SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Michel
Thibodeau and Lynda Thibodeau
Appellants
and
Air
Canada
Respondent
And
Between:
Commissioner
of Official Languages of Canada
Appellant
and
Air
Canada
Respondent
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 133)
Dissenting
Reasons:
(paras. 134 to 178)
|
Cromwell J. (McLachlin C.J. and LeBel,
Rothstein and Karakatsanis JJ. concurring)
Abella J. (Wagner J. concurring)
|
thibodeau v. air canada, 2014
SCC 67, [2014] 3 S.C.R. 340
Michel Thibodeau and
Lynda Thibodeau Appellants
v.
Air Canada Respondent
‑ and ‑
Commissioner of Official
Languages of Canada Appellant
v.
Air Canada Respondent
Indexed as: Thibodeau v. Air Canada
2014 SCC 67
File No.: 35100.
2014: March 26; 2014: October 28.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Abella, Rothstein,
Cromwell, Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the federal court of appeal
Official
languages — Breach of language rights during international carriage by air — Airline
failing to provide services in French on international flights — Passengers
applying to Federal Court for damages and a structural order under Official
Languages Act — Whether award of damages barred by limitation of damages
liability set out in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air (“Montreal Convention”) — Whether structural
order appropriate — Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th
Supp .), s. 77(4) — Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, Article 29.
Legislation
— Interpretation — Conflicting legislation — Airline breaching passengers’
right to services in French under Official Languages Act by failing to provide
services in French on international flights — Passengers applying to Federal
Court for damages under Official Languages Act — Whether award of damages
barred by limitation of damages liability set out in Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (“Montreal
Convention”) — Whether Official Languages Act and Montreal Convention conflict
or overlap — Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp .),
s. 77(4) — Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309, Article 29.
In
2009, on three international flights operated by the airline and in an airport,
the passengers did not receive services in the French language. They filed
several complaints with the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages
against the airline, four of which were upheld. There is no dispute that the
airline breached its obligations to supply services in French under s. 22
of the Official Languages Act (the “OLA ”) on the occasions giving
rise to those four complaints. The passengers applied to the Federal Court
under s. 77 of the OLA for damages and for structural orders in
relation to the airline’s breaches of their right to services in French. The
airline defended against the claims for damages by relying on the limitation on
damages liability set out in the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air (the “Montreal Convention”),
which restricts the types and the amount of claims for damages that may be made
against international air carriers. The Federal Court found that the
passengers were entitled to both damages and a structural order, holding that
although there was a conflict between the limitation on damages in the Montreal
Convention and the power under the OLA to award damages, the latter prevailed.
The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the award of damages for the three
complaints about events that took place on board the flights as well as the
structural order. It held that the Montreal Convention precluded the
damages remedy and that a structural order was not appropriate.
Held
(Abella and Wagner JJ. dissenting): The appeals should be dismissed.
Per
McLachlin C.J. and LeBel, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.: The
Montreal Convention’s uniform and exclusive scheme of damages liability
for international air carriers does not permit an award of damages for breach
of language rights during international carriage by air. To hold otherwise
would do violence to the text and purpose of the Montreal Convention,
depart from Canada’s international obligations under it and put Canada off-side
a strong international consensus concerning its scope and effect. The general
remedial power under the OLA to award appropriate and just remedies
cannot — and should not — be read as authorizing Canadian courts to depart from
Canada’s international obligations under the Montreal Convention.
The
claims before this Court fall squarely within the exclusion established by the Montreal
Convention. The key provision at the core of the Montreal Convention’s
exclusive set of rules for liability is Article 29. This provision makes
clear that the Montreal Convention provides the exclusive recourse
against airlines for various types of claims arising in the course of
international carriage by air. Article 29 establishes that in relation to
claims falling within the scope of the Montreal Convention, “any action
for damages, however founded” may only be brought “subject to the conditions
and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention”. Articles 17
to 19 of the Montreal Convention establish that the carrier is liable
for damage sustained: in case of an accident causing the death or bodily injury
of a passenger on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking (Article 17); in case of destruction or loss of, or of damage
to, baggage while in the charge of the carrier (Article 17); in the event
of the destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo during carriage
(Article 18); and for damage occasioned by delay (Article 19).
Two
of the main purposes of the Montreal Convention are to achieve a uniform
set of rules governing damages liability of international air carriers and to
provide limitation of carrier liability. These purposes can only be achieved
by the Montreal Convention if it provides the exclusive set of rules in
relation to the matters that it covers. The Montreal Convention does
not deal with all aspects of international carriage by air, but within the
scope of the matters which it does address, it is exclusive in that it bars
resort to other bases for liability in those areas. The Montreal Convention’s
text and purpose as well as a strong current of jurisprudence make it clear
that the exclusivity of the liability scheme established under the Montreal
Convention extends at least to excluding actions arising from injuries
suffered by passengers during flight or embarkation and debarkation when those
actions do not otherwise fall within the scheme of permitted claims.
The
passengers’ argument that the Montreal Convention does not limit claims
for damages sought in relation to public law claims or breaches of
quasi-constitutional statutes has no support in the text or purpose of the Montreal
Convention or in the international jurisprudence. The limitation in
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention applies to “any action” in
the carriage of passengers, baggage or cargo, “for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise”. There
is no hint in this language that there is any intention to exempt any “action
for damages” in the carriage of passengers, baggage or cargo depending on its
legal foundation, such as when a plaintiff brings forward a statutory monetary
claim of a public law nature based on the breach of quasi-constitutional rights.
The passengers’ claims are an “action for damages” within the meaning of
Article 29, as they claim damages for injuries, namely moral prejudice,
pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of their vacation, suffered in the
course of an international flight. Permitting an action in damages to
compensate for moral prejudice, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of a
passenger’s vacation that does not otherwise fulfill the conditions of
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention (because the action does not
relate to death or bodily injury) would fly in the face of Article 29. It
would also undermine one of the main purposes of the Montreal Convention,
which is to bring uniformity across jurisdictions to the types and upper limits
of claims for damages that may be made against international carriers for
damages sustained in the course of carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo. The
application of the Montreal Convention focuses on the factual
circumstances surrounding the monetary claim, not the legal foundation of it.
The
passengers’ argument that the substantive scope of the Montreal Convention
does not extend to barring claims for “standardized damages” and that their
claims are of that nature must also be rejected. Even if this Court were to
adopt the distinction between “individual damages” and “standardized damages”
relied on in jurisprudence from the European Court of Justice, the damages
sought by the passengers in this case were for damages on an individual basis,
as they were geared to and depended upon the impact on the passengers of the
particular breaches.
The
passengers’ submission that, even if their claims fall within the substantive
scope of the Montreal Convention, they fall outside its temporal scope
for cases involving personal injuries since the assignments of non-bilingual
flight attendants on the relevant flights were decisions made long before the
embarkation process is not well founded. The passengers were clearly within
the temporal limits of the Montreal Convention when they suffered the
breach of their language rights. Courts must focus their application of the
exclusivity principle on the location or activity of the passenger when the
accident or occurrence directly causing the particular injury giving rise to
the claim occurred, not on some antecedent fault.
When
the OLA and the Montreal Convention are properly interpreted,
there is no conflict between the general remedial powers under the OLA
and the exclusion of damages under the Montreal Convention and,
therefore, there is no need to consider which would prevail if there were. Courts
presume that legislation passed by Parliament does not contain contradictions
or inconsistencies and only find that they exist when provisions are so
inconsistent that they are incapable of standing together. Even when
provisions overlap in the sense that they address aspects of the same subject,
they are interpreted so as to avoid conflict wherever this is possible. The
provisions in issue here overlap but do not conflict. They have markedly
different purposes and touch on distinct subject matters. The remedial provisions
of the OLA are part of a larger scheme of obligations and mechanisms the
object of which is to preserve and strengthen the vitality of Canada’s official
languages in our federal institutions. The Montreal Convention, in
contrast, is part of an internationally agreed upon uniform and exclusive
scheme addressing the damages claims in the field of international carriage by
air. The remedial provisions in the OLA cannot be understood to be an
exhaustive code that requires damages to be available in all settings and
without regard to all other relevant laws. The OLA does not provide
that damages should be granted in every case, but authorizes courts to grant
“appropriate and just” remedies. The power to grant an “appropriate and just”
remedy may easily be reconciled with the specific and limited exclusion of
damages in the context of international air travel. A remedy is not
“appropriate and just” if awarding it would constitute a breach of Canada’s
international obligations under the Montreal Convention. Accordingly,
in fashioning an appropriate and just remedy under the OLA in a case of
international carriage by air, the Federal Court must apply the limitation on
damages set out in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention.
The
passengers’ submission that the quasi-constitutional status of the OLA
prevents a harmonious interpretation of s. 77(4) of the OLA and of
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention must be rejected. Section 77(4)
of the OLA , which confers a wide remedial authority, is certainly part
of a quasi‑constitutional statutory scheme designed to both reflect and
actualize the equality of status of English and French as the official
languages of Canada and the equal rights and privileges as to their use in the
institutions of Parliament and government of Canada as declared in s. 16(1)
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , and it should be
interpreted generously to achieve its purpose. These factors, however, do not
alter the correct approach to statutory interpretation which requires that the
words of a statute be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and
ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme and object of the statute and the
intention of Parliament. The OLA, read in its full context,
demonstrates that Parliament did not intend to prevent s. 77(4) from being
read harmoniously with Canada’s international obligations given effect by
another federal statute. The proposition that Parliament, through s. 77(4) ,
intended that courts should be able to grant damages even though doing so would
be in violation of Canada’s international undertakings as incorporated into
federal statute law runs afoul of the principle of interpretation that
Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate in breach of Canada’s
international law obligations. Section 77(4) should be understood as
having been enacted into an existing legal framework which includes statutory
limits, procedural requirements and a background of general legal principles — including
Canada’s international undertakings incorporated into Canadian statute law — which
guide the court in deciding what remedy is “appropriate and just”.
The
Federal Court of Appeal was correct to set aside the structural order. Structural
orders are treated with special care because of two potential and related
problems: first, insufficient clarity, which in turn may result in the second,
namely the need for ongoing judicial supervision. Orders must be sufficiently
clear so that they give the parties bound by them fair guidance on what must be
done to comply and to prevent a potentially endless round of further
applications to determine whether the parties have complied. Ongoing judicial
supervision will be appropriate in some cases, but absent compelling
circumstances, the courts generally should not make orders that have the almost
inevitable effect of creating ongoing litigation about whether the order is
being complied with. In this case, the order is too imprecise, risks ongoing
litigation and court supervision in relation to whether it is being complied
with, and is inappropriate particularly in light of the Commissioner’s
statutory powers and expertise in relation to monitoring compliance with the OLA .
Per
Abella and Wagner JJ. (dissenting): The Montreal
Convention does not bar a damage award for breach of language rights during
international carriage by air.
The T’s
seek damages for violations of a statute that reifies constitutionally
protected rights. The Montreal Convention should be
interpreted in a way that is respectful of the protections given to fundamental
rights, including language rights, in domestic legislation. There is no
evidence in the Parliamentary record or the legislative history of the Convention
to suggest that Canada, as a state party, intended to extinguish domestic
language rights protection by ratifying or implementing the Montreal Convention.
Given the significance of the rights protected by the Official Languages Act
and their constitutional and historic antecedents, the Montreal Convention
ought to be interpreted in a way that respects Canada’s express commitment to
these fundamental rights, rather than as reflecting an intention to subvert
them. This Court has often said that domestic law should be generously
interpreted in alignment with international law and its human rights values.
It has never said that international law should be interpreted in a way that
diminishes human rights protected by domestic law.
The process of treaty
interpretation is a process of discernment. The literal meaning of the words
is rarely reliably able to yield a clear and unequivocal answer. The intention
of state parties must therefore be discerned by using a good faith approach not
only to the words at issue, but also to the context, history, object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole. In this case, this exercise leads to the
conclusion that Article 29 of the Montreal Convention does not
exclusively govern the universe of damages for which carriers are liable during
international carriage by air. The first words of Article 29 are words
that restrict its scope by declaring that any action for damages “[i]n the
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo” must be brought subject to the
conditions set out in the Montreal Convention. The phrase that
immediately follows — “however founded, whether under
this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise” — is
a clause dependant for its meaning on the preceding opening words; thus,
“action” refers only to an action for damages “[i]n the carriage of passengers,
baggage and cargo”. It is, therefore, only an action for damages incurred “[i]n
the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo” that must be brought “subject to
the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out” in the Montreal
Convention.
Other provisions of
the Montreal Convention, and, in particular, of Chapter III in which
Article 29 is found, provide interpretive assistance to assess the meaning
of an action for damages “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo”.
Chapter III sets out the limited liability of carriers in the carriage of
passengers, baggage and cargo. Articles 17, 18 and 19 refer to death or
bodily injury of a passenger, destruction or loss of, or damage to, baggage,
destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo, and delay in the carriage of
persons, baggage or cargo. Together with Article 29, these provisions
confirm that the Montreal Convention exclusively governs only actions
for damages in respect of these subjects.
The predecessor Warsaw Convention came into being in 1929 to
assist the fledgling airline industry take flight. At that time, aviation
technology was in its initial stages. Accidents were common, and many pilots
and passengers were injured or died as a result. The relative frequency of
accidents exposed carriers to unpredictable and significant losses. This made
it difficult to secure investment capital or insurance protection. Airlines
responded by requiring passengers to sign waivers relieving carriers of any and
all liability in the event of an injury. When accidents happened, those
passengers were left with no remedy for their injuries or losses. As safety in
the industry improved, governments turned their attention from protecting the
financial viability of airlines to introducing a more passenger-friendly legal
regime. The focus tilted towards increasing the exceptionally low limits on
carrier liability established in the Warsaw Convention and states subsequently
signed on to different international efforts to expand carrier liability.
Notwithstanding
the increasing recognition that compensation for passengers was too low, a
single international instrument increasing ceilings on carrier liability proved
elusive. Out of concern that this fractured response could lead to the demise
of a unified system of international air law, the industry took action. The Montreal
Agreement of 1966, a private arrangement between airlines, increased
carrier liability under the Warsaw Convention for personal injury.
Having
been “upstaged” by industry initiatives to address the low ceilings on carrier
liability, states began to work towards updating the Warsaw Convention.
The Montreal Convention came into being in 1999, adopting a two-tier
liability scheme for passenger injury or death. The Montreal Convention
sought to replace the patchwork system that had attempted to expand the limits
on liability set by the Warsaw Convention in 1929. The drafters of the Montreal
Convention continued to maintain a uniform liability scheme, as had the Warsaw
Convention, but while the primary goal of the Warsaw Convention had
been to limit the liability of carriers in order to foster the growth of the
nascent commercial aviation industry, the state parties to the Montreal
Convention were more focused on the importance of ensuring protection of
the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for
equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution.
Interpreting
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention in a way that narrows
protection for consumers and expands it for carriers, is therefore both
counter-intuitive and historically anomalous. At no time was there ever any
suggestion that the new Convention was designed to reduce the
ability of passengers to sue carriers.
The
absence of any reference in the Parliamentary record to the changes in language
between the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Convention is also
revealing. Dramatic changes in law tend to attract dramatic reactions. This
purported change attracted none. The most logical explanation for the silence,
therefore, is that there was no change in law. In fact, it is hard to imagine
such a drastic domestic intrusion without either express language or
Parliamentary disclosure. The silence about such consequences suggests that no
such consequence was either contemplated or intended.
The
meaning of Article 29, considered in context and in light of the
object and purpose of the Montreal Convention, therefore, points to a
limited scope of exclusivity, and should be interpreted as directing that the Montreal
Convention governs only those actions brought for damages incurred “[i]n
the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo”, namely, actions covered by
Articles 17, 18 and 19.
