Docket: IMM-2695-16
Citation:
2017 FC 275
Ottawa, Ontario, March 14, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Madam Justice Strickland
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BETWEEN:
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EMAN MAJALI,
ABDELAZEZ MJALLI AND RIDA ALLAH MAJDI AHMED MJALLI, BY THEIR LITIGATION
GUARDIAN EMAN MAJALI
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of a
decision of a Senior Immigration Officer of Citizenship and Immigration Canada
(“Officer”), dated April 29, 2016, denying the Applicants’ Pre-Removal Risk
Assessment (“PRRA”) application.
Background
[2]
The Applicants are a 50 year old woman
(“Principal Applicant”) and her two minor children, aged 13 and 17, who are
Stateless Palestinians from the West Bank.
[3]
The Principal Applicant alleges that her husband
is a moderate Muslim and teacher who believes in a peaceful solution to the
conflict between Palestine and Israel and between different Palestinian
factions. As such, he does not believe in violence and conveyed that belief to
his students. Hamas did not like that way of thinking and tried to recruit the
Principal Applicant’s husband to advocate for their ideology, he refused,
making the family a target. Hamas then accused the Principal Applicant’s
husband of collaborating with Israel, which justified him being killed, and the
family were threatened many times by Hamas militants. In 2008, the Principal Applicant’s
husband was shot in the leg by Hamas militants as a warning, and his life
threatened unless he agreed to cooperate with them. In 2012 one of their sons,
Oday, was beaten by Hamas people which necessitated surgery on his eye. In
2014 the Principal Applicant’s husband was approached by two masked people who
accused him of being a collaborator and threw burning material on his neck.
Her husband went into hiding, and his whereabouts are not known. Hamas men
came to their home looking for the Principal Applicant’s husband, they
threatened her and the children with violence and the sexual assault of her
daughters if he did not surrender. The Principal Applicant claims that she
decided to flee because she feared that Hamas militants would hurt or kill her
and her family.
[4]
The Principal Applicant and two of her sons
obtained visas to the United States and arrived there on August 20, 2014. On
August 21, 2014 the Applicants made a claim for protection in Canada. However,
they were considered not to be exempt from the Canada-US Safe Third Country
Agreement, deemed ineligible and issued a removal order because, at that time,
the Principal Applicant’s brother, who is a Canadian permanent resident, was
briefly out of the country (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC
2001, c 27 (“IRPA”), s 101(1)(e); Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (“IRP Regulations”), s 159.5(b)(ii)).
[5]
Their removal order stated that they could not
return to Canada for 12 months and, believing that they could return at that
time and make another refugee claim, the Applicants sought to do so on September
17, 2015. However, because their previous claim had been deemed ineligible,
they were not permitted to make a second claim (IRPA, s 101(1)(c)). They were
permitted to remain in Canada in order to file a PRRA application.
Decision Under Review
[6]
The Officer listed the documents submitted in
support of the PRRA but noted the absence of important documentary evidence.
Specifically, the Principal Applicant did not submit documents to show that her
husband was a teacher, that he was threatened by Hamas, is currently in hiding or
that the family had experienced ongoing and increasingly violent harassment by
Hamas between 2008 and 2014.
[7]
The Officer found a medical report of an
orthopedic surgeon provided by the Principal Applicant concerning her
husband’s 2008 gunshot wound which the Principal Applicant claims was
inflicted by Hamas; a medical report from an ophthalmologist concerning injury
to her son’s eye that the Principal Applicant claimed was the result of an
altercation with Hamas; and, a third medical report which the Principal
Applicant stated pertained to an attack on her husband causing him to be burned,
had little probative value in substantiating the Applicants’ allegations of
risk from Hamas and afforded them little weight.
[8]
The Officer also stated that the Principal Applicant’s
affidavit contained minimal details, for example, the dates of assaults and
threats, the date of her husband’s disappearance, whether she or the rest of
her family have contact with him, and how and why the medical certificates were
obtained. The Principal Applicant’s mother, sister, two brothers, son and
three daughters all still reside in the West Bank and while she claims that
they are in hiding, little further information was provided.
