, 2017; in an email dated
March 10, 2017; and during a conference call on March 24, 2017. According to
the Applicant, at the February 9, 2017 meeting the Respondent also said the
decision that Chiefs or Councillors could not form a majority on the Board of
Directors was based on an “expert report or studies
indicating that corporations with a majority of Chiefs on the Board of
Directors had been unsuccessful.”
[17]
On March 30, 2017, another meeting took place.
At this meeting, the Respondent said they would not approve the Applicant’s
Transformation Initiative proposal because its Bylaws allowed a majority of
Chiefs or Councillors to sit on the Board of Directors. The Respondent said it
could not continue negotiations as this governance structure did not meet their
policy to have separation between day-to-day operations and political organizations
(a policy based on the 2011 Senate Report). The Respondent’s position was that in
order to access funds from the Transformation Initiative program, the Applicant
had to change this proposed governance structure so that the majority of board
members could not be elected Chief and Councillors.
[18]
The Applicant refused to change their proposed
governance structure and filed for judicial review of this decision on April
28, 2017. The Applicant asked the Court to quash the Respondent’s decision to
disallow a majority of Chiefs and or Councillors on the Board of Directors of
the proposed Meadow Lake First Nation Education Authority Inc. The Applicant also
asked that the Court order the Respondent to accept the proposal which would
allow representatives on the proposed yet unincorporated School Board to be
composed of any of the following: Chiefs, Councillors, Parents, Educational
Experts, or First Nation Community Members—meaning that the Applicant asks this
Court to order that a majority of the Board of Directors may consist of elected
Chiefs and Councillors.
III.
Issues
[19]
The first two issues were submitted by the
Applicant and the last by the Respondent at paragraph 55 of their submissions:
A. Whether the Respondent erred in law, or acted contrary to law in
deciding to prohibit the Applicant’s Chiefs and/or Councillors from forming a
majority on the Board of Directors of the proposed Meadow Lake First Nation
Education Authority contrary to the Applicant’s rights under section 128(3) of
the Canada Not-for-profit Corporations Act, SC 2009, c 23 or section
93(3) of the Non-Profit Corporations Act, 1995, SS 1995, c N-4.2.
B. Whether the Respondent acted beyond their jurisdiction in deciding
to prohibit Chiefs and/or Councillors from forming a majority on the Board of
Directors of the proposed Meadow Lake First Nation Education Authority Inc.
contrary to the Applicant’s rights under section 128(3) of the Canada
Not-for-profit Corporation Act, SC 2009, c 23, or the Non-Profit
Corporations Act, 1995, SS 1995, c N-4.2.
C. Whether the Respondent based its decision on an erroneous finding of
fact that it made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the
material before it pursuant to 18.1(4)(d) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC
1985, c F-7.
A.
Jurisdiction or Justiciability Issue
[20]
Before I can judicially review the merits, there
are threshold questions to answer. I must first determine if the matter is
justiciable and if the Federal Court has jurisdiction under the Federal Courts
Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Federal Courts Act]. I asked the
parties to provide argument on this issue before reserving and hearing the parties’
argument on the merits.
B.
Relevant Provisions
Federal Courts Act, RSC, 1985, c F-7
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Definitions
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Définitions
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2(1) In this
Act,
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2 (1) Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
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federal
board, commission or other tribunal means
any body, person or persons having, exercising or purporting to exercise
jurisdiction or powers conferred by or under an Act of Parliament or by or
under an order made pursuant to a prerogative of the Crown, other than the
Tax Court of Canada or any of its judges, any such body constituted or
established by or under a law of a province or any such person or persons
appointed under or in accordance with a law of a province or under section 96
of the Constitution Act, 1867;
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office
fédéral Conseil,
bureau, commission ou autre organisme, ou personne ou groupe de personnes,
ayant, exerçant ou censé exercer une compétence ou des pouvoirs prévus par
une loi fédérale ou par une ordonnance prise en vertu d’une prérogative
royale, à l’exclusion de la Cour canadienne de l’impôt et ses juges, d’un
organisme constitué sous le régime d’une loi provinciale ou d’une personne ou
d’un groupe de personnes nommées aux termes d’une loi provinciale ou de
l’article 96 de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867.