The
T’s action for damages does not fall within the actions covered by
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Montreal Convention. The language of
Article 17(1) makes it clear that the provision does not apply to all events
that take place on board an aircraft or in the course of the operations of
embarking or disembarking. Rather, Article 17(1) imposes the requirements
that: (1) there must have been an accident, (2) which caused, (3) death or
bodily injury, (4) while the passenger was on board the aircraft or was in the
course of embarking or disembarking. In this case, there is no complaint of an
accident. That is dispositive since Article 17(1) talks of “death or
bodily injury” caused by an accident. The T’s have not suffered any bodily
injury. The fact that the breaches of their language rights occurred on board
the aircraft is irrelevant since those circumstances are only pertinent if
there was an accident.
The appeals should be
allowed with respect to the claims for damages and the damages awarded by the application
judge should be restored.
Cases Cited
By Cromwell J.
Referred
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By
Abella J. (dissenting)
El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999); Ehrlich
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R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp .), s. 10 .
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
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Dempsey, Paul Stephen. Aviation Liability Law, 2nd ed.
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Field, Andrew. “International Air Carriage, The Montreal Convention
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237.
Fountain Court Chambers. Carriage by Air. London: Butterworths,
2001.
International Civil Aviation Organization. International
Conference on Air Law, vol. I, Minutes, Doc. 9775‑DC/2.
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Tompkins, George N., Jr. “The Continuing Development of
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Weber, Ludwig, and Arie Jakob. “The Modernization of the Warsaw
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APPEALS
from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal (Pelletier, Gauthier and Trudel JJ.A.),
2012 FCA 246, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 155, 435 N.R. 131, 355 D.L.R. (4th) 62, [2012]
F.C.J. No. 1201 (QL), 2012 CarswellNat 3578, setting aside in part a
decision of Bédard J., 2011 FC 876, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 83, 394 F.T.R. 160,
239 C.R.R. (2d) 301, [2011] F.C.J. No. 1030 (QL), 2011 CarswellNat 6095.
Appeals dismissed, Abella and Wagner JJ. dissenting.
Érik
Labelle Eastaugh, Ronald F. Caza and Alyssa
Tomkins, for the appellants Michel and Lynda Thibodeau.
Pascale
Giguère, Kevin Shaar and Mathew Croitoru,
for the appellant the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada.
Louise‑Hélène Sénécal, Pierre
Bienvenu and Andres Garin, for the respondent.
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and
LeBel, Rothstein, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. was delivered by
Cromwell J. —
I.
Introduction
[1]
Air Canada failed to provide services in French on some international flights as it was obliged
to do under the Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp .)
(the “OLA ”). Two passengers, the appellants Michel and Lynda Thibodeau,
applied to the Federal Court for damages and for orders, referred to as
“structural” or “institutional” orders, requiring Air Canada to take steps in
order to ensure future compliance with the OLA . The airline defended
against the claims for damages by relying on the limitation on damages
liability set out in the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (the “Montreal
Convention”), which is part of Canadian federal law by virtue of the Carriage
by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26 , a federal statute.
[2]
The Federal Court
rejected Air Canada’s defence, awarded damages and granted a structural order
(2011 FC 876, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 83). However, the Federal Court of Appeal set
that ruling aside in part, holding that the Montreal Convention precluded
the damages remedy for the events that took place on board Air Canada flights
and that a structural order was not appropriate (2012 FCA 246, [2013] 2 F.C.R.
155). The main issue on the further appeal to this Court is whether the Federal
Court of Appeal erred in these conclusions.
[3]
The issue of damages sits at the intersection of
Canada’s domestic commitment to official languages and its international
commitment to an exclusive and uniform scheme of damages liability for
international air carriers. The question thus implicates two important values.
[4]
On one hand, we have
Canada’s duty to comply with its international undertaking, by its ratification
of the Montreal Convention and its adoption of the Montreal Convention
into domestic law, to establish and give effect to limitations on liability for
international air carriers. Air Canada maintains that upholding a damages
remedy against the airline would be inconsistent with this important
international undertaking. On the other hand, we have Canada’s foundational
commitment to the equality of the French and English languages, a commitment
reflected, among other places, in s. 16 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms and in the OLA . These language rights are “basic to the
continued viability of [this] nation”: R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
234, at p. 269, per La Forest J. The appellants say that a damages
remedy must be available for breach of language rights in order to fulfill the
purposes of the OLA .
[5]
This appeal requires us
to resolve this tension by interpreting the OLA and the Montreal
Convention in accordance with their text and purpose. As I see it, when
they are properly interpreted, there is no conflict between the general
remedial powers under the OLA and the exclusion of damages under the Montreal
Convention and there is no need to consider which would prevail if there
were.
[6]
The Montreal Convention’s uniform and exclusive scheme of damages liability for
international air carriers does not permit an award of damages for breach of
language rights during international carriage by air. To hold otherwise would
do violence to the text and purpose of the Montreal Convention, depart
from Canada’s international obligations under it and put Canada off-side a strong
international consensus concerning its scope and effect. The general remedial
power under the OLA to award appropriate and just remedies cannot — and
should not — be read as authorizing Canadian courts to depart from Canada’s
international obligations under the Montreal Convention.
[7]
I also conclude that the Federal Court of Appeal
was correct to set aside the structural order as it was impermissibly vague and
unclear.
[8]
I would therefore
dismiss the appeals.
II.
Facts and Proceedings
A.
The Official Languages Act
[9]
The OLA is a federal statute whose
purposes include ensuring respect for English and French as the official
languages of Canada and the equality of status and equal rights and privileges
as to their use in all federal institutions: s. 2 (a). The OLA also
seeks to support the development of English and French linguistic minority
communities and, as well, sets out the powers, duties and functions of federal
institutions with respect to official languages: s. 2 (b) and (c).
[10]
Parts I to VI of the OLA set out various
language rights in a number of settings: the proceedings of Parliament,
legislative and other instruments, the administration of justice,
communications with the public and the workplace. Parts VII and VIII of the OLA
set out duties and responsibilities with respect to enhancing the vitality
of English and French linguistic minorities and fostering the full recognition
and use of both English and French in Canadian society. Part IX establishes the
Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages and sets out the
Commissioner’s duties and powers. These include the duty to undertake
investigations, to make recommendations and to report.
[11]
Part X provides for court remedies and includes provision for a person who has made a complaint to the
Commissioner in relation to certain parts of the OLA to apply to the
Federal Court for a remedy: s. 77(1) . The court is empowered, if it finds that
a federal institution has failed to comply with the OLA , to award “such
remedy as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”: s. 77(4) .
[12]
As the Court has observed on a number of
occasions, the OLA has a special status: “. . . it
belongs to that privileged category of quasi-constitutional legislation which
reflects ‘certain basic goals of our society’ and must be so interpreted ‘as to
advance the broad policy considerations underlying it’” (Lavigne v. Canada
(Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages), 2002 SCC 53, [2002] 2
S.C.R. 773, at para. 23, quoting Canada (Attorney General) v. Viola,
[1991] 1 F.C. 373 (C.A.), at p. 386).
[13]
Air Canada and its affiliate Jazz are subject to the OLA : see Air Canada Public
Participation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp .), s. 10 . (For convenience,
I will refer to either or both of them as “Air Canada” in these reasons.) The OLA
requires Air Canada to supply services in French or English where there is
“significant demand” for them: see s. 22 (b).
B.
The Montreal Convention
[14]
The Montreal Convention, which is
part of Canadian federal law by virtue of the Carriage by Air Act ,
restricts the types and the amount of claims for damages that may be made
against international air carriers. It permits claims for death or bodily
injury, destruction, damage or loss of baggage and cargo and for delay:
Articles 17 to 19 . It bars all other actions for damages, however
founded, in the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo: Article 29 . The
Thibodeaus’ claims for damages under the OLA are clearly not within the
types of permitted claims for death or bodily injury, destruction, damage or
loss of baggage and cargo or for delay. The Thibodeaus submit, however, that
their claims are not barred by the Montreal Convention.
C.
The Complaints
[15]
On three international flights on Air Canada and in an airport, over the course of roughly four months in 2009,
Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau did not receive services in the French language. On some
flights, there was no flight attendant able to provide services in French and
in some cases passenger announcements on board and in the terminal were made
only in English.
[16]
On January 23, 2009, while on board a flight
from Toronto to Atlanta, Georgia, Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau did not receive
services in French because there was no bilingual flight attendant on the aircraft.
A few days later, coming back from Atlanta, there was no French announcement
made by the pilot or translation of it. On May 12, 2009, the Thibodeaus again
did not receive services in French, this time on a flight from Charlotte, North
Carolina, to Toronto. Upon arrival in Toronto, an announcement concerning
baggage collection was made only in English.
[17]
There is no longer any dispute that Air Canada breached its obligations under s. 22 of the OLA on
these occasions.
[18]
Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau filed eight complaints with the Office of the Commissioner of Official
Languages: four complaints related to the breaches described above and four
related to other incidents during those two trips. These latter complaints were
however rejected by the Commissioner (and later by the application judge) and
only the four complaints that were upheld by the Commissioner were subsequently
upheld by the application judge: application judge’s reasons, at para. 30.
[19]
In response to the Commissioner’s investigation of the Thibodeaus’ complaints, Air Canada put in
place remedial measures to improve its capacity to offer bilingual services.
These measures led the Commissioner to close its files pertaining to the four
complaints that he had found to be established.
[20]
The Commissioner also undertook an audit of the bilingual services offered by Air Canada to its
passengers and released its report in September 2011, after the Federal Court
rendered its decision in the present case (Audit of Service Delivery in
English and French to Air Canada Passengers: Final Report (2011)). The
Commissioner made 12 recommendations to Air Canada in this audit,
recommendations to which the latter responded by suggesting measures and
deadlines to implement said measures. The Commissioner declared himself
satisfied with Air Canada’s proposed solutions for 11 of the recommendations,
and partly satisfied with the answer provided for the remaining recommendation,
which I should say is not relevant for the outcome of this appeal. (I note that
the reliance of the Federal Court of Appeal on this subsequently acquired
report was objected to by the Commissioner. I refer to this audit here simply
to complete the factual background of this case and not in relation to the
specific issues I will later decide in these reasons.)
D.
Proceedings in the Federal Courts
[21]
As outlined earlier, under s. 77 of the OLA , a person who has complained to the
Commissioner under various provisions, including in relation to failure to
provide services to the public in both official languages, may apply to the
Federal Court of Canada for a remedy. If the court concludes that a federal
institution has failed to comply with the OLA , the court may
grant such remedy as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
[22]
The Thibodeaus applied to the Federal Court for
remedies in relation to Air Canada’s breaches of their right to services in
French. They requested that the court make “institutional orders against Air
Canada and . . . order it to pay punitive and exemplary damages”, as
well as damages for the violation of their language rights: application judge’s
reasons, at para. 43.
[23]
Air Canada’s position was that damages for breach of the OLA are not permitted under
the Montreal Convention and that the Thibodeaus’ claims for damages were
therefore precluded because they arose out of injury suffered in the course of
international flights governed by the Montreal Convention.
(1)
Federal Court, Bédard J.
[24]
The Federal Court found
that the Thibodeaus were entitled to both damages and a structural order. The
judge concluded that there was a conflict between the limitation on damages in
the Montreal Convention and the power under the OLA to
award damages. As she put it, “in interpreting the Montréal Convention as
allowing compensation on the basis of a cause of action which is not
contemplated by the Convention, I would depart from the Canadian and
international case law”: para. 77. She concluded, however, that the power to
award damages under the OLA prevailed over the Montreal Convention
in the face of this conflict: paras. 81-83. She therefore ordered Air
Canada to pay $6,000 in damages to each of the Thibodeaus ($1,500 per incident)
in order to compensate them for the harm they suffered (moral prejudice, pain
and suffering and loss of enjoyment of their vacation), to recognize the
importance of the rights at issue and to deter future breaches: paras. 88-90.
[25]
Bédard J. then analyzed the evidence
supporting the Thibodeaus’ claim for a structural order and concluded that
there was a “systemic problem at Air Canada”, in the sense that violations of
its linguistic obligations were not “isolated problems that [were] out of [its]
control”: para. 153. She therefore ordered the airline to put in place within
the next six months a monitoring process that would “quickly identify, document
and quantify potential violations of its language duties”: application judge’s
reasons, at p. 153.
(2)
Federal Court of Appeal, Trudel J.A. (Pelletier
and Gauthier JJ.A. Concurring)
[26]
Air Canada appealed these conclusions and, on September 25, 2012,
the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the award of
damages for the three complaints about events that took place on board Air
Canada flights (the claim for damages related to the announcement concerning
baggage collection at the Toronto Airport was not appealed: Air Canada factum,
para. 29) and the structural order. The court agreed with the judge at first
instance that the Montreal Convention
would bar the Thibodeaus’ claims for damages unless the broad remedial power
under the OLA prevails over that bar: paras. 20-22.
The court, however, found that there was no conflict between the two regimes:
in deciding whether a remedy is “appropriate and just” under the OLA ,
the court must take into account the fact that damages are not permitted in the
circumstances to which the Montreal Convention applies: para. 43.
[27]
With respect to the structural order, the Federal Court of Appeal
concluded it was not appropriate in the circumstances of this case because the
evidence was insufficient and because the order was too vague to be properly
enforced: paras. 74-76.
[28]
This Court granted Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau leave to appeal and, by
the same judgment, gave appellant status to the Commissioner of Official
Languages of Canada. I will refer to them collectively as the appellants.
III.
Analysis
A.
Does the Montreal Convention Purport to
Exclude Monetary Damages Under the Official Languages Act ?
(1)
The Appellants’ Submissions
[29]
The appellants make
three principal submissions in support of their position that the Montreal
Convention does not purport to exclude a damages remedy under the OLA :
1.
The Montreal Convention applies
only to private law claims, not statutory claims in relation to fundamental
rights such as language rights.
2.
The Montreal Convention only
limits “individual” damage awards, not remedies for “standardized” damages.
3.
The appellants’ claims do not fall within the
temporal scope of the Montreal Convention’s limitation of claims.
[30]
Both the Federal Court
and the Federal Court of Appeal were of the view that the Montreal Convention
purports to exclude a claim for damages under the OLA and I agree with them. In my view, the appellants’ submissions to
the contrary are based on a misconception of the purpose and structure of the Montreal
Convention and a misreading of its text. Before turning in more detail
to each of the appellants’ main submissions, I will set out briefly some
important interpretative considerations in relation to the Montreal Convention.
(2)
Interpreting the Montreal Convention
(a)
Overview
[31]
The Montreal Convention was adopted in
1999 in Montréal and applies to all international
carriage by aircraft of persons, baggage or cargo. It was
the successor to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (the “Warsaw
Convention”) and its purpose was “to
modernize and consolidate the Warsaw Convention and related instruments”:
preamble of the Montreal Convention. To understand the purposes
of the Montreal Convention, we therefore must go back to its
predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929, as set out at Sch. I of the Carriage by Air Act (as amended at
The Hague in 1955, as set out at Sch. III). The purposes of the Warsaw Convention and of the Montreal
Convention were the same and decisions and commentary respecting the Warsaw
Convention are therefore helpful in understanding those purposes: Stott
v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd., [2014] UKSC 15, [2014] 2 W.L.R. 521, at
paras. 24-25; P. S. Dempsey, Aviation Liability Law (2nd ed. 2013), at
p. 304; P. S. Dempsey and M. Milde, International Air Carrier Liability: The
Montreal Convention of 1999 (2005), at p. 7.
[32]
There were a number of attempts to revise the Warsaw
Convention, leading ultimately to the Montreal Convention with which
we are directly concerned here: see, e.g., Montreal Protocol No. 4 to amend
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as amended by the Protocol
done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, 2145 U.N.T.S. 31, as set out at
Sch. IV of the Carriage by Air Act . For a comprehensive overview of
these modifications which led to the Montreal Convention, see J. D.
McClean et al., eds., Shawcross and Beaumont: Air Law (loose-leaf), at
pp. VII-103 to VII-165. The Montreal Convention resulted from the
work of delegates of approximately 120 states meeting in Montréal in 1999: L.
Weber and A. Jakob, “The Modernization of the Warsaw System: The Montreal
Convention of 1999” (1999), 24 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 333, at
pp. 334-35; Dempsey, at p. 336; Dempsey and Milde, at pp. 36-41.