[9]
Further, that the most recent Immigration and Refugee
Board report indicates that even the families of known Israeli collaborators
are not routinely targeted by Hamas. The Officer concluded that the Applicants
had adduced insufficient evidence to meet their evidentiary burden and stated
that this was not an issue relating to credibility; rather it was an issue of
insufficient objective evidence to demonstrate the allegation of risk on a
balance of probabilities.
[10]
As to the claimed risk to the minor Applicants
of being forcefully recruited by Hamas, the Officer found that credible
independent sources suggested that there was very little evidence of forced
recruitment and that the minor Applicants had not indicated ever being
pressured to join Hamas in the past, nor was there any indication of other
family members being pressured or forced to join Hamas. The Officer was unable
to conclude that the minor Applicants faced this risk upon return to the West
Bank. Similarly, that the information before the Officer did not demonstrate
that young Palestinian males are systemically targeted or mistreated by either
the Israeli army or Israeli settlers in the West Bank.
[11]
Finally, the Officer found that the documentary
evidence confirmed that general country conditions were far from perfect but
applied to all residents and are not unique to the Applicants. There was
insufficient evidence to conclude that the Applicants would be singled out.
Issues and Standard of Review
[12]
I agree with the Applicants’ description of the
issues as follows:
1. Was the Applicants’ right to procedural fairness breached by failing
to provide an oral hearing?
2. Were the Officer’s findings erroneous and unreasonable, particularly
the findings made about the medical reports?
[13]
The Applicants submit that the Officer’s
findings of fact or of mixed fact and law in the context of a PRRA application
are reviewed on a standard of reasonableness and that errors of law or
violations of procedural fairness are reviewable on a standard of correctness.
While the jurisprudence is mixed on the standard of review of a PRRA officer’s
decision of whether to hold an oral hearing under s 113(b) of the IRPA, this is
a question of procedural fairness and, accordingly, that deference should not
be shown to the Officer regarding this decision.
[14]
The Respondent submits that the Officer’s decision
is reviewable on the reasonableness standard including the decision not to hold
an oral hearing.
[15]
I agree with the parties that the standard of
review that applies to the Officer’s decision as a whole is reasonableness (Wang
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 799 at para 11; Chen v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 702 at para 13).
[16]
While the jurisprudence remains divided on the
standard of review applicable to a PRRA officer’s decision respecting an oral
hearing (Khatibi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1147 at
para 13), I have previously found that this is reviewable on the reasonableness
standard as a PRRA officer decides whether to hold an oral hearing by
considering the PRRA application against the requirements of s 113(b) of
the IRPA and the factors in s 167 of the IRP Regulations which is a question of
mixed fact and law (Chekroun v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2013 FC 738 at para 40 (“Chekroun”); Seyoboka v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2016 FC 514 at para 29; Ibrahim v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2014 FC 837 at para 6 (“Ibrahim”)). I have not
been persuaded differently in this matter.
ISSUE 1:
Was the Applicants’ right to procedural fairness breached by failing to provide
an oral hearing?
Applicants’ Position
[17]
The Applicants submit that the Officer breached
the duty of procedural fairness by failing to hold an oral hearing in
accordance with s 113(b) of the IRPA and s 167 of the IRP Regulations.
Where a serious issue of credibility arises in the determination of a PRRA
application, an oral hearing is required (Singh v Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 at para 105; Tekie v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 27 at paras 15-17; Zmari v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 132 at paras 17-18 (“Zmari”)).
And, because credibility findings may be disguised in language the Court must
go beyond the language used by the PRRA officer to determine whether credibility
findings were being made (Hurtado Prieto v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC 253 at para 33; Ferguson v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 1067 at para 16 (“Ferguson”)).
[18]
The Applicants submit that where a claimant
swears to the truth of his or her testimony, that testimony is presumed to be
true unless there is a valid reason to doubt its truthfulness and that this
presumption applies equally in the context of a PRRA. The Officer’s reasons
for discounting the three medical reports, particularly when considered against
the evidence provided by the Principal Applicant in her sworn affidavit,
illustrate that the Officer was really making adverse credibility findings.
