Docket: A-163-14
Citation:
2015 FCA 56
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CORAM:
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NOËL C.J.
STRATAS J.A.
SCOTT J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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INFORMATION COMMISSIONER OF CANADA
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Appellant
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and
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MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
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Respondent
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and
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INFORMATION AND PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF ONTARIO
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Intervener
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
NOËL C.J.
[1]
This is an appeal brought by the Information Commissioner of Canada (the Commissioner) from a decision of the Federal Court (2014
FC 205) wherein Kane J. (the Federal Court judge) dismissed her application for
judicial review of a decision by the Department of National Defence (DND) to
assert, in response to a request for records under the Access to Information Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. A-1 (the Act), an extension of 1,110 days.
[2]
The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario (the intervener) was granted leave to intervene in the present appeal.
[3]
At issue is whether the Federal Court has
jurisdiction under section 42 of the Act to review a decision by a government
institution under subsection 9(1) to extend the time limit set out in section
7. The Federal Court judge answered this question in the negative.
[4]
For the reasons that follow, I would propose
that the appeal be allowed.
[5]
The legislative provisions which are relevant to
the analysis are set out in the annex to these reasons.
BACKGROUND
[6]
On February 3, 2011, a lawyer acting for his
clients (the requester) requested from DND access to records relating to the
sale of certain military assets.
[7]
On March 4, 2011, DND notified the requester
that, pursuant to subsection 9(1) of the Act, it was extending the 30-day time
limit set out in section 7 by 1,110 days in order to deal with the request. In
response, the requester communicated his intent to file a complaint with the
Commissioner and proceeded to do so on or about March 22, 2011.
[8]
On March 29, 2011, the Commissioner provided
notice of her intention to investigate pursuant to section 32 of the Act.
During the course of the investigation, DND informed the Commissioner that 230
of the 1,110 days had been taken under paragraph 9(1)(a) to deal with
the large number of records involved and that the remaining 880 days had been
taken under paragraph 9(1)(b) to complete the necessary consultations
with third parties.
[9]
In May 2012, DND informed the Commissioner that
it had identified 2,400 pages requiring review and consultation. DND also
provided several reasons for the length of the extension taken, citing among
other things the need to review the documents for matters of solicitor-client
and litigation privilege, the occurrence of a major and unprecedented software
malfunction in the department’s access to information unit, and the need to
consult with three government departments, being Public Works and Government
Services Canada (PWGSC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). DND advised that DFAIT might
in turn be required to consult with foreign governments.
[10]
On July 9, 2012, DND sent the relevant records
to the three consulting departments. While PWGSC and DOJ provided a response to
DND by August 15, 2012, DFAIT responded only on August 31, 2012, and notified
DND that it would need another 120 days to complete its consultations.
[11]
On October 18, 2012, the Commissioner reported
the results of her investigation to DND. DND was found to have breached its
duty under subsection 4(2.1) of the Act, as it failed to make every effort to
process the request in a timely manner. DND’s asserted extension was also found
to be invalid, as the criteria for an extension under paragraph 9(1)(a)
were not all met, and the time taken under paragraph 9(1)(b) was
unreasonably long. Given the Commissioner’s finding of invalidity, she
concluded that the applicable time limit for meeting the requester’s request
remained March 4, 2011, 30 days past the point in time at which the original
request had been made. Because no response had been received by that date, DND
was found to have been in a state of deemed refusal pursuant to subsection
10(3) of the Act.
[12]
The Commissioner recommended that DND commit to
respond by February 28, 2013. On November 6, 2012, DND informed the
Commissioner that it could not so commit, as the consultations in question were
external and beyond its control.
[13]
On January 11, 2013, acting under section 42 of
the Act, the Commissioner filed an application for judicial review in Federal
Court. The Commissioner sought a declaration that DND was in a state of deemed
refusal for having failed to give access within the time limits set out in the
Act and an order directing DND to respond to the request within a 30-day
period.
[14]
On September 11, 2013, 27 days before the
Federal Court hearing, DND gave the requester access to the requested
documents. Given this development, DND moved to dismiss the Commissioner’s application
on the basis that the underlying issue had become moot.
[15]
The motion to dismiss was heard on October 8,
2013, in conjunction with the judicial review application.
DECISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT
[16]
By decision rendered on March 3, 2014, the
Federal Court judge disposed of both the motion to dismiss and the judicial
review application. Though she agreed that the dispute was moot, consideration
of the factors set out in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989]
1 S.C.R. 342, 57 D.L.R. (4th) 231 led her to exercise her
discretion to nevertheless consider the Commissioner’s request for a
declaration.
