Date:
20110503
Docket:
A-446-09
Citation: 2011 FCA 148
CORAM: LÉTOURNEAU
J.A.
NADON
J.A.
SEXTON
J.A.
BETWEEN:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, represented by the
Attorney General of Canada,
The Hon. Chuck Strahl
In his capacity as Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development,
The Hon. Vic Toews in his capacity as
President of Treasury Board,
The Hon. Peter MacKay in his capacity as
Minister of National Defence,
The Hon. Lawrence Cannon in his capacity
as
Minister Responsible for Canada Lands
Company,
Appellants
and
BROKENHEAD FIRST NATION, LONG PLAIN FIRST
NATION,
PEGUIS FIRST NATION, ROSEAU RIVER ANISHINABE FIRST NATION,
SAGKEENG FIRST NATION, SANDY BAY OJIBWAY FIRST NATION,
SWAN LAKE FIRST NATION,
collectively being Signatories to Treaty
No. 1
and known as “Treaty One First Nations”
Respondents
REASONS FOR
JUDGMENT
NADON J.A.
[1]
This
is an appeal from a decision (“Reasons”) of Campbell J. (the “Judge”), 2009 FC
982, [2009] 4 C.N.L.R. 30, dated September 30, 2009, wherein he held that the government
of Canada (“Canada”) had breached its duty to consult the respondents when it
decided to transfer the Kapyong Barracks (the “Barracks”), situated in the city
of Winnipeg, Manitoba, to Canada Lands Company Ltd. (“CLC”), a non-agent Crown
corporation, pursuant to Treasury Board’s Policy on the Disposal of Surplus
Real Property (the “Policy”) as amended by the Directive on the Sale or
Transfer of Surplus Real Property (the “Directive”).
[2]
The
main issue in this appeal is whether Canada had a duty to consult the
respondents before deciding to transfer the Barracks to CLC and, if so, whether
Canada had discharged
that duty.
The Facts
Background:
[3]
In
1871, the aboriginal bands of Manitoba and Canada signed Treaty
No. 1. Pursuant thereto, the aboriginal bands agreed to give up their title
to the land that now comprises the province of Manitoba in exchange for Canada
setting aside a certain amount of land for their exclusive use: 160 acres per
family of five. This provision has come to be known as the “per capita provision”.
For reasons which are not relevant to the determination of this appeal, Canada did not
fulfill its end of the bargain.
[4]
The
land claims of five of the respondents were found to be valid by Canada. Hence, in
the 1990s, Canada signed treaty land entitlement (“TLE”) agreements with these
respondents to rectify its failure to fulfill the per capita provision: in 1994
with the Long Plain First Nation (“Long Plain”), in 1995 with the Swan Lake
First Nation (“Swan Lake”), in 1996, with the Roseau River Anishinabe First
Nation (“Roseau River”) and in 1997, the Brokenhead Ojibway Nation
(“Brokenhead”) negotiated its claim through the Treaty Land Entitlement
Committee of Manitoba Inc. (“TLEC”). That year, TLEC executed the Manitoba
Treaty Land Entitlement Framework Agreement (the “Framework Agreement”)
with Canada. Pursuant thereto,
Brokenhead signed its separate TLE Agreement in 1998. In 2008, Peguis First
Nation (“Peguis”) signed its Agreement with Canada.
[5]
Each
of these agreements entitled the aforementioned bands to acquire private land
and to acquire provincial “Crown land” – defined as land that is owned by or
under the administration and control of Manitoba and is situated within the
Province of Manitoba – on a priority basis to fulfill their treaty land
entitlement. The right to acquire land on a priority basis essentially amounts
to a right of first refusal with respect to the category of land to which the
right relates. The nature and extent of this priority is described in the
respondents’ agreements with Canada. The priority does not, however, give any
of the respondents an entitlement to acquire the land because all of the
agreements specify that land will be transferred only on a willing
buyer/willing seller basis.