And, given that the Applicants did not have an opportunity to appear before the
Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”), the failure to grant an oral hearing was
particularly problematic.
[19]
The Applicants submit that the Officer made
veiled credibility findings disguised as insufficiencies in their evidence or
as assignments of little probative value to the documents they submitted to
substantiate their claim. Further, that veiled credibility findings can be
said to have been made by a PRRA officer’s “implicit
rejection” of an applicant’s story, which is apparent in this case (Zmari
at para 20). Here the Applicants adduced sufficient evidence, however, the
Officer chose not to believe it. Had the Officer believed their evidence,
which documented serious injuries to the Applicants’ immediate family members
and included sworn testimony as to how these injuries were received, it could
have grounded a claim for protection.
[20]
Further, questioning the origin and content of
the medical documents and the information provided in the sworn affidavit
clearly amounts to a credibility finding (Shaiq v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 149 at para 77), despite the language used by the
Officer in the decision. And, had the Officer accepted the credibility of the
Applicants’ narrative, there would have been no need for corroborating
evidence. Further, a negative inference cannot be drawn from the absence of
corroborative evidence unless there are valid reasons for doubting an applicant’s
credibility and an applicant has been unable to provide a reasonable
explanation for the lack of corroborative material (Dundar v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 1026 at paras 21-22).
[21]
The Applicants submit that the Officer also
raised a number of peripheral issues including how the Principal Applicant
obtained the medical reports and where the remainder of her family members were
living. The Applicants say that these could have been addressed by way of an
oral hearing and that they could not have anticipated them.
[22]
The Applicants’ evidence that they were
threatened and harmed by Hamas was central to their application and to the
Officer’s decision. The Officer’s finding that families of known collaborators
with Israel are not routinely targeted is irrelevant in the face of the
Applicants’ evidence that they have been personally targeted.
Respondent’s Position
[23]
The Respondent submits that no oral hearing was
required as the Officer’s findings were clearly based on insufficiency of
evidence and not on credibility. In that regard, it is well established that
there are two separate assessments that can be made of evidence tendered before
a PRRA officer: one for weight and one for credibility and it is open for an
officer to assess evidence for weight before considering credibility. The
question, irrespective of whether the evidence is from a credible source, is
whether the evidence if taken to be true, is capable of persuading the officer
on a balance of probabilities that the applicant faces a risk under ss 96 or 97
of the IRPA (Ferguson at paras 25-26; Ozomma v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2012 FC 1167 at para 49; Ibrahim at para 23).
Further, that this principle applies equally to sworn statements made by
applicants (II v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 892 at
paras 21-24). Evidence tendered by persons with a personal interest in the
outcome of the case, such as the Principal Applicant’s evidence, may also be
examined for its weight before considering its credibility because typically
this kind of evidence requires corroboration if it is to have probative value.
If there is no corroboration then it may be unnecessary to assess credibility (Ferguson
at para 27). The Respondent submits that it is open for the PRRA Officer to
require corroboration to satisfy the legal burden.
[24]
Further, that the burden of proof rests with the
Applicants to tender evidence proving on a balance of probabilities that they
would be subject to a risk under s 96 or s 97 of the IRPA. The fact that they
have not discharged the burden of proof does not mean that they lack
credibility but rather that they have not provided sufficient evidence to
support the proposition advanced.
[25]
The Officer found that the Applicants’ evidence
was insufficient to prove on a balance of probabilities that Hamas was
interested in harming them and pointed out the deficiencies in the evidence,
being the lack of detail. The Principal Applicant’s affidavit did not include
the dates of the assaults or when her husband went into hiding, whether she has
contact with her husband, how the medical certificates were obtained and there
was minimal information about her other family members who were still living in
the West Bank. The medical reports only established that the Principal
Applicant’s husband and son were injured. There was no corroborating evidence
to show that her husband was a teacher, that he was in hiding or that Hamas
visited the family. In addition, the Officer examined the documentary evidence
and found it did not demonstrate that Hamas used forcible recruitment or that
it was likely to pursue someone who did not want to recruit students on its
behalf and there was no evidence that the minor Applicants or other family
members had been forced to join Hamas or that it targeted families of known
collaborators. In any event, the Applicants are not known collaborators.