[17]
Before considering the reasonableness of the
extension taken by DND, the Federal court judge first considered whether the
Federal Court had jurisdiction pursuant to section 42 of the Act to issue the
requested declaration.
[18]
According to the Federal Court judge, the answer
to this question turned on whether and when a time extension taken by a
government institution pursuant to subsection 9(1) of the Act can amount to a
deemed refusal under subsection 10(3). Because the Federal Court’s jurisdiction
is limited to instances of refusal (sections 41 and 42), a deemed refusal is
the only route by which to challenge a government institution which extends the
time under subsection 9(1), without actually refusing to provide the requested
records.
[19]
The Federal Court judge ultimately concluded
that, where a government institution takes an extension under subsection 9(1),
it will not enter a state of deemed refusal unless and until it fails to give
access by the date on which the asserted extension expires (Reasons at paras.
97 to 99).
[20]
The Federal Court judge supported this
conclusion on several grounds. First, she pointed to the language of the Act.
Under section 7 of the Act, the head of a government institution has 30 days to
respond to an access request. Subsection 9(1) of the Act allows for the
extension of this 30-day limit “for a reasonable period
of time, having regard to the circumstances”. Subsection 10(3) of the
Act deems a refusal to have taken place where the records requested are not
provided within the time limits provided by the Act. According to the Federal
Court judge, this last provision provides in effect that “where there is no outright refusal of access, if the
requested records are not provided within 30 days or within the period of time
claimed as an extension under section 9, there is a deemed refusal”
(Reasons at para. 66).
[21]
The Federal Court judge also contrasted the
language in section 30 of the Act with that in sections 41 and 42. Section 30,
in setting out when the Commissioner shall investigate complaints,
distinguishes between complaints following a refusal of access (paragraph
30(1)(a)) and those following an asserted extension that the requester
believes to be unreasonable (paragraph 30(1)(c)). Sections 41 and 42,
however, in setting out the grounds for judicial review, speak only of
refusals. Had Parliament intended to grant the Federal Court jurisdiction to
review the reasonableness of extensions, it would have done so expressly, as it
did in setting out the grounds for complaints to the Commissioner (Reasons at
paras. 96, 105 and 106). Read together, the provisions make it clear that,
ultimately, the only remedy available for an allegedly unreasonable extension
is to invite the Commissioner to investigate, make recommendations to the
government institution concerned and, if necessary, make note of the behaviour
in her Annual or Special Report (Reasons at paras. 105 and 109).
[22]
The Federal Court judge further based her
conclusion on several earlier Federal Court decisions. She relied in particular
on Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), 2011
FC 649, 391 F.T.R. 28 [PSAC] wherein Beaudry J. stated (at para. 21):
In my view, there can be no refusal and
therefore no review pursuant to section 41 of the Act until the deadline for
processing a request has passed. The language of the Act clearly limits this
Court’s jurisdiction to the review of refusals, whether actual or deemed, and leaves
no room for the review of extensions.
[23]
The Federal Court judge also cited another
Federal Court decision (Canada (Attorney General) v. Canada (Information Commissioner), 2002 FCT 136, 216 F.T.R. 274 [Attorney General])
wherein Kelen J. held that (at paras. 26 and 27):
In the case at bar, the time limit for
giving access has been extended to three years and that time period has not yet
passed. Accordingly, there is no “deemed refusal to give access” since the
government institution has not refused to give access within the extended time
limit.
[24]
The Federal Court judge took note of two other
Federal Court decisions which, according to the Commissioner, went the other
way (Reasons at para. 89, citing Canada (Information Commissioner) v.
Canada (Minister of External Affairs), [1989] 1 F.C. 3 (T.D.) [External
Affairs(I)] and Canada (Information Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of External Affairs), [1990] 3 F.C. 514, 3 T.C.T. 5297 [External
Affairs(II)]), but held nevertheless that the jurisprudence has not been
shown to be inconsistent (Reasons at para. 101).
[25]
The Federal Court judge further supported her
conclusion on the basis of policy reasons. If the Commissioner’s position were
accepted, the asserted extension would have been held to be invalid and DND would
therefore have been deemed to have refused access following the expiry of the
30-day time limit provided for under section 7 of the Act. In the Federal Court
judge’s view, such a decision would not necessarily have sped up the provision
of the requested records in the case at bar (Reasons at para. 112). Moreover,
the Court might not be best positioned to determine what the appropriate time
to comply would be (ibidem).
