Docket: A-559-15
Citation: 2017 FCA 53
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CORAM:
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DAWSON J.A.
RENNIE J.A.
WOODS J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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BENJAMIN MOORE
& CO. LIMITED
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Appellant
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and
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HOME HARDWARE
STORES LIMITED
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
WOODS J.A.
[1]
Benjamin Moore & Co. Limited has applied
under section 30 of the Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 (Act) to
register two trademarks: the word mark “BENJAMIN MOORE
NATURA,” and the design mark depicted below. Both marks are to be used
in association with interior and exterior paints.
[2]
Home Hardware Stores Limited filed oppositions
to the applications pursuant to section 38 of the Act. It asserts, among other
things, that the Benjamin Moore marks are confusing with nine of Home
Hardware’s trademarks that include the term “natura.” The
Home Hardware marks are set out in Appendix A.
[3]
Seven of the Home Hardware marks are registered
design marks bearing two common features, the name of a product or product line
and a stylized form of the term “natura.” A
typical example is the design mark that contains the words “natura wood prep”, which is associated with a
preparation to clean exterior wood.
[4]
The other two Home Hardware marks are word marks
that are not registered, and were at the relevant time the subject of pending
applications for registration.
[5]
One of these marks is “BEAUTI-TONE
NATURA,” which is used in association with paints and paint-related
products. It is the only relevant Home Hardware mark used specifically with
paints and is also the only relevant mark that includes the term “BEAUTI-TONE,” which is a Home Hardware brand associated
with paints.
[6]
The other relevant Home Hardware word mark is “NATURA.” In the application for registration, this
mark is associated with a diverse group of wares that does not include paints.
I.
Procedural history
[7]
Home Hardware’s oppositions were rejected by the
Trade-marks Opposition Board (Board) in a decision dated September 29, 2014
(2014 TMOB 211). Central to the decision was a finding that there was no
confusion between any of the Benjamin Moore and Home Hardware trademarks at any
of the material dates at which confusion was to be determined.
[8]
Home Hardware appealed this decision to the
Federal Court pursuant to subsection 56(1) of the Act. In the Federal Court, Home
Hardware introduced new material evidence pursuant to subsection 56(5) of the
Act. As a result, the Federal Court undertook a de novo review of the
matter.
[9]
In a decision dated December 4, 2015, the
Federal Court found that there was confusion between the trademarks, “particularly as those marks are used in association with
paint” (reasons, paragraph 73). Accordingly, the Benjamin Moore applications
for registration were refused (Home Hardware Stores Limited v. Benjamin
Moore & Co., Limited, 2015 FC 1344, 139 C.P.R. (4th) 109).
[10]
Benjamin Moore has appealed the judgment of the Federal
Court to this Court.
II.
Legislative framework
[11]
The relevant statutory provisions are reproduced
in Appendix B.
[12]
Under section 38 of the Act, a person may oppose
an application for registration of a trademark on any of the following grounds:
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(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of
section 30;
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a) la
demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’article 30;
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(b) that the trade-mark is not registrable;
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b) la
marque de commerce n’est pas enregistrable;
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(c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to
registration of the trade-mark; or
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c) le
requérant n’est pas la personne ayant droit à l’enregistrement;
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(d) that the trade-mark is
not distinctive.
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d) la
marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive.
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[13]
The grounds of opposition above are linked to
other provisions of the Act that provide requirements for registration. The registration
requirements that are relevant in this appeal are set out below.
(a)
A trademark may not be registered if it is
confusing with a registered trademark (paragraphs 38(2)(b) and 12(1)(d)
of the Act). The determination of whether trademarks are confusing is made as
at “the date where the matter is disposed of on the
evidence adduced” (Park Avenue Furniture Corp. v. Wickes/Simmons
Bedding Ltd. (1991), 37 C.P.R. (3d) 413 at 422, 130 N.R. 223 (F.C.A.)).
