SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
|
Citation:
Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50
|
Appeal Heard:
January 13, 2017
Judgment
Rendered: October 19, 2017
Docket:
36784
|
Between:
Thanh
Tam Tran
Appellant
and
Minister
of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
Respondent
-
and -
Attorney
General of British Columbia, Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers, British Columbia
Civil Liberties Association and African Canadian Legal Clinic
Interveners
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis, Wagner,
Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
|
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 56)
|
Côté J. (McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver,
Karakatsanis, Wagner, Gascon, Brown and Rowe JJ. concurring)
|
Note: This document is subject to editorial revision before its
reproduction in final form in the Canada Supreme Court Reports.
tran v. canada (public
safety and emergency preparedness)
Thanh Tam Tran Appellant
v.
Minister of Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness Respondent
and
Attorney General of British Columbia,
Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers,
British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association and
African Canadian Legal Clinic Interveners
Indexed as: Tran v.
Canada (Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness)
2017 SCC 50
File No.: 36784.
2017: January 13; 2017: October 19.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Abella, Moldaver, Karakatsanis,
Wagner, Gascon, Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Immigration
— Inadmissibility and removal — Permanent residents —Serious criminality —
Permanent resident convicted of federal offence receiving 12‑month
conditional sentence — Maximum sentence for offence increased after offence
committed but before conviction and sentencing — Whether conditional sentence
is “term of imprisonment” for purposes of assessing permanent resident’s
inadmissibility to Canada on grounds of serious criminality under s. 36(1) (a)
of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act — Whether “maximum term of imprisonment”
referred to in s. 36(1) (a) is maximum sentence that could have been
imposed at time of commission of offence or of admissibility determination —
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, s. 36(1) (a).
T, a
permanent resident in Canada, was charged with a federal offence for which, at
the time of the commission of the offence, the maximum penalty was seven years
of imprisonment. After he was charged, but prior to his conviction, the maximum
penalty for that offence was increased to 14 years of imprisonment. T was
convicted of the charge against him, and received a 12‑month conditional
sentence of imprisonment to be served in the community.
Following
T’s conviction and sentencing, immigration officers prepared a report stating
that T was inadmissible to Canada on grounds of serious criminality, under
s. 36(1) (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA ”).
This provision provides that a permanent resident is inadmissible to Canada for
having been convicted in Canada of a federal offence punishable by a maximum
term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of a federal offence for which a
term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed. The report was
then submitted to a delegate of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness, who decided to adopt it and refer the matter to the Immigration
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board for an admissibility hearing. T
applied for judicial review of the delegate’s decision. The reviewing judge
allowed the application, finding that the offence of which T was convicted did
not come within s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA and that the delegate’s
decision to the contrary was unreasonable. The Court of Appeal allowed the
Minister’s appeal.
Held: The appeal should be allowed, the decision of the Minister’s
delegate quashed and the matter remitted to a different delegate.
The
modern principle of statutory interpretation is that the words of an Act are to
be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense
harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the
intention of Parliament. Applying this approach, the interpretation of s. 36(1) (a)
of the IRPA by the Minister’s delegate cannot stand under either
standard of review.
Conditional
sentences are not captured in the meaning of the phrase “term of imprisonment”
in s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA . The purpose of s. 36(1) (a) is to
define “serious criminality” for permanent residents convicted of an offence in
Canada. It is clear from the wording of the provision that whether or not an
imposed sentence can establish serious criminality depends on its length — it must
be “more than six months”. However, the seriousness of criminality punished by
a certain length of jail sentence is not the same as the seriousness of
criminality punished by an equally long conditional sentence. Conditional
sentences, even with stringent conditions, will usually be more lenient than
jail terms of equivalent duration, and generally indicate less serious
criminality than jail terms. Since a conditional sentence is a meaningful
alternative to incarceration for less serious and non‑dangerous
offenders, interpreting “a term of imprisonment of more than six months” as
including both prison sentences and conditional sentences undermines the
efficacy of using length to evaluate the seriousness of criminality.
Furthermore,
the meaning of “term of imprisonment” varies according to the statutory
context. Its meaning in ss. 36(1) (a) and 64 of the IRPA has been
interpreted by this Court to mean “prison”. This interpretation avoids absurd
results. Since more serious crimes may be punished by jail sentences that are
shorter than conditional sentences imposed for less serious crimes, it would be
an absurd outcome if less serious and non‑dangerous offenders who
received conditional sentences were deported, while more serious offenders
receiving jail terms shorter than those conditional sentences were permitted to
remain in Canada. Public safety, as an objective of the IRPA , is not
enhanced by deporting less culpable offenders while allowing more culpable
persons to remain in Canada.
The
phrase “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years” in
s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA refers to the maximum term of imprisonment
available at the time of the commission of the offence, and is to be understood
as referring to the circumstances of the actual offender or of others in
similar circumstances. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the IRPA ,
as outlined in s. 3 . The IRPA aims to permit Canada to obtain the
benefits of immigration, while recognizing the need for security and outlining
the obligations of permanent residents. The obligation of permanent residents
to behave lawfully includes not engaging in “serious criminality” as defined in
s. 36(1) ; however, that obligation must be communicated to them in
advance. While Parliament is entitled to change its views on the seriousness of
a crime, it is not entitled to alter the mutual obligations between permanent
residents and Canadian society without clearly and unambiguously doing so.