Finally, DND would be required to respond at once to both the judicial review
application and the access request, potentially “duplicat[ing]
efforts and spread[ing] resources even thinner” (ibidem). According to the Federal Court
judge, if government institutions are to make the 30-day time limit without
extensions, they will simply need greater resources (Reasons at paras. 126 to
127).
[26]
As DND provided access to the documents claimed
within its own deadlines as asserted under subsection 9(1), the Federal Court
judge held that she had no jurisdiction to issue the declaration sought. Hence,
there was no need for the Court to decide whether the 1,110-day extension was
reasonable (Reasons at para. 122).
POSITION OF THE APPELLANT
[27]
The Commissioner argues that an extension under
section 9 of the Act represents a conditional exception to the 30-day time
limit set out in section 7 (Commissioner’s memorandum at paras. 42, 45, and
51). Where a government institution asserts an extension under section 9, but
fails to meet the conditions, the extension is void ab
initio (Commissioner’s
memorandum at para. 63). One of the conditions under section 9 is that
the extension be for “a reasonable period of time,
having regard to the circumstances” (Commissioner’s memorandum at paras.
42, 45, and 51).
[28]
Subsection 10(3) provides that a deemed refusal
occurs where a government institution fails to give access to a requested
record “within the time limits set out in [the] Act”.
Read together, sections 7 and 9 set out these time limits (Commissioner’s
memorandum at para. 61). A deemed refusal will therefore occur after 30 days if
a government institution has given neither an actual refusal nor access in
response to a request and has taken no valid extension (Commissioner’s
memorandum at paras. 49 and 63).
[29]
The Commissioner argues that the Federal Court
judge erred in her comparison of section 30 to sections 41 and 42.
Specifically, she ignored several cases which show that these latter sections
are to be broadly construed, and contemplate grounds of judicial review not
expressly set out in their language (Commissioner’s memorandum at paras. 67 to
68, citing Clearwater v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), 177
F.T.R. 103 (F.C.), [1999] F.C.J. No. 1441 and Canada (Information
Commissioner) v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [1990] 3 F.C. 22
(T.D), [1990] F.C.J. No. 152).
[30]
The Commissioner further submits that the
Federal Court judge’s interpretation conflicts with the principle, enshrined in
section 2 of the Act, that “decisions on the disclosure
of government information should be reviewed independently of government”
(Commissioner’s memorandum at para. 69, citing section 2 of the Act). The
decision of the Federal Court judge would, if allowed to stand, permit
government institutions to immunize themselves from judicial review
(Commissioner’s memorandum at para. 72).
[31]
The Commissioner argues that the Federal Court
judge erred in her assessment of earlier Federal Court decisions. The
Commissioner maintains that PSAC and Attorney General dealt with
an entirely different set of facts (Commissioner’s memorandum at para. 78).
Moreover, Attorney General was decided before subsection 4(2.1) was
added to the Act in 2006, and the judge deciding PSAC did not consider
this amendment, which requires government institutions to assist requesters and
provide timely access to sought records (Commissioner’s memorandum at para.
80). Finally, the Commissioner argues that the Federal Court judge erred in
failing to confront the statement made in External Affairs(I) to the
effect that (per Jerome A.C.J. at para. 19):
… (w)here the application is based on an
allegedly unauthorized extension taken under section 9, that enquiry consists
of determining … whether it amounts to a deemed refusal. To perform that task,
it is inescapable that the Court must be able to review the extension itself and
reasons given therefor.
[32]
The Commissioner also takes issue with the
Federal Court judge’s suggestion that the Court may not be well-placed to
determine whether an extension of time is reasonable. The Act empowers the
Commissioner to investigate extensions of time and assemble a factual record
that may be brought before the Federal Court for adjudication (Commissioner’s
memorandum at paras. 84 and 88). Concerns that the courts should avoid
“second-guessing” government institutions evince a concern that the courts will
micro-manage extensions. This concern can be seen to be misplaced given the
deferential standard to be applied (i.e. reasonableness) (Commissioner’s
memorandum at para. 91).
[33]
In this instance, the Commissioner says, the
asserted extension was invalid and, for purposes of efficiency, this Court
should exercise its discretion to rule on the matter. Because the evidentiary
record is in writing, this Court is in no worse a position than the court below
to decide this question.
