Docket: T-1080-16
Citation:
2017 FC 262
Ottawa, Ontario, March 3, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Kane
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BETWEEN:
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RODICA MITER
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
The Applicant, Ms. Rodica Miter, seeks judicial
review of the decision of the Appeal Division of the Social Security Tribunal
Appeal Division [Appeal Division], dated May 30, 2016. The Appeal Division
dismissed her appeal of the decision of the General Division of the Social Security
Tribunal [General Division] pursuant to section 58
of the Department of Employment and Social Development Act, SC 2005, c
34 [the Act]. The General Division had found that Ms.
Miter’s appeal of the denial of disability benefits under the Canada Pension
Plan, RSC 1985, c C-8 [CPP] had no reasonable chance of success.
I.
Background
[2]
Ms. Miter recounts that she had surgery in 2003
and since that time has experienced a wide range of medical symptoms that have
had a severe impact on her health and ability to work. She recounts that
doctors repeatedly dismissed and/or misdiagnosed her medical conditions.
[3]
Ms. Miter applied for CPP disability benefits in
2013. In the application for benefits, she stated that she had not been able to
work in her custom drapery and interiors business since 2011 due to her
debilitating health condition. In her reconsideration application, she claimed
that her disability commenced in 2003.
[4]
Her application was denied in November 2013, and
again denied after reconsideration in February 2014, based on the fact that she
did not meet the contributory requirements for the time she claimed a
disability.
[5]
Ms. Miter appealed the decision to the General
Division. The General Division summarily dismissed the appeal on August 18,
2015 finding that the appeal had no reasonable chance of success. The General
Division found that the Applicant’s contributory period was 2004-2010, but she
had made contributions only in 2007 and 2010, which did not meet the
requirement to have made contributions in four out of the six years in the
relevant contributory period, which is the period preceding the claim for
benefits, or to have made valid contributions for at least 25 years including
three of the last six years.
[6]
Ms. Miter then appealed the decision of the General
Division to the Appeal Division. She argued that the General Division had
failed to meet a principle of natural justice and had made factual errors. She
argued that she was unable to work due to her medical condition and that the
Appeal Division should consider additional medical records.
II.
The Appeal Division Decision under Review
[7]
The Appeal Division found that Ms. Miter had not
made the required contributions in the relevant period and that she did not
dispute this fact. As she did not meet one of the two statutory requirements
for disability benefits (which are valid contributions and the establishment of
a disability in the relevant period), the appeal could not succeed. The Appeal
Division found that the General Division had not made any factual errors and
that Ms. Miter’s allegation of a breach of natural justice appeared to be based
on her claims regarding medical malpractice and was not related to the process
in the General Division.
[8]
The Appeal Division found that the General
Division had correctly stated the test for summary dismissal, had correctly
applied that test and had correctly concluded that the appeal had no reasonable
chance of success on the evidence before it.
[9]
The Appeal Division considered Ms. Miter’s
arguments that the General Division should have considered her medical records
and opinions. The Appeal Division found that establishing a disability is only
one part of the eligibility requirements for CPP disability benefits. The other
requirement is to meet the minimum qualifying period contributions. Ms. Miter
had not done so. It was, therefore, unnecessary to consider the medical
information to assess whether it established a prolonged disability.
III.
The Standard of Review
[10]
The sole issue in this judicial review is
whether the Appeal Division’s decision to dismiss Ms. Miter’s appeal is
reasonable.
[11]
The standard of review for decisions of the
Appeal Division to grant or to deny leave to appeal is reasonableness (Reinhardt
v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 158 at para 15; Atkinson v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 FCA 187 at paras 22-33.
[12]
To determine whether a decision is reasonable,
the Court looks for “the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process” and
considers “whether the decision falls within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47, [2008] 1
SCR 190).
[13]
As explained at the hearing, the standard of
reasonableness is a legal concept which has been interpreted in the
jurisprudence. It may not reflect what Ms. Miter considers to be reasonable
from her perspective, as that term is used in every-day language.
