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SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Yousanthan
Youvarajah
Appellant
and
Her
Majesty The Queen
Respondent
-
and -
Criminal
Lawyers’ Association
Intervener
Coram: McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
Reasons
for Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 72)
Dissenting
Reasons:
(paras. 73 to 153):
|
Karakatsanis J. (McLachlin C.J. and Fish,
Abella and Cromwell JJ. concurring)
Wagner J. (Rothstein J. concurring)
|
R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720
Yousanthan Youvarajah Appellant
v.
Her Majesty The Queen Respondent
and
Criminal Lawyers’ Association Intervener
Indexed as: R. v. Youvarajah
2013 SCC 41
File No.: 34732.
2013: February 20; 2013: July 25.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Fish, Abella, Rothstein, Cromwell,
Karakatsanis and Wagner JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for ontario
Criminal
law — Evidence — Admissibility — Hearsay — Murder trial — Co-accused witness recanting previous statement implicating accused in murder — Trial judge
finding prior inconsistent statement not meeting threshold reliability test —
Whether prior inconsistent statement was sufficiently reliable to be considered
by jury for truth of its contents.
The
accused, Y, and D.S., the co-accused shooter, were charged with first degree
murder after a failed drug deal. D.S. was tried separately as a young
offender. He pleaded guilty to second degree murder. As
part of his plea agreement, D.S. signed a written Agreed Statement of Facts
(ASF) drafted by Crown counsel, with input from defence counsel. The ASF directly
implicated Y in the murder. At the time of his plea, D.S. acknowledged the
accuracy of the ASF. The ASF was neither videotaped nor preceded by sworn oath
or affirmation.
During
Y’s trial, the Crown asked D.S. to adopt the ASF. D.S. testified that he could
not remember signing the document, but acknowledged that it bore his
signature. D.S. further denied the facts in the ASF implicating Y. In
response to D.S.’s denials, the Crown sought to adduce the ASF for the truth of
its contents. Following a voir dire, the trial judge found insufficient
means for the jury to assess the reliability of the ASF as a prior inconsistent
statement and ruled the signed ASF did not meet the threshold reliability
required for it to be admissible as evidence for the truth of its contents. When
D.S. asserted solicitor-client privilege, the ability to cross-examine was
curtailed and the trial judge found the opportunity for an effective
cross-examination at trial was to a large extent illusory. The trial judge granted
the defence’s application for a directed order acquitting Y. The Court of
Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.
Held
(Rothstein and Wagner JJ. dissenting): The appeal should be allowed and
the acquittal restored.
Per McLachlin C.J.
and Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ.: A prior inconsistent
statement of a non-accused witness may be admitted for the truth of its
contents if the following reliability indicia are met: (1) the statement
is made under oath or solemn affirmation after a warning as to possible
sanctions if the person is untruthful; (2) the statement is videotaped or
recorded in its entirety; and (3) the opposing party has a full
opportunity to cross-examine the witness on the statement. The prior inconsistent
statement’s threshold reliability may also be established by: (1) the
presence of adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural
reliability); and (2) sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability
or an inherent trustworthiness (substantive reliability). A trial judge is well-placed
to assess the hearsay dangers in a particular case and the effectiveness of any
safeguards to assist in overcoming them. Thus, absent an error in principle,
the trial judge’s determination of threshold reliability is entitled to
deference.
In
this case, the trial judge did not err in finding that there were insufficient
safeguards to establish threshold reliability to admit the ASF as evidence for
the truth of its contents. Only a full and complete opportunity to cross-examine
would have provided a genuine basis on which to assess the reliability of D.S.’s
statements. D.S.’s invocation of solicitor-client privilege, however, curtailed
significantly the cross-examination available to assess the threshold
reliability of the prior inconsistent statement. The Crown could not have
probed the conversations between D.S. and his counsel about legal advice in
connection with his decision to plead guilty or to accept the ASF. The trial
judge may have overstated the scope of solicitor-client privilege and its
consequences for the cross-examination of D.S.; however, any overstatement would
not have had a material impact on the conclusion that cross-examination was
not, in this case, a sufficient means to satisfy threshold reliability.
The
Crown cannot ask for a new trial on the basis that the prosecution should have
been conducted differently. The trial judge did not preclude the Crown from
conducting a more probing cross-examination of the witness or from calling
other witnesses about the creation of the ASF. The trial judge made no
comments suggesting that there should be no further cross-examination of the
witness on the voir dire. The judge was not asked for a ruling on this
issue. Had Crown counsel wished to call further evidence, he could have sought
direction. Since this was the same Crown counsel who had prosecuted D.S. at
his separate youth trial, and who negotiated the plea bargain and drafted the ASF,
he knew what D.S. or his lawyers could say about those matters, outside the
scope of solicitor-client privilege.
The
trial judge did not err in finding that the circumstances surrounding the making
of the prior inconsistent statement did not provide sufficient guarantees of
substantive reliability. The circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
asserted by the Crown — the thorough process in creating the ASF, the involvement
of counsel, and the solemnity of the guilty plea proceeding — do not establish
threshold reliability for the statements from which D.S. recanted, which served
to minimize his involvement in the murder and shift responsibility to Y. In
the circumstances of this case, the formality of the process and the
involvement of counsel only provide comfort in respect of D.S.’s statements
admitting his own culpability for the murder. The administration of justice
would not be enhanced in permitting admissions made by a co-accused in his own
interest, as part of a plea bargain for a conviction of a lesser crime and
favourable sentence, to be used against a co-accused, in circumstances where
the reliability of the statements cannot be adequately tested.
Per Rothstein and Wagner JJ.
(dissenting): Threshold reliability should be generously interpreted in the
admissibility inquiry. As a general rule, if a statement is accepted for its
truth by the courts, and used to balance the liberty interests of the accused
with societal considerations such as deterrence and retribution, then that
statement provides a level of implicit reliability that warrants consideration
in the admissibility inquiry in a subsequent third-party trial. That is not to
say that a statement’s use and judicial acceptance at a prior proceeding is
sufficient in and of itself to meet the reliability requirement of the
principled approach. Rather, it is merely a factor that must be considered in
the admissibility inquiry, a factor that goes towards meeting the threshold
reliability standard. Each case will have to be examined on its particular
circumstances when determining threshold reliability, but consideration should
certainly be given to the general acceptance of and reliance on statements read
in as part of a guilty plea. Limits on cross-examination should not be applied
rigidly and absolutely where solicitor-client privilege is asserted. Rather,
issues of privilege should be addressed as they arise on cross-examination.