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…
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…
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Extraordinary
remedies, federal tribunals
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Recours
extraordinaires : offices fédéraux
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18 (1)
Subject to section 28, the Federal Court has exclusive original jurisdiction
(a) to issue
an injunction, writ of certiorari, writ of prohibition, writ of mandamus
or writ of quo warranto, or grant declaratory relief, against any
federal board, commission or other tribunal; and
(b) to hear
and determine any application or other proceeding for relief in the nature of
relief contemplated by paragraph (a), including any proceeding brought
against the Attorney General of Canada, to obtain relief against a federal
board, commission or other tribunal.
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18 (1) Sous
réserve de l’article 28, la Cour fédérale a compétence exclusive, en première
instance, pour :
a) décerner
une injonction, un bref de certiorari, de mandamus, de
prohibition ou de quo warranto, ou pour rendre un jugement
déclaratoire contre tout office fédéral;
b) connaître
de toute demande de réparation de la nature visée par l’alinéa a), et
notamment de toute procédure engagée contre le procureur général du Canada
afin d’obtenir réparation de la part d’un office fédéral.
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…
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…
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Remedies
to be obtained on application
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Exercice
des recours
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(3) The
remedies provided for in subsections (1) and (2) may be obtained only on an
application for judicial review made under section 18.1.
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(3) Les
recours prévus aux paragraphes (1) ou (2) sont exercés par présentation d’une
demande de contrôle judiciaire.
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Application
for judicial review
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Demande de
contrôle judiciaire
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18.1 (1) An
application for judicial review may be made by the Attorney General of Canada
or by anyone directly affected by the matter in respect of which relief is
sought.
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18.1 (1) Une
demande de contrôle judiciaire peut être présentée par le procureur général
du Canada ou par quiconque est directement touché par l’objet de la demande.
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…
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…
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[21]
According to section 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, the Federal Court’s judicial review jurisdiction is limited to the
review of decisions made by a federal board, commission, or other tribunal. To
determine whether a decision maker acted as a federal board, commission, or
other tribunal, the Federal Court of Appeal [FCA] set out a two-step enquiry in
Anisman v Canada Boarder Services Agency, 2010 FCA 52 at paras 29-30 [Anisman]:
• First a court determines “what jurisdiction or power the body
or person seeks to exercise.”
• Second, a court must determine “what is the source or the
origin of the jurisdiction or power which the body or persons seeks to exercise.”
[22]
The FCA recently reaffirmed and applied the Anisman
test in Pokue v Innu Nation, 2014 FCA 271 at para 11.
[23]
The Applicant submits that the Respondent acted
as a federal board, commission, or tribunal as required by section 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act, and relies on Canada (Attorney General) v TeleZone Inc,
2010 SCC 62 for the proposition that the meaning of federal board, commission,
or other tribunal is broad in definition. In regards to step 1 of the Anisman
test, the Applicant argues the Respondent exercised jurisdiction over
education or schools in relation to Indians. In regards to step 2 of the Anisman
test, the Applicant argues the Respondent obtained this authority over
schools pursuant to the Indian Act, RSC 1985, c I-5 at sections 114-122.
In particular, the Applicant says the Respondent exercised their authority
under section 114(2) to “establish, operate, and
maintain schools for Indian children.”
[24]
The Federal Court’s judicial review jurisdiction
is also limited to “matters” which satisfy
section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act (Air Canada v Toronto Port
Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at paras 28-30, 42). The Applicant has argued
that the failed negotiation is a “matter” within
the meaning of section 18.1. In support of their argument, the Applicant relies
on May v CBC/Radio Canada, 2011 FCA 130 [May] and Krause v
Canada, [1999] 2 FC 476 (FCA). In May the FCA held that “the word “matter” embraces more than a mere decision or
order of a federal body, but applies to anything in respect of which relief may
be sought” (at para 10).
[25]
The Applicant submits that, while policies themselves
are not judicially reviewable, an application of a policy is a judicially
reviewable matter. Therefore, the Applicant argues this Court can determine
whether this matter, which they describe as an application of policy, is reasonable.