Section 36(1) (a) must be interpreted in a way that respects these mutual
obligations. In the absence of an indication that Parliament has considered the
retrospectivity of this provision and the potential for it to have unfair
effects, the presumption against retrospectivity applies. Accordingly, the
relevant date for assessing serious criminality under s. 36(1) (a) is the
date of the commission of the offence, not the date of the admissibility
decision.
Cases Cited
Considered:
Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC
51, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539; Brosseau v. Alberta Securities Commission,
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 301; referred to: Halifax (Regional Municipality) v.
Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364; R.
v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61; R. v. Shah, 2003 BCCA 294,
182 B.C.A.C. 142; R. v. Saundercook‑Menard, 2008 ONCA 493; R.
v. Chapman, 2007 YKSC 55; R. v. Jacobson (2006), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 270;
R. v. Keller, 2009 ABCA 418, 469 A.R. 151; R. v. Sandhu, 2014
ONCJ 95; R. v. Kasakan, 2006 SKCA 14, [2006] 8 W.W.R. 23; R. v. Lebar,
2010 ONCA 220, 101 O.R. (3d) 263; R. v. Knoblauch, 2000 SCC 58, [2000] 2
S.C.R. 780; R. v. Wu, 2003 SCC 73, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 530; R. v.
Middleton, 2009 SCC 21, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 674; Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd.
(Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27; Gustavson Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of
National Revenue, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271; British Columbia v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd., 2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473; Black‑Clawson
International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof‑Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975]
A.C. 591; Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; R.
v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906; R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15,
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 739; R. v. Vine (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 195; In re A
Solicitor’s Clerk, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1219; R. v. Hooyer, 2016 ONCA 44,
129 O.R. (3d) 81.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
s. 11 (i).
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,
S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 7(1) , (2) (b) [rep. & sub. 2012, c. 1,
s. 41], (2)(b)(v).
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46,
ss. 742 to 742.7 .
Immigration Act, 1976, S.C. 1976‑77,
c. 52, s. 27(1)(d).
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 3 , 36(1) , 44(1) , (2) , 45 (a), (c), (d),
46(1) (c), 50 (b), 63(3) , 64(2) [am. 2013, c. 16, s. 24], 74(d).
Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C.
2012, c. 1, s. 41 .
Authors Cited
Ashworth, Andrew. Positive Obligations in Criminal Law.
Oxford: Hart, 2013.
Brown, Donald J. M., and John M. Evans, with the
assistance of David Fairlie. Judicial Review of Administrative Action in
Canada. Toronto: Canvasback, 1998 (loose‑leaf updated April 2017,
release 1).
Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Citizenship and
Immigration. Evidence, No. 064, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., November 28,
2012, pp. 2‑5.
Canada. Senate. Debates of the Senate, vol. 148, No. 168,
1st Sess., 41st Parl., May 30, 2013, p. 4081.
Driedger, Elmer A. Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed.
Toronto: Butterworths, 1983.
Fuller, Lon. L. The Morality of Law, rev. ed. New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Gauthier, Ryer and Near JJ.A.),
2015 FCA 237, [2016] 2 F.C.R. 459, 478 N.R. 165, 392 D.L.R. (4th) 351, 38 Imm.
L.R. (4th) 175, [2015] F.C.J. No. 1324 (QL), 2015 CarswellNat 5677 (WL
Can.), setting aside a decision of O’Reilly J., 2014 FC 1040, 31 Imm. L.R.
(4th) 160, [2014] F.C.J. No. 1106 (QL), 2014 CarswellNat 4405 (WL Can.).
Appeal allowed.
Peter H. Edelmann, Aris Daghighian and Erin C. Roth, for the appellant.
François Joyal and Kathryn
Hucal, for
the respondent.
Written submissions
only by Christina Drake, for the intervener the
Attorney General of British Columbia.
John Norris, for the intervener the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers.
Lorne Waldman and Warda
Shazadi Meighen, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association.
Faisal Mirza, Dena Smith and Danardo Jones, for the intervener the African
Canadian Legal Clinic.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by
Côté J. —
[1]
Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (“IRPA ”) recognizes that there are
important social, cultural and economic benefits to immigration. It also
recognizes that successful integration of permanent residents involves mutual
obligations for those new immigrants and for Canadian society.
[2]
This appeal concerns the obligation of permanent
residents to avoid “serious criminality”, as set out in s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA .
This obligation is breached when a permanent resident is convicted of a federal
offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or
of a federal offence for which a term of imprisonment of more than 6 months has
been imposed.
[3]
The appellant, Thanh Tam Tran, was convicted of
a federal offence and received a 12-month conditional sentence. At issue in
this appeal is whether a conditional sentence consists of a “term of
imprisonment” for the purposes of s. 36(1) (a) and whether, when the
maximum sentence for an offence has changed over time, the “maximum term of
imprisonment” referred to at s. 36(1) should be taken to be the maximum
sentence that could have been imposed at the time of the commission of the
offence, of the conviction, of sentencing or of the determination as to the
permanent resident’s admissibility to Canada.
[4]
For the reasons that follow, I would allow the
appeal.
I.
Background
[5]
Section 36(1) (a) of the IRPA provides the
basis for finding a permanent resident inadmissible to Canada on grounds of
“serious criminality”:
36 (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on
grounds of serious criminality for
(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of
Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years,
or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of
more than six months has been imposed;
Inadmissibility can lead
to loss of status and removal from Canada.