This way, relevant information that may not be prohibited by the assertion of
privilege may still be elicited, furthering the underlying truth-seeking
function of the proceedings.
The
question of admissibility in this case must be redetermined in a new trial where
threshold reliability can be properly assessed. The trial judge erred in his
determination that the ASF did not meet the standard of threshold reliability.
He failed to adequately assess the available indicia of reliability and
erroneously found the opportunity to cross-examine D.S. to be illusory. That
is not to say that the circumstances in this case provide sufficient evidence
to conclusively determine that the ASF should be admitted. Rather, the
admissibility inquiry was incomplete and did not provide a proper basis for the
trial judge to exclude the relevant evidence. The opportunity to cross-examine
D.S. was not entirely closed and the trial judge misapprehended the scope and
impact of solicitor-client privilege on the opportunity for cross-examination.
Had the trial judge permitted the cross-examination to proceed and addressed
issues involving solicitor-client privilege as they arose, information
sufficient to meet the threshold reliability standard may have been brought
forward. D.S. was available for cross-examination, he recalled having made
many of the statements within the ASF, he did not dispute understanding the key
facts in the ASF which he subsequently denied at Y’s trial, and he recalled the
ASF being read in at his guilty plea proceeding.
Other
factors were available in this case that could have satisfied the trial judge that
the circumstances surrounding the drafting and reading in of the ASF provided
assurances of reliability equivalent to an oath and presence. If these indicia
had been considered and cross-examination had been permitted, it is possible
that threshold reliability would have been met. Perhaps the most persuasive
indicia of reliability are the nature of the statement and how it was
constructed. The ASF tendered as evidence in D.S.’s guilty plea proceeding
provides just such a record. Having been reduced to writing, signed not only by
D.S. but by both Crown and defence counsel, and having been read in to the
record in the context of D.S.’s guilty plea, the source of the document cannot
be disputed. This was not a statement that was unilaterally drafted and forced
upon D.S. to adopt. Rather, the drafting of the ASF was a collaborative effort
where there is evidence that at least one crucial component to the Crown’s case
against Y was supplied by defence counsel — namely the statement that Y
supplied D.S. with the gun. Moreover, D.S. had the opportunity to review the
ASF with his counsel prior to signing it and adopting it. This is an important
aspect as it refutes any negative inferences that could be drawn against the
ASF on the grounds that it was not captured in D.S.’s own words or that D.S.
did not understand its contents. Perhaps most importantly, D.S. testified that
he understood the three crucial components of the ASF, namely that Y gave D.S.
the gun, Y told D.S. to shoot the victim, and demanded that D.S. return the
gun. Without more persuasive evidence to the contrary, this essentially
forecloses any argument that D.S. lacked understanding of the ASF’s contents. Looking
beyond the construction of the ASF, the context of the proceedings under which
it was read in to court and the contents of the ASF itself provide additional
indicia supporting threshold reliability.
Cases Cited
By Karakatsanis J.
Referred
to: R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740; R. v. Conway
(1997), 36 O.R. (3d) 579; R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R.
787; R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531; R. v. Smith, [1992] 2
S.C.R. 915; R. v. U. (F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764; R. v. Blackman,
2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298; R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043; R.
v. Devine, 2008 SCC 36, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283; R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC
28, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517; R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R.
609; R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC 13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411; R. v. Khela,
2009 SCC 4, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 104; R. v. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11, [2000] 1
S.C.R. 237.
By Wagner J. (dissenting)
R.
v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740; R. v. Conway (1997), 36 O.R. (3d)
579; R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787; R. v. U.
(F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 764; R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 517; R. v. Trieu (2005), 195 C.C.C. (3d) 373; R. v. Blackman,
2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298; R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043; R.
v. Tran, 2010 ONCA 471, 103 O.R. (3d) 131; R. v. D.P., 2010 ONCA
563, 268 O.A.C. 118; R. v. McGee, 2009 CanLII 60789; R. v. McClure,
2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445; R. v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1
S.C.R. 688.
Authors Cited
Paciocco, David M., and Lee Stuesser. The Law of Evidence,
6th ed. Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011.
Proulx, Michel, and David Layton. Ethics and Canadian Criminal Law.
Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001.
Wigmore, John Henry. Evidence in Trials at Common Law, vol. 8.
Revised by John T. McNaughton. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1961.
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal (Winkler C.J.O. and Moldaver and
Simmons JJ.A.), 2011 ONCA 654, 107 O.R. (3d) 401, 284 O.A.C. 300,
278 C.C.C. (3d) 102, 90 C.R. (6th) 184, [2011] O.J. No. 4610 (QL), 2011
CarswellOnt 11167, setting aside the accused’s acquittal entered by Flynn J.
on March 17, 2010, and ordering a new trial. Appeal allowed and
acquittal restored, Rothstein and Wagner JJ. dissenting.
Philip R. Campbell and Jonathan Dawe, for the appellant.
James K. Stewart and Nadia Thomas, for the respondent.
Marie Henein and Matthew
Gourlay, for the intervener.
The judgment of McLachlin
C.J. and Fish, Abella, Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. was delivered by
Karakatsanis J. —
I. Introduction
[1]
The issue in this appeal
is whether a co-accused’s prior inconsistent statement, implicating the
appellant in a murder, was sufficiently reliable to be considered by a jury for
the truth of its contents.
[2]
The Crown’s theory was
that the appellant planned the murder and provided the murder weapon to the co-accused
shooter. The shooter, in a separate proceeding in youth court, pleaded guilty
to second degree murder. In doing so, he adopted a written Agreed Statement of
Facts (ASF) in which he shifted responsibility for planning the murder and for
obtaining the murder weapon to the appellant.
[3]
As a witness in the appellant’s murder trial,
the shooter resiled from those facts inculpating the appellant and refused to
adopt the prior statement. The Crown’s case against the appellant collapsed
when the trial judge found that the ASF did not meet the threshold reliability
required to be admitted for the truth of its contents.
