Date: 20120522
Docket: A-69-12
Citation: 2012 FCA 147
CORAM: SHARLOW J.A.
PELLETIER J.A.
MAINVILLE
J.A.
BETWEEN:
THE PROFESSIONAL INSTITUTE
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE OF CANADA
Appellant
and
IRENE J. BREMSAK
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
SHARLOW J.A.
[1]
In a
judgment dated February 16, 2012 (2012 FC 213), Justice Lemieux found the
Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada guilty of contempt of an
order (the “Reinstatement Order”) made by the Public Service Labour Relations
Board on August 26, 2009 (2009 PSLRB 103) which, among other things, ordered
the reinstatement of the respondent Irene Bremsak to elected and appointed
positions from which she had been wrongfully removed. For the reasons that
follow, I would dismiss the appeal.
Proceedings before the Public
Service Labour Relations Board
[2]
This
matter originally involved two unfair labour practice complaints Ms. Bremsak filed
with the Board pursuant to the Public Service Labour Relations Act, S.C.
2003, c. 22. The first complaint was made on November 16, 2007. In that
complaint Ms. Bremsak alleged that the Institute had breached paragraph 188(c)
of the Act when it apologized on Ms. Bremsak’s behalf for certain comments she
had made following a local election.
[3]
The second
complaint was filed on July 8, 2008. It related to the Institute’s response to
Ms. Bremsak’s first complaint. The Institute had adopted a policy that any
member who referred to an “outside body” (including the Board) a matter that
has been or ought to be referred to the Institute’s internal procedure would
automatically be subject to temporary suspension from elected or appointed
office. When Ms. Bremsak filed her first complaint to the Board, the Institute
applied that policy and suspended Ms. Bremsak from the positions she then held
(shop steward, member-at-large of the SP Vancouver Sub-Group, president of
the Vancouver Branch, member-at-large of the B.C./Yukon Regional Executive, and
sub-group coordinator of the SP Group Executive). In Ms. Bremsak’s second complaint to
the Board, she alleged that the Institute had breached subparagraph 118(e)(ii)
of the Act when it adopted the policy.
[4]
In the
Reinstatement Order, the Board dismissed the first complaint, allowed the
second complaint, and made a number of orders as a remedy in respect of the
second complaint, including the following (at paragraphs 143 to 145 of the
Board’s reasons):
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143. The [Institute] is directed
to rescind the application of its “Policy Relating to Members and Complaints
to Outside Bodies” to [Ms. Bremsak].
144. The [Institute] is directed
to amend its “Policy Relating to Members and Complaints to Outside Bodies” to
ensure that it complies with the Act.
145. The [Institute] is directed to
restore [Ms. Bremsak’s] status as an elected official of the bargaining unit
and to advise its members and officials, in the form described in paragraph
131 of this decision, that she has been reinstated to all of her elected and
appointed positions subject to the normal operation of the constitution and by-laws
of the [Institute].
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[5]
The
reference in paragraph 145 of the Reinstatement Order to paragraph 131 of the
decision is somewhat unclear. It seems to have been intended as a reference to
paragraph 132, which sets out the text of the notice to be given to the
Institute’s members and officials. This is implicitly acknowledged by the
parties in a statement of agreed facts filed in the Federal Court. Paragraphs
131 and 132 of the Board’s decision read as follows:
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131. Finally, I consider that the real harm
in this case has to be the complainant's suspension from her elected
positions and that the objective of any remedy must be, as much as
practicable, to correct that harm and to restore her to the situation she was
in before her suspension. Therefore, I direct that the suspensions of the
complainant from elected and appointed offices be rescinded. Furthermore, the
fact that the membership and officials of the bargaining agent were told of
the complainant's suspension is significant, and I conclude that it is
appropriate to direct that the membership and officials be told the
suspensions have been rescinded. Unlike in Veillette 2, I find that I
have the authority to intervene in the bargaining agent's internal affairs to
fashion a remedy that relates to the matters set out in subparagraph 188(e)(ii)
of the Act. These include penalties imposed by a bargaining agent
because a person has made an application to the Board and, in this case, the
penalty was suspension from office. This Order is not intended to override
the normal operation of the constitution and by-laws of the bargaining agent
in matters such as the usual expiry of the terms of elected or appointed
offices.