[26]
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the
Officer’s decision was properly based on insufficiency of evidence and there is
no indication that the Officer thought that the Principal Applicant was
lying.
Analysis
[27]
An oral hearing is not required in the normal
course of deciding a PRRA application and, in this case, it appears that the
Applicants did not request one when making their PRRA application. However, s
113(b) of the IRPA states that a hearing may be held if the Minister, on the
basis of prescribed factors, is of the opinion that a hearing is required.
[28]
The prescribed factors are set out in s 167 of
the IRP Regulations:
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167. For the
purpose of determining whether a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b)
of the Act, the factors are the following:
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167 Pour
l’application de l’alinéa 113b) de la Loi, les facteurs ci-après servent à
décider si la tenue d’une audience est requise :
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(a) whether
there is evidence that raises a serious issue of the applicant's credibility
and is related to the factors set out in sections 96 and 97 of the Act;
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a)
l’existence d’éléments de preuve relatifs aux éléments mentionnés aux
articles 96 et 97 de la Loi qui soulèvent une question importante en ce qui
concerne la crédibilité du demandeur;
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(b) whether
the evidence is central to the decision with respect to the application for
protection; and
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b)
l’importance de ces éléments de preuve pour la prise de la décision relative
à la demande de protection;
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(c) whether
the evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing the application for
protection.
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c) la
question de savoir si ces éléments de preuve, à supposer qu’ils soient admis,
justifieraient que soit accordée la protection.
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[29]
This Court examined s 113(b) of the IRPA and s
167 of the IRP Regulations in Strachn v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2012 FC 984 and held:
[34] This has been interpreted to be a
conjunctive test: therefore, an oral hearing is generally required if there is
a credibility issue regarding evidence that is central to the decision and
which, if accepted, would justify allowing the application: Ullah v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 221. While the Court has
acknowledged that there is a difference between an adverse credibility finding
and a finding of insufficient evidence, the Court has sometimes found an
officer to have improperly framed true credibility findings as findings
regarding sufficiency of evidence and therefore an oral hearing should have
been granted: Zokai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FC 1103 at para 12; Liban v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2008 FC 1252 at para 14; and Haji v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 889 at paras 14-16.
[30]
In this matter the Applicants alleged that they
were entitled to an oral hearing because the Officer made veiled credibility
findings while the Respondent asserts that the Officer, as stated in the reasons,
based the decision on an insufficiency of evidence. Accordingly, the Court
must first determine whether a credibility finding was made, explicitly or
implicitly. If so, then it must determine if the issue of credibility was
central to or determinative of the decision (Adeoye v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2012 FC 680 at para 7; Matute Andrade v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1074 at para 30 (“Matute-Andrade”)).
More specifically in this matter, whether the Applicants’ credibility was
called into question and if this was a determinative factor in the Officer’s
finding that they will not face a risk to life, a risk of torture or a risk of
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Palestine.
[31]
When considering an allegation of veiled
credibility findings, the Court must look beyond the words that have been used
by the Officer in the decision. Although the Officer explicitly stated in the
decision that he or she was not making credibility findings, that does not
dispose of the issue as it is possible that the Officer, by his or her reasoning,
was calling into question the Applicants’ credibility, even while stating that
the decision was based on insufficient evidence. The Court must therefore
identify the true basis for the decision (Matute-Andrade at paras 31-32).
[32]
As recognized by Justice Kane in Gao v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 59, it can be difficult to
distinguish between a finding of insufficient evidence and a finding of
credibility:
32 I note that in some cases it is
difficult to draw a distinction between a finding of insufficient evidence and
a finding that the applicant was not believed i.e. was not credible. The choice
of words used, whether referring to credibility or to insufficiency of the
evidence is not solely determinative of whether the findings were one or the
other or both. However, it cannot be assumed that in cases where an Officer
finds that the evidence does not establish the applicant's claim, that the
Officer has not believed the applicant.