[33]
The Montreal Convention was ratified by
Canada in 2002 and it came into force in 2003. It is part of Canadian federal
law by virtue of s. 2 of the Carriage by Air Act , and its text is set
out at Sch. VI of that statute. The same basic structure and language used in
the various versions of the Warsaw Convention can be found in the Montreal
Convention and the same quid pro quo between limiting air
carrier’s liability and facilitating consumers’ claims was maintained: Dempsey,
at pp. 310 and 338-40; Shawcross and Beaumont, at p. VII-251.
[34]
The question raised in this appeal is whether
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, which limits the actions in
damages that can be brought for injuries in the course of international air
carriage, excludes the Thibodeaus’ claims for damages. I turn therefore to the
interpretation of this article.
[35]
I begin this exercise with a fundamental
principle of interpretation, set out in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37: “A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.” I will therefore first turn to the text of Article 29 of the Montreal
Convention and then analyze its place within the Montreal Convention in
light of the latter’s purpose and object: Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982, at para. 56.
(b)
Text
[36]
The key provision at the core of the Montreal
Convention’s purpose of establishing a uniform and exclusive set of
rules for liability is Article 29, which is the successor of Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention. Article 29 reads:
Article 29 — Basis of Claims
In
the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages,
however founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or
otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions and such limits
of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice to the
question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what
are their respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any
other non-compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.
[37]
The Montreal Convention makes
clear that it provides the exclusive recourse against airlines for various
types of claims arising in the course of international carriage by air. It
provides that all “action[s] for damages” in the carriage of passengers,
baggage and cargo are subject to the conditions and limitations of liability
set out in its provisions. The provision could hardly be expressed more
broadly; it applies to “any action for damages, however founded”.
This breadth is equally reflected in the French text: “. . . toute
action en dommages-intérêts, à quelque titre que ce soit
. . . .”
[38]
This exclusivity principle is expressed even
more clearly in the Montreal Convention than it was in the Warsaw
Convention. Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention introduces
its exclusion of other claims by referring to “the cases covered by” Articles
17 to 19. Article 29 of the Montreal Convention, in contrast, introduces
its exclusion of other claims by using the terms “[i]n the carriage of
passengers, baggage and cargo”. By using this broader language, it articulates
even more clearly the state signatories’ intention to exclude any actions not
specifically addressed in Articles 17 to 19. The comments made by the chairman
of the International Conference on Air Law, held in Montréal in May 1999, on
this point are enlightening:
The provisions contained in
Article [29] (Basis of Claims) made it clear that an action which was
brought for damages, however founded, whether under the new Convention or in
contract or tort or otherwise, could only be brought subject to the conditions
and such limits of liability as were set out in the Convention. There was
indeed jurisprudence which suggested that it was exclusive. It was not possible
to get around the provisions of the Convention regarding the burden of
proof, etc., by bringing an action in tort or by attempting to bring an action
outside the Convention . . . . [Emphasis added.]
(International
Civil Aviation Organization, International Conference on Air Law,
vol. I, Minutes, Doc. 9775-DC/2 (2001), at p. 137)
[39]
The Montreal Convention sets out
in Chapter III the types of liability of carriers that are permitted and
the applicable limits on compensation. It also clarifies the set of events that
Article 29 purports to cover. Articles 17 to 19 establish that the carrier is
liable for damage sustained: in case of an accident causing the death or bodily
injury of a passenger on board the aircraft or in the course of embarking or
disembarking (Article 17); in case of destruction or loss of, or of damage to,
baggage while in the charge of the carrier (Article 17); in the event of the
destruction or loss of, or damage to, cargo during carriage (Article 18); and
for damage occasioned by delay (Article 19). The full text of the relevant
provisions of the Montreal Convention is set out in the Appendix.
[40]
The monetary limits of the carrier’s liability
(which are not directly relevant to this appeal) are set out in Articles 21 and
22 . These limits of liability are linked specifically and exclusively to the
claims addressed in Articles 17 to 19 and, by virtue of Article 26, any
contractual provision tending to relieve a carrier of liability or fix a lower
limit of liability than that established in the Montreal Convention
is null and void. Chapter VI of the Montreal Convention
underlines its exclusive force by providing that any provision in a contract of
carriage or special contract that purports to infringe the rules laid down by
the Montreal Convention is null and void: Article 49. As discussed
earlier, Article 29 establishes that in relation to claims falling within the
scope of the Montreal Convention, “any action for damages, however
founded” may only be brought “subject to the conditions and such limits of
liability as are set out in this Convention”.
(c)
Purpose and Object of the Montreal Convention
[41]
The Warsaw Convention (and therefore its
successor the Montreal Convention) had three main purposes: to create
uniform rules governing claims arising from international air transportation;
to protect the international air carriage industry by limiting carrier
liability; and to balance that protective goal with the interests of passengers
and others seeking recovery. These purposes responded to concerns that many
legal regimes might apply to international carriage by air with the result that
there could be no uniformity or predictability with respect to either carrier
liability or the rights of passengers and others using the service. Both
passengers and carriers were potentially harmed by this lack of uniformity.
There were also concerns that the fledging international airline business
needed protection against potentially ruinous multi-state litigation and
virtually unlimited liability.
[42]
As succinctly summed up by one text, the Warsaw
Convention aimed “to eliminate many of the conflicts problems which might
arise in international air travel, to create a system of internationally
recognized documentation, to prescribe a limitation period for claims, to
resolve questions of jurisdiction and, perhaps most importantly, to impose very
strict limits on carriers’ liability”: Fountain Court Chambers, Carriage by
Air (2001), at p. 3. From the point of view of passengers and
shippers, this limitation was balanced against a reversal of the burden of
proof in their favour such that, on proof of damage, fault on the part of the
carrier would be presumed: ibid. See also Dempsey, at pp. 309-10; Shawcross
and Beaumont, at pp. VII-105 to VII‑105A; A. Field, “International Air Carriage, The Montreal Convention and the Injuries
for Which There is No Compensation” (2006), 12 Canta. L.R. 237, at p. 239; L. Chassot, Les
sources de la responsabilité du transporteur aérien international: entre
conflit et complémentarité (2012), at pp. 45-46.
[43]
It will be helpful to explain in a bit more
detail how the Warsaw Convention addressed each of its three main
purposes.
[44]
To further the goal of uniformity, the Warsaw
Convention provided for three areas of air carrier liability: personal
injuries in Article 17; loss, destruction and damage to baggage or cargo in
Article 18; and damage occasioned by delay in Article 19. It also set out
the conditions exempting air carriers from liability (Article 20), the
monetary limits of liability (Article 22 ) and, to keep the scheme in balance,
the circumstances in which air carriers may not limit liability
(Articles 23 and 25). The intention was to exempt carriers from the differing
liability regimes under the law of the various states: see, e.g., El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999), at pp. 169-71, per
Ginsburg J.
[45]
As for the second purpose — limiting liability —
the Warsaw Convention restricted both the nature of admissible claims
and the amount of recovery. In Articles 22 and 24, passengers were limited in
the amount of damages they could recover and restricted in the claims they
could pursue. The Warsaw Convention’s regime rests on an exclusivity
principle, found at Article 24, which provides that “[i]n the cases covered” by
Articles 17 to 19, “any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Convention”. It is
useful to reproduce here Article 24 in its entirety, since several cases I will
discuss later turn on this provision:
Article 24
(1) In
the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in
this Convention.
(2) In
the cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also
apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are persons who have the
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
[46]
The third purpose of the Warsaw Convention
was to balance the interests of passengers seeking recovery for personal
injuries, and the interests of air carriers seeking to limit potential
liability: Tseng, at p. 170. While there was concern that damage suits
could put the nascent international airline industry at risk, there was also
concern that the airlines would take undue advantage of their ability to limit
their liability by contractual means: ibid. The Warsaw Convention
was thus seen as “a compromise between the interests of air carriers and their
customers worldwide”: Tseng, at p. 170. Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention denies carriers the contractual prerogative to exclude or limit
their liability for personal injury, whereas Articles 22 and 24 limit the
amount of damages that passengers can recover and restrict their claims. As
previously mentioned, the Warsaw Convention also gave passengers and
shippers the benefit of a reversed burden of proof.
[47]
As we have seen, two of the main purposes of the
Warsaw Convention, and hence of the Montreal Convention,
are to achieve a uniform set of rules governing damages liability of
international air carriers and to provide limitation of carrier liability.
These purposes can only be achieved by the Montreal Convention if
it provides the exclusive set of rules in relation to the matters that it
covers. The Montreal Convention of course does not deal with all
aspects of international carriage by air: it is not comprehensive. But within
the scope of the matters which it does address, it is exclusive in that it bars
resort to other bases for liability in those areas: M. Clarke, Contracts of
Carriage by Air (2nd ed. 2010), at pp. 8 and 160-62; G. N. Tompkins, Jr.,
“The Continuing Development of Montreal Convention 1999 Jurisprudence” (2010),
35 Air & Space L. 433, at pp. 433-36.
[48]
The scope of the exclusivity principle in the Montreal
Convention lies at the heart of this appeal. While we do not have to
resolve all of the issues that may arise with respect to how this exclusivity
principle operates, the Montreal Convention’s text and purpose as well
as a strong current of jurisprudence make it clear that the exclusivity of the
liability scheme established under the Montreal Convention extends at
least to excluding actions arising from injuries suffered by passengers during
flight or embarkation and debarkation when those actions do not otherwise fall
within the scheme of permitted claims.
[49]
I dwell on this point because the appellants’
submissions, while not doing so directly, in effect take issue with this
exclusivity principle. Instead of asking whether their claims fall within those
permitted by the Montreal Convention, the appellants seek to
circumvent the exclusivity of the Montreal Convention by arguing that
their claims are not specifically excluded. The appellants have never suggested
that the Thibodeaus’ claims under the OLA could also be maintained under
Articles 17 to 19 of the Montreal Convention. This, respectfully, is the
fatal flaw in their argument. As we shall see in further detail below, the
appellants try to escape the application of the Montreal Convention by
claiming that the Thibodeaus’ proceedings in the Federal Court do not
constitute an “action for damages” covered by the substantive scope of the Montreal
Convention and that therefore its bar on claims does not apply to their
action. The appellants also argue that the Thibodeaus’ claims do not fall
within the temporal scope of the Montreal Convention. These
submissions fail because they are inconsistent with the exclusivity principle
that underlies the Montreal Convention and because they are not
consistent with its clear text. A review of the international jurisprudence
supports this view.
(d)
The International Jurisprudence
[50]
The highest courts of state parties to the Montreal
Convention have affirmed the exclusivity principle: S. Radošević,
“CJEU’s Decision in Nelson and Others in Light of the Exclusivity
of the Montreal Convention” (2013), 38 Air & Space L. 95, at p. 99.
In light of the Montreal Convention’s objective of achieving
international uniformity, we should pay close attention to the international
jurisprudence and be especially reluctant to depart from any strong
international consensus that has developed in relation to its interpretation:
see Tseng, at p. 175; Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,
[2002] UKHL 7, [2002] 2 A.C. 628, at paras. 5 and 7; see also Plourde v.
Service aérien FBO inc. (Skyservice), 2007 QCCA 739 (CanLII), at paras. 53-55,
leave to appeal refused, [2007] 3 S.C.R. xiii; Sakka
(Litigation Guardian of) v. Air France, 2011 ONSC 1995, 18 C.P.C. (7th)
150, at para. 28; and Chassot, at p. 34.
[51]
I begin my review with cases decided under the Warsaw
Convention, which, as I noted earlier, is similar in purpose,
structure and text to its successor the Montreal Convention which is in
issue on this appeal. In cases under the Warsaw Convention, the
highest courts of the United Kingdom, the United States, and France have
endorsed the exclusivity principle. The exclusivity principle, affirmed under
this Warsaw Convention jurisprudence, is, if anything, more strongly
apparent in the text of the Montreal Convention.
[52]
In Sidhu v. British Airways Plc., [1997]
A.C. 430 (H.L.), the plaintiffs were taken hostage
during a layover in Kuwait by the Iraqi forces, at the commencement of what
became known as the Gulf War. Ms. Sidhu sued British Airways for personal
injury at common law and Ms. Abnett, for delay and for breach of contract at
common law. While the House of Lords did not express an opinion on this issue,
it was common ground that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, as fully
implemented by the Carriage by Air Act, 1961, 9 & 10 Eliz. 2, c. 27,
in the United Kingdom, did not apply to the plaintiffs’ claim. Indeed, the
parties agreed that Article 17 could not apply, given that no “accident”
occurred while on board the aircraft or while disembarking and that
psychological damage could not fall under the notion of “bodily injury”: pp.
440-41. The stark issue was therefore “whether a passenger who has sustained
damage in the course of international carriage by air due to the fault of the
carrier, but who has no claim against the carrier under article 17 of the
[Warsaw] Convention, is left without a remedy”: p. 441. In deciding this
question, the House of Lords analyzed the purpose of the Warsaw Convention,
as well as its text and context, and concluded, at pp. 453-54:
I believe that the answer to the question raised in the present case
is to be found in the objects and structure of the Convention. The language
used and the subject matter with which it deals demonstrate that what was
sought to be achieved was a uniform international code, which could be applied
by the courts of all the high contracting parties without reference to the
rules of their own domestic law. The Convention does not purport to deal with
all matters relating to contracts of international carriage by air. But in
those areas with which it deals — and the liability of the carrier is one of
them — the code is intended to be uniform and to be exclusive also of any
resort to the rules of domestic law.
. . .
. . . It was not designed to provide remedies against the
carrier to enable all losses to be compensated. It was designed instead to
define those situations in which compensation was to be available. So it set
out the limits of liability and the conditions under which claims to establish
that liability, if disputed, were to be made. A balance was struck, in the
interests of certainty and uniformity.
. . .
The conclusion must be therefore that any remedy is excluded by the Convention,
as the set of uniform rules does not provide for it. The domestic courts are
not free to provide a remedy according to their own law, because to do this
would be to undermine the Convention. It would lead to the setting alongside
the Convention of an entirely different set of rules which would distort the
operation of the whole scheme.
[53]
This understanding of the exclusivity principle
was reiterated by the House of Lords in In re Deep Vein Thrombosis
and Air Travel Group Litigation, [2005] UKHL 72, [2006] 1 A.C. 495, at
para. 3:
It is to the passengerʼs
disadvantage, however, that even clear causative negligence on the part of the
carrier will not entitle the passenger to a remedy if the article 17 conditions
cannot be satisfied. It has been authoritatively established that if a
remedy for the injury is not available under the Convention, it is not
available at all: see Sidhu v British Airways plc [1997] AC 430 and El
Al Israel Airlines Ltd v Tsui Yuan Tseng (1999) 525 US 155. [Emphasis
added.]
[54]
In Tseng, the Supreme Court of the United
States agreed with the House of Lords’ affirmation of the exclusivity principle
in Sidhu and adopted the interpretation of the Warsaw Convention
which was supported by the United States government. The plaintiff was
subjected to an intrusive security search at John F. Kennedy International
Airport in New York before she boarded an El Al Israel Airlines flight to Tel
Aviv. She sought damages for psychic or psychosomatic injuries, but agreed that
she did not suffer any “bodily injury”. The airline and the U.S. government
submitted that the words “[i]n the cases covered by Article 17”, found at
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention, “refer[red] generically to all
personal injury cases stemming from occurrences on board an aircraft or in
embarking or disembarking”: p. 168. The United States Supreme Court further
agreed with the proposition that “[s]o read, Article 24 [of the Warsaw
Convention] would preclude a passenger from asserting any air transit
personal injury claims under local law, including claims that failed to satisfy
Article 17’s liability conditions”: ibid.
[55]
The French Cour de cassation adopted a similar
approach in Civ. 1re, June 14, 2007, Bull. civ. 6, No. 230.
