Docket: IMM-1092-16
Citation:
2017 FC 12
Ottawa, Ontario, January 4, 2017
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson
|
BETWEEN:
|
|
CLAROY KADEEM
REEVES
|
|
Applicant
|
|
and
|
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION AND THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS
|
|
Respondents
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The applicant, Mr. Claroy Kadeem Reeves, is a
citizen of Jamaica who arrived in Canada in 2010 with his parents and sister as
a temporary resident. His parents initiated a claim for refugee protection. The
claim was rejected.
[2]
A Pre-Removal Risk Assessment [PRRA] was initiated
in January 2015 on the basis that Mr. Reeves fears harm should he return to
Jamaica due to his sexual orientation, a risk that had not been raised in the
refugee claim and had not previously been assessed. The PRRA application was
refused in June 2015 and Mr. Reeves sought judicial review of that decision. Based
upon agreement between the parties, the judicial review was discontinued and
the matter was returned for redetermination.
[3]
On redetermination, the PRRA Officer [Officer]
conducted an oral hearing to address questions relating to Mr. Reeves’ sexual
orientation. In February 2016, the PRRA application was again refused as the
Officer did not find Mr. Reeves credible on the question of his homosexuality.
It is that decision that is now before this Court
[4]
Mr. Reeves submits that the Officer’s
credibility findings were based on unreasonable or irrelevant considerations
and that the Officer unreasonably addressed evidence advanced in support of his
sexual orientation claim. He also submits that in failing to provide him with
an opportunity to address alleged inconsistencies in the evidence, the Officer
breached his right to procedural fairness.
[5]
The application raises the following issues:
A.
Were the Officer’s credibility findings
unreasonable?;
B.
Did the Officer ignore or fail to assess corroborating
evidence?; and
C.
Was the process procedurally unfair?
[6]
I am of the opinion that the Officer reasonably
addressed the evidence advanced by Mr. Reeves and reached findings and
conclusions that were reasonable based on the facts and the law. There was no
breach of procedural fairness. The application is dismissed for the reasons
that follow.
II.
Standard of Review
[7]
The parties agree that questions relating to
credibility and the weight to be given to evidence are questions of fact to be reviewed
on a reasonableness standard. An Officer’s findings of fact are to be granted a
high level of deference by a reviewing court (Chakrabarty v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 1199, Girmaeyesus v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2010 FC
53 [Girmaeyesus] at para 21, Dunsmuir v New
Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at para 47
and Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 89). This Court
will only intervene where an Officer’s decision fails to meet the requirements
of justification, transparency and intelligibility, or falls outside the range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law (Dunsmuir at para 47).
[8]
For questions
related to procedural fairness, the correctness standard applies (Girmaeyesus at para 21).
III.
Analysis
A.
Were the Officer’s credibility findings
unreasonable?
[9]
In the decision, the Officer identified a number
of inconsistencies between the evidence Mr. Reeves provided in the course of his
testimony and the narrative he provided for the purpose of his first PRRA in
February 2015. The Officer also noted inconsistencies between Mr. Reeves’
testimony and the evidence provided by Mr. Belnavis who had been in a
relationship with the applicant from 2012 until the spring of 2015. The Officer
drew negative credibility inferences as a result of these inconsistencies.
[10]
In addition, the Officer drew a negative
inference from Mr. Reeves’ inability to recall the name of a school official in
Jamaica to whom he had disclosed his sexual orientation over the phone and his
inability to provide the first name of a teacher in Jamaica with whom he
claimed to have been involved in an intimate relationship for several months
prior to arriving in Canada.
[11]
Mr. Reeves takes issue with the negative
credibility inferences arguing they were unsupported by the evidence or that
the Officer focussed on insignificant details. He argues that the failure to
focus on the totality of the evidence prevented the Officer from recognizing
the risk related to his sexual orientation. I do not agree.
[12]
The Officer undertook a detailed assessment of
the evidence and carefully considered and addressed the inconsistencies between
Mr. Reeves’ testimony and the other evidence advanced in support of the PRRA
application. As noted above, it is for the Officer, not this Court, to weigh
and assess the evidence. In reviewing the evidence and the Officer’s decision,
I am satisfied that the credibility findings were reasonable. The Officer was
legitimately concerned with the inconsistencies between Mr. Reeves’ testimony
and the other evidence presented. The Officer sought explanations for these inconsistencies
and where they were provided, they were considered and addressed.