[6]
The
type of arrangement made with each of the respondents varies. With respect to
the respondents Long Plain, Swan Lake and Roseau River, their
agreements provide for a specific amount of funding from Canada so as to
allow them to purchase land to meet their outstanding entitlements. These
agreements do not provide for the acquisition of surplus federal land and make
no mention, other than in the case of the Agreement with Roseau River, of land under
the administration and control of Canada. As to Roseau River’s Agreement,
it provides at clause 4.12 that it may purchase land under the administration
and control of Canada at fair market value.
[7]
With
respect to the respondents Brokenhead and Peguis, their agreements allow them to
select a specified amount of unoccupied provincial Crown land and “other land”,
which includes surplus federal land, and stipulate that Canada will provide
an amount of funding for their use in the purchasing of that land. The
agreements with Brokenhead and Peguis further provide that these respondents
are entitled to notice from Canada whenever the federal Crown intends to
dispose of certain “surplus federal land” – defined for Brokenhead in the
Framework Agreement at subclause 1.01(88), and for Peguis at subclause
1.01(82). Both provisions are identical and read as follows:
“Surplus
Federal Land”
means any “federal real property”, as defined in the Federal Real Property
Act, excluding any “real property” as defined in the Federal Real
Property Act to which the title is vested in a “federal crown corporation”
as defined in section 83 of the Financial Administration Act, that is:
(a)
within the
Province of Manitoba;
(b)
determined
by a “minister”, as defined in the Federal Real Property Act, who has
the “administration”, as defined in the Federal Real Property Act, of
that “federal real property”, to no longer be required for the program purposes
of that “minister’s” department;
(c)
determined
by that “minister” to be available for sale; and
(d)
made
available by that “minister” to any “other minister” of Canada for a transfer
of administration in accordance with any then existing policies or directives
of the Treasury Board of Canada;
[8]
Both
of these agreements set out the process for the respondents to acquire surplus
federal land. However, to repeat, the agreements do not provide the respondents
with an entitlement to acquire the land, but allow them to acquire such land on
a willing buyer/willing seller basis. As an example of this is clause 3.05(2)
of the Framework Agreement which provides that “Other Land”, which includes
surplus federal land, may be purchased by a First Nation “on a ‘willing
buyer/willing seller’ basis”.
[9]
There
are no agreements with the last two respondents. The claim of the respondent Sagkeeng
First Nation (“Sagkeeng”) remains outstanding, with Canada awaiting
further submissions and evidence in respect of the claim. As to the claim of
the respondent Sandy Bay Ojibway First Nation (“Sandy Bay”), Canada and the
Indian Claims Commission have rejected it on the ground that Sandy Bay’s treaty
land entitlement has already been fulfilled.
The
Barracks:
[10]
The
Barracks are comprised of two units. One unit covers 159.62 acres of land and
includes the operational section of an armed forces base centrally-located
within the city of Winnipeg. The other unit covers 61.78 acres of land and
includes the married quarters area of the base. Canada says that a
decision has been made only with respect to the operational section of the
base.
[11]
On
April 12, 2001, a news release from the Department of National Defence (“DND”)
announced that the Barracks were being closed. At some point following this
announcement, the Department of Indian and Northern Development (“DIAND”)
received notice from DND that the Barracks would be declared surplus.
[12]
Shortly
after the closure announcement, Brokenhead and Long Plain expressed interest in
the Barracks.
[13]
Effective
July 1, 2001, Treasury Board enacted the Policy which governs the disposal of
surplus federal real property. The Policy divided surplus property disposal
into two categories: routine and strategic. All property falls into the first
category unless it has an especially high market value or is “sensitive” – in
which case it becomes “strategic”. The respondents did not seek judicial review
of the Policy.
[14]
In
November 2001, Treasury Board decided that the Barracks would be disposed of
through the “strategic” process. As a result of this designation and pursuant
to the Policy, the Barracks were no longer available to those of the respondents
who were entitled to purchase that land on a priority basis. The end result of
the strategic disposal process is that the property will be assessed and then
transferred to CLC, a federal non-agent Crown corporation which disposes of
property for the federal government. The respondents also did not challenge
this decision.