[6]
If a Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”)
officer is of the opinion that a permanent resident is inadmissible, that
officer may prepare a report setting out the relevant facts and transmit that
report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (“Minister”)
(IRPA, s. 44(1) ). If the Minister is of the opinion that the report is
well founded, the Minister may refer the report to the Immigration Division of
the Immigration and Refugee Board (“Immigration Division”) for an admissibility
hearing (s. 44(2) ). However, even if he is of the opinion that the report is
well founded, the Minister retains some discretion not to refer it to the
Immigration Division.
[7]
If the Minister does refer the report to the
Immigration Division, an admissibility hearing is held for the permanent
resident, and the Immigration Division must either recognize that person’s
right to enter Canada (IRPA, s. 45 (a)), authorize him or her to
enter Canada for further examination (s. 45 (c)), or make a removal order
against that person (s. 45 (d)). If a removal order is made, that person’s
permanent resident status is lost (IRPA, s. 46(1) (c)). Although a right
to appeal to the Immigration Appeal Division exists against a decision to make
a removal order against a permanent resident (IRPA, s. 63(3) ), there is
no right to appeal by a permanent resident who has been found inadmissible on
grounds of serious criminality if the finding of inadmissibility was “with
respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at
least six months” (IRPA, s. 64(2) ).
[8]
This appeal concerns the judicial review of a
decision by the Minister to refer a report concerning Mr. Tran’s admissibility
to the Immigration Division.
[9]
Mr. Tran is a citizen of Vietnam. In 1989, he
acquired permanent resident status in Canada. In March 2011, he was involved in
a marihuana grow operation containing approximately 915 plants and was charged
with production of a controlled substance, contrary to s. 7(1) of the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (“CDSA ”). At the
time of the commission of the offence, the maximum penalty if convicted was
seven years of imprisonment (s. 7(2) (b)).
[10]
On November 6, 2012, legislation came into
effect (Safe Streets and Communities Act, S.C. 2012, c. 1, s. 41 )
increasing the maximum sentence for this offence to 14 years of imprisonment
and providing for a new minimum sentence of 2 years of imprisonment if the
number of plants produced was more than 500 (CDSA, s. 7(2) (b)(v)).
[11]
On November 29, 2012, Mr. Tran was convicted of
the charge against him. On January 18, 2013, he received a 12-month
conditional sentence of imprisonment, to be served in the community.
II.
Decisional History
A.
Administrative Decisions
[12]
On July 26, 2013, a CBSA officer prepared a
report stating that Mr. Tran was inadmissible to Canada under s. 36(1) (a)
of the IRPA . A delegate of the Minister referred Mr. Tran’s case to the
Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing. This referral was withdrawn
on September 10, 2013, in view of legislative changes to appeal rights under s.
64(2) of the IRPA . Mr. Tran was given an opportunity to make additional
submissions as to why a removal order should not be sought against him.
[13]
On October 4, 2013, Mr. Tran provided written
submissions in which he argued that he did not fall within the purview of s. 36
because: (1) the conditional sentence order made against him was not a “term of
imprisonment”, and therefore a “term of imprisonment of more than six months”
had not been imposed; and (2) the CDSA amendments raising the maximum
sentence for the offence for which he was convicted were not retroactively
applicable to him, and therefore the offence, at the time he committed it, was
not “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years”. Mr.
Tran also made submissions on various discretionary factors in support of his
position that his case did not warrant referral to the Immigration Division.
[14]
On October 7, 2013, a second CBSA officer
submitted another report (“Report”) regarding Mr. Tran to a delegate of the
Minister. The Report states, in part:
I recommend that this report
be referred to an admissibility hearing and a deportation order be issued.
. . .
I have reviewed counsel’s
submissions carefully and thoroughly, and given thought to each relevant point.
Many are legal arguments that do not fall into the scope of my duties in
this matter. In looking at my responsibility under the Act, I am guided by
CIC Enforcement Manual ENF 6, which states I should consider the following
non-exhaustive list of factors. I address each of them below, with
consideration to additional and relevant points raised by counsel. [Emphasis
added.]
(A.R., vol. I, at p. 1)
The Report then canvasses
conditions in Mr. Tran’s home country of Vietnam, his degree of establishment
in Canada, and the best interests of his children. Notably, the Report lists a
series of arrests and charges without conviction, and a conviction for impaired
driving, which are cited in support of a conclusion that Mr. Tran
tends to get arrested every
couple of years. By failing to acknowledge any of his past problems,
particularly his very recent conviction, it is my opinion that [Mr. Tran] is
not accepting responsibility for his actions. Based on the little information
before me, I can only assume he will reoffend because he has done so in the
past and because he has not demonstrated any inclination to take responsibility
for anything beyond what he thinks immigration officials are aware of. . . .
. . .
Based on all of the above
information, and in consideration of the submissions made by counsel, it is my
opinion that this report should be referred to a hearing. [Mr. Tran] has been
involved in a serious criminal offence. The evidence provided is that he has
been involved in criminal activity in the past and that he is not taking full
responsibility for his actions. The mitigating factors (establishment, family,
hardship in Vietnam, etc) are overshadowed by the seriousness of the offence,
[Mr. Tran]’s conduct in society, and the lack of any indication his
behaviour will improve.
(A.R., vol. I, at p. 3)
[15]
On October 10, 2013, the Minister’s delegate
endorsed the Report and referred the matter for an admissibility hearing before
the Immigration Division. Mr. Tran then applied for judicial review of the
delegate’s decision.
B.