[4]
The question before us
is whether the trial judge erred in finding that the ASF did not meet threshold
reliability to be put before the jury.
[5]
The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
judge erred. However, for the reasons that follow, I would allow the appeal
and reinstate the acquittal.
II. Background
[6]
Yousanthan Youvarajah, the appellant, and D.S.,
a minor, were charged with first degree murder after a failed drug deal. On
the Crown’s theory, Youvarajah planned the murder and provided the murder
weapon for D.S. to shoot the victim.
[7]
D.S. was tried separately as a young offender. He pleaded guilty to second degree murder and
was sentenced as a youth. As part of his plea agreement, D.S. signed the ASF
drafted by Crown counsel, with input from defence counsel. In it, D.S.
directly implicated the appellant in the murder: the appellant gave D.S. the
handgun that was used in the shooting; he ordered D.S. to shoot the victim; and
he demanded the return of the handgun after the shooting.
[8]
At the time of his plea,
D.S. acknowledged the accuracy of the ASF. At the appellant’s trial, he
testified that he did not understand the words “acknowledged” or “accurate” as
used by his counsel at the guilty plea proceedings.
[9]
The ASF was neither
videotaped nor preceded by sworn oath or affirmation. D.S. was told that, for
endorsing the agreed statement, no further statement regarding the murder would
be required from him. During his testimony at the appellant’s trial, he said
that was one of the reasons that motivated him to plead guilty.
[10]
During examination-in-chief,
the Crown asked D.S. to adopt the ASF. D.S. testified that he could not
remember signing the document, but acknowledged that it bore his signature.
D.S. further denied the facts in the statement implicating the appellant.
Instead, D.S. testified that the gun was his own; he shot the victim because of
the way he was talking; and he threw the gun into the river after the shooting.
[11]
In response to D.S.’s denials, the Crown sought
to adduce the ASF for the truth of its contents. The trial judge rejected the
Crown’s application. At the close of the Crown’s case, the trial judge granted
the defence’s application for a directed order acquitting the appellant.
III. Decisions Below
[12]
Following a voir dire, Flynn J. ruled
that the signed ASF — hearsay evidence by virtue of being an out-of-court
statement adduced for the truth of its contents — did not meet the threshold
reliability required for it to be admissible as evidence. None of the
safeguards identified in this Court’s decision in R. v. B. (K.G.),
[1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (K.G.B.), for reducing the dangers associated with
hearsay had been undertaken. The statement was not videotaped; there had been
no recital of an oath or affirmation; and the transcript of the guilty plea
proceedings was not a suitable substitute to assess D.S.’s demeanour and
credibility at the time the statement was made. Furthermore, the statement had
been drafted by counsel; it was not offered spontaneously and was not in D.S.’s
own words.
[13]
Referring to R. v. Conway (1997), 36 O.R.
(3d) 579 (C.A.), Flynn J. noted that the opportunity for an effective
cross-examination at trial would be “to a large extent illusory” where the
declarant experiences significant memory lapses or where he recants (A.R., vol.
I, at p. 61). D.S.’s refusal to waive solicitor-client privilege precluded
questions to D.S. or his counsel about how D.S. came to implicate the appellant
(A.R., vol. I, at p. 59).
[14]
Flynn J. found insufficient means for the jury
to assess the reliability of the ASF as a prior inconsistent statement and held
that it was not admissible as evidence for the truth of its contents.
[15]
The Ontario Court of
Appeal concluded that the trial judge erred in his understanding of the scope
of solicitor-client privilege. Solicitor-client privilege would not have
precluded all questioning of D.S. or his counsel regarding the ASF or his
choice to implicate the appellant. The Court of Appeal also held that the
trial judge further erred in strictly focussing on the K.G.B.
requirements for establishing reliability and in failing to consider other
factors, such as the solemnity of the occasion upon which D.S. adopted the ASF
and the involvement of counsel in preparing it.
[16]
Satisfied that without such errors the trial
judge might have admitted the ASF into evidence, the Ontario Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.
IV. Issues
[17]
The question in this
appeal is whether the trial judge erred in finding that there were insufficient
safeguards to establish threshold reliability to admit the ASF as evidence and,
if he did, whether the error had a material bearing on the result. Answering
this question requires the consideration of two issues:
(a) Did the trial judge err in finding that cross-examination
did not provide a sufficient basis for the jury to assess the truthfulness of
the prior inconsistent statement?
(b) Did the trial judge err in finding that the circumstances
surrounding the making of the prior inconsistent statement did not provide
sufficient guarantees of substantive reliability?
V. Legal Principles
A. Hearsay and Threshold Reliability
[18]
Hearsay evidence — an out-of-court statement
tendered for the truth of its contents — is presumptively inadmissible. This
is because the dangers associated with hearsay evidence may undermine the
truth-seeking function of a trial or its fairness. These dangers typically
include an inability to test and assess a declarant’s perception, memory,
narration, or sincerity: R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R.
787, at para. 2.
[19]
The law has conventionally favoured the evidence
of witnesses who give evidence in court because they can be observed, under
oath or affirmation, and their credibility and reliability can be tested
by cross-examination. These elements help the trier of fact assess the
credibility of the declarant or witness, the reliability of the evidence, and
the degree of probative force it carries. When these elements are absent, as
is the case with a statement made outside of the court, it is more difficult
for the trier of fact to make these assessments.
[20]
Over time, however, the
law has recognized that in certain circumstances, it may be safe to rely on
out-of-court statements for the truth of their contents. Exceptions to the
hearsay rule developed for statements carrying certain guarantees of inherent
trustworthiness, often because of the circumstances in which they were made
(for example, dying declarations and declarations that are adverse in
interest).
[21]
In addition to the
traditional exceptions, however, this Court developed a principled approach
that permits trial judges to admit hearsay evidence if it meets the twin
threshold requirements of necessity and reliability. This is a flexible
case-by-case examination. See especially R. v. Khan, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
531; R. v. Smith, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 915; K.G.B.; R. v. U. (F.J.),
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 764; and R. v. Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2 S.C.R.
298, at para. 38. With the increased flexibility provided by the principled approach,
however, the gatekeeper function of the trial judge becomes more complex and
nuanced.
[22]
Where a witness recants from a prior statement,
necessity is established: Khelawon, at para. 78. The focus in this case
is on whether the prior inconsistent statement meets threshold reliability.