[15]
In
August 2002, Long Plain informed Canada that it remained
interested in the Barracks. In September 2002, Canada informed
Long Plain that disposal of the Barracks would take place pursuant to the
strategic disposal process.
[16]
On
December 4, 2002, DIAND sent a letter to each of the respondents notifying them
that the Barracks would be dealt with as a strategic disposal and that, as a
result, their interest therein would not be considered on a priority basis.
[17]
In
response to DIAND’s letter, Brokenhead and Long Plain indicated to Canada that they
remained interested in the Barracks.
.
[18]
In
January 2003, Brokenhead initiated the dispute resolution provisions of the
Framework Agreement, arguing that the Barracks should not have been removed
from the scope of its Agreement with Canada.
[19]
In
March 2003, DIAND asked Long Plain and Brokenhead – the two respondents that
had expressed interest in the Barracks – for specific information with regard
to the amount of land each was interested in acquiring, the proposed purchase
price for that land and the proposed use for any land purchased.
[20]
Brokenhead
and Long Plain subsequently continued to express interest in the Barracks and
held several meetings with DIAND. After February 2004, Canada received no further
communication from any of the respondents with respect to the Barracks until
September 2007.
[21]
On
November 1, 2006, Treasury Board issued the Directive amending the Policy,
which provided that Canada should consider the possible effects of
declaring a property to be strategic on any relevant aboriginal rights or
claims.
.
[22]
On
September 5, 2007, the respondents wrote to DIAND, advising that they were
laying claim to the Barracks as part of their unfulfilled treaty land
entitlements. More particularly, the respondents’ claim was premised upon a
claim of aboriginal title, not only to the Barracks, but to the entire city of Winnipeg. However, by
the time of the hearing before the Judge, the respondents’ claim was not as
broad in that they asserted only a right to be consulted by Canada in respect
of reserve land promises made to them pursuant to the per capita provision in Treaty
No.1.
[23]
In
November 2007, Treasury Board approved the transfer of the Barracks to CLC for
development and disposal outside of the scope of the agreements.
[24]
On
January 25, 2008 the respondents commenced an application for judicial review
of the November 2007 Treasury Board decision to transfer the Barracks to CLC, seeking
a declaration that Canada had a legal duty to consult and accommodate them before
disposing of the Barracks.
The Federal Court Decision
[25]
The
Judge allowed the respondents’ judicial review application. First, he rejected Canada’s argument
that the release provisions of its agreements with the respondents relieved it of
any obligation to the respondents arising from Treaty No.1. In the
Judge’s view, the duty to consult the respondents arose from subsection 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982 and, consequently, could not “be the
subject of contracting out”. At paragraphs 23 and 24 of his Reasons, the Judge
expressed his opinion in the following terms:
[23] In my
opinion, the release does not affect Canada’s
continuing obligations in the implementation of the First Nations’ Treaty right
to land, and, in particular, it does not affect Canada’s obligation to meet its duty to
consult. The duty to consult arising from the principle of the honour of the
Crown, as well as Canada’s constitutional and legal
duty to First Nations pursuant to s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, cannot
be the subject of contracting out.
[24]
Therefore, in its dealings with the Applicant First Nations, and in particular
with the Brokenhead and Peguis First Nations, I find that Canada had a duty to consult.
[Emphasis added]
[26]
Second,
the Judge refused, in effect, to consider Canada’s alternative argument that if
a duty to consult existed, then Canada had discharged this
duty. The Judge stated that Canada’s alternative argument was one “which I
cannot take seriously”, adding that “[i]t is not credible to take the position
in law that a very serious action is not required [i.e. the duty to consult the
respondents] and to conduct yourself accordingly and then argue that, if it is
required, it was accomplished”: Judge’s Reasons at paragraph 27. This led the
Judge to find that although Canada had engaged in “some dialogue” with the
respondents regarding the disposition of the Barracks, Canada had no
intention of engaging in meaningful consultation: Judge’s Reasons at paragraph
28. Thus, in the Judge’s view, there was no basis to support Canada’s
alternative argument and he dismissed it.