Judicial Review in the Federal Court, 2014 FC
1040, 31 Imm. L.R. (4th) 160
[16]
Justice O’Reilly found the decision to be
unreasonable. He allowed Mr. Tran’s application for judicial review and
ordered that another officer consider the question of Mr. Tran’s
inadmissibility. The judge found that whether a conditional sentence is a “term
of imprisonment” varies according to the statutory context; that conditional
sentences are meant as an alternative to incarceration for less serious
offences; and that Mr. Tran’s conditional sentence was not a “term of imprisonment”
under the IRPA . Ergo, Mr. Tran had not been sentenced to a “term of
imprisonment of more than six months”. On the maximum term of imprisonment
question, O’Reilly J. found that s. 36(1) (a) referred to the maximum
punishment available at the time of conviction (para. 20):
The maximum sentence at the time of his
conviction was 7 years. While the maximum sentence was subsequently raised to
14 years, Mr. Tran was not punishable by a sentence of that duration.
Therefore, the offence of which he was convicted did not come within s.
36(1) (a), and the officer’s decision to the contrary was unreasonable.
The judge also found the
officer’s reliance on unproven allegations of criminal activity to be
unreasonable.
[17]
Justice O’Reilly certified two questions of
general importance, thus permitting an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal
under s. 74 (d) of the IRPA :
1.
Is a conditional sentence of imprisonment
imposed pursuant to the regime set out in ss. 742 to 742.7 of the Criminal
Code [R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 ] “a term of imprisonment” under s. 36(1) (a) of
the IRPA ?
2.
Does the phrase “punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of at least 10 years” in s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA refer to
the maximum term of imprisonment available at the time the person was sentenced
or to the maximum term of imprisonment under the law in force at the time
admissibility is determined?
(2015
FC 899)
C.
Federal Court of Appeal, 2015 FCA 237, [2016] 2
F.C.R. 459
[18]
Justice Gauthier, for a unanimous Federal Court
of Appeal, allowed the Minister’s appeal. She found that even if the reviewing
judge’s interpretation of s. 36(1) (a) was correct, he had nevertheless
failed to do what he was required to do under a reasonableness standard on
judicial review: to assess whether the interpretation adopted by the
administrative decision maker fell within the range of interpretations
defensible on the law and facts.
[19]
Gauthier J.A. found that the interpretation of
s. 36(1) (a) adopted by the Minister’s delegate was not unreasonable.
Regarding the actual term of imprisonment imposed (the first certified
question), she held that it was not unreasonable to construe a conditional
sentence as a “term of imprisonment” under s. 36(1) (a). She added that to say
that a conditional sentence is more lenient than similar terms of incarceration
does not mean that Parliament does not nevertheless consider the offence in
question serious enough to warrant inadmissibility. She noted that the
parliamentary committee debates about lowering the threshold of the term of
imprisonment beyond which there is no right to appeal inadmissibility findings
to the Immigration Appeal Division (IRPA, s. 64(2) ) included
three proposals to exclude conditional sentences, each of which was defeated.
She explained that if Parliament considers a conditional sentence of at least
six months to be sufficiently serious to warrant the loss of appeal rights, it
was not unreasonable for the Minister’s delegate to interpret a conditional
sentence as a “term of imprisonment” under s. 36(1) (a).
[20]
With respect to “punishable by a maximum term of
imprisonment of at least 10 years”, Gauthier J.A. found that “punishable”
refers to the offence under the Act of Parliament and not to what could be
imposed on any particular offender. She was of the view that the context of s.
36(1) (a) supports a conclusion that the test is objective rather than
subjective. She found that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the
relevant point in time is when admissibility is being assessed, since
admissibility should be assessed against Canada’s prevailing views of the
seriousness of the offence in question. She was also of the view that s. 11 (i)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did not apply because
proceedings before the Minister’s delegate are neither criminal nor penal.
III.
Preliminary Matters
[21]
Prior to tackling the statutory interpretation
questions at the heart of this appeal, I will address two preliminary matters.
First, to be clear, the decision under review is that of the Minister’s
delegate, taken pursuant to s. 44(2) of the IRPA , to refer the matter to
the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing. While the Minister’s
delegate merely adopted the Report ― and that Report is all
that is available in support of the decisions taken at the s. 44(1) and s.
44(2) stages ― it is nevertheless the Minister’s delegate’s
decision that was under review and not that of the officer.
[22]
Second, while courts have the discretion to hear
an application for judicial review prior to the completion of the
administrative process and the exhaustion of appeal mechanisms, they should
exercise restraint before doing so (Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova
Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 364, at
paras. 35-36; D. J. M. Brown and J. M. Evans, with the assistance of
D. Fairlie, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada
(loose-leaf), vol. 1, at topic 3:4100). In this case, the parties have not
asked this Court to revisit the decisions of the courts below to hear the
application, and I am of the view that this Court should respect those
decisions.
IV.
Analysis
[23]
The modern principle of statutory interpretation
is that “the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in
their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act,
the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (E. A. Driedger, Construction
of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at p. 87). Applying this approach, I am of the
view that, under either standard of review, the assumed interpretation of s.
36(1) (a) by the Minister’s delegate cannot stand.
A.
Conditional Sentences Are Not Included in “Term
of Imprisonment”
[24]
I cannot, on either standard of review, accept
the interpretation that conditional sentences are captured in the meaning of
“term of imprisonment”. Such an interpretation must be rejected for at least
three reasons.