[34]
According to the Commissioner, the asserted
extension was invalid on three accounts. First, it claims that the 230-day
portion of the extension taken pursuant to paragraph 9(1)(a) was not
taken in compliance with the statutory conditions, as DND could not show, as
required by the provision in question, that meeting the request within the
30-day time limit would unreasonably interfere with its operations
(Commissioner’s memorandum at paras. 96 to 98).
[35]
Second, the Commissioner claims that the
remaining period, being the 880 days asserted pursuant to paragraph 9(1)(b),
was unreasonably long. DND’s initial explanation was that it had merely
calculated the average DFAIT response time (110 days) and multiplied it by
eight, because the requester had sought approximately eight times the number of
records typically sent to DFAIT for consultation (Commissioner’s memorandum at
para. 102). Such an exercise ignores many factors, such as the nature and
accessibility of records (Commissioner’s memorandum at para. 103). Though DND
later amended its answer to suggest that such factors were accounted for, it
could not explain why the number had then remained exactly 880 days
(Commissioner’s memorandum at para. 104). That the actual consultations took no
longer than 173 days further supports the unreasonableness of this estimate
(Commissioner’s memorandum at paras. 105 and 106).
[36]
Third, the Commissioner claims generally that
DND exercised its discretion unreasonably in asserting the extension it did.
First, it failed to consider such relevant factors as its duty to assist under
subsection 4(2.1) of the Act, the quasi-constitutional status of the Act, and
relevant government policies (Commissioner’s memorandum at paras. 108 to 110,
citing Treasury Board of Canada, Policy on Access to Information, sections
3.1, 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). Second, it considered irrelevant factors such as
potential causes of delay and abdicated all responsibility by asserting that it
had no control over the responses of other institutions (Commissioner’s
memorandum at paras. 111 to 113).
POSITION OF THE INTERVENER
[37]
In his submissions, the intervener undertook to
illustrate that, in Ontario, the reasonableness of an extension to respond to
an access to information request has proven to be a justiciable question
(Intervener’s memorandum at para. 35). In support of this effort, the
intervener canvassed the evidentiary factors considered in determining whether
a government institution has proven its claim that a given extension was
required for the reasons set out in the intervener’s enabling statute
(Intervener’s memorandum at paras. 22 to 25).
[38]
Though the intervener took no formal position on
the disposition of the case at bar, he took issue with the duration of the
extension claimed. In particular, he questioned the validity of the formula
originally offered by DND in support of the 880-day portion of the extension
taken (Intervener’s memorandum at paras. 9 and 23). More generally, the
intervener noted that, in the Ontario setting, no extension exceeding 10 months
has ever been found to be reasonable (Intervener’s memorandum at para. 25).
POSITION OF THE RESPONDENT
[39]
DND argues that the Federal Court judge
correctly construed the Act and properly assessed the case law, essentially for
the reasons that she gave. Significant sections of the written submissions
repeat the judge’s own language (see for instance DND’s memorandum at paras. 35
and 70).
[40]
In addition to reiterating the Federal Court
judge’s reasoning, DND argues that the Commissioner’s proposed interpretation
of the Act is flawed. DND argues that, in reviewing the Minutes of Proceedings
and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, it can be
seen that the government was not prepared to impose a definitive time limit for
extensions under subsection 9(1) of the Act (DND’s memorandum at para. 47).
Furthermore, if Parliament had intended the Federal Court to have the
jurisdiction to review extensions, it would have used more specific language
rather than simply requiring that extensions be “reasonable
… having regard to the circumstances” (DND’s memorandum at para. 48).
For instance, it could have elected to provide for clear deadlines defined in
days (ibidem). Finally, if
Parliament had intended for deemed refusals under subsection 10(3) of the Act
to include instances in which the government institution takes an unreasonable
extension under section 9 or an extension beyond a defined length, it could
have specified this (DND’s memorandum at para. 49).
[41]
DND reiterates its argument, accepted by the
Federal Court judge, that while the paragraphs of subsection 30(1) of the Act
clearly distinguish between refusals and unreasonable extensions in setting out
the grounds of complaint to the Commissioner, sections 41 and 42 are limited to
refusals (DND’s memorandum at paras. 51 to 52). Had Parliament wished to grant
the Federal Court jurisdiction to decide the reasonableness of extensions, it
could have included in the judicial review section of the Act a provision like
the one included in the complaint section (DND’s memorandum at para. 52).
[42]
DND further argues that, contrary to some
equivalent provincial statutory schemes, Parliament expressly limited the
Commissioner to an ombudsman role, declining to vest her with the powers to
compel compliance with the Act (DND’s memorandum at para. 55). The
Commissioner’s findings are therefore not “decisions” that may be judicially
reviewed. This undermines the Commissioner’s argument that, the moment she
finds that an unreasonable extension has been asserted, she may initiate a
judicial review application (DND’s memorandum at para. 56).