[26]
I agree, as do the parties, that this Court can judicially
review the application of a policy provided section 18.1 of the Federal
Courts Act is satisfied (Timberwest Forest Corp v Canada,
2007 FC 148 at para 92, aff’d 2007 FCA 389). But I do not agree that the
decision this Court was asked to judicially review in this case is the
application of a policy. I see the matter I am asked to judicially review as a
negotiation at an impasse. Each party took a position that resulted in the
stoppage of the negotiation. At the moment, neither party will move from their
respective positions.
[27]
Whether the Court should exercise its
jurisdiction and judicially review the impasse in negotiations is a question of
justiciability. Not all matters are justiciable. For instance, the FCA dealt
with justiciability in Hupacasath First Nation v Minister of Foreign Affairs
Canada, 2015 FCA 4 at paras 59-70 [Hupacasath]. In Hupacasath,
Canada had entered into a foreign investment promotion and protection
agreement with the People’s Republic of China. While dealing with whether the
Federal Court should judicially review Canada’s decisions to enter into the international
agreement and treaties, Justice Stratas confirmed that the exceptions of what
is not justiciable is very narrow:
62 Justiciability, sometimes called
the “political questions objection,” concerns the appropriateness and ability
of a court to deal with an issue before it. Some questions are so political
that courts are incapable or unsuited to deal with them, or should not deal
with them in light of the time-honoured demarcation of powers between the
courts and the other branches of government.
63 Whether the question before the
Court is justiciable bears no relation to the source of the government power[.]
…
66 … In rare cases, however,
exercises of executive power are suffused with ideological, political,
cultural, social, moral and historical concerns of a sort not at all amenable
to the judicial process or suitable for judicial analysis. In those rare
cases, assessing whether the executive has acted within a range of
acceptability and defensibility is beyond the courts’ ken or capability, taking
courts beyond their proper role within the separation of powers. For
example, it is hard to conceive of a court reviewing in wartime a general’s
strategic decision to deploy military forces in a particular way.
[Emphasis added].
[28]
The Applicant has disguised this judicial review
as a legal dispute when in actuality it is a political dispute. That it is a
political dispute is evident by the parties’ negotiation positions. For
instance, the Respondent’s position, based on senate hearings, is that the Board
of Directors is to be completely separate from politics and thus cannot have
political (elected) officials fill a majority on the Board. The Applicant’s
negotiation position is that the Respondent should allow elected Chiefs and
Councillors to form a majority of the Board’s composition. Since the
Respondent’s mandate is that the School Board corporation must be free from
political interference, their further position is that the Applicant’s proposal
(which allows the possibility of a majority of Chiefs and Councillors to sit on
the Board) is unacceptable.
[29]
The Applicant says the Respondent’s decision to
stop negotiations is unreasonable since it is an unreasonable application of
policy to prohibit Chiefs and Councillors to sit on the Board. The Applicant also
says it is unreasonable for the Respondent not to accept the proposal as it is
written because the Applicant’s proposal does separate day-to-day operations.
[30]
I find this application for judicial review fits
within the exception in Hupacasath as it is “so
political that courts are incapable or unsuited to deal with them, or should
not deal with them in light of the time-honoured demarcation of powers between
the courts and the other branches of government.” Before me is one of the
rare cases where “exercises of executive power are
suffused with ideological, political, cultural, social, moral and historical
concerns of a sort not at all amenable to the judicial process or suitable for
judicial analysis.” Again, this “matter”
before me is an impasse in negotiations that may still be resolved (or may not
be).
[31]
And furthermore, the matter is inappropriate for
the judicial review process because the judiciary has not been given access to
all the information available to the political actors regarding their
respective political positions within the negotiation. The Court has no
supervisory role over the political aspects of the negotiation entered into by
the parties. In addition, the remedy sought by the Applicant can only be
obtained by political evaluation and actions to resolve it one way or the
other.
[32]
Not accepting jurisdiction to hear this matter is
an appropriate use of judicial restraint. There is not a sufficient legal
component to make it justiciable. The impasse in the negotiations is not an
issue to be tried or resolved by the judicial process.
[33]
I do not need to go through the exercise and application
of whether the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Federal Court as the
matter is not a judiciable matter and this Court will not exercise its
jurisdiction.
[34]
The application for judicial review is
dismissed.
[35]
Neither party sought costs and so none are
awarded.