[25]
First, the purpose of s. 36(1) (a) is to define
“serious criminality” for permanent residents convicted of an offence in
Canada. It is clear from the wording of the provision that whether or not an
imposed sentence can establish “serious criminality” depends on its length.
Length is the gauge. It must be “more than six months”. However, the
seriousness of criminality punished by a certain length of jail sentence is not
the same as the seriousness of criminality punished by an equally long
conditional sentence. In other words, length of the sentence alone is not an
accurate yardstick with which to measure the seriousness of the criminality of
the permanent resident.
[26]
Chief Justice Lamer explained in R. v. Proulx,
2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 44, that “a conditional sentence,
even with stringent conditions, will usually be a more lenient sentence than a
jail term of equivalent duration”. He elaborated as follows (at para. 52):
A judge does not impose a fixed
sentence of “x months” in the abstract, without having in mind where that
sentence will be served. Furthermore, when a conditional sentence is chosen,
its duration will depend on the type of conditions imposed. Therefore, the
duration of the sentence should not be determined separately from the
determination of its venue. [Citations omitted.]
[27]
The dissymmetry between the length of jail terms
and the length of conditional sentences was usefully illustrated by counsel for
Mr. Tran. On the one hand, there are cases in which mitigating factors
prompted courts to replace jail terms of less than six months with conditional
sentences longer than six months (e.g. R. v. Shah, 2003 BCCA 294, 182
B.C.A.C. 142; R. v. Saundercook-Menard, 2008 ONCA 493; R. v.
Chapman, 2007 YKSC 55; R. v. Jacobson (2006), 207 C.C.C. (3d) 270
(Ont. C.A.)). On the other hand, there are cases in which aggravating
factors led courts to replace conditional sentences longer than six months with
jail terms shorter than six months (e.g. R. v. Keller, 2009 ABCA 418,
469 A.R. 151; R. v. Sandhu, 2014 ONCJ 95; R. v. Kasakan, 2006
SKCA 14, [2006] 8 W.W.R. 23; R. v. Lebar, 2010 ONCA 220, 101 O.R. (3d)
263). Notably, in the case at bar, Mr. Tran asked the Court of Appeal for
British Columbia to replace his 12-month conditional sentence with a custodial
sentence of less than 6 months (A.F., at para. 18).
[28]
Not only is length an unreliable indicator of
“serious criminality” when comparing jail sentences to conditional sentences,
but it may not even be a reliable measure across conditional sentences because
of the disparate conditions attached to them. More fundamentally, conditional
sentences generally indicate less “serious criminality” than jail terms. As
Lamer C.J. said, a “conditional sentence is a meaningful alternative to
incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous offenders” (Proulx, at
para. 21; see also R. v. Knoblauch, 2000 SCC 58, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 780, at
para. 102). Thus, interpreting “a term of imprisonment of more than six months”
as including both prison sentences and conditional sentences undermines the
efficacy of using length to evaluate the seriousness of criminality.
[29]
Second, the meaning of “term of imprisonment”
varies according to the statutory context. In some instances, the word
“imprisonment” is used in the Criminal Code to capture conditional
sentences (R. v. Wu, 2003 SCC 73, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 530, at para. 25; Proulx,
at para. 29). But that is not always the case. In R. v. Middleton, 2009
SCC 21, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 674, at para. 14, Justice Fish concluded that there is
no consistent meaning for the word “imprisonment” in the Criminal Code :
. . .
“imprisonment” in the phrases “sentence of imprisonment” and “term of
imprisonment” does not bear a uniform meaning for all purposes of the Criminal
Code . In several instances, these terms necessarily contemplate
incarceration.
Nor is there a consistent
meaning across other statutes. Critically, its meaning in ss. 36(1) (a) and
64 of the IRPA was interpreted by this Court in Medovarski v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51, [2005] 2
S.C.R. 539, at paras. 11 and 13, to mean “prison”:
. .
. the IRPA creates a new scheme whereby persons sentenced to more than
six months in prison are inadmissible: IRPA, s. 36(1) (a). If they
have been sentenced to a prison term of more than two years then they
are denied a right to appeal their removal order: IRPA, s. 64 .
Provisions allowing judicial review mitigate the finality of these provisions,
as do appeals under humanitarian and compassionate grounds and pre-removal risk
assessments. However, the Act is clear: a prison term of over six months
will bar entry to Canada; a prison term of over two years bans an
appeal.
. . .
In
summary, the provisions of the IRPA and the Minister’s comments indicate
that the purpose of enacting the IRPA , and in particular s. 64 , was to
efficiently remove criminals sentenced to prison terms over six months
from the country. [Emphasis added.]
While not necessarily
determinative, this existing interpretation of “term of imprisonment” in the
context of the IRPA fortifies my conclusion in this case.
[30]
The Minister says that, in recent amendments to
ss. 50 (b) and 64(2) of the IRPA , the exclusion of conditional sentences
from the meaning of “term of imprisonment” was explicitly rejected. I do not
agree with this interpretation of legislative history. It is useful to note as
a starting point that the six-month threshold originated in the Immigration
Act, 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, s. 27(1)(d) ― before the
introduction of conditional sentences as a sentencing option in Canada ―
and was later kept in the IRPA in 2002. In 2013, the threshold for
denial of appeal rights set out in s. 64(2) was reduced from a “term of imprisonment”
of at least two years to a “term of imprisonment” of at least six months (S.C.