IV.
The Applicant’s Submissions
[14]
Ms. Miter submits that her disability, which began
with surgery in 2003, prevented her from working continuously and, as a result,
from making contributions to the CPP in subsequent years. She explains that if
she had received proper treatment and diagnosis, her health would not have
deteriorated and she could have continued to work and to make contributions to
the CPP. She also explains that if the doctors she consulted had acknowledged
their misdiagnosis and/or had provided her with the necessary supporting
medical documents she could have pursued her application for benefits earlier. Ms.
Miter suggests that she could not obtain medical records from doctors who were
concealing their misdiagnosis of her health conditions.
[15]
On this application for judicial review, Ms.
Miter submitted a written account describing her health issues in detail, a
chronology of her pursuit of a diagnosis and treatment with several doctors,
copies of correspondence from several doctors that had been submitted to the
General Division and Appeal Division and a copy of the April 29, 2016 decision
of the Ontario Health Professions Appeal and Review Board which considered the
results of an investigation into Ms. Miter’s allegations against doctors who
had treated her, primarily in the period around 2011-2013.
[16]
Ms. Miter notes that she made contributions to
the CPP throughout her working life, but could not do so more recently due to
her deteriorating health. She questions why a broader examination of her
contributions in the past cannot be relied on to provide her with the benefits she
now needs, including to pay for her medication.
V.
The Respondent’s Submissions
[17]
The Respondent acknowledges and sympathizes with
Ms. Miter’s description of her serious health conditions.
[18]
The Respondent explains that the CPP is a
contributory plan to provide benefits where the eligibility criteria are met.
The eligibility criteria in the CPP are strict and inflexible; an applicant
must be both disabled as defined in the CPP and meet the contribution
requirements for the relevant period. The Respondent acknowledges that Ms.
Miter made contributions to the CPP in the past. The Respondent’s records note
that contributions were made in 1979-1982, 1985-1988, 2000-2001, 2007 and 2010.
[19]
The Respondent notes, however, that Ms. Miter
did not meet the eligibility requirements for a CPP disability pension, whether
her disability arose in 2003, at the time of her surgery, or in 2011, as she
stated in her first benefits claim. Ms. Miter applied for benefits in 2013. The
relevant six year period to assess her contributions is 2007- 2013. Ms. Miter
made contributions for only two years (2007 and 2010), rather than the four
years required in the relevant six year period.
[20]
The Respondent submits that the Appeal Division
did not err in finding that the General Division properly summarily dismissed
the appeal as it did not have a reasonable chance of success.
VI.
The Appeal Division Did Not Err
[21]
Ms. Miter is in a very unfortunate situation.
She describes long-standing health issues that interfered with her ability to
work and to make contributions to the CPP. She now submits that she is in need
of the CPP disability benefits because she remains disabled, cannot work and
has medical and drug expenses.
[22]
Although the Court is very sympathetic to Ms.
Miter’s health conditions, the issue before the Court is whether the Appeal
Division erred in applying the law that governs Appeals from denials of
benefits.
[23]
I find that the Appeal Division did not err; it
properly applied the law to the facts before it.
[24]
The Appeal Division noted the requirements for
CPP disability benefits, which are: to be under 65 years of age; to not be in
receipt of the CPP retirement pension; to be disabled; and to have made valid
contributions to the CPP for not less than the Minimum Qualifying Period [MQP].
[25]
The MQP is set out in subsection 44(2) of the
CPP and, at its simplest explanation, provides that an applicant has made
contributions in four of the last six years within the relevant contributory
period or has made valid contributions for at least 25 years including three of
the last six years.
[26]
Ms. Miter made contributions in 2007 and 2010.
In her 2013 claim for benefits she stated that her disability began in 2011 and
she stopped working at that time. Clearly she had not made contributions in
four of the six years in her contributory period. She did not dispute this at
the General Division, at the Appeal Division or before this Court.