Ms. Gillet suffered a pulmonary embolism more than two weeks after an
international flight with Air Canada and sued the latter for damages, arguing
that it failed to inform her of the risks of aerial transportation, as was its
contractual duty under the French Code de la consommation. She was
however denied monetary relief by virtue of the application of the Warsaw
Convention, which was integrated in French domestic law by art. L.
322-3 of the Code de l’aviation civile. She appealed to the Cour de
cassation, première chambre civile, submitting among other arguments that the
Cour d’appel de Paris erred in not applying the provisions of the Code de la
consommation, which are of public order at domestic law. The Cour de
cassation rejected this contention, holding that a personal injury claim that
does not respect the conditions set out at Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention was precluded by Article 24 of this Convention.
[56]
This understanding of the exclusivity principle
in the Warsaw Convention was also affirmed by the Court of Appeal of
Hong Kong in Ong v. Malaysian Airline System Bhd, [2008] 3 H.K.L.R.D.
153, the High Court of Ireland in Hennessey v. Aer Lingus Ltd., [2012]
IEHC 124 (BAILII), the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Emery Air Freight
Corp. v. Nerine Nurseries Ltd., [1997] 3 N.Z.L.R. 723, the Singapore Court
of Appeal in Seagate Technology International v. Changi International
Airport Services Pte. Ltd., [1997] SGCA 22, [1997] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 57, and the
High Court of South Africa in Potgieter v. British Airways Plc, [2005]
ZAWCHC 5 (SAFLII). In Canada, courts have adopted the same view: see Gal v.
Northern Mountain Helicopters Inc., 1999 BCCA 486, 128 B.C.A.C. 290, and Sakka,
at para. 30. A similar understanding of the exclusivity principle under the
Montreal Convention was affirmed by the supreme court of Germany in Az.
X ZR 99/10, March 15, 2011 (online), the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in
Stott, at para. 31, and the High Court of Ireland in McAuley v.
Aer Lingus Ltd., [2011] IEHC 89 (online), at paras. 6.3-6.6; in Canada, see
O’Mara v. Air Canada, 2013 ONSC 2931, 115 O.R. (3d) 673, and Walton
v. MyTravel Canada Holdings Inc., 2006 SKQB 231, 280 Sask. R. 1.
[57]
To sum up, the text and purpose of the Montreal
Convention and a strong current of international jurisprudence show that
actions for damages in relation to matters falling within the scope of the Montreal
Convention may only be pursued if they are the types of actions
specifically permitted under its provisions. As the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom put it very recently, “[t]he Convention is intended to deal
comprehensively with the carrier’s liability for whatever may physically happen
to passengers between embarkation and disembarkation”: Stott, at
para. 61.
[58]
I turn now to address the specific submissions
advanced on behalf of the appellants.
(3)
Analysis of Appellants’ Submissions
(a)
The Montreal Convention Does Not Limit Claims
for Compensation for Public Law Claims for Breach of Statute or Fundamental
Rights Arising Under Quasi-Constitutional Statutes Such as the Official
Languages Act
[59]
The appellants contend that the Montreal Convention
does not limit claims for damages sought in relation to public law claims or
breaches of quasi-constitutional statutes. To place this submission in its
statutory context, the appellants assert that their claims for damages under
the OLA do not fall within the substantive scope of the Montreal Convention,
that is to say the areas of air carriers’ liability that the latter purports
to cover. Since language rights claims would escape this substantive scope,
their claims for damages would not be within the type of “action for damages”
contemplated by Article 29 of the Montreal Convention and the
exclusivity principle contained therein would therefore not apply. In support
of this submission, the appellants principally argue that the violation of
language rights is not an inherent risk to air carriage covered by Article 17
and that the Montreal Convention intends to govern neither statutory
claims based on fundamental rights nor the “public law damages” they would give
rise to. In my view, this position has no support in the text or purpose of
the Montreal Convention or in the international jurisprudence.
(i)
The Appellants’ Argument Is Inconsistent With
the Text and Purpose of the Montreal Convention
[60]
I have already discussed the breadth of the
language that is used in Article 29 to describe the basis of the claims
that are subject to the Montreal Convention’s limitations. The
limitation applies to “any action” in the carriage of passengers, baggage or
cargo, “for damages, however founded, whether under this Convention or
in contract or in tort or otherwise”. There is no hint in this language
that there is any intention to exempt any “action for damages” in the carriage
of passengers, baggage or cargo depending on its legal foundation, such as when
a plaintiff brings forward a statutory monetary claim of a public law nature
based on the breach of quasi-constitutional rights. As Dr. Chassot has said,
both the terms “action” and “damages” must be understood in a broad sense; to
do otherwise would unduly limit the ambit of the Montreal Convention
in a way that was not intended: see pp. 176-77.
[61]
The Thibodeaus’ claims are an “action for damages”
within the meaning of Article 29, as they claim damages for injuries suffered
in the course of an international flight. This is clear from the way in which
the claims were asserted and from the application judge’s reasons.
[62]
The Thibodeaus referred in their pleading to
what they were claiming as damages. Their claims for damages, as set out in
Part III (a) and (b) of their notice of application, filed with the Federal
Court, included $25,000 in damages and $250,000 in punitive and exemplary
damages for each of them. In response to these claims, the Federal Court
awarded damages to compensate the Thibodeaus for the injury flowing from the
breaches of their language rights. As the judge at first instance put it, “the
applicantsʼ language rights are clearly very important to them and the violation of their rights
caused them a moral prejudice, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of
their vacation”: para. 88 (emphasis added).
(Although the judge decided against awarding punitive or exemplary damages in
this case, I note in passing that such damages are excluded by the concluding
words of Article 29, even in actions that are otherwise permitted under the Montreal
Convention.)
[63]
In short, damages for moral prejudice, pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of their vacation are what the Thibodeaus
sought in their court proceeding and such damages are what the judge awarded.
[64]
Permitting an action in damages to compensate
for “moral prejudice, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of [a passenger’s]
vacation” that does not otherwise fulfill the conditions of Article 17 of the Montreal
Convention (because the action does not relate to death or bodily injury)
would fly in the face of Article 29. It would also undermine one of the main
purposes of the Montreal Convention, which is to bring uniformity
across jurisdictions to the types and upper limits of claims for damages that
may be made against international carriers for damages sustained in the course
of carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo. As the international
jurisprudence makes clear, the application of the Montreal Convention focuses
on the factual circumstances surrounding the monetary claim, not the legal
foundation of it. To decide otherwise would be to permit artful pleading to
define the scope of the Montreal Convention.
(ii) The Appellants’ Argument Is Inconsistent With International
Jurisprudence
[65]
The abundant international jurisprudence
provides no support for the appellants’ position that their claims escape the
substantive scope of the Montreal Convention. It supports the opposite
conclusion.
[66]
American courts have been faced with a similar
issue as they had to decide whether claims based on fundamental rights were
precluded by the Warsaw Convention. District and appellate
courts, following Tseng, have concluded that, despite the substantive
difference between tort claims and discrimination claims, the Warsaw
Convention had to be applied to damages in relation to both of these types
of claims. The principle underlying these holdings is that the application of
the Warsaw Convention depends on the factual circumstances giving rise
to the claim, not on its legal foundation. As discussed earlier, the exclusion
under the Montreal Convention is, if anything, even clearer than
it is under the Warsaw Convention.
[67]
In King v. American Airlines, Inc., 284
F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002), Mr. and Ms. King claimed damages before the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that they
had been racially discriminated against in violation of their equal rights
under the law, as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Kings also relied on the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41310(a), and various other state and federal
laws. They contended that American Airlines “bumped them from an overbooked
flight because of their race”: p. 355. The U.S. Federal Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, had to decide whether the Warsaw Convention
applied to the Kings’ damages claim. If it did, then this claim would be
excluded, as it had been filed outside the two-year limitation period provided
at Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.
[68]
Circuit Judge Sotomayor (as she then was)
for the court concluded that the claim fell within the substantive scope of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, which
exhaustively covers claims for injuries suffered while “in the course of [one
of] the operations of embarking”: pp. 359-60. The Kings, however, submitted
that civil rights claims based on federal statutes would fall outside the
intended exclusivity regime of the Warsaw Convention: p. 360. Sotomayor
J. rejected this argument:
As Tseng
makes clear, the scope of the Convention is not dependent on the legal
theory pled nor on the nature of the harm suffered. See Tseng, 525
U.S. at 171, 119 S.Ct. 662 (rejecting a construction of the Convention that
would look to the type of harm suffered, because it would “encourage artful
pleading by plaintiffs seeking to opt out of the Convention’s liability scheme
when local law promised recovery in excess of that prescribed by the
treatyˮ) . . . .
Notably,
every court that has addressed the issue of whether discrimination claims are
preempted by the Warsaw Convention post-Tseng has reached a similar
conclusion. . . .
. . . It is not for the courts to rewrite the terms of a
treaty between sovereign nations. Cf. Turturro, 128 F.Supp.2d at
181 (“[T]he Convention massively curtails damage awards for victims of horrible
acts [of] terrorism; the fact that the Convention also abridges recovery for
. . . discrimination should not surprise anyone.ˮ). [Emphasis
added; pp. 361-62.]
[69]
This decision is highly
relevant because the Kings’ argument that damages for civil rights claims were
not excluded by the Warsaw Convention is similar to the
appellants’ arguments in this case that damages for breach of language rights
are not excluded. The logic of King, holding that the exclusion does
apply, supports the same conclusion here.
[70]
Similarly, in Gibbs v. American Airlines,
Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002), Dr. Gibbs brought a claim against
American Airlines under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that the air carrier
“refused to perform its contract to transport him . . . on the basis
of his race”: pp. 146-47. Dr. Gibbs argued that “Congress did not
intend the [Warsaw] Convention to impede civil rights claims rooted in the
[American] Constitution, such as Section 1981 claims”: p. 148. Kennedy J. of
the United States District Court, District of Columbia, however rejected this
argument and held that the “negative consequences that the Tseng Court
found would flow from ‘[c]onstruing the [Warsaw] Convention . . . to
allow passengers to pursue claims under local law when the [Warsaw] Convention
does not permit recovery’ are no less likely with statutory discrimination
claims than with common law claims”: ibid., citing Tseng, at p.
171. As Kennedy J. explained, “the primary purpose of the [Warsaw] Convention
is to prevent variations in liability according to local law” and, as such,
this purpose “does not distinguish between types of local law, only
between local and international law”: p. 149. To that extent, “[f]ederal
discrimination statutes clearly fall into the former category”: ibid. On
the application of the Warsaw Convention to civil rights claims, see
also Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F.Supp.2d 170 (S.D.N.Y.
2001), and Brandt v. American Airlines, 2000 WL 288393 (N.D. Cal.).
[71]
Jurisprudence from other jurisdictions,
including a very recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom,
also supports the view that exclusion under the Montreal Convention
turns on whether the claim is one for damages related to the circumstances
contemplated by the Montreal Convention, not on the alleged
source of the obligation to pay them.
[72]
In Stott, the plaintiff, a disabled
passenger in a wheelchair, claimed damages resulting from a series of breaches
by Thomas Cook Tour Operators of the Civil Aviation (Access to Air Travel
for Disabled Persons and Persons with Reduced Mobility) Regulations 2007,
SI 2007/1895, which implemented in the United Kingdom Regulation (EC) No.
1107/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the rights of
disabled persons and persons with reduced mobility when travelling by air. The
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom however found that, because the claim did
not fall within the sorts of injury claims permitted under Article 17 of
the Montreal Convention, no monetary relief could be awarded:
Should a
claim for damages for ill treatment in breach of equality laws as a general
class, or, more specifically, should a claim for damages for failure to provide
properly for the needs of a disabled passenger, be regarded as outside the
substantive scope of the Convention? As to the general question, my answer is
no for the reasons given by Sotomayor CJ in King v American Airlines. I
agree with her analysis that what matters is not the quality of the cause of
action but the time and place of the accident or mishap. The Convention is
intended to deal comprehensively with the carrierʼs liability for whatever
may physically happen to passengers between embarkation and disembarkation. The
answer to that general question also covers the more specific question. [para.
61]
[73]
I agree with this analysis and I reject the
appellants’ argument that statutory claims for quasi-constitutional rights fall
outside the type of actions covered by the Montreal Convention.
[74]
The Commissioner however
submits that the Montreal Convention only applies to claims
finding their source in private law and to claims for private law damages. With
regards to the source of the liability at law, the Commissioner argues that
claims such as the ones made by Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau, based on a statutory
right, would not be excluded by Article 29, as they would be more akin to
administrative complaints mechanisms than private law proceedings.
[75]
The flaw in this argument is that, as I have
discussed, the relevant question concerns the nature of the claim (i.e. is it
an action for damages related to the circumstances contemplated by the Montreal
Convention, however founded), not the underlying source of the claim: see
also Chassot, at p. 179; J. J. Wegter, “The ECJ
Decision of 10 January 2006 on the Validity of Regulation 261/2004: Ignoring
the Exclusivity of the Montreal Convention” (2006), 31 Air & Space L.
133, at p. 144.
[76]
The argument relating to
the distinction between “public law” and “private law” damages rests on the
same logic and can be answered in a similar fashion. Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau
submit that they claimed public law damages, as they are pursuing redress for
breach of quasi-constitutional rights. In support of this argument, they rely
heavily on the remarks of this Court in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010
SCC 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28, where the Chief Justice differentiated actions for
public law damages from actions for private law damages, emphasizing that they
are distinct remedies: para. 22.
[77]
There are two flaws in this submission. The
first is that, subject to constitutional considerations, the scope of the
exclusivity principle in the Montreal Convention cannot be
modeled on national definitions of damages. As Dr.
Chassot explains, at p. 177:
[translation]
The concept of damages, as an element of the definition of the scope of the
exclusivity provided for in Article 29 [of the Montreal Convention], is
a matter of uniform law: it must be interpreted
independently. . . . To assess the scope of the exclusivity,
one cannot refer to the domestic law concept of damages, however, since the
rules of domestic law would then be defining the scope of the Convention, which
would clearly be inconsistent with the objective of Article 29 [of the Montreal
Convention]. Thus, the concept of damages within the meaning of Article
29 [of the Montreal Convention], the purpose of which is to define the
scope of the exclusivity of the Convention’s rules respecting liability, must
be distinguished from that of the damage for which compensation might be
obtained under Articles 17 et seq. [of the Montreal Convention].
[Emphasis added.]
[78]
The second flaw in the appellants’
submission is that, even if domestic law were relevant at this
stage, the damages discussed in Ward were damages against the state; but
of course Air Canada is not the state, or its agent.
[79]
I conclude that the appellants’ arguments that
the Montreal Convention does not apply to the damages they
claimed in these proceedings are inconsistent not only with the text and
purpose of the Montreal Convention, but with a strong current of
international jurisprudence interpreting it.
(b)
The Montreal Convention Excludes Only “Individual
Damages” and Not Claims for “Standardized Damages”
[80]
The Thibodeaus further submit that the
substantive scope of the Montreal Convention does not extend to
barring claims for “standardized damages” and that their claims are of that
nature. This argument relies on jurisprudence from the European Court of
Justice, in particular International Air Transport Association v. Department
for Transport, C-344/04, [2006] E.C.R. I-403 (Grand Chamber) (“IATA”),
which was followed by the Fourth Chamber of the European Court of Justice in Wallentin-Hermann
v. Alitalia, C-549/07, [2008] E.C.R. I-11061, at
para. 32, and Sturgeon v. Condor Flugdienst GmbH, Joined Cases C-402/07 and C‑432/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-10923,
at para. 65, and reaffirmed by the Grand Chamber in Nelson v. Deutsche
Lufthansa AG, Joined Cases C-581/10 and C-629/10, [2013] 1 C.M.L.R. 42 (p.
1191), at paras. 46-60. In the IATA case, for example, the question was
whether a European Community regulation dealing with air passengers’ rights in
the event of delay was inconsistent with the Montreal Convention. The
regulation required airlines to provide assistance to delayed passengers
ranging from free meals and refreshments to free hotel accommodation. The court
concluded that passenger delay gives rise to two distinct types of damage, only
one of which is governed by the Montreal Convention. The first,
which in the court’s view is not addressed by the Montreal Convention,
is “damage that is almost identical for every passenger, redress for which may
take the form of standardised and immediate assistance or care for everybody
concerned”: para. 43. This, in the court’s view, was the sort of measure
contained in the regulation. The second, which is subject to the Montreal
Convention, is “individual damage . . . redress for which
requires a case-by-case assessment of the extent of the damage caused”: ibid.