[27]
Third,
the Judge dealt with Canada’s decision to transfer the Barracks to
CLC. He found that that decision triggered a duty to consult with Brokenhead
and Peguis: At paragraphs 36 and 37, he wrote as follows:
[36] In the
present case, the Kapyong Barracks will be placed out of the reach of the
Brokenhead and Peguis First Nations as surplus lands if a transfer takes place
to the Canada Lands Company. Therefore, the draw-back in decision-making must
be to the point in time just before the decision was taken to transfer the
Kapyong Barracks to the Canada Land Company. It is at this point in the
decision-making continuum that meaningful consultation must take place.
[37] There is
no doubt that Canada understood that acting on the Treasury Board Directive
would have a profound and adverse impact on the ability of the Brokenhead and
Peguis First Nations’ ability to acquire federal land, and, in particular,
federal land that might be used to meet its valid interest and ambition to
create an urban reserve. Thus, I find that the intention by Canada to transfer the Kapyong
Barracks to the Canada Land Company triggered a duty to consult the Brokenhead
and Peguis First Nations before the intention was carried out in the form of a
decision. In my opinion, having made this decision without lawful consultation,
Canada’s decision to act on the
Treasury Board Directive is unlawful and a failure to maintain the honour of
the Crown.
[28]
Fourth,
having found that Canada had violated its duty to consult, the Judge fashioned
a remedy. Specifically, he made the following declaration:
… I
declare that:
Canada had a legal
duty to consult on its decision to dispose of surplus federal lands at Kapyong
Barracks and Canada did not meet that duty; and,
in particular,
Canada acted
contrary to law by failing to meet the mandatory legal requirement of
consultation with the Brokenhead and Peguis First Nations before the making of
the November 2007 decision to transfer the surplus lands at Kapyong Barracks to
the Canada Lands Company pursuant to the Treasury Board Directive on the Sale
or Transfer of Surplus Real Property; and, as a result,
The November 2007
decision is invalid.
I award cost of
the present Application to the Applicant First Nations.
The
Issues
[29]
The
appeal raises the following issues:
1. Did
a duty to consult arise? If so, with respect to which of the respondents?
2. If
there was a duty to consult, what is the content of the duty here?
3. Given
the content of the duty, did Canada’s actions discharge that duty?
4. Was Brokenhead required to
pursue the dispute resolution process contained in its Agreement?
5. If
Canada did not
discharge the duty, what is the appropriate remedy?
Analysis
[30]
As
I indicated at the outset of these Reasons, the issue at the heart of this
appeal is whether Canada had a duty to consult the respondents and, if
so, whether it breached its duty of consultation when it decided to transfer
the Barracks to CLC. Because of my view that the reasons given by the Judge for
concluding as he did are inadequate in that they do not allow for meaningful
appellate review, I would allow the appeal and return the matter to a judge of
the Federal Court, other than Campbell J., for redetermination of the issues.
[31]
In
so concluding, I am mindful that “[s]erious remedies such as a new trial
require serious justification”: R. v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26, [2002] 1
S.C.R. 869 at paragraph 22 [Sheppard], and that the Judge’s Reasons are 23
pages long. However, as this Court has held, “adequacy of reasons is not
measured by the pound”: Ralph v. Canada (Attorney
General),
2010 FCA 256, 410 N.R. 175, at paragraph 18.
[32]
Recently,
in R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3 [R.E.M.], the
Supreme Court of Canada addressed the issue of adequacy of reasons when it said
that reasons must be read in their whole context, which includes the
evidentiary record and the submissions of counsel: at paragraph 55. The Supreme
Court also said that reasons are especially crucial in circumstances – such as
in the present matter – where there are both difficult questions of law before
the court and a confusing evidentiary record: ibid. Ultimately, reasons
must be intelligible insofar as they establish a “logical connection between the
evidence and the law on one hand, and the verdict on the other”: at paragraphs 35,
41.
