Docket: A-471-15
Citation:
2016 FCA 147
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CORAM:
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PELLETIER J.A.
WEBB J.A.
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
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BETWEEN:
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DARREN RAY HURTUBISE
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Applicant
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and
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ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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REASONS
FOR JUDGMENT
DE MONTIGNY J.A.
[1]
This is an application for judicial review of
the Social Security Tribunal, Appeal Division’s decision upholding the General
Division’s decision, which concluded that Mr. Hurtubise left his employment
without just cause within the meaning of sections 29 and 30 of the Employment
Insurance Act, SC 1996, c 23 [the Act].
[2]
Having read the record and heard the oral
representations made by the Applicant and counsel for the Respondent, I find
that the application ought to be dismissed.
[3]
Section 30 of the Act provides that
claimants who voluntarily leave their employment without just cause will be
disqualified from receiving any benefits, subject to the exceptions set out in
that section. Pursuant to paragraph 29(c) of the Act, “just cause” for
voluntarily leaving an employment exists if the claimant had no reasonable
alternative to leaving, having regard to all the circumstances.
[4]
When contacted by the Canada Employment
Insurance Commission, the Applicant stated that he quit his job because he was
claustrophobic and was required to work in confined spaces, and also because he
was looked down upon by his colleagues who would talk over him and not
acknowledge him. Upon reviewing the evidence, the General Division of the
Social Security Tribunal found that that the Applicant voluntarily left his
employment without just cause, noting that when contacted by the Commission he
stated that he was not advised by his doctor to quit his job. The General
Division also found that the Applicant did not give the job a reasonable try
before he left as he had only worked a few days. As for the evidence from his
doctor according to which “[h]e had been medically
advised to terminate his employment in September as it was viewed that his
employment and related issues were contributing factors to his unwellness”,
the General Division gave it no weight because it was sought only after his
reconsideration request to the Commission was refused, and referred to a job in
September when his new job only started in October. That decision was confirmed
by the Appeal Division.
[5]
When reviewing decisions of the Appeal Division,
this Court must show deference and apply the standard of reasonableness to questions
of mixed fact and law: Thibodeau v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA
167, 477 N.R. 104, at paras 39-41. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Dunsmuir
v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para 47,
reasonableness is concerned with the existence of justification, transparency
and intelligibility within the decision-making process, as well as whether the
decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes, which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law.
[6]
In the case at bar, I am unable to find that the
Appeal Division decision was unreasonable. Pursuant to subsection 58(1) of the Department
of Employment and Social Development Act, S.C. 2005, c. 34, the Appeal
Division can intervene in the General Division’s decision only if there has
been a breach of natural justice, an error of law or an erroneous finding of
fact made in a perverse or capricious manner or without regard for the material
that was submitted. The Appeal Division found no such errors.
[7]
In his memorandum of fact and law and in his
oral submissions before this Court, the Applicant put forward essentially the
same arguments that he had submitted to the Appeal Division. Unfortunately, the
role of this Court is not to reassess these arguments, but rather to determine
whether the decision of the Appeal Division was reasonably open to it. After
reviewing the evidence, the Appeal Division found that the Applicant’s working
conditions were not so intolerable as to leave him no reasonable option but to
resign two days after he started. It also came to the conclusion that the
December 2, 2013 medical note should be given little weight considering that it
was sought after the fact and did not particularize the employment and the
medical conditions it was referring to. The Applicant has not convinced me that
these conclusions are unreasonable.
[8]
For these reasons, I would dismiss this
application, without costs.
“Yves
de Montigny”
“I agree.
J.D.
Denis Pelletier J.A.”
“I agree.
Wyman W. Webb J.A.”
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