[81]
In my respectful view, this line of
jurisprudence is not relevant to the issue that confronts us here. Even if we
were to adopt the distinction between “individual damages” and “standardized
damages” relied on by the European Court of Justice, it would not assist the
Thibodeaus. The damages which they seek in this case cannot be described as
“damage . . . redress for which may take the form of standardised and
immediate assistance or care for everybody concerned” as were the measures
required by the regulation considered in IATA. The damages as
claimed by the Thibodeaus and as awarded by the application judge were, at
least in part, geared to and depended upon the impact on the Thibodeaus of the
particular breaches. Their claims were for damages on an individual basis.
[82]
I note that the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom recently understood the IATA line of jurisprudence in the same
way. The court held that a claim for damages for breach of duties owed to
disabled persons was a claim for damages on an individual basis and therefore
the IATA line of jurisprudence did not assist the claimant’s attempt to
escape the bar set out in the Montreal Convention: Stott,
at para. 58. I respectfully agree and would apply the same reasoning here.
(c)
The Appellants’ Claims Do Not Fall Within the
Temporal Scope of the Montreal Convention’s Limitations
[83]
Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau submit that, even if their
claims fall within the substantive scope of the Montreal Convention,
they nonetheless fall outside its temporal scope for cases involving personal
injuries. Article 17 of the Montreal Convention deals with
personal injuries suffered “on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking”. Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau argue that
the assignments of non-bilingual flight attendants on the relevant flights by
Air Canada were decisions made long before the embarkation process and were, as
the application judge found, the result of systemic problems within the
management of the airline. Thus, they submit, the failure to provide French
language services did not occur “on board the aircraft or in the course of any
of the operations of embarking or disembarking”.
[84]
This submission is not well founded and I cannot
accept it.
[85]
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom rejected
a similar argument, in my view correctly, in Stott. The appellant in
that case argued that he “had a complete cause of action before boarding the
aircraft based on his poor treatment prior to that stage”: para. 60. The court
rightly held that, by this logic, “most accidents or mishaps” could be “traced
back to earlier operative causes” and that such an approach to the Montreal
Convention “would distort [its] broad purpose”: ibid. Rather, courts
must focus their application of the exclusivity principle on the location or
the activity of the passenger when the accident or occurrence directly causing
the particular injury giving rise to the claim occurred, not on some antecedent
fault: ibid. See also Dempsey, at pp. 439-41; Shawcross and Beaumont,
at pp. VII-685 to VII-687.
[86]
In this case, the Thibodeaus were clearly within
the temporal limits of the Montreal Convention when they suffered the
breach of their language rights; they were aboard the aircraft for the three
breaches for which damages were set aside by the Court of Appeal. I therefore
reject the Thibodeaus’ submission based on the temporal aspect of
Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.
(d)
Conclusion
[87]
The claims before this Court fall squarely
within the exclusion established by the Montreal Convention.
B.
Are Mr. and Ms. Thibodeau Nonetheless Entitled
to Monetary Damages Because the OLA and the Montreal Convention Conflict and the
OLA Prevails?
(1)
Introduction
[88]
I have concluded that if the Montreal Convention
applies, it bars the Thibodeaus’ claims for damages under the OLA . The
appellants say, however, that even if this is so, the Montreal Convention
conflicts with the OLA and that the OLA prevails. They submit
that the power of the Federal Court under s. 77(4) of the OLA to “grant
such remedy as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances”
conflicts with the exclusion of actions for damages under the Montreal Convention.
The first question therefore is whether these provisions conflict. I agree with
the Federal Court of Appeal that they do not.
[89]
Courts presume that legislation passed by
Parliament does not contain contradictions or inconsistencies and only find
that they exist when provisions are so inconsistent that they are incapable of
standing together. Even where provisions overlap in the sense that they address
aspects of the same subject, they are interpreted so as to avoid conflict
wherever this is possible.
[90]
When we apply these principles, we see that the
provisions in issue here do not conflict. They have markedly different
purposes. The remedial provisions in the OLA cannot be understood to be
an exhaustive code that requires damages to be available in all settings and
without regard to all other relevant laws. Moreover, the power to grant an
“appropriate and just” remedy may easily be reconciled with the specific and
limited exclusion of damages in the context of international air travel. A
remedy is not “appropriate and just” if awarding it would constitute a breach
of Canada’s international obligations under the Montreal Convention.
(2)
What Is “a Conflict”?
[91]
The appellants contend that there is a conflict
between two acts of the same legislature. The Carriage by Air Act ,
incorporating the Montreal Convention, purports to preclude an award of
damages while s. 77(4) of the OLA permits the court to grant an
“appropriate and just” remedy, including damages. In short, the appellants’
position is that the exclusion of damages during international air travel
conflicts with the power to award an “appropriate and just” remedy.
[92]
The legal framework that governs this question
is not complicated. First, courts take a restrictive approach to what
constitutes a conflict in this context. Second, courts find that there is a conflict
only when the existence of the conflict, in the restrictive sense of the word,
cannot be avoided by interpretation. Overlap, on its own, does not constitute
conflict in this context, so that even where the ambit of two provisions
overlaps, there is a presumption that they both are meant to apply, provided
that they can do so without producing absurd results. This presumption may be
rebutted if one of the provisions was intended to cover the subject matter
exhaustively. Third, only where a conflict is unavoidable should the court
resort to statutory provisions and principles of interpretation concerned with
which law takes precedence over the other. This case turns on the first two of
these principles and I will explore them in somewhat more detail.
[93]
Courts presume that “the body of legislation
enacted by a legislature does not contain contradictions or inconsistencies,
that each provision is capable of operating without coming into conflict with
any other”: R. Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes (5th
ed. 2008), at p. 325; R. v. Ulybel Enterprises Ltd., 2001 SCC 56,
[2001] 2 S.C.R. 867, at para. 30. This is sometimes
expressed as a presumption of coherence, based on the common sense idea that
the legislature does not intend to make contradictory enactments: Friends
of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1
S.C.R. 3, at p. 38. This is why courts take a very restrictive approach to
defining what constitutes a conflict: P.-A. Côté, in
collaboration with S. Beaulac and M. Devinat, The Interpretation of
Legislation in Canada (4th ed. 2011), at p. 375.
[94]
What then is a conflict in this context? The
provisions must be “so inconsistent with . . . or repugnant” to each
other that they are “incapable of standing together”: Daniels v. White,
[1968] S.C.R. 517, at p. 526; Toronto Railway Co. v. Paget (1909), 42
S.C.R. 488, at pp. 491 and 499; Canadian Westinghouse Co. v. Grant,
[1927] S.C.R. 625, at p. 630; International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Town of Summerside, [1960] S.C.R. 591, at pp. 598-99; Reference
re Broadcasting Regulatory Policy CRTC 2010-167 and Broadcasting Order CRTC
2010-168, 2012 SCC 68, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 489, at paras. 41-45. Application of one provision “must implicitly or explicitly preclude application
of the other”: P.-A. Côté, The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada
(3rd ed. 2000), at p. 350, adopted by the Court in Lévis
(City) v. Fraternité des policiers de Lévis Inc., 2007 SCC 14, [2007]
1 S.C.R. 591, at para. 47; see also Côté (4th ed.), at p. 376.
[95]
Bastarache J. held in Lévis that “[u]navoidable conflicts . . . occur
when two pieces of legislation are directly contradictory or where their
concurrent application would lead to unreasonable or absurd results”: para.
47. It is not an absurd result to exclude one particular remedy — damages — in
the particular context of international air travel. Therefore, the live issue
here is whether the provisions are directly contradictory.
[96]
A “direct contradiction” exists if the
application of one law excludes the application of the other. For example, in Massicotte
v. Boutin, [1969] S.C.R. 818, one statute allowed for an extension of time
only before the time limit expired, while another statute allowed for an
extension to be granted even after the time limit had expired. There was thus a
direct conflict between the two laws with respect to an application for an
extension of time sought after the time limit had expired: p. 820. Similarly,
in Lévis, one provision required dismissal of a police officer who has
been convicted of a criminal offence while another provision allowed the
officer to retain the position upon showing special circumstances. As
Bastarache J. put it, one enactment said yes while the other said no: paras.
48-49.
[97]
This is not the situation that faces us
here. The OLA does not provide that damages
should be granted in every case, but authorizes courts to grant “appropriate
and just” remedies. The exclusion of a damages remedy in the context of
international air travel is thus not a direct contradiction of the remedial
power under the OLA .
[98]
This case is therefore not one of direct
contradiction but of overlap. The OLA’s broad
and discretionary remedial provisions permit an award of damages where that is
what the court considers to be an appropriate and just remedy in the
circumstances. The Montreal Convention,
on the other hand, restricts claims for damages by passengers in the context of
international air travel. Overlapping provisions, however, do not necessarily
conflict. Laws do not conflict simply because “they overlap, are active in the
same field or deal with the same subject matter”: Côté (4th ed.), at p. 376; Toronto
Railway, at p. 499. If the overlapping laws can
both apply, it is presumed that they are meant to apply, and “[t]he only issue
for the court is whether the presumption is rebutted by evidence that one of
the provisions was intended to provide an exhaustive declaration of the
applicable law”: Sullivan, at p. 326.
[99]
Courts strive through interpretation to avoid finding that
overlapping provisions conflict. As Bastarache J. said in Lévis, “an
interpretation which results in conflict should be eschewed unless it is
unavoidable” (para. 47). Courts are therefore slow to find that broadly worded
provisions were intended to be an exhaustive declaration of the applicable law
where the result of that conclusion creates rather than avoids conflict. For
example, when overlapping provisions have different purposes or touch on different
aspects, they will generally not be found to conflict: Sullivan, at p. 328. As
Professor Côté explains, the court must consider the
purpose of the law in order to determine whether in the circumstances the
enactment of one norm may be interpreted as excluding all others: 4th ed., at pp. 379-80.
[100]
To pause here for a moment, the two
allegedly conflicting laws in this case have markedly different purposes and
touch on distinct subject matters. The remedial provisions of the OLA are part of a larger scheme of obligations and
mechanisms the object of which is to preserve and strengthen the vitality of
Canada’s official languages in our federal institutions. It applies to only one
airline, Air Canada. The Montreal Convention, in contrast, is part of an
internationally agreed upon uniform and exclusive scheme addressing damages
claims in the field of international carriage by air. Given these two
dramatically different purposes and spheres of operation, we should be slow to
find a conflict in the narrow point at which the schemes overlap. It will be
helpful to review briefly three judgments of this Court dealing with
overlapping provisions in order to see how these principles play out in
specific cases.
(3)
The Jurisprudence
[101]
In The King v. Williams, [1944] S.C.R. 226, Mr. Williams
was fined as a result of his conviction under the Foreign Exchange Control
Order, P.C. 7378, made under the War Measures Act, R.S.C. 1927, c.
206, for attempting to export a quantity of gold from Canada without a licence.
When he was pursued for forfeiture of the gold, he argued that the exportation
of gold was addressed under The Gold Export Act, S.C. 1932, c. 33, which
did not provide for forfeiture. It followed, he argued, that forfeiture
was not available in the case of exporting gold contrary to the Foreign
Exchange Control Order. The submission in effect was that The
Gold Export Act dealt exhaustively and exclusively with the consequences of
attempting to export gold from Canada. That position was rejected by a majority
of the Court. The point is perhaps made most clearly in the concurring reasons
of Hudson J., at p. 240:
In the
present case there is no repugnancy. Two measures were passed for different
purposes and are to be enforced through different organs of the Government. The
Foreign Exchange Control Order is very comprehensive, covering the whole
field of currency, securities and commodities. I do not think that the Court
could properly imply an intention to exclude from “currency” gold coins and
from “commodities” fine gold, which nominally determines the value of all
currency and monetary obligations. [Emphasis added.]
[102]
There is a clear parallel between Williams and this case.
The two provisions were enacted for very different purposes, as I discussed
earlier. The Montreal Convention is a “very comprehensive” scheme in
relation to claims for damages in the field of international carriage by air.
The remedial provisions in the OLA , by
contrast, are very generally worded and cannot realistically be thought to
mandate that damages must be available for every breach. Following the
reasoning of Williams, there is no “repugnancy” between the two
provisions.
[103]
In Myran v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 137, a memorandum
of agreement with the force of statute assured the
appellants, who were Treaty Indians, that they would have the right of hunting,
trapping and fishing for food on all unoccupied Crown lands (and certain other
lands). However, another statute made it an offence to hunt without due regard
for the safety of other persons in the vicinity. There was no serious question
that the appellants, while hunting, had failed to show due regard for the
safety of other persons. The question was whether the statute creating the
offence conflicted with the appellants’ right to hunt. The Court concluded that
it did not. There was no “irreconcilable conflict” between the two provisions:
they served very different purposes (p. 142, per Dickson J.). One was
concerned with conservation of game to secure a continuing supply of food for
the Indians while the second was concerned with the risk of death or serious
injury when hunters disregarded the safety of others. The obligation to hunt in
a manner that did not risk death or serious injury did not diminish the right
to hunt: ibid. This was a case in which the Court concluded that
the broad and general words affirming the right to hunt could not be taken as
an exhaustive and exclusive statement of the law governing its exercise.
[104]
There is once again a clear parallel
between Myran and this case. The two schemes have different purposes and
the broad right to an “appropriate and just” remedy is not inconsistent with
the restriction on damages claims in relation to injuries during international
carriage by air.
[105]
A third case, in which the Court reached the
opposite conclusion, is Perron-Malenfant v. Malenfant (Trustee of),
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 375. The analysis leading to that conclusion is instructive.
[106]
Without getting too immersed in the details, the
question in Perron-Malenfant concerned whether one of the bankrupt’s assets
became the property of the trustee upon bankruptcy. More precisely, the issue
was whether the cash surrender value of a life insurance policy was exempt from
seizure by the trustee on the policyholder’s bankruptcy. By virtue of the
incorporation of certain elements of provincial laws by the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 , the answer to the issue depended on
the interpretation of certain provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada.
If two articles (art. 2552 and 2554) were exhaustive statements of the
applicable exemptions, the surrender value would not be exempt.
However, jurisprudence developed under another article (art. 1031), if
applicable, would (the Court assumed without deciding) result in the surrender
value being exempt. The question boiled down to whether the two
articles, which did not allow for an exemption of the surrender value in this
case, were intended to be an exhaustive statement of the exemptions from
seizure of life insurance.
[107]
In answering this question, the Court examined
the legislative history and evolution of the provisions, their text and their
purpose. The legislative history and evolution revealed that arts. 2552 and
2554 were part of a comprehensive legislative treatment of every aspect of
insurance law which had created “an insurance code within the Civil Code”:
paras. 36-37. The Court then turned to the text and purpose of the provisions,
concluding that the legislature “must have had all elements of the life
insurance contract in mind, including the right to surrender the contract for
its cash surrender value”: para. 39. To read the provisions as being other than
comprehensive would “empt[y] them of much of their meaning”: para. 41. The
Court also placed its textual analysis within the overall thrust of the
insurance reforms of which these articles formed a part. This led to the
conclusion that the articles in question reflected a “careful balancing of the
relevant considerations”: para. 50. Taking all of these elements into account,
the Court concluded that arts. 2552 and 2554 were intended to be a
comprehensive and exclusive set of rules in relation to the seizability of the
rights under life insurance contracts:
. . . it defies common sense to assume that the legislator
wished to remain silent, in its exemption provisions, on the most important
value of a life insurance policy for creditors — the cash surrender value. On
the contrary, given the legislator’s policy of making rights under insurance
contracts more available to creditors as part of the policyholder’s collateral,
the most reasonable conclusion is that the cash surrender value of the
insurance contract was exactly what the legislature had in mind when
determining, in arts. 2552 and 2554, which policies should be exempt, and which
should not be. [para. 52]
[108]
To paraphrase the Court in Perron-Malenfant,
the issue here is whether it defies common sense to assume that by permitting a
court to grant an “appropriate and just” remedy for violation of the OLA ,
Parliament intended that the court would be free to make an order violating
Canada’s international treaty obligations. In other words, does it make sense
that Parliament intended that a court order in breach of Canada’s international
obligations would be an “appropriate and just” remedy? The appellants would
have us answer yes to both questions.