(b)
An applicant is not entitled to register a proposed
trademark if it is confusing with a trademark that had been previously used in
Canada or made known in Canada by any other person (paragraphs 38(2)(c)
and 16(3)(a) of the Act). This determination is made at the date of
filing the application for registration (subsection 16(3) and Park Avenue
Furniture, at 422).
(c)
An applicant is not entitled to register a proposed
trademark if it is confusing with a trademark in respect of which an
application for registration by any other person is pending (paragraphs 38(2)(c)
and 16(3)(b), and subsection 16(4) of the Act). This is to be determined
at the date of filing the application for registration (subsection 16(3) and Park
Avenue Furniture, at 422).
(d)
A trademark may not be registered if it is not
distinctive. The term “distinctive” is defined
to mean that the trademark actually distinguishes the goods or services from
the goods or services of others, or is adapted to distinguish them (paragraph
38(2)(d) and section 2 of the Act). This is to be determined at the date
of filing the statement of opposition (Park Avenue Furniture, at
423-424).
[14]
Section 6 of the Act provides the framework for
determining whether one trademark is confusing with another. In general, the
test is whether the use of both marks in the same area would be likely to lead
to the inference that the relevant goods or services are manufactured or sold
by the same person. For this purpose, the term “use”
is given an expansive meaning in section 4 of the Act.
[15]
Subsection 6(5) sets out the considerations to
be taken into account in the confusion analysis. It provides that all the
surrounding circumstances are to be considered, including:
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(a) the inherent
distinctiveness of the trade-marks or trade-names and the extent to which
they have become known;
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a) le caractère distinctif inhérent des
marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et la mesure dans laquelle ils sont
devenus connus;
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(b) the length of time the trade-marks or trade-names have been
in use;
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b) la
période pendant laquelle les marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été
en usage;
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(c) the nature of the
goods, services or business;
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c) le genre de produits, services ou
entreprises;
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(d) the nature of the
trade; and
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d) la nature du commerce;
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(e) the degree of resemblance between the trade-marks or
trade-names in appearance or sound or in the ideas suggested by them.
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e) le degré de ressemblance entre les
marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son,
ou dans les idées qu’ils suggèrent.
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III.
Federal Court decision
[16]
As mentioned above, the Federal Court concluded
that the Benjamin Moore and Home Hardware trademarks were confusing, particularly
the parties’ trademarks used in association with paints.
[17]
The reasons for this conclusion were summarized
in paragraphs 72 and 73 of the decision, and are reproduced below at paragraph
27. I need only say that the Federal Court concluded that most of the relevant
factors in the confusion analysis favoured Home Hardware.
[18]
Although this conclusion is quite different from
the Board’s, it is not disputed that the Federal Court was entitled to
undertake a de novo consideration of the matter on the basis that new
material evidence was introduced that was not before the Board.
IV.
Position of Benjamin Moore
[19]
In this appeal, Benjamin Moore seeks an order
that the Registrar of Trade-marks be directed to allow its applications for
registration. It submits that the Federal Court’s reasons contain three main
errors of law: (1) there is no separate mark to mark comparative confusion analysis;
(2) the grounds of opposition are not analyzed separately; and (3) the proper material
dates are not applied when considering each ground of opposition.
V.
Position of Home Hardware
[20]
Home Hardware submits that the Federal Court did
not fail to undertake a mark to mark analysis, or to separately address the
grounds of opposition, or to apply the proper material dates. It submits that
the judge undertook a proper analysis in a pragmatic fashion. Nor did the judge
err in his consideration of the term “natura.”
[21]
Further, Home Hardware submits that the Federal
Court’s decision is correct because its family of NATURA trademarks provides
strong prior established rights.
VI.
Analysis
[22]
In paragraph 73 of its reasons, the Federal
Court concluded that there would likely be confusion between the trademarks,
and particularly the marks used in association with paints. I will first
consider whether there was a proper confusion analysis with respect to the trademarks
generally, and then consider the Federal Court’s confusion analysis with respect
to the marks used in association with paints.
A.
Did the Federal Court undertake a proper
confusion analysis?