[43]
Finally, DND argues that the Federal Court
judge’s ruling is not inconsistent with the section 2 principle that decisions
on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of
government. Simply put, this principle does not require that all decisions made
under the Act be subject to judicial review (DND’s memorandum at para. 58).
[44]
In the event that this Court finds that it does
have jurisdiction to issue the declaration sought, DND argues that its
extension was reasonable.
[45]
DND insists that its only obligation under
subsection 9(1) was to notify the requester that it would be taking an
extension and to specify the length of the extension (DND’s memorandum at para.
61).
[46]
DND argues that many variables were taken into
account in determining the amount of time it took under paragraph 9(1)(a)
of the Act, including previous experience with similar requests, sensitivity of
the information and the current workload of the analyst assigned to the file
(DND’s memorandum at para. 63). Furthermore, DND’s access to information unit
had suffered a “major and unprecedented” software malfunction, which further
affected the response time (ibidem).
[47]
As to consultations, DND argues that previous
experience and communication with the other institutions was taken into account
(DND’s memorandum at para. 64). Estimates were particularly difficult to
generate in respect of the DFAIT consultations, as the reactions of foreign
governments often prove difficult to predict accurately (DND’s memorandum at
paras. 65 to 67).
[48]
DND emphasized that, under subsection 9(1) of
the Act, it only has 30 days to determine the extension it will take (DND’s
memorandum at para. 68). Furthermore, it cannot change that estimate. It is
therefore reasonable to consider potential causes of delay (ibidem). Furthermore, that the
consultations ultimately took less time than expected is irrelevant to whether,
at the time the extension was asserted, the duration selected was reasonable
(DND’s memorandum at para. 69).
[49]
In reply to the submissions made by the
intervener, DND outlined the differences between the Act and the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.31, emphasizing that the latter
gives the provincial Commissioner an adjudicative role, while the former gives
the federal Commissioner an investigative one (Respondent’s reply memorandum at
paras. 15 to 18). With respect to the intervener’s view that extensions beyond
10 months would require an exceptional justification, DND submits that the
intervener has no expertise or experience in cases such as this one, which
involves military assets and consultation with foreign governments
(Respondent’s reply memorandum at paras. 25 and 26).
ANALYSIS
Standard of
Review
[50]
In this case, this Court is determining an
appeal of a decision by the Federal Court to dismiss an application for
judicial review brought by the Commissioner under paragraph 42(1)(a).
[51]
The appeal raises two issues. The first is
whether the Federal Court had jurisdiction under section 42 of the Act to hear
the Commissioner’s application. The second, which must be answered only if the
first question is answered in the affirmative, is whether the extension taken
by DND was valid.
[52]
The first issue is preliminary to any
consideration of the underlying application, concerning whether the
preconditions for a judicial review are met. As such, this question was first
decided by the Federal Court, and never arose before the administrative
decision-maker in question. Therefore, on appeal, we employ the appellate
standard of review in Housen v. Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 [Housen], not the
administrative standard of review in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC
9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190.
[53]
Whether the preconditions for a judicial review
had been met turns on a pure question of statutory construction, i.e. when an
extension is taken by a government institution, does the Act (specifically
sections 41 and 42 when read with section 7 and subsections 9(1) and 10(3)) give
the Federal Court jurisdiction to assess the legal validity of the extension?
The Federal Court answered this in the negative. As a determination on a
question of law, this holding stands within the appellate framework to be
reviewed on the standard of correctness: Housen, supra at paras.
8 and 9.
[54]
If I hold that the section 42 preconditions have
been met in this case, I must examine whether the extension taken by DND in
this case was valid. The Federal Court judge did not rule on that question.
Therefore, consistent with the approach set out in Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 at
paragraphs 45 to 47, I must select the appropriate standard of review and then
apply it myself.
[55]
Like the parties, I accept that this second
question should be reviewed on a standard of reasonableness. I would add that,
because the decision under review is essentially fact and policy driven, the
range of possible acceptable outcomes or the margin of appreciation to be given
to DND is broad: Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and
Communities) v. Jagjit Singh Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56 at paras. 91 to 92; Canada (Attorney General) v. Abraham, 2012 FCA 266, [2012] F.C.J. No. 1324 at
para. 44.
Are the preconditions for a judicial review under section
42 met?