132
For these
reasons, I consider it necessary in the circumstances of this case to direct the
bargaining agent to publish the following announcement in a prominent place
in the next edition of one of its regular and significant publications to the
membership (this may be an online announcement):
Announcement to all members and
officials of the Institute
On April 9, 2008, Ms. Irene Bremsak was
temporarily suspended from her positions of Member-at-Large, SP Vancouver
Sub-Group, President, Vancouver Branch; Member-at-Large, B.C./Yukon Regional
Executive; and Sub-Group Coordinator, SP Group Executive. This suspension was
a result of the Institute's "Policy Relating to Members and Complaints
to Outside Bodies" and a complaint filed by Ms. Bremsak with the Public
Service Labour Relations Board.
The Public Service Labour Relations
Board has recently directed, pursuant to subparagraph 188(e)(ii) and section
192 of the Public Service Labour Relations Act, that the Institute
rescind this policy as it applies to the circumstances of Ms. Bremsak and to
amend the policy to ensure that it complies with the Public Service Labour
Relations Act. The Board also concluded that there may be different
circumstances when it is appropriate to suspend a member from elected or appointed
office. Finally, the Board directed that this announcement be made to members
and officials of the Institute.
Therefore, Ms. Bremsak is
reinstated to all her elected and appointed positions effective immediately,
subject to the normal operation of the Institute's by-laws.
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The Institute’s challenge to
the Reinstatement Order
[6]
On
September 2, 2009, the Institute applied to this Court for judicial review of
the Reinstatement Order, and subsequently filed two motions to stay the Board’s
order. Both stay motions were dismissed on October 28, 2009 (2009 FCA 312). On
April 28, 2010, the Institute discontinued its judicial review application.
The Institute’s failure to
comply with the Reinstatement Order
[7]
The
Institute did not comply with the Reinstatement Order when it was made on
August 26, 2009, or soon afterward. For reasons that will become apparent,
there is no evidence in the record explaining why the Institute did not comply
with the Reinstatement Order soon after it was made although, as explained
below, the Institute claims to have a lawful excuse for its non-compliance on
and after October 20, 2009.
[8]
The
Institute has also asserted that it would be unreasonable to hold it in
contempt of the Reinstatement Order before October 28, 2009, the date on which
its two stay applications were determined by this Court. It is convenient to
deal with that submission at the outset because it is so obviously devoid of
merit. As a matter of law, merely taking proceedings to stay an order cannot
excuse non-compliance with the order, although in certain circumstances
non-compliance with an order while a stay application is pending may be a
mitigating factor in determining the consequences of non-compliance.
Enforcement proceedings
[9]
On
September 1, 2009, Ms. Bremsak submitted a request to the Board that the
Reinstatement Order be filed with the Federal Court pursuant to section 52 of
the Act so that it could be enforced as an order of the Federal Court. Section
52 reads as follows:
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52. (1) The Board must, on the
request in writing of any person or organization affected by any order of the
Board, file a certified copy of the order, exclusive
of the reasons for the order, in the
Federal Court, unless, in its opinion,
(a) there
is no indication of failure or likelihood of failure to comply with the
order; or
(b) there
is other good reason why the filing of the order in the Federal Court would
serve no useful purpose.
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52. (1) Sur demande écrite de la
personne ou de l’organisation touchée, la Commission dépose à la Cour
fédérale une copie certifiée conforme
du dispositif de l’ordonnance sauf si,
à son avis :
a) soit rien ne laisse
croire qu’elle n’a pas été exécutée ou ne le sera pas;
b) soit, pour d’autres
motifs valables, le dépôt ne serait d’aucune utilité.
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(2) An
order of the Board becomes an order of the Federal Court when a certified
copy of the order is filed in that court, and it may subsequently be enforced
as such.
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(2) En vue de son exécution, l’ordonnance rendue par
la Commission, dès le dépôt à la Cour fédérale de la copie certifiée
conforme, est assimilée à une ordonnance rendue par celle-ci.
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[10]
The
Institute opposed the request for the filing of the Reinstatement Order in the
Federal Court. By order dated December 4, 2009 (2009 PSLRB 159), the Board
determined that the Institute had not complied with paragraph 143 and 145 of
the Reinstatement Order, and rejected the submission of the Institute that no
useful purpose would be served by filing it in the Federal Court. The Board
made an order accordingly, and the Reinstatement Order was filed on December 8,
2009. Ms. Bremsak immediately commenced contempt proceedings.
Other proceedings by the
Institute against Ms. Bremsak
[11]
As these
events were unfolding, the Institute was taking further steps against Ms.