2013, c. 16, s. 24 ). The Minister points to committee debates surrounding those
amendments ― debates in which proposals to exclude conditional sentences
from counting toward the s. 64(2) threshold were rejected. Specifically, the
Minister’s argument rests on the rejection of three proposals by the House of
Commons and Senate committees tasked with examining amendments. However, since
the proposed amendments addressed more than just conditional sentences[1] and had to do with changes to s. 64(2) rather than to
s. 36(1) (a), I cannot draw any meaningful inferences from the rejection of
those proposals.
[31]
Finally, my interpretation avoids absurd
results. In Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at
para. 27, Justice Iacobucci explained the presumption that the legislature does
not intend absurd consequences:
It is a well established principle of
statutory interpretation that the legislature does not intend to produce absurd
consequences. According to Côté [P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada (2nd ed. 1991)], an interpretation can be considered
absurd if it leads to ridiculous or frivolous consequences, if it is extremely
unreasonable or inequitable, if it is illogical or incoherent, or if it is
incompatible with other provisions or with the object of the legislative
enactment (at pp. 378-80). Sullivan echoes these comments noting that a label
of absurdity can be attached to interpretations which defeat the purpose of a
statute or render some aspect of it pointless or futile [R. Sullivan, Driedger
on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994)], at p. 88).
[32]
If s. 36(1)(a) is interpreted such that a
conditional sentence is a “term of imprisonment”, absurd consequences will
follow. As previously mentioned, conditional sentences are “for less serious
and non-dangerous offenders” (Proulx, at para. 21). Thus, more serious
crimes may be punished by jail sentences that are shorter than
conditional sentences imposed for less serious crimes ― shorter because
they are served in jail rather than in the community. It would be an absurd
outcome if, for example, “less serious and non-dangerous offenders” sentenced
to seven-month conditional sentences were deported, while more serious
offenders receiving six-month jail terms were permitted to remain in Canada.
Public safety, as an objective of the IRPA (s. 3(1) (h)), is not enhanced
by deporting less culpable offenders while allowing more culpable persons to
remain in Canada.
[33]
It would also be absurd for offenders to seek
prison sentences instead of conditional sentences so that they can remain in
Canada, as Mr. Tran has done in this case. Conditional sentences are designed
as an alternative to incarceration in order to encourage rehabilitation, reduce
the rate of incarceration, and improve the effectiveness of sentencing (Proulx,
at para. 20). These objectives would be sabotaged if individuals who are
subject to conditional sentences sought to replace them with prison terms,
thinking the latter to be their only path for a future in the Canadian
communities from which incarceration would remove them.
[34]
For these reasons, the phrase “term of
imprisonment” in s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA cannot, by either standard of
review, be understood to include conditional sentences.
B.
The Maximum Term Is Determined as of the Time of
the Commission of the Offence
[35]
Turning to the interpretation of “punishable by
a maximum term”, in my view, a contextual reading of s. 36(1) (a) supports only
one conclusion: the phrase “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at
least 10 years” refers to the maximum sentence that the accused person could
have received at the time of the commission of the offence.
[36]
Section 36(1) (a) begins with “having been convicted”,
which sets the temporal marker at the time of conviction. As counsel for Mr.
Tran underscored during oral argument, the fact of a conviction precedes the
two disjunctive clauses: the maximum term and the actual term imposed. Both are
rooted in the fact of having been convicted. It is at the moment of conviction
that the two disjunctive clauses become operable, and it is with reference to
that time that the clauses are to be understood.
[37]
By the time of Mr. Tran’s conviction (November
29, 2012) and sentencing (January 18, 2013), the maximum sentence for an
offence under s. 7(1) of the CDSA had increased from imprisonment for 7
years to imprisonment for 14 years. However, in view of s. 11 (i) of the Charter ,
Mr. Tran, or anyone else in his position, could not receive a sentence greater
than seven years. This is so because production of a controlled substance,
contrary to s. 7(1) of the CDSA , is a criminal offence. Hence, sentences
for convictions under that provision must not offend s. 11 (i) of the Charter
which provides:
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right
. . .
(i)
if found guilty of the offence and if the punishment for the offence has been
varied between the time of commission and the time of sentencing, to the
benefit of the lesser punishment.
Accordingly, the maximum
sentence Mr. Tran could have been sentenced to upon his conviction is limited
by the maximum sentence available at the time of the commission of the offence.
Mr. Tran was not punishable by a term of imprisonment of at least
10 years.
[38]
The Court of Appeal held that “punishable by a
maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years” could be interpreted without
reference to Mr. Tran or to a person in his position. I disagree. The criterion
cannot simply be the abstract maximum penalty divorced from the actual
“permanent resident . . . convicted” in a particular case. In my view,
“punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years” is to be
understood as referring to the circumstances of the actual offender or of
others in similar circumstances.
[39]
This interpretation aligns with the purpose of
the IRPA , as outlined in s. 3 :
3 (1) The objectives of this Act with respect to immigration are
(a) to permit Canada to pursue the maximum social, cultural and
economic benefits of immigration;
(b) to enrich and strengthen the social and cultural fabric of
Canadian society, while respecting the federal, bilingual and multicultural
character of Canada;
. . .
(c) to support the development of a strong and prosperous Canadian
economy, in which the benefits of immigration are shared across all
regions of Canada;
(d) to see that families are reunited
in Canada;
(e) to promote the successful integration of permanent residents
into Canada, while recognizing that integration involves mutual obligations
for new immigrants and Canadian society;
. . .