[56]
With respect to the first issue, the
determinative holding made by the Federal Court judge appears at paragraph 66
of her reasons:
… subsection 10(3) provides that where the
records are not provided within the time limits set out in this act, the head
of the institution is deemed to have refused to give access. In other words,
where there is no outright notice of refusal, if the requested records are not
provided within 30 days or within the period of time claimed as an extension
under section 9, there is a deemed refusal.
Stated conversely and perhaps more
accurately, the Federal Court judge held that so long as there is compliance
with the time extension taken, there can be no deemed refusal pursuant to
subsection 10(3) regardless of the reasonableness of the extension, and
therefore no right of judicial review arises in the circumstances of this case.
[57]
As will be seen, the reading proposed by the
Federal Court judge is consistent with a number of Federal Court decisions (X
v. Canada (Minister of National Defence), [1991] 1 F.C. 670, 41
F.T.R. 73 at paras. 8 and 10 [X]; Attorney General at paras. 25
to 27, citing X at para. 8; PSAC at para. 21, citing Attorney
General at para. 25). There are, however, other cases from the same court
which go the other way (External Affairs(I) at para. 19 and External
Affairs(II) at para. 9).
Statutory
Construction
[58]
I first turn to the issue of statutory
construction. In my view, a reading of subsection 10(3) which would prevent
judicial review of an extension, as is being proposed here, falls short of what
Parliament intended. The correct approach to statutory interpretation requires
that courts read “the words of an Act … in their entire
context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the
scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”
(Thibodeau v. Air Canada, 2014 SCC 67, [2014] S.C.J. No. 67 at para.
112).
[59]
Part of the statutory scheme are the “time
limits set out” in the Act, which, when breached, give rise to a deemed refusal
pursuant to subsection 10(3). There are only two such limits: the 30-day time
limit that arises by operation of section 7 following a request for access, and
the extended time limit that arises as a result of a notice of extension issued
pursuant to section 9. Based on the Federal Court judge’s interpretation, the
length of this last time limit would rest exclusively in the hands of the
government institution asserting it, and escape judicial review regardless of
its duration.
[60]
For the purpose of applying subsection 10(3),
construing subsection 9(1) as allowing for whatever period of time the
institution may wish to take reads out of the Act the requirement that the
extension be “reasonable … having regard to the circumstances”
and the criteria set out in paragraphs 9(1)(a) and 9(1)(b).
Moreover, the extended “time limit” that the Federal Court judge accepts as
falling within the “time limits set out in [the] Act”
(Reasons at para. 66) is not a time limit at all. If a government institution
is free to choose the deadline of its choice, without regard to the statutory
conditions set out in subsection 9(1), there are no limits on the
deadline it may choose.
[61]
The Federal Court judge’s interpretation
is not aided by her comparison of section 30 of the Act to sections 41 and 42.
According to her, had Parliament intended unreasonable time limits to be
judicially reviewed, it would have set this out expressly, as it did in
subsection 30(1) with respect to complaints. The suggestion as I understand it
is that if unreasonable extensions could give rise to deemed refusals pursuant
to subsection 10(3) as the Commissioner contends, there would be no need for
paragraph 30(1)(c) (subsection
30(1) is reproduced in part, for ease of reference):
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Receipt and Investigation of Complaints
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Réception des plaintes et enquêtes
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30. (1) Subject to this Act, the
Information Commissioner shall receive and investigate complaints
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30. (1)
Sous réserve des autres dispositions de la présente loi, le Commissaire à
l’information reçoit les plaintes et fait enquête sur les plaintes:
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(a) from
persons who have been refused access to a record requested under this Act
or a part thereof;
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(a) déposées
par des personnes qui se sont vu refuser la communication totale ou
partielle d’un document qu’elles ont demandé en vertu de la présente loi;
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…
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[…]
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(c) from persons
who have requested access to records in respect of which time limits have
been extended pursuant to section 9 where they consider the extension
unreasonable;
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(c) déposées
par des personnes qui ont demandé des documents dont les délais de
communication ont été prorogés en vertu de l’article 9 et qui considèrent la
prorogation comme abusive;
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[…]
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[My emphasis]
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[62]
This reasoning gives rise to two difficulties.
First, subsection 10(3) makes it clear that a deemed refusal occurs where a
government institution has missed either of “the time
limits set out in [the] Act”. It is therefore not useful to resort to
inferences to elucidate the meaning of a deemed refusal for purposes of
applying sections 41 and 42 and particularly problematic when, as here, doing
so would lead to a meaning that is different from what is expressly stated in
the Act.