Bremsak in connection with harassment complaints made against her by five
members of the Executive Branch of the Institute in April and June of 2009. On
October 20, 2009, the Institute informed Ms. Bremsak that following an
investigation, her membership in the Institute had been suspended for a period
of five years effective immediately. The Institute informed Ms. Bremsak that
she could not be a candidate for office, or vote for officers, or otherwise
participate in the affairs of the Institute.
[12]
The
October 20, 2009 decision of the Institute is the subject of a further unfair
labour practice complaint filed with the Board by Ms. Bremsak. The Institute
disputes the complaint. That matter is still pending before the Board.
The show cause proceedings in
the Federal Court
[13]
In show
cause proceedings before a prothonotary on March 26, 2010, the Institute
admitted in a statement of agreed facts that by December 8, 2009 when the
Reinstatement Order was filed in the Federal Court, it had not rescinded any of
Ms. Bremsak’s suspensions, it had not restored her to any of her elected or
appointed positions, and it had not advised the members and officials of the
Institute in the form described in paragraphs 131 and 132 of the Reinstatement
Order that Ms. Bremsak had been reinstated to all of her elected and appointed
positions.
[14]
A show
cause order was made by a prothonotary on June 17, 2010 (2010 FC 661) on the
basis that Ms. Bremsak had made out a prima facie case of contempt by
the Institute. The allegation of contempt as set out in the prothonotary’s
order reads as follows:
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The
acts with which the Institute is charged is that the Institute breached the
Order of this Court filed on December 8, 2009 by failing , in a timely
manner, to restore the status of [Ms. Bremsak] as shop steward, and member on
the British Columbia Yukon Regional Executive and SP Vancouver Sub-Group
Executive, and to advise its members and officials, in the form described in
paragraph 131 of [the Board’s] decision, that [Ms. Bremsak] has been
reinstated to all of her elected and
appointed
positions subject to the normal operation of the constitution and by-laws of
the [Institute].
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[15]
In the
show cause order, the recitation of the offices held by Ms. Bremsak excludes
two of the positions from which Ms. Bremsak had been suspended, namely her
positions with the National SP Group Executive and the Greater Vancouver Branch
Executive. That is because Ms. Bremsak’s terms on those two positions expired
before December 8, 2009.
[16]
The
prothonotary had concluded (at paragraph 33 of his reasons) that “a prima
facie case of contempt has not been made out with respect to reinstatement
of Ms. Bremsak to the two positions whose terms had expired at the time the
Board decision was filed with this Court.” That conclusion was based on the
premise, stated at paragraph 30 of his reasons, that the requirement to comply
with the Reinstatement Order crystallized on December 8, 2009, when it was
filed with the Federal Court and became a court order.
Warman v. Tremaine
[17]
The show
cause order was made without the benefit of the decision of this Court in Warman
v. Tremaine, 2011 FCA 297 (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada
denied: Tremaine v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights
Commission),
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 510). The narrow issue determined in Warman is that
an order of a tribunal that is filed in the Federal Court pursuant to a
provision similar to section 52 of the Act may be the subject of contempt
proceedings in the Federal
Court if the alleged contemnor has knowledge of the
tribunal’s order whether or not it has knowledge that the order is filed in the
Federal Court.
[18]
More
broadly, Warman stands for the proposition that in enforcement
proceedings following the filing of a tribunal order in the Federal Court, what
is being enforced is the tribunal order. This is well explained in the
following excerpt from the reasons of Justice Noël, writing for the majority:
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38. In my view, the issue raised in this appeal turns on the
registration provision set out in section 57 of the [Canadian Human Rights
Act], and in particular whether the order enforced under the authority of
that provision is the order of the Tribunal or the order of the Court.
39. The answer to that question is relatively straight
forward when one considers that the only order being enforced under this
scheme is that of the Tribunal and that there is to-day no legal principle
that restricts the use of contempt powers to orders issued by superior
Courts.
40. This last proposition flows from the decision of the
Supreme Court in United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General),
[1992] S.C.J. No. 37;
[1992] 1 S.C.R. 901
[United Nurses ]. The issue in that case turned on subsection 142(7)
of the Labour Relations Act of Alberta, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-1.1, a provision
analogous to section 57 of the Act:
142. (7) If any directive made by the Board pursuant to
subsection (5) or (6) is not complied with, the Board may, ..., file a copy
of the directive with the clerk of the Court [of Queen's Bench] ... and
thereupon the directive is enforceable as a judgment or order of the Court.