[23]
The trial judge, as the evidentiary gatekeeper,
assesses the threshold reliability of the hearsay statement. The
decision as to the ultimate reliability of the statement is left to the
trier of fact: Khelawon, at para. 2. Even if the necessity and
reliability of the hearsay evidence are proven, the trial judge maintains
discretion to exclude the evidence where the “prejudicial effect is out of
proportion to its probative value”: Khelawon, at para. 3.
[24]
Why not simply let the trier of fact determine
both threshold and ultimate reliability? Professors D. M. Paciocco and L.
Stuesser provide the following explanation, with which I agree:
In considering “reliability”,
a distinction is made between “threshold” and “ultimate” reliability. This
distinction reflects the important difference between admission and reliance.
Threshold reliability is for the trial judge and concerns the admissibility of
the statement. The trial judge acts as a gatekeeper whose function “is limited
to determining whether the particular hearsay statement exhibits sufficient indicia
of reliability so as to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the statement.” So long as it can be assessed and
accepted by a reasonable trier of fact, then the evidence should be admitted.
Once admitted, the jury remains the ultimate arbiter of what to do with the
evidence and deciding whether or not the statement is true.
(The Law of Evidence (6th ed. 2011), at pp. 122-23)
See R.
v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043, at para. 75; and Khelawon, at
paras. 50-52.
[25]
Threshold reliability serves an important
function. Rules of evidence and principles governing the admissibility of
evidence exist in the first place because experience teaches that certain types
of evidence can be presumptively unreliable (or prejudicial) and can undermine
the truth-seeking function of a trial. Rules of admissibility of evidence
address trial fairness and provide predictability. They also provide the means
to maintain control over the scope of criminal trials to keep them manageable
and focussed on probative and relevant evidence.
B. Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements
[26]
Historically, an out-of-court prior inconsistent
statement of a non-accused witness was admissible only to impeach the
credibility of the witness. A prior inconsistent statement — hearsay evidence
— was not admissible for the truth of its contents unless the witness adopted
the prior statement in court. Otherwise, the jury was limited to rejecting the
viva voce evidence of the recanting witness; the jury could not
substitute the contents of the out-of-court statement.
[27]
This traditional rule
excluding prior inconsistent statements was altered in K.G.B. to conform
with the evolving principled approach to hearsay. On an exceptional basis, a
prior inconsistent statement is admissible for the truth of its contents,
provided the threshold criteria of necessity and reliability are established.
[28]
In K.G.B., at p. 787, Lamer C.J. stated that the focus of the
reliability inquiry, when dealing with prior inconsistent statements, “is on
the comparative reliability of the prior statement and the testimony offered at
trial, and so additional indicia and guarantees of reliability . . . must be
secured in order to bring the prior statement to a comparable standard of
reliability before such statements are admitted as substantive evidence”.
[29]
Accordingly, Lamer C.J.
held, at pp. 795-96, that a prior inconsistent statement of a non-accused
witness may be admitted for the truth of its contents if the so-called K.G.B.
reliability indicia are met: (1) the statement is made under oath or solemn
affirmation after a warning as to possible sanctions if the person is
untruthful; (2) the statement is videotaped or recorded in its entirety; and
(3) the opposing party has a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness on
the statement. Such K.G.B. statements have become prevalent, especially
in murder investigations.
[30]
However, the K.G.B. indicia are not the
only means of establishing threshold reliability. The prior inconsistent
statement’s threshold reliability may be established by: (1) the presence of
adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability);
and (2) sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability or an inherent
trustworthiness (substantive reliability): Khelawon, at paras. 61-63.
These two principal ways of showing threshold reliability are not mutually
exclusive: R. v. Devine, 2008 SCC 36, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, at para. 22.
[31]
The admissibility of
hearsay evidence, such as the prior inconsistent statement in this case, is a
question of law. Of course, the factual findings that go into that
determination are entitled to deference and are not challenged in this case.
As well, a trial judge is well placed to assess the hearsay dangers in a
particular case and the effectiveness of any safeguards to assist in overcoming
them. Thus, absent an error in principle, the trial judge’s determination of threshold
reliability is entitled to deference: R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 517, at para. 81.
[32]
To obtain a new trial
following an acquittal, the Crown must show that the trial judge erred and that
this error “might reasonably be thought . . . to have had a material bearing on
the acquittal”: R. v. Graveline, 2006 SCC 16, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 609, at
para. 14. The Crown is not required to establish “that the verdict would
necessarily have been different”: Graveline, at para. 14. This is
still, however, a “heavy onus” for the Crown: R. v. Briscoe, 2010 SCC
13, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 411, at para. 26.
VI. Application
[33]
In light of the trial
judge’s obligation to act as evidentiary gatekeeper, I turn first to the
specific hearsay dangers posed by the prior inconsistent statement in this case
as noted by the trial judge. In the context of the plea bargain, D.S. had a
strong incentive to minimize his role in the crime and to shift responsibility
to the appellant, a co-accused, in order to obtain a favourable outcome. There
was no opportunity to observe the demeanour of D.S. or his own choice of words,
as the ASF was drafted by counsel and was not spontaneous. When D.S. asserted
solicitor-client privilege, the ability to cross-examine was curtailed.
[34]
The trial judge therefore considered whether
cross-examination of D.S. at the appellant’s trial would provide an adequate
procedural basis to permit the jury to assess the veracity of the prior
statement and whether there were other circumstances that provided circumstantial
assurances of trustworthiness.
A. Procedural Substitutes: The Opportunity to Cross-Examine
the Recanting Witness
[35]
The most important
factor supporting the admissibility of a prior inconsistent statement of a
non-accused witness for the truth of its contents is the availability of the
non-accused witness for cross-examination. In Couture, Charron J. held
that “the availability of the declarant for cross-examination goes a
long way to satisfying the requirement for adequate substitutes” for testing
the evidence (at para. 92) and that “the opportunity to cross-examine is the
most powerful factor favouring admissibility” (para. 95).