[63]
Second, the reasoning according to which
paragraph 30(1)(c) would be rendered meaningless does not account for
the situation where a requester receives a notice of extension within the
initial 30-day time period. In these circumstances, paragraph 30(1)(c)
provides a requester with the same immediate right to invoke the assistance of
the Commissioner as he or she would have if confronted with an outright
refusal. I stress in this respect, and in the context of the appeal generally,
that timely access is a constituent part of the right of access (see subsection
4(2.1) of the Act).
The Federal
Court Jurisprudence
[64]
The Federal Court judge’s conclusion that “there is no footing to argue that the jurisprudence is
inconsistent” is unexplained (Reasons at para. 101). As noted earlier,
there are at least two decisions that take the opposite view. In External
Affairs(I)¸ Jerome A.C.J. held that, where an application under section 42
of the Act is based on an allegedly unjustified extension under section 9, the
court is required to review the extension itself and decide whether it was justified
(at para. 19). In External Affairs(II), Muldoon J. came to the same
conclusion, holding that, “in order to show that
extensions are for ‘a reasonable period of time’… the department must state
cogent, genuine reasons for the extension, and for its length” (at para.
9).
[65]
Though the Federal Court judge adopts the
reasoning of Beaudry J. in PSAC (Reasons at paras. 99 to 101, citing PSAC
at paras. 21 to 24), who declined to follow External Affairs(I) and (II),
his decision has no more precedential value than the other two. It was of
course open to the Federal Court judge to adopt one position and reject the
other, subject to explaining her reasons for doing so (Apotex Inc. v.
Allergan Inc., 2012 FCA 308, 105 C.P.R. (4th) 371 [Allergan]
at paras. 48 and 50; Apotex Inc. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2014 FCA 250
at paras. 112 to 115).
[66]
For reasons already explained, PSAC ought
not to be followed because the reasoning advanced in that case does not
confront or take into account the requirement that a valid extension must
comply with the statutory conditions set out in subsection 9(1). The same
observation extends to X and Attorney General.
Other grounds
[67]
I do not accept DND’s attempts to support the
interpretation of the Federal Court judge on other grounds. Specifically, it
does not follow that specific time limits defined in days would have been set
out in the Act had Parliament intended that extensions be judicially reviewed.
The concept of “reasonableness” embodied in subsection 9(1) is a core legal
standard which courts are regularly called upon to apply. There is no reason to
believe that this standard is not appropriate or workable in assessing the
legality of extensions taken pursuant to subsection 9(1).
[68]
Similarly, the excerpts relied upon by DND from
the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee on Justice
and Legal Affairs are of no assistance (Appeal Book, Vol. II, Tab 41):
I find it rather difficult to set a
definitive period of time within which the head of the institution must give
access to the record. Basically, if no notice is given, the request is deemed
refused and there are appeals to the Information Commissioner and from the Information Commissioner to the Court. It is difficult to say when you have a request for a
whole flood of material … the amount of time required to go through that is
rather large, so it is rather difficult to give the undertaking that the answer
must be given within a certain period of time. That is why we are trying to
build into the clause the type of amendment recommended this morning, ensuring
that notice be given to the Information Commissioner, which always gives the Information Commissioner the opportunity to ask questions.
[69]
I do not read this passage as suggesting that
the Federal Court was to have no jurisdiction over the extensions taken under
section 9 (DND’s memorandum at para. 47). Rather, it is clear when regard is
had to the passage when read in its fuller context that the only proposition
being rejected is the one which prompted this response,
i.e. limiting the extensions permissible by
applying a firm 30-day cap.
[70]
Moreover, the fact that the Commissioner’s
investigative findings made pursuant to subsection 37(1) are not subject to
judicial review cannot be set up as a bar against the Commissioner’s
entitlement to bring an application for judicial review upon finding that an
extension taken is unreasonable (DND’s memorandum at para. 56). In that
context, the decision under review is the one taken by the government
institution to extend the time limit, not the findings made by the Commissioner
in respect of that decision. Indeed, it is difficult to visualize a scheme
whereby the Commissioner would make a decision and then seek its judicial
review.
The Correct
Interpretation
[71]
In my view, the correct construction is the one
offered by the Commissioner. Section 7 of the Act requires a government
institution to respond to an information request within 30 days. This
requirement is subject to several exceptions, one of which is the power which
may be exercised by a government institution, pursuant to section 9 of the Act,
to extend the time.