41. At issue was whether criminal contempt proceedings could
validly be initiated further to the filing of a Board directive under that
provision with the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench. One of the arguments made
was that at common law, the power to punish for criminal contempt is
available only in relation to orders of superior Courts, and since the
directive sought to be enforced was that of a lower Tribunal, the Court did
not have the jurisdiction to invoke its contempt powers in support of it (United
Nurses, para. 70).
42. McLachlin J. (as she then was) writing for the majority,
rejected this argument. She explained that although Board orders are not the
same as Court orders, that does not mean that they are any less enforceable
by superior Courts through contempt proceedings (United Nurses, para.
71). In so holding, she adopted the reasoning of Blair J.A. in Ajax and
Pickering General Hospital v. Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 906,
132 D.L.R. (3d) 270;
[1981] O.J. No. 1121
[Ajax ], who held that a Board order issued pursuant to the equivalent
provision of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 228,
was enforceable as such from the time it was filed in the Court (Ajax,
paras. 63 to 83).
43. Earlier on in her reasons, McLachlin J. explained that
there was a time when only orders of superior Courts were considered to be
deserving of the respect which contempt proceedings are intended to secure.
However, that time has passed; the question whether criminal contempt powers
should be available with respect to orders of lower tribunals no longer
raises an issue of jurisdiction but one of policy (United Nurses,
para. 69):
It questions whether the legislature should enact that
breach of a tribunal order is subject to the same consequences as breach of a
court order. The power of the legislature to do this cannot be questioned;
legislatures routinely make changes in the law which empower or require
federally appointed judges to impose certain remedies. Thus the question is
one of policy; policy moreover, which can be debated. Against the argument
that the contempt power is so serious that it should only be available for
breaches of orders actually made by s. 96 judges, can be raised the argument
that in reality important portions of our law are administered not by s. 96
judges but by inferior tribunals, and that these decisions, like court decisions,
form part of the law and deserve respect and consequently the support of the
contempt power.
44. It is now settled law that decisions of lower Tribunals
can be enforced on their own account through contempt proceedings because
they, like decisions of the superior Courts, are considered by the legislator
to be deserving of the respect which the contempt powers are intended to
impose. This is what section 57 achieves with respect to orders made by the
Tribunal under sections 53 and 54 of the Act.
45. It follows that in
the present case, there is only one order - the Tribunal order - which is
enforced by the Federal Court pursuant to section 57 as though it was an
order of that Court. This intent is best reflected by the French text according to which:
"les ordonnances rendues en vertu des articles 53 et 54 [...] peuvent
[...] être assimilées aux ordonnances rendues par celle-ci [i.e.,
la Cour fédérale] ".
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[19]
In my view, the same
reasoning necessarily leads to the conclusion that the contempt proceedings in
this case must focus on the alleged breach of the Reinstatement Order from the
date on which it was made, August 26, 2009, and not from the date on which it
was filed in the Federal Court. It follows that the prothonotary erred in
concluding that the Institute could not, as a matter of law, be found to be in
contempt of the Reinstatement Order in respect of the period between August 26,
2009 and December 8, 2009.
[20]
Justice Lemieux
concluded, as have I, that the Warman case demonstrated that the
prothonotary’s order was based on an incorrect legal principle, and he
proceeded to determine the merits of the contempt charge on the basis of the
Institute’s failure to comply with the Reinstatement Order at any time after it
was made.
[21]
In this appeal, the
Institute makes two submissions on the effect of Warman. First, the
Institute argues that regardless of what contempt it could have been charged
with under the principle in Warman, the actual charge set out in the
show cause order relates only to events after December 8, 2009 and therefore,
the determination of whether it had a lawful excuse for failing to comply with
the Reinstatement Order must be determined on the basis of the state of affairs
on and after December 8, 2009. Second, the Institute argues that to find it in
contempt in relation to events that occurred before December 8, 2009 is a
breach of procedural fairness because it was not given an opportunity to defend
itself from a contempt charge based on earlier events.