(4)
Application
[109]
With these principles in mind, I return to the
question of whether there is a conflict between the broad remedial discretion
under s. 77(4) of the OLA and the specific limitation on that remedial
authority that results from Article 29 of the Montreal Convention.
[110]
These provisions bear all of the hallmarks of
the sorts of provisions that have been found not to conflict. They were
enacted for markedly different purposes. They may easily be interpreted in a
way that permits them to operate together without absurdity: an “appropriate
and just” remedy must not violate Canada’s international obligations. The only
serious question is whether the so-called presumption of overlap is rebutted
because s. 77(4) of the OLA was intended as an exhaustive and exclusive
declaration of the court’s remedial power such that damages must always be
available for breach of the OLA . This position, in my respectful view,
is untenable.
[111]
The appellants suggest that the
quasi-constitutional status of the OLA prevents a harmonious
interpretation of s. 77(4) of the OLA and Article 29 of the Montreal
Convention: Commissioner’s factum, at paras. 90-95. The argument goes that
to read s. 77(4) as not permitting an award of damages in the context of
international air travel would run counter to the OLA ’s status as
quasi-constitutional legislation and therefore would run counter to
Parliament’s intention. With respect, I cannot accept this submission.
[112]
Section 77(4) of the OLA is certainly
part of a quasi-constitutional statutory scheme designed to both reflect and to
actualize the “equality of status” of English and French as the official languages
of Canada and the “equal rights and privileges as to their use in all
institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada” as declared in s.
16(1) of the Charter : see, e.g., R. v. Beaulac, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
768; Lavigne, at para. 23. Like s. 24(1) of the Charter,
s. 77(4) of the OLA confers a wide remedial authority and should be
interpreted generously to achieve its purpose. These factors, however, do not
alter the correct approach to statutory interpretation which requires us to
read “the words of an Act . . . in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the
object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Lavigne, at para.
25, quoting E. A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983), at
p. 87. As I see it, the OLA , read in its full context, demonstrates
that Parliament did not intend to prevent s. 77(4) from being read harmoniously
with Canada’s international obligations given effect by another federal
statute.
[113]
It is unlikely that, by means of the broad and
general wording of s. 77(4) , Parliament intended this remedial power to be read
as an exclusive and exhaustive statement in relation to the Federal Court’s
remedial authority under the OLA , overriding all other laws and legal
principles. The appellants’ position in effect is that Parliament, through s.
77(4) , intended that courts should be able to grant damages even though doing
so would be in violation of Canada’s international undertakings as incorporated
into federal statute law. This proposition runs afoul of the principle of
interpretation that Parliament is presumed not to intend to legislate in breach
of Canada’s international law obligations: see, e.g., Daniels, at p.
541; Zingre v. The Queen, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 392, at pp. 409-10; Ordon
Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at paras. 128-31; Sullivan, at pp.
539-42.
[114]
I find it impossible to discern any such intent
in the broad and general language of s. 77(4) . Instead, this provision should
be understood as having been enacted into an existing legal framework which
includes statutory limits, procedural requirements and a background of general
legal principles — including Canada’s international undertakings incorporated
into Canadian statute law — which guide the court in deciding what remedy is
“appropriate and just”.
[115]
Moreover, a review of the legislative history of
this provision provides no evidence that Parliament intended to authorize
awards of damages in violation of Canada’s international commitments. The
legislative record shows that members of Parliament discussing the scope of s.
77 of the OLA at the time of its enactment did not focus on the specific
remedies available under this provision, but rather on how it gave courts the
ability to enforce, through remedies, certain parts of the new OLA , in
contrast to its predecessor that was merely declaratory: see House of
Commons Debates, vol. X, 2nd Sess., 33rd Parl., February 8, 1988, at pp.
12706, 12712, 12715 and 12737 (Hon. Ray Hnatyshyn, Minister of Justice and
Attorney General of Canada, Mr. Jean-Robert Gauthier, Ms. Marion Dewar, Hon.
Warren Allmand); House of Commons Debates, vol. XIV, 2nd Sess., 33rd
Parl., July 7, 1988, at p. 17224 (Hon. Ray Hnatyshyn, Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada). While the debate contemplated that damages
could constitute an “appropriate and just” remedy in certain circumstances, it
highlighted the open-ended nature of these terms and that they left to the
courts the duty of determining what would be an “appropriate and just remedy”
in the circumstances: Debates of the Senate, vol. IV, 2nd Sess., 33rd
Parl., July 27, 1988, at pp. 4135-36. There is nothing in this to suggest any
intent that this power would override other limitations on the court’s
authority to award damages.
[116]
We are not in a situation like that faced by the Court in Perron-Malenfant
in which allowing both provisions to operate empties the remedial
provisions in the statute of much of their meaning. It is not suggested that
the powers of the Commissioner, including his authority to apply to the Federal
Court for remedies under s. 78 of the OLA ,
conflict with the limitation on damages under the Montreal Convention.
Damages are by no means the only remedies available under s. 77(4) and the
limitation on their availability set out in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention
applies only in respect of claims by passengers arising out of international
carriage by air. I therefore reject the contention that my proposed
interpretation of the Montreal Convention somehow silences language
rights.
[117]
In short, there are no indicators here of a
conflict between these two provisions in the narrow and strict sense of
conflict which applies in this context, and there is no hint in the text,
scheme or purpose of the OLA that the brief, broad, general and highly
discretionary provision in s. 77(4) was intended to permit courts to make
orders in breach of Canada’s international undertakings which have been
incorporated into federal law.
[118]
I conclude that there is no conflict between
these provisions and that, in fashioning an appropriate and just remedy under
the OLA in a case of international carriage by air, the Federal Court
must apply the limitation on damages set out in Article 29 of the Montreal
Convention. In light of that conclusion, I do not need to consider which
provision would prevail in the event of conflict.
C.
Did the Federal Court of Appeal Err in Allowing
the Appeal in Relation to the Structural Order?
(1)
Introduction
[119]
The Thibodeaus sought a structural order
requiring Air Canada to take all necessary measures so that it could comply
with its obligations to provide services in the French language. These included
measures to ensure that it had the bilingual capability to provide in-flight
services in French when there is sufficient demand for them; to actively offer
service in French at the outset of communications by providing signs, notices,
and other information on services and initiating communication with the public;
to establish an adequate monitoring system and procedures designed to quickly
identify, document and quantify potential violations of language rights; and to
ensure that language rights prevail over any contract and collective agreement
signed by the airline.
[120]
The application judge concluded that “Air Canada
and Jazz make considerable efforts and invest substantial sums to comply with
their linguistic duties”: para. 145. She found, however, that “not everything
is perfect and that more remains to be done”: para. 146. She noted that major
improvements were implemented following the Thibodeaus’ complaints but
expressed surprise that there was no monitoring system that enabled Air Canada
to determine the number of times where no bilingual flight attendant is
assigned to a flight on which there is a significant demand for services in
French: para. 151. The judge found that there was a “systemic problem” at Air
Canada:
. . . even
though Air Canada is making efforts to comply with its linguistic duties,
problems persist, and both Air Canada and Jazz have not completely developed a
reflex to proactively implement all the tools and procedures required to comply
with their duties, to measure their actual performance in the provision of
services in French and to set improvement objectives. This finding, combined
with Jazz’s admission that it still has difficulty complying with all its
duties, leads me to conclude that there is a systemic problem at Air Canada.
[para. 153]
[121]
The application judge concluded in light of
these findings that it was “fair and appropriate to require that Air Canada
make every reasonable effort to fulfill all its duties under Part IV of the OLA
and to ensure that it implement a monitoring process to allow it to identify
and document the occasions on which [Air Canada] does not assign the required bilingual
personnel on board flights on which there is significant demand for services in
French”: para. 154. She therefore ordered Air Canada to
•
make every reasonable effort to comply with all
of its duties under Part IV of the Official Languages Act ;
•
introduce, within six months of this judgment, a
proper monitoring system and procedures to quickly identify, document and
quantify potential violations of its language duties, . . .
particularly by introducing a procedure to identify and document occasions on
which Jazz does not assign flight attendants able to provide services in French
on board flights on which there is significant demand for services in French;
[application judge’s reasons, at p. 153]
[122]
The Federal Court of Appeal set this order
aside. It held that the portion of the order that required Air Canada to “make
every reasonable effort to comply with all of its duties” under Part IV of the OLA
was simply a general order to comply with the law, a type of order that
should be granted only in exceptional circumstances which did not exist here:
paras. 55-60. Turning to the rest of the order, the court found that it was not
supported by the evidence and that it, too, was not sufficiently precise: para.
63. As Trudel J.A. put it on behalf of the court:
The
imprecise wording of the order leads me once again to expect that its
implementation would be problematic for the appellant, and for any court called
to intervene in the event of a future dispute. Nothing in the record reveals
what a proper and quick monitoring system is. The use of the word
“particularly” shows that the assignment of bilingual flight attendants by Jazz
is only one of the elements which call for action on the part of the
appellant. What are the other elements? By encompassing the obligations set
out in Part IV of the OLA , the order concerns not only in-flight services, but
services offered at the various sales and baggage check-in counters, call
centres, etc. The scope of the order goes much further than what is necessary
to remedy the violation of the Thibodeaus’ language rights. [para. 76]
[123]
The Commissioner submits that the Federal Court
of Appeal exceeded its proper appellate role by weighing the evidence de
novo and thereby not giving appropriate appellate deference to the findings
at first instance. However, in my respectful view, the order was properly set
aside.
[124]
The first part of the order simply requires Air
Canada to comply with the law. But those types of orders should only be made
in exceptional circumstances which do not exist here. The appellants did not
attempt to defend this part of the application judge’s order and, for the
reasons given by the Federal Court of Appeal on this point, my view is that the
application judge erred in making it.
[125]
With respect to the second aspect of the order —
requiring Air Canada to put a monitoring system in place — it too was correctly
set aside. My view is that the order is too imprecise, risks ongoing litigation
and court supervision in relation to whether it is being complied with, and is
inappropriate particularly in light of the Commissioner’s statutory powers and
expertise in relation to monitoring compliance with the OLA .
(2)
Legal Principles
[126]
Structural orders play an important, but
limited, role in the enforcement of rights through the courts: Doucet-Boudreau
v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at
para. 56. Orders of this nature are treated with special care because of two
potential and related problems: first, insufficient clarity, which in turn may
result in the second, namely the need for ongoing judicial supervision —
ongoing supervision being something that courts only exceptionally undertake.
[127]
With respect to clarity, we must bear in mind
that the ultimate sanction for failure to abide by an order of this nature is a
finding of contempt of court and consequent imposition of a fine or a period of
incarceration. Orders must be sufficiently clear so that they give the parties
bound by them fair guidance on what must be done to comply and to prevent a potentially
endless round of further applications to determine whether the parties have
complied. As the Court put it in Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006
SCC 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612, at para. 24:
The terms of the order must be clear
and specific. The party needs to know exactly what has to be done to comply
with the order. . . . While the specificity requirement is
linked to the claimant’s ability to follow up non-performance with contempt of
court proceedings, supervision by the courts often means relitigation and the
expenditure of judicial resources.
[128]
Ongoing judicial supervision will be appropriate
in some cases, as discussed in Doucet-Boudreau. However, absent
compelling circumstances, the courts generally should not make orders that have
the almost inevitable effect of creating ongoing litigation about whether the
order is being complied with. This is particularly so in this case given the
statutory powers and expertise of the Commissioner to identify problems in
relation to compliance with the OLA and to monitor whether appropriate
progress is being made in implementing measures to correct them: ss. 49 to 75 .
(3)
Application
[129]
Tested against these principles, my view is that
the Federal Court erred in law by making the structural order in this case. I will
focus on the monitoring provisions of the order as there was no serious effort
on the appellants’ part to defend the first part of the judge’s order that
simply directed Air Canada to obey the law.
[130]
On its face, the monitoring aspects of the order
immediately raise a number of questions about its scope and limits. In order
to comply with the order, what would constitute a “proper” monitoring system?
Would periodic inspections be sufficient or does the monitoring system have to
be capable of documenting each and every “potential” violation? How “quickly”
does it have to identify “potential violations”? For that matter, what is a
“potential” violation? These rather obvious questions arising from a review of
the order, and to which neither the order nor the record provides any answers,
point to its lack of precision. While the application judge appears to have
intended to focus on the assignment of flight attendants capable of providing
services in French to flights on which there is a significant demand for
services in French, her order goes far beyond that, as the Federal Court of
Appeal noted.
[131]
In addition to these difficulties, there is also
the fact that the Commissioner has both the statutory powers and the
institutional expertise to monitor compliance and ameliorative efforts. This
will generally make ongoing judicial supervision in relation to this statutory
scheme something that should be undertaken in only truly compelling
circumstances that did not exist here.
[132]
I agree with the Federal Court of Appeal that
the structural order should not have been made. The declaration, apology, and
costs of the application constituted appropriate and just remedies in this
case.
IV.
Disposition
[133]
I would dismiss the appeals. The respondent has
not requested costs and I would order none.
The reasons of Abella and
Wagner JJ. were delivered by
[134]
Abella J. (dissenting) — International law is a work
in progress. Courts in liberal democracies are increasingly grappling with the
domestic effect of international human rights law. Most of these cases involve
interpreting domestic rules in light of broader international human rights
protection. This case presents the opposite scenario — how to interpret an
international treaty that may be in conflict with the broader protection of fundamental
rights available domestically.
[135]
Air Canada breached its duty to provide services
in French to Michel and Lynda Thibodeau on three flights between Canada and the
United States. The Thibodeaus applied to the Federal Court for damages and for
“structural” orders to redress Air Canada’s allegedly systemic violations of
its bilingualism duties. Air Canada acknowledged that it is subject to the Official
Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 31 (4th Supp .), but relied on the
limitations on carrier liability in the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, signed in Montréal, as set
out in Schedule VI of the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26 (the
Montreal Convention or Convention) as a barrier to the
Thibodeaus’ claims for damages.
[136]
There is no dispute that Air Canada breached its
obligations under s. 22 of the Official Languages Act by failing to
provide services and announcements in French. The remaining issue is whether
the Montreal Convention prevents the Thibodeaus from recovering damages
from Air Canada for these breaches.
[137]
In my respectful view, the Montreal
Convention neither contemplates nor excludes the type of damages at issue
on these appeals. I would therefore allow the appeals.
Analysis
[138]
The general focus of these appeals is on the
scope of the liability provisions in the Montreal Convention. The
particular focus is on Article 29, which is found in Chapter III of the Convention,
headed “Liability of the Carrier and Extent of Compensation for Damage”.
Article 29 states:
Article 29 — Basis of Claims
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and
cargo, any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only
be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set
out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the
persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages
shall not be recoverable.
[139]
Interpreting this language takes us to Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Can. T.S. 1980 No.
37, which requires that treaties be interpreted “in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose” (entered into force January
27, 1980).
[140]
The process of treaty interpretation is a
process of discernment. The literal meaning of the words is rarely reliably
able to yield a clear and unequivocal answer. The intention of state parties
must therefore be discerned by using a good faith approach not only to the
words at issue, but also to the context, history, object and purpose of the treaty
as a whole. In my respectful view, this exercise leads to the conclusion that
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention does not exclusively govern the
universe of damages for which carriers are liable during international carriage
by air.
[141]
The first words of Article 29 are words that
restrict its scope by declaring that any action for damages “[i]n the
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo” must be brought subject to the
conditions set out in the Convention. I accept that the words which
immediately follow — “however founded, whether under this Convention or in
contract or in tort or otherwise” — are, if read in isolation, broad in scope.