[33]
In Ferguson Justice Zinn addressed the
assessment of evidence submitted to a PRRA officer. There, the PRRA
officer found that the applicant in that case had provided insufficient
evidence to establish that she was lesbian. The only evidence substantiating
her claim was an unsworn written statement by her counsel and the officer found
that this was not probative evidence. The applicant argued that the officer
was really making a credibility finding as to her sexual orientation. Justice
Zinn disagreed, finding that the PRRA officer’s reasoning simply suggested that
he neither believed nor disbelieved the applicant but remained unconvinced.
Justice Zinn also noted the two ways in which a PRRA officer may assess
evidence, by assessing its credibility and then determining the weight to be
afforded to it, or, by moving immediately to an assessment of weight or
probative value without considering whether it is credible.
[34]
The Respondent takes the position that in this
matter the Officer took the latter approach. However, in my view, the Officer’s
reasons for discounting the medical reports and the Principal Applicant’s
affidavit evidence do not support that position.
[35]
As a preliminary point, I note that when
submitting the PRRA application the Applicants’ counsel noted that he was
enclosing a copy of the Principal Applicant’s affidavit, which summarized her
claim for refugee protection and asked the Officer to review the affidavit for
a summary of her fear of persecution. The content of the Principal Applicant’s
affidavit is described, in part, in the background section of this decision.
It is clear from the affidavit that the primary risk being presented by the
Applicants for the purposes of their PRRA application was their fear of death
and bodily harm by Hamas militants. Accordingly, the evidence related to the harassment
and assault of the Applicants’ immediate family members by Hamas militants was
central to the application and is significant when considering ss 167(b) and
(c) of the IRP Regulations.
[36]
The Principal Applicant’s affidavit attached, as
an exhibit, a medical report dated March 16, 2015 from an orthopedic
surgeon to corroborate the allegation in her affidavit that her husband was
shot by Hamas militants in 2008. That report states that the named patient is
suffering from left thigh pain and numbness, “S/P old
bullet injury to left thigh with femoral Artery injury, underwent surgical
operation for repairing the femoral artery”. It describes post-surgery
scars, an x-ray report as showing “opaque shadow to
medial aspect of left Femur to proximal third (Bullet)” and states “Given this medical report upon his request”.
[37]
The Officer discounts this report on the basis
that it does not indicate when the gunshot injury occurred or the circumstances
in which the injury was inflicted. Further, that the author of the report
indicated that it was issued to the patient upon his request but, according to
the Principal Applicant’s affidavit, her husband had gone into hiding in 2014
and his whereabouts remain unknown. Moreover, the Principal Applicant left
Palestine in 2014, thus it was unclear how her husband obtained the report,
which was only a copy and not an original, and provided it to the Principal
Applicant. In my view, the Officer is clearly calling into question the
authenticity of the document and the credibility of the Principal Applicant
based on the inconsistency between the statement in her sworn affidavit that
her husband’s whereabouts have been unknown since 2014 and the fact that the
report was issued to her husband in 2015. It was also unreasonable for the
Officer to expect that a medical report, presumably issued for the purpose of
confirming an injury that was alleged to have occurred approximately seven
years previously, would indicate the circumstances under which it was inflicted
(Ukleina v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1292 at para
10). The physician did not witness the alleged shooting.
[38]
The Principal Applicant’s affidavit also states
that in 2012, persons from Hamas beat her son, Oday, damaging his eye which
required the implantation of an intraocular lens. Further, that his doctor, afraid
for his life, refused to write the exact cause of the injury. The affidavit
attached as an exhibit a medical report from an ophthalmologist, dated March
15, 2015, in support of this allegation. It states, in part, that the named
patient had “suffered Traumatic Cataract on left eye
since 3 years ago. Intraocular lens done for the left eye….He can wear glass
or do laser operation”.