[33]
The
purpose for this minimal standard is to permit meaningful appellate review. At
paragraph 11 in R.E.M., the Chief Justice, writing for a unanimous
Supreme Court, explained the need for adequate reasons so as to allow for effective
appellate review:
[11] …
3. … A clear
articulation of the factual findings facilitates the correction of errors and
enables appeal courts to discern the inferences drawn, while at the same time
inhibiting appeal courts from making factual determinations “from the lifeless
transcript of evidence, with the increased risk of factual error”: M. Taggart,
“Should Canadian judges be legally required to give reasoned decisions in
civil cases?” (1983), 33 U.T.L.J. 1, at p. 7. Likewise, appellate review
for an error of law will be greatly aided where the trial judge has articulated
her understanding of the legal principles governing the outcome of the case.
Moreover, parties and lawyers rely on reasons in order to decide whether an
appeal is warranted and, if so, on what grounds.
[34]
I
am of the opinion that this Court cannot, in the present matter, perform its
appellate function. As a result, I am satisfied that the case should be
remitted back to another judge of the Federal Court.
The
Problems with the Reasons:
[35]
The
beginning of the Judge’s Reasons is adequate. He first describes the background
context of the case: at paragraphs 1 to 6. He then establishes that correctness
is the proper standard of review: at paragraph 7. Next, he reviews some of the
relevant jurisprudence pertaining to the honour of the Crown, the principle of
reconciliation, and the duty to consult: at paragraphs 8 to 16. However, with
respect, the remainder of the Judge’s Reasons is rife with uncertainty and
contradiction. I see at least eight problems, six of which bear on the adequacy
of his reasons and two of which reveals a different kind of error.
[36]
First,
it is unclear to which respondents Canada owes the duty of consultation.
At paragraph 17, the Judge says that it was agreed that “only the Brokenhead
First Nation and the Peguis First Nation are directly affected” by Canada’s decision
to transfer the Barracks. But, at paragraph 24 he finds that Canada owed a duty
to consult to all the respondents. Then, at paragraph 36, he reiterates that
Brokenhead and Peguis are specifically affected by the transfer decision and,
at paragraph 37, he finds that Canada’s decision to transfer the Barracks to CLC
“triggered a duty to consult the Brokenhead and Peguis First Nations before the
intention was carried out in the form of a decision”. Finally, in his Order he says
that “Canada had a legal
duty to consult on its decision … [and] did not meet that duty”, going on to
state that “in particular”, Canada had failed “to meet the mandatory legal
requirement of consultation” with Brokenhead and Peguis. He then concludes by
awarding costs to all of the respondents.
[37]
While
it is possible to infer from the Judge’s Reasons that he meant that Canada owed
a duty only to Brokenhead and Peguis, it is equally possible to read his
Reasons as signifying that Canada owed a duty to all of the respondents.
This lack of clarity, in my view, presents two problems.
[38]
First,
it violates the rule that “[t]he terms of [an] order must be clear and
specific. [A] party needs to know exactly what has to be done to comply with
the order”: Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., 2006 SCC 52, [2006] 2
S.C.R. 612, at paragraph 24. As a result of the Judge’s lack of clarity, Canada is left in
the position of being ordered to consult, but being unsure with whom it must
consult.
[39]
Second,
the lack of clarity prevents this Court from performing its appellate review
function. This Court must determine whether it was appropriate for the Judge to
make the Order he made. However, because the meaning of the Order is unclear,
this Court is “unable to determine whether the decision is vitiated by error”: Sheppard
at paragraph 28.
[40]
A
second related source of uncertainty is the Judge’s failure to adequately
distinguish between the different circumstances of the respondents as disclosed
in the record and argued at the hearing. Long Plain, Swan Lake and Roseau River all
have signed TLE agreements with Canada that do not give them
an explicit priority right to surplus federal land. Brokenhead and Peguis have
signed agreements with Canada containing provisions that specifically
give them a priority right to surplus federal land. Sagkeeng has not yet signed
any agreement with Canada. With respect to Sandy Bay, it has
also not signed an agreement with Canada, since Canada has rejected
its claim.