[23]
It is well-established that a confusion analysis
under the Act must be undertaken on a mark to mark basis (Masterpiece Inc.
v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 387, paragraph 45)
and that the appropriate material dates should be applied to each ground of
opposition.
[24]
For the reasons below, I do not agree with Home
Hardware that the Federal Court applied a proper mark to mark analysis and took
into account the relevant material dates for each ground of opposition. These
deficiencies represent errors of law, which are to be reviewed on a standard of
correctness (Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235).
[25]
In its confusion analysis, the Federal Court
undertakes a consideration of each relevant surrounding circumstance as
required by subsection 6(5) of the Act. However, distinctions between the
parties’ respective marks and particular material dates are expressed in a very
general manner. For example, in considering distinctiveness, the Federal Court
concludes that the distinctiveness factor “overall
favours [Home Hardware], even if only slightly with respect to some of its
trade-marks at some of the material dates” (reasons, paragraph 38).
[26]
This deficiency permeates the entire decision,
to the point that I conclude that a proper mark to mark comparison at the
appropriate material dates was not undertaken.
[27]
The Federal Court’s conclusion at paragraphs 72
and 73 of the reasons illustrates this.
[72] Summarising the conclusions I
reached above:
1) the
distinctiveness factor slightly favours the applicant;
2) the length of use
factor slightly favours the applicant;
3) the nature of the
wares factor weighs in favour of the applicant;
4) there is some
overlap in the channels of trade;
5) the degree of
resemblance factor favours the applicant; and
6) the “family of
trademarks” argument supports the applicant’s position;
[73] Therefore,
I find that an ordinary consumer would likely be confused as to whether the
parties’ trade-marks originate from the same source, particularly as those
marks are used in association with paint, notwithstanding the modifying aspects
of BEAUTI-TONE and BENJAMIN MOORE respectively. In my opinion, as a matter of
first impression, a casual consumer somewhat in a hurry who encounters BENJAMIN
MOORE NATURA paint, when that consumer has no more than an imperfect
recollection of BEAUTI-TONE NATURA paint, would likely be confused as to the
source of these wares, at least as of the later material dates when the
Applicant’s NATURA brand had acquired particular distinctiveness in respect of
paint. A consumer would likely be confused as to whether the Respondent’s
trade-mark originates from the same source as the Applicant’s trade-mark.
[28]
It is especially important to undertake a
separate mark to mark comparison at the appropriate material dates because
otherwise it is impossible to undertake a proper weighing of the confusion
factors in subsection 6(5).
[29]
Home Hardware suggests that it is not necessary
to conduct a separate trademark to trademark confusion analysis in this
particular case because it owns a family of “NATURA”
trademarks that have been built up over several years (Respondent’s Memorandum,
paragraph 50). In this regard, Home Hardware introduced new evidence in the
Federal Court to establish that it had extensively used trademarks with the
term “NATURA” on environmentally-friendly wares,
which included wares that were not listed in the statements of opposition.
[30]
The concept of a “family
of marks” has been recognized in the Federal Court for many years. It
was almost 20 years ago that the protection afforded by a family of marks was
described by this Court in Techniquip Ltd. v. Canadian Olympic Assn., 3
C.P.R. (4th) 298, 1999 CarswellNat 2511:
[15] The notion of a family of marks
was developed in the context of proceedings under section 6 of the Act. In Molnlycke
Aktiebolag v. Kimberly-Clark of Canada Ltd., Cattanach J. explained:
If these are a series of marks all
having the same features and are all owned by the same trader then this is a
circumstance which must reflect adversely upon an applicant for a mark
containing that common feature since the public might think that such a mark
indicated goods coming from the same source as the goods covered by the other
marks.
[…]
If those marks which have common
characteristics are registered in the names of different owners then the
presumption is that the common characteristic is a common feature in the trade
and registration ought to be allowed. The fact that the marks are owned by
different persons tends to negative any proprietorial significance of the
common feature and so assists an applicant.