[36]
In assessing the means by which a jury could
rationally evaluate the truthfulness and accuracy of the statement, the trial
judge correctly noted the importance of cross-examination. He stated that it
was an important means for the jury to determine whether a previous statement
from a witness was ultimately reliable. However, referring to Conway,
the trial judge noted that the opportunity for an effective cross-examination
of D.S. at the appellant’s trial would be “to a large extent illusory” due to
D.S.’s memory lapses with respect to the ASF and his invocation of
solicitor-client privilege.
[37]
With respect to
solicitor-client privilege, the trial judge concluded:
Solicitor/client privilege precluded
questions to or from [D.S.] or indeed of his counsel about how it came to be
that this confession from [D.S.] as the shooter and his implication of the
accused as the person who provided him with the gun and directed him to do the
shooting was made on the day of his guilty plea almost two years after his
arrest when he had never confessed or implicated Yousanthan Youvarajah in all
that time. [A.R., vol. I, at p. 59]
[38]
The respondent agrees
with the Ontario Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in overstating the
scope of solicitor-client privilege and failed to recognize that there would be
significant areas of cross-examination open to counsel at trial. The Court of
Appeal found that the trial judge erred in relying on Conway to conclude
that cross-examination of D.S. would be “to a large extent illusory”. As a result,
the court concluded that the trial judge may have admitted the ASF if he had
appreciated the broader scope of cross-examination available to test its
reliability.
[39]
The Court of Appeal
concluded that both counsel and the trial judge appeared “to have been of the
mistaken view” that solicitor-client privilege would preclude certain questions
being asked of D.S. with respect to the ASF (2011 ONCA 654, 107 O.R. (3d) 401,
at para. 93). Further, at para. 95, the Court of Appeal cited the trial
judge’s statement that “no legal witnesses that have [ever] spoken to [D.S.]”
should be called (A.R., vol. II, at p. 132).
B. Solicitor-Client Privilege
[40]
On a strict reading of the passage quoted above,
I agree that the trial judge overstated the scope of solicitor-client
privilege. It would have been more accurate for the trial judge to say that it
precluded many questions about his decision to accept the plea bargain
and his reasons for implicating the appellant. Simmons J.A., for the unanimous
panel of the Court of Appeal, outlined a number of areas of questioning that
remained available to the Crown (see para. 84).
[41]
However, for the reasons that follow, on my
reading of the reasons and the voir dire record, I am not persuaded that
the trial judge erred in concluding that cross-examination was “to a large
extent illusory” and insufficient to overcome the hearsay dangers in this
particular case. Further, I do not agree that the trial judge precluded the
Crown from conducting a more probing cross-examination of the witness or from
calling other witnesses about the creation of the ASF. Finally, I am not
persuaded that any overstatement of the scope of solicitor-client privilege
would have had a material impact on the conclusion that cross-examination was
not, in this case, a sufficient means to satisfy threshold reliability.
[42]
Once D.S. confirmed that
he would not waive solicitor-client privilege, the Crown chose to circumscribe
its cross-examination and had no further questions of the witness. The trial
judge made no comments suggesting that there should be no further
cross-examination of the witness on the voir dire.
[43]
The following exchange
between Crown counsel and the trial judge occurred after independent counsel
confirmed that D.S. would not waive solicitor-client privilege (A.R., vol. II, at
p. 132):
[CROWN COUNSEL]: And I don’t
anticipate even now given the comments of [D.S.’s independent counsel] Mr.
Marentette I don’t anticipate needing to call further witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, no legal
witnesses that have ever spoken to this man anyway.
[CROWN COUNSEL]: Right.
THE COURT: Right. I mean
we’re going to take Mr. Marentette’s word as the final word on that.
[CROWN COUNSEL]: Right.
[44]
This exchange between
the trial judge and Crown counsel must be read in context. It does not amount
to a direction or a ruling not to call other witnesses. The trial judge merely
affirmed Crown counsel’s statement that he would not be calling any “legal
witnesses that have ever spoken to” the witness (emphasis added). The
judge was not asked for a ruling. Had Crown counsel wished to call further
evidence, he could have sought direction. The judge would no doubt have sought
submissions and considered the extent of the restrictions imposed by
solicitor-client privilege before making a ruling.
[45]
Since this was the same
Crown who had prosecuted D.S. at his separate youth trial, and who negotiated
the plea bargain and drafted the ASF, he knew what D.S. or his lawyers could
say about those matters, outside the scope of solicitor-client privilege.
Thus, I reject the submission that the trial judge curtailed the scope of
evidence on the voir dire.
[46]
I conclude that the voir dire unfolded as
it did primarily due to the Crown’s prosecutorial decisions. Crown counsel was
not precluded by the trial judge from calling further witnesses or from posing
further questions to D.S. The Crown cannot ask for a new trial on the basis
that the prosecution should have been conducted differently.
[47]
Further, it should not be inferred from this
exchange that the trial judge did not correctly understand the scope of
solicitor-client privilege when he made his ruling on the voir dire.
Trial judges are presumed to know the law. Further, given the context of this
informal exchange, I am not persuaded that it provides a basis to conclude that
the trial judge did not understand the scope of solicitor-client privilege. He
was neither stating a legal principle nor making a ruling.
[48]
Finally, notwithstanding
the aspects of cross-examination that would have remained available, the
reality is that solicitor-client privilege would curtail significantly the
cross-examination available to assess the threshold reliability of the prior
inconsistent statement. The Crown could not have probed the conversations
between D.S. and his counsel about legal advice in connection with his decision
to plead guilty or to accept the ASF.
[49]
Simply put, D.S. recanted the portions of the ASF that implicated the
appellant and replaced them with assertions that exonerated the appellant.
Cross-examination of D.S. did not elicit an explanation for his about-face from
the assertions that tied the appellant to the murder. This Court stated in
U. (F.J.), at para. 46, that if the witness “provides an explanation for
changing his or her story, the trier of fact will be able to assess both
versions of the story, as well as the explanation”. Paciocco and Stuesser
similarly state that “[a] testing of the witness’s recantation is only possible
when the witness admits making the earlier statement and provides a story
for his or her recantation” (p. 131 (emphasis added)). See also Khelawon,
at para. 76.
[50]
In this case, solicitor-client privilege would
hinder the fact finder’s opportunity to fully explore any explanation offered.