(h) to protect public health and safety and to maintain the
security of Canadian society;
(i) to promote international justice and security by fostering
respect for human rights and by denying access to Canadian territory to
persons who are criminals or security risks; and
(j) to work in cooperation with the provinces to secure better
recognition of the foreign credentials of permanent residents and their more rapid
integration into society.
[40]
As stated above, the IRPA aims to permit
Canada to obtain the benefits of immigration, while recognizing the need for
security and outlining the obligations of permanent residents. The Minister
emphasizes the IRPA ’s security objective. Yet, as the Chief Justice
explained in Medovarski, the security objective in the IRPA “is
given effect by preventing the entry of applicants with criminal records, by
removing applicants with such records from Canada, and by emphasizing the
obligation of permanent residents to behave lawfully while in Canada” (para.
10). The obligation under the IRPA to behave lawfully includes not
engaging in “serious criminality” as defined in s. 36(1) . So long as this
obligation is met, the IRPA ’s objectives related to “successful
integration” will remain relevant to permanent residents, and the IRPA ’s
objectives related to the “benefits of immigration” and “security” will be
furthered.
[41]
A similar interaction between the mutual
obligations of the state and of individuals, in the criminal law context, has
been described as follows:
The
state’s duty to provide a framework for security may be presented as part of a
bargain between the state and its citizens, a bargain in which a measure of
security is provided in return for a measure of obedience.
. . .
The
fundamental duty of justice requires the state to recognise certain rights of
individuals in its dealings with them; notably, in the sphere of criminal law,
the state should respect the rule of law and the principle of legality, so that
citizens as rational agents may plan their lives so as to avoid criminal
conviction.
(A. Ashworth, Positive
Obligations in Criminal Law (2013), at pp. 100-101)
This description is
apposite in the immigration law context. Permanent residents too must be able
to “plan their lives”. Their obligations must be communicated to them in
advance. As Lon Fuller warned, a legal system must “publicize, or at least . .
. make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe” (The
Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969), at p. 39). When Mr. Tran committed his
offence, he could not have been aware that doing so was an act of “serious
criminality” that might breach his obligations and lead to deportation.
[42]
The Minister relies on Medovarski, at
para. 47, for the proposition that permanent residents cannot expect that “the
law will not change from time to time”. The Minister argues that admissibility
under s. 36(1) (a) must be tested against Parliament’s views of the seriousness
of the offence at the time of the admissibility decision. I do not agree. While
Parliament is entitled to change its views on the seriousness of a crime, it is
not entitled to alter the mutual obligations between permanent residents and
Canadian society without doing so clearly and unambiguously. In this case, it
has failed to do so. As such, s. 36(1) (a) must be interpreted in a way that
respects these mutual obligations. The right to remain in Canada is
conditional, but it is conditional on complying with knowable obligations.
Accordingly, the relevant date for assessing serious criminality under s.
36(1) (a) is the date of the commission of the offence, not the date of
the admissibility decision.
[43]
The presumption against retrospectivity lends
further support to this conclusion. While I agree with the Court of Appeal that
s. 11 (i) of the Charter does not apply to the decision of the
Minister’s delegate because the proceedings were neither criminal nor penal,
the presumption against retrospectivity is a rule of statutory interpretation that
is available in the instant case. The purpose of this presumption is to protect
acquired rights and to prevent a change in the law from “look[ing] to the past
and attach[ing] new prejudicial consequences to a completed transaction”
(Driedger (1983), at p. 186). The presumption works such that “statutes are not
to be construed as having retrospective operation unless such a construction is
expressly or by necessary implication required by the language of the Act” (Gustavson
Drilling (1964) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 271,
at p. 279; see also British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,
2005 SCC 49, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473, at para. 71).
[44]
The presumption against retrospectivity engages
the rule of law. Lord Diplock explained that the rule of law “requires that a
citizen, before committing himself to any course of action, should be able to
know in advance what are the legal consequences that will flow from it” (Black-Clawson
International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G., [1975] A.C.
591 (H.L.), at p. 638). As this Court explained in Reference re Secession of
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 70, the rule of law “vouchsafes to
the citizens and residents of the country a stable, predictable and ordered
society in which to conduct their affairs”.
[45]
The presumption against retrospectivity also
bespeaks fairness (R. v. K.R.J., 2016 SCC 31, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 906, at
para. 25). For example, sentencing judges are required to consider immigration
consequences (R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739). It would
raise issues of fairness to introduce a new collateral consequence after
sentencing that would have been relevant before sentencing. As
Mr. Tran points out, a permanent resident convicted of marijuana
production 25 years ago would suddenly find themselves inadmissible years after
having served the associated sentence. Such an outcome would not only offend
fairness and the rule of law, but would also undermine the decision of the
sentencing judge who decades ago crafted an appropriate sentence without
knowledge of additional deportation consequences.
[46]
The Minister argues that the presumption against
retrospectivity cannot assist Mr. Tran because this Court’s decision in Brosseau
v. Alberta Securities Commission, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 301, precludes its
application. I disagree.
[47]
In Brosseau, this Court held that the
presumption will not apply if the new prejudicial consequence at issue is
designed to protect the public rather than as a punishment for a prior event.
The fact that s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA reflects “an intent to prioritize
security” (Medovarski, at para. 10) is not, in itself, sufficient to
bring it within the “public protection” exception contemplated in Brosseau.
To interpret the public protection exception as inclusive of all legislation
that can be said to be broadly aimed at public protection would ignore
the purpose underlying the presumption against retrospectivity.