[31]
Home Hardware’s use of a family of “NATURA” trademarks is relevant to the mark to mark
comparative analysis because such use may increase the likelihood of confusion
between Benjamin Moore’s “natura” products and
any or all of Home Hardware’s trademarks set out in Appendix A. Several factors
may potentially influence this consideration, including the extent to which the
Home Hardware family of marks have become known. In addition, the likelihood of
confusion may possibly be decreased because of the fact that the Benjamin Moore
trademarks do not use the term “natura” on their
own but in conjunction with the company name, “Benjamin
Moore.” Further, Benjamin Moore submits the likelihood of confusion is
decreased because a form of the term “natura” is
commonly used by other companies. All relevant circumstances should be
considered in considering how the family of marks affects the confusion
analysis.
[32]
Although Home Hardware’s “family of marks” is relevant to this case, I do not
agree with the submission of Home Hardware that as a result it is not necessary
to undertake a mark to mark confusion analysis taking into account the relevant
material dates. The jurisprudence does not support this and it conflicts with
the relevant statutory provisions. The use of a family of marks does not
obviate the need to undertake a full comparative confusion analysis on a mark
to mark basis for each relevant ground of opposition.
[33]
I now turn to the Federal Court’s specific confusion
analysis with respect to the paints trademarks.
B.
Did the Federal Court err in concluding that the
paints trademarks were confusing?
[34]
As mentioned earlier, the Federal Court made a
specific finding of confusion with respect to trademarks associated with paints
(reasons, paragraph 73). The relevant trademarks are the word mark “BENJAMIN MOORE NATURA,” the related Benjamin Moore design
mark, and Home Hardware’s word mark “BEAUTI-TONE
NATURA.”
[35]
Since Home Hardware’s paints trademark was not
registered, paragraph 16(3)(b) of the Act is the relevant provision relating
to confusion.
[36]
The identification of the relevant provision is
significant in this case because it affects the material date. This date for the
purpose of paragraph 16(3)(b) is the date of Benjamin Moore’s
applications for registration, which was January 9, 2009. This is the earliest
of all the relevant material dates in this matter and at that date neither
party was selling paints with these trademarks. Home Hardware started selling
paints using “BEAUTI-TONE NATURA” shortly after
January 9, 2009 and Benjamin Moore commenced sales of paint using “BENJAMIN MOORE NATURA” in April 2009.
[37]
In my view, the Federal Court erred in its
confusion analysis by not limiting its consideration to the earliest material
date with respect to the paints trademarks. There are several aspects of the
reasons that lead me to this conclusion.
[38]
First, the Federal Court inexplicably does not
mention paragraph 16(3)(b) of the Act as being at issue in the appeal
(reasons, paragraph 20). This is a significant omission because this is the
only provision that requires a confusion analysis for the paints trademarks.
[39]
Second, throughout its confusion analysis the Federal
Court refers to actual sales of paint as a factor to be considered. Examples
are with respect to distinctiveness (reasons, paragraphs 37 and 38), length of
use (reasons, paragraph 41), and resemblance (reasons, paragraph 51). In
general, sales are an irrelevant consideration to the confusion analysis with
respect to the paints trademarks because neither party was selling paints with
these trademarks at the material date.
[40]
Third, in paragraph 73 of the reasons the
Federal Court concludes that consumers would likely be confused as to the
source of paint associated with these trademarks “at
least as of the later material dates.” The later material dates are not
relevant to this analysis. Only the earliest material date, January 9, 2009, is
relevant.
[41]
The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn
from the reasons as a whole is that the Federal Court applied the wrong
material dates in determining that the paints trademarks were confusing. This
is an error of law.
VII.
Conclusion
[42]
The errors in the Federal Court’s reasons go to
the heart of its conclusion. However, since most of the surrounding
circumstances were found by the Federal Court to be in Home Hardware’s favour,
I have considered whether the errors would have made a difference in the
outcome. Taking the reasons as a whole into account, and especially the
importance that the Federal Court placed on sales of paint, I am not convinced
that the overall conclusion would have been the same if a proper analysis had
been undertaken.