But I do not see this as an independent, defining phrase, I see it as a clause
dependent for its meaning on the preceding opening words. Thus, “action” refers
only to an action for damages “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and
cargo”.
[142]
It is, therefore, only an action for damages
incurred “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo” that must be
brought “subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out”
in the Convention, whether or not the action is brought in contract or
tort, under the Convention or otherwise. No other actions for damages
are included in the scope of Article 29.
[143]
What then does an action for damages “[i]n the
carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo” mean? For interpretive assistance,
we look to other provisions of the Convention, and, in particular, to
Chapter III in which we find Article 29.
[144]
Chapter III sets out the limited liability of
carriers in the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo. Article 17(1)
establishes the conditions of liability for “Death and Injury of Passengers”.
Articles 17(2), 17(3) and 17(4) establish the conditions of liability for “Damage
to Baggage”. Article 18 establishes the conditions of liability for “Damage to
Cargo”. Article 19 establishes the conditions of liability “for damage
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo”.
Subsequent provisions establish the limits on recovery for these types of
damage. Article 21 establishes the rules of “Compensation in Case of Death or
Injury of Passengers” and Article 22 outlines the “Limits of Liability in
Relation to Delay, Baggage and Cargo”.
[145]
Article 19 actually tracks the opening words of
Article 29 (“[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo”) and the other
provisions refer to the same subject areas: death or bodily injury of a
passenger, destruction or loss of, or damage to, baggage, destruction or loss
of, or damage to, cargo, and delay in the carriage of persons, baggage or
cargo. The rest of Article 29 (“any action for damages, however founded
. . . can only be brought subject to the conditions and such
limits of liability as are set out in this Convention”) merely confirms that
the Treaty exclusively governs actions for damages in respect of these
subjects.
[146]
Significant support for this interpretation can
be found in the relationship between Article 29 of the Montreal Convention
and its predecessor, Article 24 of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw,
October 12, 1929, as amended at The Hague, 1955, as set out at Schedule I of
the Carriage by Air Act (the Warsaw Convention ). Article 24
states:
Article 24
(1) In the cases
covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for damages, however founded, can
only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
Convention .
(2) In the cases
covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also apply,
without prejudice to the questions as to who are persons who have the right to
bring suit and what are their respective rights.
[147]
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
clearly limits the scope of the words “any action for damages, however founded”
to “the cases covered by” Articles 17, 18 and 19. Those Articles had set out
the conditions of liability for personal injury to passengers, for damage to
baggage or cargo and for damage caused by delay. The language used in these
provisions of the Warsaw Convention is almost identical to the language
found in Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the Montreal Convention.
[148]
The only real difference, in fact, between the
language in Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention and Article 29 of the Montreal
Convention is that the words in Article 24 clarifying that the actions for
damages relate to the cases covered by Articles 17, 18 and 19, are not found in
Article 29. I do not see this as particularly meaningful for two reasons.
[149]
First, the U.S. Supreme Court examined this
variation in language in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng,
525 U.S. 155 (1999). Writing for eight of the
members of the court, Ginsburg J. concluded that a shift from the words “[i]n
the cases covered by” to the words “[i]n the carriage of passengers and
baggage” does not change, but “merely clarifies” the scope of exclusivity of
the provision (p. 175).
[150]
Second, seeing this shift in language as
reflecting an intention to expand protection for air carriers beyond the actions
covered by Articles 17, 18 and 19 contradicts the historic reality that the Montreal
Convention was the culmination of a decades-long effort to improve consumer
protection, not restrict it.
[151]
The predecessor Warsaw Convention came
into being in 1929 to assist the fledgling airline industry take flight. At
that time, aviation technology was in its initial stages. Accidents were
common, and many pilots and passengers were injured or died as a result. The
relative frequency of accidents exposed carriers to unpredictable and
significant losses. This made it difficult to secure investment capital or
insurance protection (Paul Stephen Dempsey, Aviation Liability Law (2nd ed. 2013), at pp. 309-10).
[152]
Airlines responded by requiring passengers to
sign waivers relieving carriers of any and all liability in the event of an
injury. When accidents happened, those passengers were left with no remedy for
their injuries or losses.
[153]
The Warsaw Convention attempted a
protective reconciliation for both airlines and passengers. Airlines would
benefit from the introduction of a uniform scheme of limited liability to
protect against the financial risks and uncertainty posed by accidents,
passengers would benefit from access to predetermined amounts of limited
compensation for death or injury — about US$8,300 per passenger — and a
prohibition on airlines requiring passengers to waive all liability (Paul
Stephen Dempsey and Michael Milde, International Air Carrier Liability: The
Montreal Convention of 1999 (2005), at pp. 15-16 and 50-51; John E. J.
Clare, “Evaluation of Proposals to Increase the ‘Warsaw Convention’ Limit of
Passenger Liability” (1949), 16 J. Air L. & Com. 53). The Warsaw
Convention thus sought “to accommodate or balance the interests of
passengers seeking recovery for personal injuries, and the interests of air
carriers seeking to limit potential liability” (Tseng, at p. 170).
[154]
As safety in the industry improved, governments
turned their attention from protecting the financial viability of airlines to
introducing a more passenger-friendly legal regime. The focus tilted towards
increasing the exceptionally low limits on carrier liability established in the
Warsaw Convention (Dempsey, at pp. 315-16).
[155]
States subsequently signed on to
different international efforts to expand carrier liability. The Hague
Protocol of 1955, for example, doubled liability limits for death and
personal injury of passengers to about US$16,600 (Protocol to amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, done at The Hague, September 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S.
371, as set out in Schedule III of the Carriage by Air Act ). The Guatemala
City Protocol of 1971 introduced an absolute limit on carrier liability of
about US$100,000, and expanded the circumstances under which carriers could be
found liable under the Warsaw Convention (Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 as Amended by the
Protocol Done at The Hague on 28 September 1955, signed at Guatemala City,
March 8, 1971 (not in force)). The Guadalajara Convention of 1961
extended the Warsaw Convention’s liability regime to cover both a
contracting carrier and the carrier that actually provided service (Convention ,
Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other than the
Contracting Carrier, signed at Guadalajara, September 18, 1961, 500
U.N.T.S. 31, as set out in Schedule V of the Carriage by Air Act ). And Montreal
Protocol No. 4 of 1999 increased cargo liability limits (Montreal
Protocol No. 4 to amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, September 25 1975; Dempsey and
Milde, at pp. 17-41).
[156]
Notwithstanding the increasing recognition that
compensation for passengers was too low, a single international instrument
increasing ceilings on carrier liability proved elusive. Out of concern that
this fractured response could lead to the demise of a unified system of
international air law, the industry took action. The Montreal Agreement
of 1966, a private arrangement between airlines, increased carrier liability
under the Warsaw Convention for personal injury for carriage to, from or
through the U.S. up to US$75,000 (Agreement Relating to Liability
Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, May 13, 1966).
In 1974, some European and Japanese carriers agreed to increase passenger
liability under the Warsaw Convention through their tariffs up to
US$58,000, and later to US$100,000 (the Malta Agreement) (see Dempsey and
Milde, at pp. 29-31).
[157]
In 1992, Japanese carriers effectively agreed to
a liability regime for passenger injury of strict liability up to an initial
limit greater than that established in the Warsaw Convention, and “a
fault-based reversed burden of proof” that would apply thereafter without any
limit (the Japanese Initiative) (Dempsey and Milde, at p. 32). In 1995,
the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the trade association for
the world’s airlines, endorsed an intercarrier agreement revising the “grossly
inadequate” liability limits installed by the Warsaw Convention and
adopting a two-tier fault system of strict and then presumed liability (IATA
Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, preamble; Dempsey and Milde,
at p. 417). The signatory carriers to the IATA Intercarrier Agreement resolved
“[t]o take action to waive the limitation of liability on recoverable
compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of the Warsaw Convention as to
claims for death, wounding, or other bodily injury of a
passenger . . . so that recoverable compensatory damages
may be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the domicile of the
passenger” (Article 1; see Dempsey, at pp. 332-34; Dempsey and Milde, at pp.
32-35 and 417).
[158]
Having been “upstaged” by industry initiatives
to address the low ceilings on carrier liability, States began to work towards
updating the Warsaw Convention (Dempsey, at p. 336; Dempsey and Milde,
at pp. 36-38). Through the International Civil Aviation Organization, the Montreal
Convention came into being in 1999, adopting the two-tier liability schemes
for passenger injury or death outlined in the Japanese Initiative of 1992 and
the IATA Intercarrier Agreement of 1995, as well as an initial
limit on recovery of around US$150,000 (Dempsey and Milde, at pp. 40-41).
[159]
The Montreal Convention thereby sought to
replace the patchwork system that had attempted to expand the limits on
liability set by the Warsaw Convention in 1929. The drafters of the Montreal
Convention continued to maintain a uniform liability scheme, as had the Warsaw
Convention, but while the primary goal of the Warsaw Convention had
been to limit the liability of carriers in order to foster the growth of the
nascent commercial aviation industry, the state parties to the Montreal
Convention were more focused on the importance of “ensuring protection of
the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for
equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution” (Montreal
Convention, preamble; Ehrlich v. American Airlines, Inc., 360 F.3d
366 (2d Cir. 2004), at p. 371 (fn. 4)).
[160]
As this history shows, interpreting the change
in language from Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention to Article 29 of
the Montreal Convention in a way that narrows protection for consumers and
expands it for carriers, is both counter-intuitive and historically anomalous.
At no time was there ever any suggestion that the new Convention was
designed to reduce the ability of passengers to sue carriers.
[161]
There is, in fact, no evidence that state parties
intended to replace the subject-specific scope of exclusivity established in
Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention with a universal rule of
exclusivity in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention. What little
evidence there is of the preparatory work preceding the adoption of the Montreal
Convention suggests the opposite. As Dempsey and Milde point out, “[a]
study of the history of drafting in the convoluted procedure rather indicates
that there was no creative courage to innovate with new concepts” (p. 42).
[162]
I also find the absence of any reference in the
Parliamentary record to the changes in language between Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention and Article 29 of the Montreal Convention revealing. The
sponsors of the Convention ’s implementing bill never mentioned Article
24 or Article 29 in the House of Commons or the Senate (speech of André Harvey
(Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport), opening second reading
in Parliament of Bill S-33, An Act to amend the Carriage by Air Act, House
of Commons Debates, vol. 137, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., November 20, 2001, at
p. 7346; see also speech of the Hon. Ross Fitzpatrick, moving the second
reading in the Senate of Bill S-33, Debates of the Senate, vol. 139, 1st
Sess., 37th Parl., October 2, 2001, at p. 1346). Nor did any of the witnesses
who gave evidence before the House of Commons and Senate committees that
reviewed the implementation of the Convention into federal law
(transcript of statement of Mr. Vayzel Lee (Policy Advisor, Domestic Air
Policy, Department of Transport) to the House of Commons Standing Committee on
Transport and Government Operations, Meeting No. 40 — Evidence, November 29,
2001 (online); Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Transport and
Communications, Issue No. 15 — Evidence, October 31, 2001 (online)).
[163]
Given the suggestion that the wording in Article
29 of the Montreal Convention changes the focus from Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention by expanding protection for air carriers to all actions
for damages, this silence is, to say the least, surprising. Dramatic changes
in law tend to attract dramatic reactions. This purported change attracted
none. The most logical explanation for the silence, therefore, is that there
was no change in law. In fact, it is hard to imagine such a drastic domestic
intrusion without either express language or Parliamentary disclosure. The
silence about such consequences suggests that no such consequence was either
contemplated or intended.
[164]
Finally, it is worth noting that Article 3(4) of
the Montreal Convention also confirms a narrow interpretation of the
scope of claims governed by the Treaty. It states:
Article 3 — Passengers and Baggage
4.
The passenger shall be given written notice to the effect that where this
Convention is applicable it governs and may limit the liability of carriers in
respect of death or injury and for destruction or loss of, or damage to,
baggage, and for delay.
This sets
out what information passengers are entitled to know about the range of
liability limitations covered by the Convention , namely, “death or
injury and for destruction or loss of, or damage to, baggage, and for delay”.
Article 29 must, it seems to me, be read harmoniously with this provision.
Concluding instead that Article 29 expands this list to include all
claims for damages arising in the course of international carriage by air,
suggests that the intention of the Convention was to give passengers
notice only about some aspects of a carrier’s limited liability, without
warning them that all other actions are simply barred. This, it seems to me,
contradicts the consumer protection purpose of the Convention by
inferring that the state parties’ intention was to mislead passengers by
providing notice to them about only some, but not all, of the limits on a
carrier’s liability.
[165]
All Article 29 does, therefore, is direct that
the Montreal Convention exclusively governs only those actions brought
for damages incurred “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo”,
which in turn means those actions covered by Articles 17, 18 and 19.
[166]
The Thibodeaus, on the other hand, seek damages
for violations of a statute that reifies constitutionally protected rights. This Court has held that those laws “which seek to protect
individuals from discrimination acquire a quasi-constitutional status, which
gives them preeminence over ordinary legislation” (Dickason v. University of
Alberta, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 1103, at p. 1154, per L’Heureux-Dubé J.,
dissenting; Winnipeg School Division No. 1 v. Craton, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
150, at p. 156). As stated in Lavigne v. Canada (Office of the Commissioner
of Official Languages), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 773, at para. 23, quoting Canada
(Attorney General) v. Viola, [1991] 1 F.C. 373 (C.A.), at p. 386, the
Official Languages Act has a special status because “[i]t reflects both the
Constitution of the country and the social and political compromise out of
which it arose.” The Official Languages Act is therefore synergistically
aligned with the language protections in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms .
[167]
Why does this matter? Because it helps broker
the interpretive outcome. In my view, Article 29 of the Montreal Convention
should be interpreted in a way that is respectful of the protections given to
fundamental rights, including language rights, in domestic legislation.
[168]
And this goes to the object and purpose of the Convention .
There is no evidence in the Parliamentary record or the legislative history of
the Convention to suggest that Canada, as a state party, intended to
extinguish domestic language rights protection by ratifying or implementing the
Montreal Convention. Given the significance of the rights
protected by the Official Languages Act and their constitutional and
historic antecedents, the Montreal Convention ought to be interpreted in
a way that respects Canada’s express commitment to these fundamental rights,
rather than as reflecting an intention to subvert them.
[169]
I am aware of the jurisprudential division about
the scope of the Treaty. Some courts, as in Walker v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 785 F.Supp. 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), and Beaudet v. British Airways,
PLC, 853 F.Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1994), have assumed limits on the range of
actions covered. Others, as in Sidhu v. British
Airways Plc., [1997] A.C. 430 (H.L.), Tseng, King v. American Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352
(2d Cir. 2002), In re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group
Litigation, [2005] UKHL 72, [2006] 1 A.C. 495, and Stott v. Thomas Cook
Tour Operators Ltd., [2014] UKSC 15, [2014] 2 W.L.R. 521, have attributed
it significantly wider coverage. But it seems to me that it would be an
aberrant rule of treaty interpretation, and one which is hard to see as being
consistent with the “good faith” required by Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, to conclude that a treaty which is silent as to its effect on
domestic legislation protecting fundamental, let alone constitutional rights,
can be construed as silencing those rights.
[170]
Finally, although it is not determinative, we
cannot ignore the fact that we are dealing with a commercial treaty. This Court
has often said that domestic law should be generously interpreted in alignment
with international law and its human rights values. It has never said that
international law should be interpreted in a way that diminishes human rights
protected by domestic law.
[171]
Just as Parliament is not presumed to legislate
in breach of a treaty, it should not be presumed to implement treaties that extinguish
fundamental rights protected by domestic legislation.
[172]
The meaning of Article 29, considered in
context and in light of the object and purpose of the Montreal Convention,
therefore, points to a limited scope of exclusivity, and should be interpreted
as directing that the Montreal Convention governs only those actions
brought for damages incurred “[i]n the carriage of passengers, baggage and
cargo”, namely, actions covered by Articles 17, 18 and 19.