[48]
The presumption is a tool for discerning the
intended temporal scope of legislation. In the absence of an indication that
Parliament has considered retrospectivity and the potential for it to have
unfair effects, the presumption must be that Parliament did not intend them:
The
absence of a general requirement of legislative prospectivity exists despite the
fact that retrospective and retroactive legislation can overturn settled
expectations and is sometimes perceived as unjust: see E. Edinger,
“Retrospectivity in Law” (1995), 29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 5, at p. 13. Those
who perceive it as such can perhaps take comfort in the rules of statutory
interpretation that require the legislature to indicate clearly any desired
retroactive or retrospective effects. Such rules ensure that the legislature
has turned its mind to such effects and “determined that the benefits of
retroactivity (or retrospectivity) outweigh the potential for disruption or
unfairness”: Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994), at
p. 268. [Emphasis added.]
(Imperial Tobacco, at
para. 71, per Major J.)
[49]
The presumption exists to ensure that laws will
only apply retrospectively where Parliament has clearly signaled that it has
weighed the benefits of retrospectivity with its potential unfairness.
Otherwise, we presume that Parliament did not intend such effects.
[50]
Ordinarily, express language or necessary
implication (Gustavson Drilling, at p. 279) provides this necessary
indication that Parliament has turned its mind to the issue of retrospectivity.
The “public protection” exception permits protective legislation to operate
retrospectively absent express language or necessary implication, provided that
legislative intent otherwise supports doing so. But, in accordance with the
underlying purpose of the presumption, the exception is only triggered where
the design of the penalty itself signals that Parliament has weighed the
benefits of retrospectivity against its potential for unfairness. This will be
the case where there is a clear nexus between the protective measure and the
risks to the public associated with the prior conduct to which it attaches. In
such cases, as in Brosseau, the scope of protection is aligned with the
specific risks posed by persons who have engaged in specific harmful conduct
and is tailored to preventing those risks prospectively (see Brosseau,
at pp. 319-20, citing R. v. Vine (1875), L.R. 10 Q.B. 195, at p.
199; see also In re A Solicitor’s Clerk, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 1219 (Q.B.)).
[51]
Section 36(1) (a) of the IRPA fails to
provide such a clear nexus for two reasons, both of which are tied to the fact
that Parliament relied on criminal sentences as a gauge for “serious
criminality”. First, by not associating “serious criminality” with specific
offences and instead relying on the sentences they attract, Parliament
contemplated that the range of offences constituting “serious criminality” can
expand and contract over time. This suggests that Parliament intended to tailor
the penalty to prevailing views about a particular conduct, not to the
prevention of risks associated with that conduct (F.C.A. reasons, at para. 58).
Second, as “serious criminality” is defined by reference to criminal sentences,
the scope of public protection it affords necessarily captures criminal
sentencing considerations that extend beyond “public protection”, including
punishment (see R. v. Hooyer, 2016 ONCA 44, 129 O.R. (3d) 81, at para.
42; K.R.J., at paras. 31-32).
[52]
As such, s. 36(1) (a) does not engage the “public
protection” exception because — in the absence of a clear nexus between the
risk and the protective measures available in response — it does not signal
that Parliament weighed the potential for unfairness and the protective
benefits of requiring that the class of non-citizens inadmissible for serious
criminality remain perfectly aligned with the class of offences that s.
36(1) (a) deems “serious” at any point in time.
[53]
For these reasons, I am of the view that
“punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years” refers to
the maximum sentence that the accused person could have received at the time of
the commission of the offence. The maximum sentence that Mr. Tran could
have received at that time was only seven years. Thus he was not convicted of
an offence “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years”.
C.
Decision by the Minister’s Delegate to Refer
[54]
The Minister’s delegate formed the opinion that
the Report on Mr. Tran’s inadmissibility for serious criminality was well
founded, and he referred the Report to the Immigration Division on that basis.
Because that opinion was premised on an untenable interpretation of the grounds
for inadmissibility under s. 36(1) (a), his decision to refer the Report cannot
be sustained. It is therefore unnecessary for me to consider whether he
properly exercised his discretion under s. 44(2) .
V.
Conclusion
[55]
I would allow the appeal, quash the decision of
the Minister’s delegate, and remit the matter to a different delegate.
[56]
Additionally, while this Court’s analysis is not
limited to the certified questions, in the interest of providing guidance on
the legal questions addressed by the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal,
I would answer those questions as follows:
1. Is a conditional sentence of imprisonment imposed pursuant to
the regime set out in ss. 742 to 742.7 of the Criminal Code “a term of
imprisonment” under s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA ?
―
No.
2. Does the phrase “punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of
at least 10 years” in s. 36(1) (a) of the IRPA refer to the maximum term
of imprisonment available at the time the person was sentenced or to the
maximum term of imprisonment under the law in force at the time admissibility
is determined?
―
It refers to the maximum term of imprisonment available at the time of the
commission of the offence.
Appeal
allowed.
Solicitors for the
appellant: Edelmann & Co., Vancouver; Green & Spiegel, Toronto.
Solicitor for the
respondent: Attorney General of Canada, Montréal and Toronto.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Attorney General of British Columbia: Attorney General of
British Columbia, Victoria.
Solicitor for the
intervener the Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers: John Norris,
Barrister, Toronto.
Solicitors for the
intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association: Waldman &
Associates, Toronto.
Solicitor for the
intervener the African Canadian Legal Clinic: Mirza Kwok, Mississauga; African
Canadian Legal Clinic, Toronto.
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