The jurisprudence emphasizes the presence of a “full opportunity to
cross-examine the witness [at trial] respecting the statement”: K.G.B.,
at p. 796 (emphasis added). In Devine, Charron J. held:
It is
important to note that the availability of the declarant to be cross-examined
will not necessarily tip the scales in favour of admissibility. In order for
this factor to weigh in favour of admission, there must be a “full opportunity
to cross-examine the witness” at trial (K.G.B., at p. 796). [para. 26]
[51]
The trial judge referred
to Conway, a case in which the witness could not recall making the prior
statement and in which cross-examination therefore would not assist in
determining which version was true. Unlike Conway, two versions of the
events were before the trial judge in this case that could have been the
subject of cross-examination (i.e., the ASF and D.S.’s testimony at the
appellant’s trial).
[52]
The trial judge noted in this case that there
were significant memory lapses in addition to D.S.’s recantation and direct
contradiction. I am not satisfied that a fair reading of the trial judge’s
reasons suggests that he misunderstood the law. While he quoted from Conway,
and the circumstances in that case were somewhat dissimilar, the words he
quoted were apt.
[53]
As noted above,
solicitor-client privilege would have significantly limited the effectiveness
of the cross-examination. Thus, even if the trial judge had erred in
overstating the scope of solicitor-client privilege or the analogy to Conway,
I am not persuaded that it would have materially affected the outcome in these
circumstances.
[54]
Given the nature of the
hearsay dangers in this particular case, the trial judge did not err in
concluding that nothing short of full cross-examination could overcome them.
Here, the cross-examination at trial would be significantly limited by the
claim of solicitor-client privilege. The statement was not videotaped. There
had been no oath or affirmation when the statement was made. The transcript of
the guilty plea proceedings established the words of the prior statements but
was not a suitable substitute to assess D.S.’s demeanour and credibility at the
time the statement was made. Lastly, the ASF was not spontaneous and was not
in D.S.’s own words. Under the circumstances, I cannot conclude that the trial
judge erred in finding that there were inadequate substitutes to test and
assess the truth of the evidence.
C. Inherent Trustworthiness: The Circumstances Surrounding
the Preparation and Presentation of the ASF
[55]
If the circumstances in
which the out-of-court statement came about do not give rise to a concern over
whether the statement is true or not, the statement possesses an inherent
trustworthiness or substantive reliability.
[56]
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the
trial judge erred in failing to consider whether the circumstances surrounding
the preparation and presentation of the ASF provided an inherent
trustworthiness to establish threshold reliability.
[57]
In my view, the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness asserted by the respondent — the
thorough process in creating the ASF, the involvement of counsel, and the
solemnity of the guilty plea proceeding — do not establish threshold
reliability for the statements from which D.S. recanted, which served to
minimize his involvement in the murder and shift responsibility to the
appellant. In the circumstances of this case, the formality of the process and
the involvement of counsel only provide comfort in respect of D.S.’s statements
admitting his own culpability for the murder.
[58]
D.S.’s guilty plea was,
indeed, a solemn occasion. The ASF was drafted by the Crown and defence
counsel. It was signed and acknowledged in open court by both D.S. and his
defence counsel at the time D.S. pleaded guilty to second degree murder. D.S.
was represented by counsel when he endorsed the ASF and it formed the basis
upon which the judge entered a conviction for second degree murder and
fashioned his sentence.
[59]
To the extent that the ASF incriminated D.S.,
was against his interests, and admitted his own culpability in court, these
circumstances provide a compelling inference that those statements were in fact
reliable in establishing D.S.’s criminal conduct. However, the underlying
rationale for the admissibility of admissions as against the party making them
falls away when they are sought to be used against a third party.
[60]
Here, the portions of the ASF that the Crown
sought to rely upon at the appellant’s trial are statements that shifted
responsibility for the murder from D.S., the shooter, to his co-accused, the
appellant. They were elements that would support a plea to the lesser offence
of second degree murder as well as support a more advantageous sentence.
[61]
Furthermore, the
involvement of defence counsel provides no meaningful check on the danger of an
accused acknowledging false allegations against a third party in order to
obtain a favourable plea bargain. Counsel have an ethical duty to not
knowingly mislead the court. However, it does not require them to verify or
investigate the truth of information they present; and the duty is triggered
only where counsel has information leading to the “irresistible conclusion”
that something is false. See M. Proulx and D. Layton, Ethics and Canadian
Criminal Law (2001), at pp. 40-47 and 460.
[62]
The suggestion that the solemnity of the
occasion or the involvement of counsel increases the inherent trustworthiness
of the statement does not resonate to the extent that it incriminates a third
party — in this case a co-accused. Criminal law is generally and rightfully
suspicious of allegations made by a person against an accomplice. It has long
been recognized that evidence of one accomplice against another may be
motivated by self-interest and that it is dangerous to rely on such evidence
absent other evidence which tends to confirm it. The fact that such statements
are contained in an ASF does not provide any reassurance of reliability. Indeed,
statements by a co-accused or accomplice are recognized as inherently
unreliable.
[63]
Vetrovec warnings issued by trial judges, for example, provide jurors with direction
to consider “all of the factors that might impair [the] credibility [of the
testimony of co-accused or accomplices]”: R. v. Khela, 2009 SCC 4,
[2009] 1 S.C.R. 104, at para. 31. Triers of fact, under such conditions, are
able to determine whether the “evidence properly weighed [overcomes] its
suspicious roots”: R. v. Brooks, 2000 SCC 11, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 237, at
para. 69.
[64]
The administration of justice would not be
enhanced in permitting admissions made by a co-accused in his own interest, as
part of a plea bargain for a conviction of a lesser crime and favourable
sentence, to be used against a co-accused, in circumstances where the
reliability of the statements cannot be adequately tested.
[65]
In this case, the trial judge was alive to the circumstances surrounding the preparation and
presentation of the ASF. He described the circumstances in some detail,
including those that weighed in favour of and against reliability. He
considered whether the solemnity of D.S.’s guilty plea proceeding demonstrated
the trustworthiness of the ASF. He appreciated that defence counsel assisted
Crown counsel in the drafting of the statement and that, according to testimony
during the voir dire, the information about the source of the gun came
from the defence. He also noted the evidence from D.S. that he did not
understand all of the words in the ASF and that the assurance he would not have
to give any further statement to the police was one of the reasons he agreed to
the plea bargain.