[22]
In the unusual
circumstances of this case, I see no merit to either of these arguments. The Warman
decision of this Court was rendered on October 26, 2011, after the trial of the
contempt charge in relation to the Reinstatement Order (October 20 and 21,
2010), and while the matter was under reserve. Justice Lemieux provided the
parties with a copy of Warman and invited their submissions. Both
parties filed written submissions within the deadline stipulated by Justice
Lemieux. In making those submissions, the parties knew that because of Warman
it would be open to Justice Lemieux to conclude that events prior to December
8, 2009 could be the subject of contempt proceedings in relation to the
Reinstatement Order, and that Justice Lemieux was proposing to consider whether
those prior events should be taken into account.
[23]
In its submissions to
Justice Lemieux, the Institute argued that despite Warman, the events
prior to December 8, 2009 were not legally relevant given the language of the
charge. The Institute also argued in the alternative that even if the relevant
date was August 26, 2009, its failure to comply was justified by the fact that
its stay applications in this Court were not determined until October 28, 2009
(an argument that I have already rejected).
[24]
And yet the Institute
made no request to reopen the trial to adduce evidence relating to the period
from August 26, 2009 to December 8, 2009, a course of action that clearly was
open to it. Nor did the Institute suggest to Justice Lemieux that there is
evidence it could have adduced to establish a lawful excuse for failing to
comply with the Reinstatement Order before December 8,
2009
(apart from the evidence it had already submitted in support of its argument
that it had a lawful excuse after December 8, 2009).
[25]
It would have been
preferable as a matter of procedure if Justice Lemieux had formally amended the
show cause order to reflect the principle in Warman, effectively
restarting the contempt proceedings. However, the record discloses no basis
upon which this Court can reasonably conclude that the failure to formally
amend the charge caused prejudice to the Institute.
The merits of the contempt charges
[26]
The Institute does
not challenge the conclusion of Justice Lemieux that the Institute did not
restore Ms. Bremsak to her elected and appointed positions or give the required
notification of her reinstatement to its members and officials. The issue on
appeal is whether Justice Lemieux erred in concluding that the Institute had no
lawful justification for failing to restore Ms. Bremsak to her elected and
appointed positions.
[27]
It is convenient to
consider the question of justification in two stages. I will discuss first the
period from August 26, 2009 (the date of the Reinstatement Order) to October
20, 2009 (the date on which the Institute suspended Ms. Bremsak’s membership
for five years). I will then discuss the period after October 20, 2009 when the
suspension was in place.
August 26 to October 20, 2009
[28]
As indicated above,
by December 8, 2009 when the Reinstatement Order was filed in the Federal
Court, the Institute had
not restored Ms. Bremsak to any of her elected or appointed positions. Nor had
it done so by the time of the hearing before Justice Lemieux. The Institute
submitted to Justice Lemieux that it had a lawful excuse for failing to
reinstate Ms. Bremsak to her elected and appointed positions before December 8,
2009 because on October 20, 2009, the Institute had suspended Ms. Bremsak as a
member for a five year period and so she could not hold office during that
period.
[29]
Justice Lemieux
concluded that the suspension of Ms. Bremsak on October 20, 2009 did not excuse
the Institute from its obligation to reinstate her prior to that date. He
interpreted the Reinstatement Order to require her reinstatement “immediately
in order that her term of office not expire and the real harm she suffered not
be repaired” (paragraph 78 of his reasons). That interpretation of the
Reinstatement Order was based on a careful consideration of the Board’s
reasons, and in my view it is the correct interpretation. I conclude that
Justice Lemieux made no error in finding the Institute in contempt of the
Reinstatement Order when it failed to reinstate Ms. Bremsak after August 26,
2009 and before October 20, 2009.
After October 20, 2009
[30]
Justice Lemieux also concluded
that even after the October 20, 2009 suspension, the defence of justification
was not made out. In reaching that conclusion, he acknowledged that Ms.
Bremsak’s complaints about the suspension would be decided by the Board and not
by him. However, he also noted that he had been directed by this Court that he
was not obliged to assume that the suspension was valid.
[31]
The direction of this
Court to which Justice Lemieux referred arose this way. On March 31, 2011,
after the hearing on October 20 and 21, 2010, and while the matter was under
reserve, Justice Lemieux convened the parties by telephone to discuss his
concern about determining the contempt proceedings without the benefit of a
decision by the Board as to the merits of Ms. Bremsak’s unfair labour practice
complaint in relation to the five year suspension imposed on October 20, 2009.