[43]
The question then is whether this Court should
give the judgment that the Federal Court should have given or whether it should
return the matter to the Federal Court for an initial determination on the
merits. While this Court may give the judgment the Federal Court should have
given, it is normally preferable to remit a matter to the Federal Court when
the matter involves the assessment of evidence. This is especially the case
where the Board did not consider the merits of Home Hardware’s opposition to
the marks on the full evidentiary record.
[44]
In the result, I would allow the appeal with
costs here and below, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court, and refer
the matter back to the Federal Court for redetermination in accordance with
these reasons.
"Judith M. Woods"
“I agree
Eleanor R. Dawson J.A.”
“I agree
Donald J. Rennie J.A.”
APPENDIX
A
Home Hardware Trademarks
APPENDIX B
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. T-13
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Definitions
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Définitions
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2 In this Act,
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2 Les
définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente loi.
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…
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[…]
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distinctive, in relation to a trade-mark, means a trade-mark that actually
distinguishes the goods or services in association with which it is used by
its owner from the goods or services of others or is adapted so to
distinguish them; (distinctive)
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distinctive Relativement à une marque de commerce, celle qui distingue
véritablement les produits ou services en liaison avec lesquels elle est
employée par son propriétaire, des produits ou services d’autres
propriétaires, ou qui est adaptée à les distinguer ainsi. (distinctive)
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When mark or
name confusing
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Quand une marque ou un nom crée de la confusion
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6 (1) For the purposes of this Act, a trade-mark or trade-name is
confusing with another trade-mark or trade-name if the use of the first
mentioned trade-mark or trade-name would cause confusion with the last
mentioned trade-mark or trade-name in the manner and circumstances described
in this section.
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6 (1) Pour l’application de la présente loi, une marque de
commerce ou un nom commercial crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de
commerce ou un autre nom commercial si l’emploi de la marque de commerce ou
du nom commercial en premier lieu mentionnés cause de la confusion avec la
marque de commerce ou le nom commercial en dernier lieu mentionnés, de la
manière et dans les circonstances décrites au présent article.
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(2) The use of a trade-mark causes confusion with another
trade-mark if the use of both trade-marks in the same area would be likely to
lead to the inference that the goods or services associated with those
trade-marks are manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by the same
person, whether or not the goods or services are of the same general class.
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(2) L’emploi
d’une marque de commerce crée de la confusion avec une autre marque de
commerce lorsque l’emploi des deux marques de commerce dans la même région
serait susceptible de faire conclure que les produits liés à ces marques de
commerce sont fabriqués, vendus, donnés à bail ou loués, ou que les services
liés à ces marques sont loués ou exécutés, par la même personne, que ces
produits ou ces services soient ou non de la même catégorie générale.
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…
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[…]
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(5) In determining whether trade-marks or trade-names are
confusing, the court or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall have regard
to all the surrounding circumstances including
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(5) En
décidant si des marques de commerce ou des noms commerciaux créent de la
confusion, le tribunal ou le registraire, selon le cas, tient compte de
toutes les circonstances de l’espèce, y compris :
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(a) the inherent distinctiveness of the trade-marks or
trade-names and the extent to which they have become known;
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a) le
caractère distinctif inhérent des marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux, et
la mesure dans laquelle ils sont devenus connus;
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(b) the length of time the
trade-marks or trade-names have been in use;
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b) la période pendant laquelle les
marques de commerce ou noms commerciaux ont été en usage;
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(c) the nature of the
goods, services or business;
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c) le genre de produits, services ou
entreprises;
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(d) the nature of the trade; and
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d) la
nature du commerce;
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(e) the degree of
resemblance between the trade-marks or trade-names in appearance or sound or
in the ideas suggested by them.
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e) le degré de ressemblance entre les
marques de commerce ou les noms commerciaux dans la présentation ou le son,
ou dans les idées qu’ils suggèrent.