[66]
The trial judge identified D.S.’s incentive to minimize his own involvement in order to obtain
a youth sentence for second degree murder. Indeed, D.S. testified that he
agreed to facts outside of his knowledge or which he knew to be wrong in order
to secure his plea bargain. In the context of this plea bargain, D.S. was
motivated to minimize his own conduct and maximize that of the co-accused.
[67]
In the circumstances of this case, I cannot
conclude that the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the
solemnity of the occasion or the involvement of counsel provided circumstantial
guarantees of substantive reliability.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
[68]
The trial judge may have
overstated the scope of solicitor-client privilege and its consequences for the
cross-examination of D.S. However, I am not persuaded that the Crown has
satisfied its burden to show that any errors would have materially affected the
conclusion reached by the trial judge.
[69]
The circumstances
identified by the trial judge raise significant concerns about the threshold
reliability of the portions of the ASF upon which the Crown sought to rely at
the appellant’s trial, all of which minimized D.S.’s involvement in the murder.
D.S. endorsed the ASF as part of a plea bargain for second degree murder and a
sentence in youth court. In these circumstances, there was motivation to shift
responsibility to his co-accused. D.S. was also assured that he would not have
to make any further statements to police and he testified at the appellant’s
trial that this was one of the reasons that he had accepted the plea
agreement. D.S. further testified that he agreed to some facts in the ASF
that he said he did not or could not know and that he did not understand
everything that he read before agreeing to the statement’s contents. Those
portions of the ASF that shifted responsibility for the murder to the appellant
are inherently unreliable.
[70]
Further, the trial judge identified the following factors that made it difficult to
assess the veracity of the prior inconsistent statement. The statement was not
videotaped or taken under oath. There was no opportunity to assess D.S.’s
demeanour or rely upon any spontaneous choice of words. The police and Crown
counsel chose not to videotape, under oath, as is routinely available,
especially in homicide cases.
[71]
In light of these
difficulties, only a full and complete opportunity to cross-examine would have
provided a genuine basis on which to assess the reliability of D.S.’s
statements. His invocation of solicitor-client privilege, however, would
preclude a full opportunity to cross-examine him.
[72]
The trial judge did not
err in finding that the jury would not have the tools to assess or test the
truthfulness of the exculpatory portions of the ASF. I would allow the appeal and restore the acquittal.
The
reasons of Rothstein and Wagner JJ. were delivered by
Wagner J. (dissenting) —
I. Background
[73]
At its core, this case deals with the
admissibility of hearsay statements under the principled approach to hearsay
rooted in necessity and reliability. The hearsay evidence in question is a
prior statement which was inconsistent with the testimony of a witness (also
the co-accused) at the trial of the accused. The prior inconsistent statement
was an Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASF”) which was read in as part of the
guilty plea of the co-accused who was being tried separately as a youth.
[74]
While there is a great deal of case law that has
dealt with prior inconsistent statements under the principled approach, there
are two wrinkles which make its application to this case unique. First, unlike
the police and out-of-court statements that are dealt with in much of the
existing jurisprudence, the ASF at issue was accepted by the courts as part of
a guilty plea and sentencing relating to the co-accused’s participation in the
crime in question. Second, the analysis under the principled approach was
fraught with procedural errors stemming from the conduct of the trial judge as
well as both Crown and defence counsel. With these two differences in mind and
for the reasons that follow, I believe that the question of admissibility must
be redetermined in a new trial.
II. Background
[75]
The appellant, Yousanthan Youvarajah, stands
accused of the first degree murder of Andrew Freake who was shot and killed
during a drug deal that went wrong on October 11, 2007. While Youvarajah did
not pull the trigger, the Crown contends that the appellant orchestrated the
shooting of Freake as retribution for being short-changed during two earlier
sales of cocaine.
[76]
The events leading to
the fatal shooting were initiated when Youvarajah called Freake to arrange for
the purchase of one and a half pounds of marijuana. After a series of delays,
including an initial meeting in an apartment building and two changes of venue
for the exchange due to excessive crowds, the parties met in Clyde Park to
complete the transaction. Freake, who was accompanied by two friends, followed
the appellant into the park.
[77]
Youvarajah was accompanied by a young person,
D.S., and two other acquaintances, Abhishaik Shinde and Raibeen Mohammad. They
went to the meeting place in an SUV driven by Shinde. D.S. sat in the front
passenger seat with the appellant sitting directly behind him. Mohammad sat in
the back seat behind Shinde.
[78]
Once inside the park,
Shinde drove the SUV onto a grassy area and Freake stopped in a nearby parking
lot. Freake and one of his acquaintances approached the SUV by foot carrying
three bags of marijuana. Two bags of marijuana were passed into the car to be
tested. When Freake refused to pass the third bag, D.S. pulled out a handgun
and shot Freake in the chest.
[79]
Within days of the
shooting, both D.S. and Youvarajah were arrested and charged with first degree
murder. The charges against D.S. related to his role as the shooter while
charges against Youvarajah were for planning and orchestrating the shooting.
Since D.S. was a youth, his trial proceeded separately. He pleaded guilty to
second degree murder with the consent of the Crown. As part of his guilty plea
proceeding, an ASF which was signed by D.S., his two trial counsel, and the
Crown, was read in and filed.
[80]
In the ASF, D.S. claimed that the appellant (1)
gave D.S. the handgun used in the shooting; (2) told D.S. to shoot Freake at
some point during the drug deal; and (3) demanded that D.S. return the handgun
to him after the shooting. These three elements of the ASF were crucial components
of the Crown’s case against Youvarajah.
[81]
At the appellant’s trial,
D.S. was called to testify about Youvarajah’s alleged involvement in planning
the shooting. While D.S. confirmed that he was the shooter, his testimony
regarding the appellant’s involvement contradicted portions of the ASF, namely
the three elements previously outlined. Once on the stand, D.S. claimed that
(1) he obtained the handgun from a prior break and enter; (2) he did not shoot
Freake on Youvarajah’s instructions but rather because Freake was being
disrespectful; and (3) he threw the murder weapon into a river after the
shooting.
[82]
In light of D.S.’s testimony, the Crown applied to have the ASF admitted for the truth of its
contents. The trial judge dismissed the Crown’s application, finding that the
ASF did not meet the standard of threshold reliability that is necessary for
evidence to be admitted under the principled approach to hearsay evidence.