[39]
The Officer discounted this medical report on
the basis that it was not issued immediately after the injury/surgery but
rather three years later and within days of the other medical notes being
issued. It did not indicate the date of the injury or the instrument with
which the injury was inflicted and the Officer stated that this information
could have been provided without revealing the perpetrator of the attack, but
was not. Nor did the report allow the Officer to determine if the Principal
Applicant’s son had been attacked, as opposed to receiving an accidental injury
or that the perpetrators were members of Hamas. The Officer again raised the
question of how the report was obtained given that the Principal Applicant had
fled Palestine in 2014 but the report was dated 2015. As noted above, the
Principal Applicant’s affidavit explained that the doctor did not provide an
exact cause of the injury because he feared for his life. It also stated that
the injury was caused by a beating by persons from Hamas. In my view, the
Officer was calling into question the credibility of the Principal Applicant’s
sworn evidence on the basis that the cause of the injury was not stated by the
physician, without explaining why her sworn evidence on this point required
corroboration. It was also unreasonable to afford the report no weight on the
basis that it did not describe the instrument of injury or because it was
obtained after the incident and at the same time as the other corroborating
medical reports were obtained.
[40]
The Principal Applicant’s affidavit also
describes an incident in 2014 when two masked persons confronted her husband,
accusing him of being a collaborator who deserved death, and throwing a burning
material on his neck which caused him severe burns and pain. The affidavit attached
as an exhibit a medical report to corroborate this allegation dated March 16, 2015
which states “After examination of the above name: I
fined [sic] that he has ESCARE OF BURNIS [sic] after a caustic
material he needs a plastic surgery”. The Officer discounted this
evidence as it did not indicate the location or date of injury or that it was
the result of an assault. Further, that it is dated March 2015 which is a year
after the Principal Applicant’s husband’s alleged disappearance and seven
months after the Principal Applicant’s departure from Palestine.
Additionally, because the report is a photocopy and does not contain any
security features. Again, the Officer is calling into question the credibility
of the Principal Applicant’s sworn evidence on the basis of the information
that is and is not present in the report, is questioning the authenticity of
the report and unreasonably discounts it on the basis that it fails to state
the cause of the injury as being an assault.
[41]
An applicant’s testimony is presumed to be true
unless there is a valid reason to doubt its truthfulness (Maldonado v Canada
(Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1979] FCJ No 248 (FCA); Chekroun
at para 65; Ogunrinde v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness),
2012 FC 760 at para 38). Here the Officer implicitly disbelieved the Principal Applicant’s
claim of previous attacks by Hamas (Whudne v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2016 FC 1033 at paras 20-23). The Principal Applicant
swore that she feared that she and her family would be killed if they were
returned to Palestine. The Principal Applicant provided medical
documentation corroborating the three allegations of assault. While I agree
that there is an inconsistency arising from the Principal Applicant’s sworn
evidence that her husband’s whereabouts have not been known since 2014 and the
fact that the medical reports were obtained in 2015, one of which states it was
issued to her husband upon his request, this is the very reason why an oral
hearing would have been warranted. The Officer’s veiled credibility findings
concerning the Principal Applicant’s sworn evidence and medical reports raised
a serious issue related to the Applicants’ alleged fear of Hamas. This was
central to the decision denying protection and, had the Officer not discounted the
evidence it may have justified allowing the PRRA.
[42]
And, although not determinative, I also note
that the Officer’s credibility findings were made in a circumstance where the
Applicants had never been afforded an oral hearing before the RPD or otherwise,
which means that the Applicants have not had an opportunity to address the
credibility concerns about their claimed fear of Hamas (Zmari at para
18).
[43]
Having reached this conclusion I need not
consider the second issue, being whether the Officer’s factual findings were
erroneous and unreasonable. However, as noted briefly above, the Officer’s
assessment of the medical reports was unreasonable in discounting the reports
on the basis that they did not say how the injuries were incurred when the
doctors who prepared the reports were not witnesses to those events. The
Principal Applicant’s sworn affidavit described the cause of the injuries and
the existence of the injuries was corroborated, and not contradicted, by the
medical reports. Further, to the extent that the Officer was discounting the
reports because the Principal Applicant did not explicitly state that the
reason they had been obtained and tendered was to corroborate the claim, this
was unreasonable. Applicants routinely provide such information for just this
purpose which would also explain why they were obtained at around the same
time.
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