[41]
The
case, then, reveals at least four arguably different circumstances that may result
in the different respondents having different consultation rights, if any. The
Supreme Court has held that more detailed reasons are required where the Judge
must “resolve confused and contradictory evidence on a key issue”: R.E.M.
at paragraph 44, citing Sheppard at paragraph 55.6. The Judge has
failed, in my respectful view, to provide sufficient reasons to resolve this
confusing evidence. As a result, we cannot discern what his views are with
respect to the possible outcome arising from these different circumstances.
[42]
A
third source of uncertainty results from the Judge overlooking Canada’s
description of the Barracks. As I indicated earlier, the Barracks are comprised
of two units, i.e. the old operational section of the base and the married quarters
area of the base. Canada claims that it has made a decision only with respect
to the former. This crucial fact is not mentioned anywhere in the Judge’s Reasons.
As a result, it is unclear whether his Order covers only the operational
section of the base or the entire base.
[43]
A
fourth source of uncertainty is the Judge’s failure to analyze the importance,
if any, of the three distinct decisions made by Canada concerning the
Barracks. In paragraph 31 of his Reasons, the Judge notes that Canada made three
different decisions: its April 2001 decision to declare the Barracks to be surplus
federal land; its November 2001 decision to declare the Barracks to be subject
to the strategic disposal process; and its November 2007 decision to transfer
the Barracks to CLC. While it was helpful for the Judge to delineate these
different decisions, he failed to explain what impact, if any, the three
decisions had or have on the respondents’ rights. This failure by the Judge also
precludes us from properly reviewing the correctness of his decision.
[44]
Fifth,
the Judge indicated at paragraph 32 of his Reasons that the Policy at issue,
released in 2001, was amended in 2006 by the Directive. However, what he does
not indicate is that the Directive required Canada to consider
the possible effects of declaring a property to be strategic on aboriginal rights
or claims. Given that the Directive was issued in 2006, it may have affected the
Agreement which Peguis signed that same year. It may also have affected Treasury
Board’s November 2007 decision to transfer the Barracks to CLC. However, since
the Judge made no findings whatsoever with regard to these crucial facts, nor
did he provide any analysis in regard thereto, again we are left entirely in
the dark about the effects, if any, of the amendment to the Policy.
[45]
Sixth,
Canada argues that Brokenhead began and then wrongfully abandoned the dispute
resolution mechanism contained in its Agreement with Canada. There is a
general rule, with exceptions, that a party must exhaust the administrative
remedies available to it before commencing an action or an application for
judicial review: C.B. Powell Ltd. v. Canada (Border Services Agency),
2010 FCA 61, 400 N.R. 367, at paragraph 4. The Judge was no doubt aware of this
rule, yet he made no finding one way or another as to what impact, if any, the
dispute resolution mechanism available to Brokenhead had on its ability to
claim relief from the courts. Again, effective appellate review is impossible because
the Judge has not made any findings with respect to this important issue.
[46]
I
now turn to two other errors that do not relate to the adequacy of the Judge’s reasons
but reveals a further problem with his approach.
[47]
At
paragraph 27 of his Reasons, the Judge chastises Canada for arguing
first that the duty to consult did not exist in the circumstances and,
alternatively, if a duty to consult did exist, Canada had fulfilled
this duty. As noted above, the Judge found that Canada’s position is
“not credible”.
[48]
With
respect, the Judge’s comments are difficult to understand, given that alternate
arguments by a party are a staple of litigation and are regularly accepted by
courts: Kerr v. Danier Leather Inc., 2007 SCC 44, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 331,
at paragraphs 34 and 45; Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Assn. v.