[72]
A government institution may avail itself of
this power subject to certain conditions. One such condition is that the period
taken be reasonable when regard is had to the circumstances set out in
paragraphs 9(1)(a) and/or 9(1)(b). If this condition is not
satisfied, the time is not validly extended with the result that the 30-day
time limit imposed by operation of section 7 remains the applicable limit.
[73]
Construing subsection 10(3) in context and in
light of what it says, I conclude that a deemed refusal arises whenever the
initial 30-day time limit has expired without access being given, in
circumstances where no legally valid extension has been taken. It follows that
a right to judicially review the validity of an extension arises pursuant to
sections 41 and/or 42 upon the expiration of the 30-day time limit, subject of
course to a complaint being filed and an investigation report being completed
(compare Statham v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2010 FCA 315 at
para. 64).
[74]
In the present case, I conclude that the Federal
Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the Commissioner’s application for
judicial review of the extension taken by DND and to go on to consider the validity
of the extension of time asserted by DND. This is the issue to which I now
turn.
Was the
extension of time asserted by DND valid?
[75]
The Commissioner in insisting on a declaration
being issued is seeking nothing more than general guidance for future cases.
Although the period taken by DND in this case appears long, a large number of
documents was involved and extensive consultations were required.
[76]
That said, it can usefully be said that it is
not enough for a government institution to simply assert the existence of a
statutory justification for an extension and claim an extension of its choice.
An effort must be made to demonstrate the link between the justification
advanced and the length of the extension taken. In the case of paragraph 9(1)(a),
this will mean not only demonstrating that a large number of documents are
involved, but that the work required to provide access within any materially
lesser period of time than the one asserted would interfere with operations.
The same type of rational linkage must be made pursuant to paragraph 9(1)(b)
with respect to necessary consultations.
[77]
I note that the English text of subsection 9(1)(a)
provides that a government institution is entitled to an extension when
compliance with a shorter delay “would unreasonably
interfere with the operations” whereas the French text uses the words “entraverait de façon sérieuse le fonctionnement de
l’institution”. Similarly, the
notion of reasonableness is incorporated in the English text of subsection
9(1)(b), but the French text contemplates that an extension is warranted
when compliance “rendrait pratiquement
impossible l’observation du délai”. Finally, the
introductory words of subsection 9(1) speak of “a
reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances” whereas
the French text reads “d’une période que
justifient les circonstances”.
[78]
Read together, what these two texts contemplate
is that the extension be reasonable or justified in the circumstances and that
a demonstration be made that unless the extension is taken, providing access
will result in unreasonable or undue interference with the “operations of the government institution” in the case
of paragraph 9(1)(a), and that it is not reasonable, or practically
possible, to expect that the necessary consultations can be completed in the
case of paragraph 9(1)(b).
[79]
It would not be opportune or useful to say more
than is necessary to dispose of the present case. It suffices to say that a
government institution confronted with a request involving a great number of documents
and/or necessitating broad consultation must make a serious effort to assess
the required duration, and that the estimated calculation be sufficiently
rigorous, logic and supportable to pass muster under reasonableness review.
[80]
In the case at bar, DND originally claimed to
have estimated the time taken under paragraph 9(1)(b) (880 days) by
simply dividing the number of pages requested by the number of pages involved
in the average DFAIT consultation, and applying the resulting quotient (8) as a
multiplier against the average DFAIT consultation time (110 days). Recognizing
that the exercise will always contemplate a projection, this type of formula
has on the face of it a deficient logic and falls short of demonstrating that a
genuine attempt was made to assess the required duration. Though DND later
claimed that other variables were taken into account, it could not explain why,
if such other variables were accounted for, they had no impact whatsoever on
the amount of time required under the formula disclosed in its original
explanation.
[81]
This type of perfunctory treatment of the matter
shows that DND acted as though it was accountable to no one but itself in
asserting its extension. Its treatment of the matter falls short of
establishing that a serious effort was made to assess the duration of the
extension. As such, the extension taken by DND does not meet the requirements
of subsection 9(1). This suffices to establish the Commissioner’s entitlement
to the declaration sought.
DISPOSITION
[82]
For the foregoing reasons, I would allow the
appeal and giving the judgment which the Federal Court judge should have given,
I would declare DND to have entered into a state of deemed refusal pursuant to
subsection 10(3) of the Act on March 5, 2011, upon the expiration of the 30-day
time limit set out in section 7 of the Act. As no costs were sought, none are
awarded.
“Marc Noël”
“I
agree
David Stratas J.A.”
“I agree
A.F. Scott J.A.”
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