On April 1, 2011, Justice Lemieux ordered a stay of the contempt proceedings
pending the outcome of the Board proceedings. His reason for ordering the stay
is summarized in paragraph 10 of his reasons (2011 FC 406):
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10 Clearly a central aspect of the Institute's
defence to a finding of contempt is lawful excuse. During the hearing in
Vancouver I had ruled out any evidence by either party on the issue of
whether the Executive Committee's decision to suspend her from membership on
the basis of the harassment complaint could not be entertained by the Court
because the matter of the validity of the Executive Committee's decision was
before the [Board] and it would be improper for me to adjudicate on the issue
which Parliament had mandated the [Board], a specialized tribunal in labour
matters, to deal with. In my view, success or failure by Ms. Bremsak before
that tribunal is material to her success or failure in the contempt hearing.
In the interest of justice, I expressed, yesterday, my opinion to the parties
that I should stay the proceedings before me until the [Board]
adjudicated on her complains [sic] on her membership suspension or
until a judicial review of that decision was determined, a matter which must
be dealt with by the Federal Court of Appeal.
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[32]
Ms. Bremsak appealed
the stay order to this Court. Both parties submitted to this Court that the
stay order should be set aside and that Justice Lemieux should be required to
determine the contempt matter. The appeal was allowed on September 19, 2011
(2011 FCA 258) on the basis that the Institute was entitled to a prompt
resolution of the allegations based on the evidence the parties had chosen to
submit to the Federal Court.
[33]
The Institute argues
that Justice Lemieux erred in relying on Ms. Bremsak’s challenges to the
October 20, 2009 suspensions because he had ruled in the course of the hearing
that the parties would not be permitted to adduce evidence going to the merits
of the suspensions, which was a question before the Board. I do not accept that
argument. By virtue of the September 19, 2011 judgment of this Court allowing
the appeal from Justice Lemieux’s stay order, he was obliged to determine the
contempt charge based on the evidence then before him. At that time, the record
included properly admitted documentary evidence of the allegations made by Ms.
Bremsak in support of her complaint about the October 20, 2009 suspensions, and
the grounds upon which the Institute alleged that her complaint was unfounded.
The only excluded evidence was the oral testimony of the witnesses at the
contempt hearing to explain why the suspensions were imposed.
[34]
In my view, Justice
Lemieux made no error in considering the documentary evidence of Ms. Bremsak’s
allegations (although disputed and unproven), against the documentary evidence
of the Institute’s responses (also unproven) in order to determine whether the
suspension decision should justify the failure to comply with the Reinstatement
Order. The factual conclusions he reached upon considering that evidence were
reasonably open to him.
[35]
Justice Lemieux noted
particularly that the suspensions were ordered to take place immediately and
that the Executive Committee received no submissions from Ms. Bremsak in
determining that a five year suspension was an appropriate remedy for the
alleged harassment. The Institute had submitted to the Board that Ms. Bremsak
had an opportunity to respond to the report of the person who investigated the
harassment allegations. However, the investigator’s report, which is in the
record, makes no recommendations as to remedy. There is no evidence that Ms.
Bremsak was afforded an opportunity to make submissions to the Executive
Committee as to what an appropriate remedy might be.
[36]
I conclude that
Justice Lemieux made no error in law or fact when he found that the October 20,
2009 suspensions did not excuse the Institute from complying with the
Reinstatement Order, or when he found the Institute to be in contempt of the
Reinstatement Order after October 20, 2009.
Conclusion
[37]
I would
dismiss the appeal.
[38]
Ms.
Bremsak has asked for special costs to cover the costs of this appeal, the
contempt trial, the show cause hearing, and the cost of the proceedings before
the Board to have the Reinstatement Order filed in the Federal Court. This
Court has no authority to grant costs in respect of proceedings before the
Board. As to the request for costs in the Federal Court, I note that the matter
of costs has not yet been considered by Justice Lemieux. In my view, it would
not be appropriate in the context of this appeal for the Court to award costs
in the Federal Court. However, I would award Ms. Bremsak her costs of this
appeal. I am satisfied that Ms. Bremsak should receive costs on a higher
than normal scale. I would award her costs in this Court in
the amount of $7,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.
“K. Sharlow”
“I
agree
J.D. Denis Pelletier J.A.”
“I
agree
Robert M. Mainville J.A.”
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