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2008 FCA 6,
64 C.P.R. (4th) 343, at paragraph 17. In my view, it was an error on
the Judge’s part to fail to seriously consider Canada’s
alternative argument that its duty to consult had been fulfilled. Although the
Judge went on to cursorily opine about whether Canada had fulfilled its duty,
it is clear from his Reasons that he did not give the matter serious
consideration, writing at paragraph 29:
[29] There is no point in
setting out the details of the past course of conduct between Canada and the Applicant
First Nations over the land in question because I find that Canada admits that it believed that
it did not have a duty to consult as the explanation for its actions. Be that
as it may, by this decision, a new phase begins in the relationship between the
Canada and the Applicant First
Nations.
[49]
Second,
at paragraph 19 of his Reasons, the Judge says “by Article 3.04(4)(b) of the
[Peguis Agreement], the Peguis First Nation is entitled to surplus federal
land in similar fashion to the Brokenhead First Nation” [emphasis added]. This
statement is misleading. Article 3.04(4)(b) of the Peguis Agreement says that
Peguis “may” acquire surplus federal land in accordance with Article 3.09.
Article 3.09(7) says that “the expression of interest in Acquiring Surplus
Federal Land by Peguis … does not provide a right or create a guarantee”
that the land will be available to be Acquired by Peguis” [emphasis added]. Thus,
the Peguis Agreement clearly creates no entitlement to surplus federal land for
Peguis, but rather gives Peguis the opportunity to purchase surplus federal
land in particular circumstances. It is more accurate, as the Judge said
himself in respect of Brokenhead’s agreement at Paragraph 18 of his Reasons, that
Peguis “can” acquire surplus federal land.
Conclusion
[50]
I
therefore conclude that the Judge’s reasons are inadequate. They do not grapple
with and attempt to resolve the difficult legal issues and the confusing
evidentiary record that were before him. At paragraph 55 of her Reasons in R.E.M.,
the Chief Justice sets forth what, in her view, appellate courts should be
looking for when attempting to determine whether a judge’s reasons are
adequate:
[55] The appellate court,
proceeding with deference, must ask itself whether the reasons, considered with
the evidentiary record, the submissions of counsel and the live issues at the
trial, reveals the basis for the verdict reached. It must look at the reasons
in their entire context. It must ask itself whether, viewed thus, the trial
judge appears to have seized the substance of the critical issues on the trial.
If the evidence is contradictory or confusing, the appellate court should ask
whether the trial judge appears to have recognized and dealt with the
contradictions. If there is a difficult or novel question of law, it should ask
itself if the trial judge has recognized and dealt with that issue.
[51]
In
my view, the Judge failed to seize the substance of the critical issues before
him. He also failed to deal adequately with the evidence before him in that he
did not address key aspects thereof and did not, as a result, make any findings
in regard thereto which would have allowed this Court to conduct a meaningful
appellate review.
[52]
The
only alternative open to us, other than returning the matter to the Federal
Court, would be for this Court to transform itself into a court of first
instance and to make fresh findings of fact and determinations of law based on
those findings. That is not our role. Consequently, I am satisfied that we are
not in a position to conduct effective appellate review in these circumstances.
[53]
I
note in passing that following the Judge’s decision there have been
jurisprudential changes in aboriginal law resulting from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Rio Tinto
Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Skenai Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 650, and Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC
53, [2011] 1 C.N.L.R. 12, (“Beckman”), where the Court discusses when
the duty to consult is triggered and how modern land claim agreements, such as
those before us in the present matter, shape that duty. In particular, the Judge
who redetermine the issues may wish to consider the Crown’s argument about the
effect of the release provisions in the Crown’s respective agreements with the
respondents in light of what the Supreme Court said in Beckman about the
weight to be given to provisions in properly negotiated, sophisticated land
agreements.
[54]
For
these reasons, I would therefore allow the appeal with costs, I would set aside
the Judge’s decision and I would refer the matter back to the Chief Justice of
the Federal Court or to a
judge, other
than Campbell J., designated by the Chief Justice for redetermination of the
issues in the light of these Reasons.
“Marc
Nadon”
“I
agree.
Gilles Létourneau J.A.”
“I
agree.
J. Edgar Sexton J.A. »
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