[13]
Mr. Reeves’ inability to provide any information
regarding individuals who had suffered from homophobia in Jamaica is one of the
numerous examples of stark inconsistency noted by the Officer. Mr. Reeves stated
in initial submissions dated February 2015: “I do know
a few people who have suffer[ed] and lost their lives”, and in his
affidavit dated December 2015, he indicated that the brother of his friend
Selvin “was killed in Jamaica due to his sexual
orientation”. At the hearing, however, Mr. Reeves was unable to provide
any information about specific individuals when asked by the Officer. Similar
examples are evident when comparing Mr. Belnavis’ evidence and Mr. Reeves’
testimony.
[14]
The Officer’s negative credibility findings were
reasonable.
B.
Did the Officer ignore or fail to assess
corroborating evidence?
[15]
Mr. Reeves argues that the Officer’s failure to
address the affidavits submitted in support of the PRRA, evidence that was both
relevant and credible, renders the decision unreasonable. He submits that where
affidavit evidence was addressed, the Officer treated it unreasonably also
undermining the reasonableness of the decision. Again I disagree.
[16]
Essentially, Mr. Reeves is taking issue with
the adequacy of the reasons provided. However, adequacy of reasons is not a
stand-alone basis for interfering with a tribunal’s decision: “… the reasons must be read together with
the outcome and serve the purpose of showing whether the result falls within a
range of possible outcomes” (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708 [Newfoundland
Nurses’] at para 14).
[17]
A tribunal need not refer to every piece of
evidence or address every argument raised. Similarly, the fact that a tribunal
does not address all the arguments or evidence a reviewing judge might have
preferred does not impugn the reasonableness of either the reasons given or the
result (Newfoundland Nurses at para 16).
[18]
The Officer is presumed to have reviewed and
considered all of the evidence. A review of the record in this case
demonstrates that in fact, the Officer did. The Officer listed the evidence
presented, acknowledged the country conditions and reaffirmed in a Note to File
that all of the evidence, including the late submitted affidavit of Ms. Sunita
Mistry, was considered. The Officer’s reasons support the findings and ultimate
decision both in fact and principle.
[19]
The Officer neither ignored nor failed to assess
the corroborating evidence. It was reasonable for the Officer to find that the
evidence was insufficient to conclude that Mr. Reeves would face a personalized
forward-looking risk upon his return to Jamaica.
C.
Was the process procedurally unfair?
[20]
Mr. Reeves argues
that the Officer was required to give him an opportunity to respond to the inconsistencies
in his evidence. The failure to do so, he argues, is a reviewable error.
[21]
Justice Judith Snider addressed the issue of
putting credibility concerns to an applicant in Tekin v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 357, stating at paragraph 14 that the
decision-maker “… is not obligated by the duty of
fairness to put all of its concerns regarding credibility before the Applicant
…” and then noted “In this case, the Applicant was represented by counsel, the
parties were on notice that credibility was an issue and the inconsistency
between the Applicant's PIF narrative and his oral testimony was readily
apparent. As a result, the Board was not required to put this inconsistency to
the Applicant and its failure to do so was not a reviewable error.”
[22]
In this case, Mr. Reeves was provided with an oral
hearing, he was represented by legal counsel and he was aware that the purpose
of the hearing was to question him on his sexual orientation. Mr. Reeves and
his counsel could have reasonably anticipated that credibility would be an
issue. The Officer did put many of the inconsistencies to Mr. Reeves and many
others are readily apparent. Inconsistencies and contradictions in a claimant’s
evidence is a well-accepted basis for impugning a claimant’s general
credibility (Ikhuiwu v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 35 at para 30).
[23]
The Officer did not err by failing to put each
of the identified credibility concerns directly to Mr. Reeves. The process was
not procedurally unfair.
IV.
Conclusion
[24]
I am satisfied upon a reading of the decision as
a whole that the Officer fully understood Mr. Reeves’ claim and reasonably
concluded that the evidence in support of that claim was insufficient to
demonstrate a forward-looking risk. The application is denied.
[25]
The parties have not identified a question of
general importance, and none arises.
Email this Content