[27]
The Appeal Division addressed the grounds for
appeal argued by Ms. Miter and found that they did not reflect any of the
grounds for appeal set out in section 58 of the Act, which are the only grounds
for an appeal, and which further provides that leave to appeal will be refused
if the Appeal Division “is
satisfied that the appeal has no reasonable chance of success.”
[28]
Under subsection 58(1) of Act, the only grounds
of appeal are that:
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58 (1) The only grounds of appeal are that
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58 (1) Les seuls moyens d’appel sont les suivants :
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(a) the General Division failed to observe a principle of natural
justice or otherwise acted beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction;
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a) la division générale n’a pas observé un principe de justice
naturelle ou a autrement excédé ou refusé d’exercer sa compétence;
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(b) the General Division erred in law in making its decision,
whether or not the error appears on the face of the record; or
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b) elle a rendu une décision entachée d’une erreur de droit, que
l’erreur ressorte ou non à la lecture du dossier;
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(c) the General
Division based its decision on an erroneous finding of fact that it made in a
perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material before it.
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c) elle a fondé
sa décision sur une conclusion de fait erronée, tirée de façon abusive ou
arbitraire ou sans tenir compte des éléments portés à sa connaissance.
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[29]
To simplify the above, the grounds of appeal are
limited to: (a) a breach of procedural fairness, which focusses on the process
before the decision maker(s), such as whether an applicant had an opportunity
to make submissions; (b) an error of law, such as the application of incorrect
statutory provisions or principles of the jurisprudence; and (c) an error of
fact, such as ignoring a relevant fact or misunderstanding a fact.
[30]
As noted by Justice Manson in Canada
(Attorney General) v O’Keefe, 2016 FC 503:
[29] The DESDA
makes clear that Parliament intended that the SST-AD only hear appeals properly
falling within a ground of appeal and that have a reasonable chance of success.
The DESDA does not grant the SST-AD broad discretion in deciding leave,
and should the SST-AD grant leave to appeal in other than the instances
outlined in section 58, they have improperly stepped beyond the delegated
authority provided them by their governing statute.
[31]
In Pleasant-Joseph v Canada (Attorney
General), 2009 FCA 173, the Court of Appeal considered the appeal of a
denial of CPP disability benefits based on the applicant’s failure to satisfy
the contribution requirements. The Court of Appeal found, at paragraph 3:
[3] I am unable to find any error
with the Board’s decision which would have allowed us to intervene. Like the
Board, this Court is bound to apply the provisions of the Plan and cannot
disregard those provisions so as to remedy what might be considered or
perceived as an unfair and/or unjust result.
[32]
The same finding applies in the present case.
The role of the Court is not to determine an applicant’s eligibility for
disability benefits. Even if that were the role of the Court, it could not
ignore the clear eligibility requirements of the Act.
[33]
The existence of a severe health condition on
its own is not sufficient to be awarded CPP disability benefits. An applicant
must also demonstrate that he or she made contributions for not less than the
MQP as required by subsection 44(2) of the CPP.
[34]
The Appeal Division’s decision to dismiss the
appeal is based on the provisions of the law and the evidence before it. The
role of the Court is to determine if the Appeal Division made a reasonable
decision based on the facts and the law. The Appeal Division’s decision to
affirm the General Division’s decision that Ms. Miter’s appeal had no
reasonable chance of success is a reasonable decision. Moreover, it is the only
decision the Appeal Division could have reached.
[35]
The Court understands Ms. Miter’s frustration in
pursuing several levels of appeals with respect to the denial of her benefits,
which likely gave her some false hope that benefits could be provided. She asks
why the CPP cannot be interpreted more liberally to better meet her needs and
the needs of other contributors. The Court must apply the law and cannot bend
the requirements of this complex contributory social benefits scheme. The same
applies to the Appeal Division, the General Division and the decision makers
within the Department of Employment and Social Development.