[173]
The remaining question is whether the
Thibodeaus’ action for damages falls within those Articles.
[174]
Articles 17(2), (3) and (4), 18 and 19
contemplate damages sustained in respect of baggage, cargo and delay. The only
substantive provision of the Convention , therefore, that might relate to
the Thibodeaus’ action is Article 17(1) , which states:
Article
17 — Death and Injury of Passengers — Damage to Baggage
1.
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of
a passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or
injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.
[175]
The majority concludes that the Thibodeaus’
claim for damages relates to the circumstances contemplated by Article 17(1)
because they suffered the breach of their language rights “aboard the aircraft”
(para. 86). The language of Article 17(1) makes it clear that the provision
does not apply to all events that take place on board an aircraft or in the
course of the operations of embarking or disembarking. Rather, Article 17(1)
imposes the requirements that (1) there must have been an accident, (2) which
caused (3) death or bodily injury, (4) while the passenger was on board the
aircraft or was in the course of embarking or disembarking (Dempsey and Milde,
at p. 124; Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991), at pp.
535-36).
[176]
There is no complaint of an accident. That, in
my view, is dispositive since Article 17(1) talks of “death or bodily injury”
caused by an accident. That makes the rest of the provision redundant in this
case. The Thibodeaus have not suffered any bodily injury. The fact that the
breaches of the Thibodeaus’ language rights occurred “on board the aircraft” is
irrelevant since those circumstances are only pertinent if there was an
accident.
[177]
Consequently, the Montreal Convention
does not bar a damage award for breach of language rights during international
carriage by air.
[178]
Accordingly, while I am not persuaded that a
structural order was justified in the circumstances, I would allow the appeals
with respect to the damages claims and restore the damages awarded by the
Application Judge.
APPENDIX
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, signed at Warsaw ,
October 12, 1929, as set out at Schedule I of the Carriage by Air Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26
[Note: The
paragraphs of the Convention shown in italics were deleted and replaced (except
in the case of paragraph (2) of Article 20 ) by the Protocol set out in Schedule
III, infra.]
. . .
Article 17
The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,
if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft
or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Article 18
(1) The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of
the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any registered baggage or any
cargo, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during
the carriage by air.
(2) The
carriage by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph comprises the
period during which the baggage or cargo is in charge of the carrier, whether
in an aerodrome or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing outside
an aerodrome, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The
period of the carriage by air does not extend to any carriage by land, by sea
or by river performed outside an aerodrome. If, however, such a carriage takes
place in the performance of a contract for carriage by air, for the purpose of
loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to
the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place during the
carriage by air.
Article 19
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage
by air of passengers, baggage or cargo.
Article 20
(1) The
carrier is not liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all
necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or
them to take such measures.
(2) In
the carriage of cargo and baggage the carrier is not liable if he proves that
the damage was occasioned by negligent pilotage or negligence in the handling
of the aircraft or in navigation and that, in all other respects, he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage.
Article 22
(1) In
the carriage of passengers the liability of the carrier for each passenger is
limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the
Court seized of the case, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical
payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not exceed
125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the
passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In
the carriage of registered baggage and of cargo, the liability of the carrier
is limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor has made,
at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special
declaration of the value at delivery and has paid a supplementary sum if the
case so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not
exceeding the declared sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the
actual value to the consignor at delivery.
(3) As
regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability of
the carrier is limited to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The
sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting
of 65 ½ milligrams gold of millesimal fineness 900. These sums may be converted
into any national currency in round figures.
Article 23
Any provision
tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in this Convention shall be null and void, but the nullity
of any such provision does not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which
shall remain subject to the provisions of this Convention .
[Note: This
provision was renumbered as paragraph (1) and another provision added as
paragraph (2) by Article XII of the Protocol set out in Schedule III, infra.]
Article 24
(1) In the cases covered by Articles 18 and 19 any action for
damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and
limits set out in this Convention .
(2) In the
cases covered by Article 17 the provisions of the preceding paragraph also
apply, without prejudice to the questions as to who are persons who have the
right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
Article 25
(1) The
carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
Convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law
of the Court seized of the case, is considered to be equivalent to wilful
misconduct.
(2) Similarly
the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if
the damage is caused as aforesaid by any agent of the carrier acting within the
scope of his employment.
[Note: A new
article numbered as Article 25A was added by Article XIV of the Protocol set
out in Schedule III, infra.]
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International
Carriage by Air, signed at Montréal, as set out at
Schedule VI of the Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-26
Article 17 — Death and Injury to
Passengers — Damage to Baggage
1. The
carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a
passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or
injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.
2. The
carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of destruction or loss of, or of
damage to, checked baggage upon condition only that the event which caused the
destruction, loss or damage took place on board the aircraft or during any
period within which the checked baggage was in the charge of the carrier.
However, the carrier is not liable if and to the extent that the damage
resulted from the inherent defect, quality or vice of the baggage. In the case
of unchecked baggage, including personal items, the carrier is liable if the
damage resulted from its fault or that of its servants or agents.
3. If the
carrier admits the loss of the checked baggage, or if the checked baggage has
not arrived at the expiration of twenty-one days after the date on which it
ought to have arrived, the passenger is entitled to enforce against the carrier
the rights which flow from the contract of carriage.
4. Unless
otherwise specified, in this Convention the term “baggage” means both checked
baggage and unchecked baggage.
Article 18 — Damage to Cargo
1. The
carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss
of, or damage to, cargo upon condition only that the event which caused the
damage so sustained took place during the carriage by air.
2. However,
the carrier is not liable if and to the extent it proves that the destruction,
or loss of, or damage to, the cargo resulted from one or more of the following:
(a) inherent defect, quality or vice of that cargo;
(b) defective packing of that cargo performed by a person
other than the carrier or its servants or agents;
(c) an act of war or an armed conflict;
(d) an act of public authority carried out in connection
with the entry, exit or transit of the cargo.
3. The
carriage by air within the meaning of paragraph 1 of this Article comprises the
period during which the cargo is in the charge of the carrier.
4. The
period of the carriage by air does not extend to any carriage by land, by sea
or by inland waterway performed outside an airport. If, however, such carriage
takes place in the performance of a contract for carriage by air, for the
purpose of loading, delivery or transhipment, any damage is presumed, subject
to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which took place
during the carriage by air. If a carrier, without the consent of the consignor,
substitutes carriage by another mode of transport for the whole or part of a
carriage intended by the agreement between the parties to be carriage by air,
such carriage by another mode of transport is deemed to be within the period of
carriage by air.
Article 19 — Delay
The carrier is
liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers,
baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage
occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all
measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was
impossible for it or them to take such measures.
Article 21 — Compensation in Case of Death or
Injury of Passengers
1. For
damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17 not exceeding 100 000
Special Drawing Rights for each passenger, the carrier shall not be able to
exclude or limit its liability.
2. The
carrier shall not be liable for damages arising under paragraph 1 of Article 17
to the extent that they exceed for each passenger 100 000 Special Drawing
Rights if the carrier proves that:
(a) such damage was not due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents; or
(b) such damage was solely due to the negligence or other
wrongful act or omission of a third party.
Article 22 — Limits of Liability in Relation to
Delay, Baggage and Cargo
1. In the
case of damage caused by delay as specified in Article 19 in the carriage of
persons, the liability of the carrier for each passenger is limited to
4 150 Special Drawing Rights.
2. In the
carriage of baggage, the liability of the carrier in the case of destruction,
loss, damage or delay is limited to 1 000 Special Drawing Rights for each
passenger unless the passenger has made, at the time when the checked baggage
was handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery
at destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In
that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum, unless it proves that the sum is greater than the passenger’s actual
interest in delivery at destination.
3. In the
carriage of cargo, the liability of the carrier in the case of destruction, loss,
damage or delay is limited to a sum of 17 Special Drawing Rights per
kilogramme, unless the consignor has made, at the time when the package was
handed over to the carrier, a special declaration of interest in delivery at
destination and has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that
case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared sum,
unless it proves that the sum is greater than the consignor’s actual interest
in delivery at destination.
4. In the
case of destruction, loss, damage or delay of part of the cargo, or of any
object contained therein, the weight to be taken into consideration in
determining the amount to which the carrier’s liability is limited shall be
only the total weight of the package or packages concerned. Nevertheless, when
the destruction, loss, damage or delay of a part of the cargo, or of an object
contained therein, affects the value of other packages covered by the same air
waybill, or the same receipt or, if they were not issued, by the same record
preserved by the other means referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 4, the total
weight of such package or packages shall also be taken into consideration in
determining the limit of liability.
5. The
foregoing provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall not apply if
it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier,
its servants or agents, done with intent to cause damage or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result; provided that, in the case of such
act or omission of a servant or agent, it is also proved that such servant or
agent was acting within the scope of its employment.
6. The
limits prescribed in Article 21 and in this Article shall not prevent the court
from awarding, in accordance with its own law, in addition, the whole or part
of the court costs and of the other expenses of the litigation incurred by the
plaintiff, including interest. The foregoing provision shall not apply if the
amount of the damages awarded, excluding court costs and other expenses of the
litigation, does not exceed the sum which the carrier has offered in writing to
the plaintiff within a period of six months from the date of the occurrence
causing the damage, or before the commencement of the action, if that is later.
Article 26 — Invalidity of Contractual
Provisions
Any provision
tending to relieve the carrier of liability or to fix a lower limit than that
which is laid down in this Convention shall be null and void, but the nullity
of any such provision does not involve the nullity of the whole contract, which
shall remain subject to the provisions of this Convention .
Article 29 — Basis of Claims
In the carriage
of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded,
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only
be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set
out in this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the
persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.
In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages
shall not be recoverable.
Article 49 — Mandatory Application
Any clause
contained in the contract of carriage and all special agreements entered into
before the damage occurred by which the parties purport to infringe the rules
laid down by this Convention , whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by
altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.
Carriage by Air Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
C-26
2. (1) Subject to this section, the provisions of the Convention set
out in Schedule I and of the Convention set out in Schedule V, in so far as
they relate to the rights and liabilities of carriers, carriers’ servants and
agents, passengers, consignors, consignees and other persons, have the force of
law in Canada in relation to any carriage by air to which the provisions apply,
irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing that carriage.
(2) Subject
to this section, the provisions of the Convention set out in Schedule I, as
amended by the Protocol set out in Schedule III or by the Protocols set out in
Schedules III and IV, in so far as they relate to the rights and liabilities of
carriers, carriers’ servants and agents, passengers, consignors, consignees and
other persons, have the force of law in Canada in relation to any carriage by
air to which the provisions apply, irrespective of the nationality of the
aircraft performing that carriage.
(2.1) Subject
to this section, the provisions of the Convention set out in Schedule VI, in so
far as they relate to the rights and liabilities of carriers, carriers’
servants and agents, passengers, consignors, consignees and other persons, have
the force of law in Canada in relation to any carriage by air to which the
provisions apply, irrespective of the nationality of the aircraft performing
that carriage.
(3) The
Governor in Council may from time to time, by proclamation published in the Canada
Gazette, certify who are the parties to any convention or protocol set out
in a schedule to this Act, in respect of what territories they are respectively
parties, to what extent they have availed themselves of the Additional Protocol
to the Convention set out in Schedule I, which of those parties have made a
declaration under the Protocol set out in Schedule III or IV and which of those
parties have made a declaration under the Convention set out in Schedule VI.
(4) Any
reference in Schedule I to the territory of any party shall be construed as a
reference to the territories subject to its sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or
authority, in respect of which it is a party.
(5) Any
liability imposed by Article 17 of Schedule I or Article 17 of Schedule VI on a
carrier in respect of the death of a passenger shall be in substitution for any
liability of the carrier in respect of the death of that passenger under any
law in force in Canada, and the provisions set out in Schedule II shall have
effect with respect to the persons by whom and for whose benefit the liability
so imposed is enforceable and with respect to the manner in which it may be
enforced.
(6) Any sum
in francs mentioned in Article 22 of Schedule I shall, for the purposes of any
action against a carrier, be converted into Canadian dollars at the rate of
exchange prevailing on the date on which the amount of any damage to be paid by
the carrier is ascertained by a court.
(7) For the
purposes of subsection (6), the Canadian dollar equivalents of francs or
Special Drawing Rights, as defined in Article 22 of the Convention set out in
Schedule I, are determined by
(a) converting francs into Special Drawing Rights at the
rate of one Special Drawing Right for 15.075 francs; and
(b) converting
Special Drawing Rights into Canadian dollars at the rate established by the
International Monetary Fund.
Air Canada Public Participation Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. 35 (4th Supp .)
10. (1) The Official Languages Act applies to the Corporation
[Air Canada].
(2) Subject
to subsection (5), if air services, including incidental services, are provided
or made available by a subsidiary of the Corporation, the Corporation has the
duty to ensure that any of the subsidiary’s customers can communicate with the
subsidiary in respect of those services, and obtain those services from the
subsidiary, in either official language in any case where those services, if
provided by the Corporation, would be required under Part IV of the Official
Languages Act to be provided in either official language.
. . .
Official Languages Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
31 (4th Supp .)
2. The purpose of this Act is to
(a) ensure
respect for English and French as the official languages of Canada and ensure
equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all
federal institutions, in particular with respect to their use in parliamentary
proceedings, in legislative and other instruments, in the administration of
justice, in communicating with or providing services to the public and in
carrying out the work of federal institutions;
(b) support the
development of English and French linguistic minority communities and generally
advance the equality of status and use of the English and French languages
within Canadian society; and
(c) set out the
powers, duties and functions of federal institutions with respect to the
official languages of Canada.
22. Every federal institution has the duty to ensure that any member
of the public can communicate with and obtain available services from its head
or central office in either official language, and has the same duty with
respect to any of its other offices or facilities
(a) within
the National Capital Region; or
(b) in
Canada or elsewhere, where there is significant demand for communications with
and services from that office or facility in that language.
76. In this Part, “Court” means the Federal Court.
77. (1) Any person who has made a complaint to the Commissioner in
respect of a right or duty under sections 4 to 7, sections 10 to 13 or Part IV,
V or VII, or in respect of section 91, may apply to the Court for a remedy
under this Part.
. . .
(4) Where,
in proceedings under subsection (1), the Court concludes that a federal
institution has failed to comply with this Act, the Court may grant such remedy
as it considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
. . .
78. (1) The Commissioner may
(a) within
the time limits prescribed by paragraph 77(2)(a) or (b), apply to
the Court for a remedy under this Part in relation to a complaint investigated
by the Commissioner if the Commissioner has the consent of the complainant;
(b) appear
before the Court on behalf of any person who has applied under section 77 for a
remedy under this Part; or
(c) with
leave of the Court, appear as a party to any proceedings under this Part.
(2) Where
the Commissioner makes an application under paragraph (1)(a), the
complainant may appear as a party to any proceedings resulting from the
application.
(3) Nothing
in this section abrogates or derogates from the capacity of the Commissioner to
seek leave to intervene in any adjudicative proceedings relating to the status
or use of English or French.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
16. (1) English and French are the official languages of Canada and
have equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all
institutions of the Parliament and government of Canada.
(2) English
and French are the official languages of New Brunswick and have equality of
status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all institutions of
the legislature and government of New Brunswick.
(3) Nothing
in this Charter limits the authority of Parliament or a legislature to advance
the equality of status or use of English and French.
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter ,
have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to
obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the
circumstances.
. . .
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Can. T.S. 1980 No. 37
Article 31
General
rule of interpretation
1. A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.
2. The
context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any
agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any
instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There
shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A
special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
Appeals
dismissed, Abella and Wagner JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors for the
appellants Michel and Lynda Thibodeau: CazaSaikaley, Ottawa.
Solicitor for the
appellant the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada: Office
of the Commissioner of Official Languages, Ottawa.
Solicitors for the
respondent: Air Canada, Dorval; Norton Rose Fulbright Canada,
Montréal.