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When trade-mark registrable
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Marque de
commerce enregistrable
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12 (1) Subject to section 13, a trade-mark is registrable if it is
not
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12 (1) Sous réserve de l’article 13, une marque de commerce est
enregistrable sauf dans l’un ou l’autre des cas suivants :
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…
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[…]
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(d) confusing with a registered trade-mark;
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d) elle
crée de la confusion avec une marque de commerce déposée;
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…
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[…]
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Registration of marks used or made known in Canada
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Enregistrement des marques employées ou révélées au Canada
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…
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[…]
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16 (3) Any applicant who has filed an application in accordance
with section 30 for registration of a proposed trade-mark that is registrable
is entitled, subject to sections 38 and 40, to secure its registration in
respect of the goods or services specified in the application, unless at the
date of filing of the application it was confusing with
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16 (3) Tout
requérant qui a produit une demande selon l’article 30 en vue de
l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce projetée et enregistrable, a droit,
sous réserve des articles 38 et 40, d’en obtenir l’enregistrement à l’égard
des produits ou services spécifiés dans la demande, à moins que, à la date de
production de la demande, elle n’ait créé de la confusion :
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(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or made
known in Canada by any other person;
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a) soit
avec une marque de commerce antérieurement employée ou révélée au Canada par
une autre personne;
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(b) a trade-mark in respect of
which an application for registration had been previously filed in Canada by
any other person; or
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b) soit
avec une marque de commerce à l’égard de laquelle une demande
d’enregistrement a été antérieurement produite au Canada par une autre
personne;
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…
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[…]
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Where application for confusing mark pending
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Si une demande relative à une marque créant de la confusion est
pendante
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16 (4) The right of an applicant to secure registration of a
registrable trade-mark is not affected by the previous filing of an
application for registration of a confusing trade-mark by another person,
unless the application for registration of the confusing trade-mark was
pending at the date of advertisement of the applicant’s application in
accordance with section 37.
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16 (4) Le
droit, pour un requérant, d’obtenir l’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce
enregistrable n’est pas atteint par la production antérieure d’une demande
d’enregistrement d’une marque de commerce créant de la confusion, par une
autre personne, à moins que la demande d’enregistrement de la marque de
commerce créant de la confusion n’ait été pendante à la date de l’annonce de
la demande du requérant selon l’article 37.
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Statement of opposition
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Déclaration
d’opposition
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38 (1) Within two months
after the advertisement of an application for the registration of a
trade-mark, any person may, on payment of the prescribed fee, file a
statement of opposition with the Registrar.
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38 (1) Toute personne peut, dans le délai de deux
mois à compter de l’annonce de la demande, et sur paiement du droit prescrit,
produire au bureau du registraire une déclaration d’opposition.
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Grounds
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Motifs
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(2) A statement of opposition may
be based on any of the following grounds:
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(2) Cette opposition peut être fondée
sur l’un des motifs suivants :
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(a) that the application does not conform to the requirements of
section 30;
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a) la
demande ne satisfait pas aux exigences de l’article 30;
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(b) that the trade-mark is not registrable;
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b) la
marque de commerce n’est pas enregistrable;
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(c) that the applicant is not the person entitled to
registration of the trade-mark; or
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c) le
requérant n’est pas la personne ayant droit à l’enregistrement;
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(d) that the trade-mark is not distinctive.
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d) la
marque de commerce n’est pas distinctive.
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Appeal
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Appel
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56 (1) An appeal lies to the
Federal Court from any decision of the Registrar under this Act within two
months from the date on which notice of the decision was dispatched by the
Registrar or within such further time as the Court may allow, either before
or after the expiration of the two months.
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56 (1) Appel de toute décision rendue par
le registraire, sous le régime de la présente loi, peut être interjeté à la
Cour fédérale dans les deux mois qui suivent la date où le registraire a
expédié l’avis de la décision ou dans tel délai supplémentaire accordé par le
tribunal, soit avant, soit après l’expiration des deux mois.
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…
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[…]
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(5) On an appeal under subsection (1), evidence in addition to
that adduced before the Registrar may be adduced and the Federal Court may
exercise any discretion vested in the Registrar.
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(5) Lors de l’appel, il peut être
apporté une preuve en plus de celle qui a été fournie devant le registraire,
et le tribunal peut exercer toute discrétion dont le registraire est investi.
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