Without the relevant evidence implicating the accused, the trial judge granted Youvarajah’s
application for a directed verdict of acquittal.
[83]
In reaching his conclusions, the trial judge focused on the three indicia of reliability
outlined in R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740 (“B. (K.G.)”).
After noting that D.S. did not take an oath, he found that the jury would not
have the opportunity to assess the witness’ demeanour since the guilty plea was
not videotaped. Accordingly, the trial judge’s reliability analysis hinged on
the opportunity of cross-examining D.S.
[84]
During the trial proceedings, defence counsel suggested that the examination of D.S. regarding
the ASF could be restricted by solicitor-client privilege. D.S. was granted
the opportunity to obtain independent legal advice. After consulting with
independent counsel, Mr. Marentette, D.S. informed the court that he would not
waive solicitor-client privilege in any way. In light of D.S.’s assertion of
solicitor-client privilege, the trial judge found that the opportunity to
cross-examine D.S. about the ASF was illusory.
[85]
In his reasons, the trial judge also noted that the ASF lacked additional indicia of
reliability beyond the three markers laid out in B. (K.G.). Namely, the
ASF was not spontaneous, it was not crafted in D.S.’s own words, and the
circumstances of the ASF allowed the court to infer a motive to lie in order to
secure a lesser sentence as part of the guilty plea. The trial judge further
noted that D.S. was never warned of the potential penal consequences of later
recanting.
[86]
The Crown appealed the decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal where the acquittal was set aside
and a new trial ordered. In her reasons, Simmons J.A. addressed three issues.
First, she held that the trial judge erred in finding that the opportunity to
cross-examine D.S. was illusory. Specifically, Simmons J.A. found that the
trial judge “put his stamp of approval” on the position of both defence and
Crown counsel that a cross-examination of D.S. or D.S.’s counsel about the
circumstances giving rise to the ASF was precluded due to D.S.’s assertion of
privilege (2011 ONCA 654, 107 O.R. (3d) 401, at para. 95). Simmons J.A. also
distinguished the instant case from R. v. Conway (1997), 36 O.R. (3d)
579, where the Ontario Court of Appeal found the possibility of cross-examining
a recanting witness to be illusory since he could not recall the prior
statement. Simmons J.A. found that D.S. could recall portions of the ASF and,
in fact, the three elements crucial to the Crown’s case against Youvarajah.
[87]
Second, Simmons J.A. found that the trial judge
erred by unduly focusing on the B. (K.G.) recommended safeguards while
failing to consider other factors relevant to the reliability analysis. She
found that the lack of “presence” at the time of the prior statement, such as
in the form of a video, was irrelevant due to D.S.’s minimal involvement in the
proceeding and that the solemn circumstances of D.S.’s guilty plea added to the
reliability of the statement. Simmons J.A. also held that it could be inferred
that D.S. was warned about the penal consequences of recanting since
experienced defence counsel was involved in the preparation and presentation of
the ASF.
[88]
Third, Simmons J.A. briefly addressed the issue
of inherent motive for D.S. to lie in the ASF. She found that this was an
issue for the trial judge to address at the new trial if the other indicia
considered were not sufficient to meet the standard of threshold reliability.
III. Issues
[89]
The issue before this
Court is simply whether the ASF was sufficiently reliable to be admitted into
evidence for the truth of its contents under the principled approach to hearsay
based on necessity and reliability. Since necessity is not at issue, the focus
of the analysis that follows will be on the reliability of the ASF. The
reliability analysis raises a series of sub-issues on the facts before this
Court:
1. Did the trial judge err in
holding that the opportunity to cross-examine D.S. was illusory as a result of
his invoking solicitor-client privilege?
2. Did the nature of the ASF and the
circumstances under which it was prepared and presented provide sufficient
indicia of reliability?
IV. Analysis
A. Overview of Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Under the Principled Approach
[90]
The principled approach to the admissibility of
hearsay evidence was adopted by this Court in B. (K.G.). Prior to B.
(K.G.), the use of prior inconsistent statements, or any form of hearsay
evidence, was restricted to impeaching witness credibility. This restriction
was to ensure that untested and unreliable evidence that could lead to an
unfair verdict was excluded and that litigants were provided with the
opportunity to confront witnesses who were adverse to their position.
[91]
In certain circumstances,
hearsay evidence presents minimal dangers to trial fairness. In those
situations, its exclusion would be more detrimental to the fact-finding
function of the court than its admission. By endorsing the principled approach
in B. (K.G.), this Court sought to strike a better balance between trial
fairness and the truth-seeking function of the judicial process. Under the
principled approach, hearsay statements remain presumptively inadmissible, but
may be admitted where necessity and reliability are sufficiently demonstrated.
[92]
Necessity arises from the fact that important
evidence leading to the truth would otherwise be lost when a witness recants.
This aspect of the principled approach requires no further analysis on these
facts.
[93]
The reliability requirement is aimed at identifying cases where the dangers of hearsay evidence
may be overcome. Indeed, in R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2
S.C.R. 787, at paras. 62-63, Charron J. indicated that the reliability
requirement will generally be met either (1) by showing that there is no real
concern about a statement’s truth owing to the circumstances in which it arose;
or (2) by showing that there is no real danger that the statement is made in
hearsay form since, in the circumstances, its reliability can be sufficiently
tested by means other than contemporaneous cross-examination and presence.
These categories are not mutually exclusive and merely provide guidance in
identifying the factors to be considered in an admissibility inquiry.
[94]
In B. (K.G.), this Court addressed the presence of adequate substitutes for traditional
safeguards relied upon to test hearsay evidence. The admissibility question in B.
(K.G.) dealt with the prior inconsistent statements made by the accused’s
friends in which they told police that he was responsible for stabbing and
killing the victim. The three friends recanted at trial and the Crown sought
to have their prior statements admitted for their truth. While a new trial was
ordered to determine the admissibility of the prior inconsistent statements,
this Court outlined the principled approach to be used in the analysis.
[95]
Lamer C.J. indicated that sufficient
circumstantial guarantees of reliability could be found where three indicia
were satisfied: if (1) the statement was made under oath, solemn affirmation or
solemn declaration following an explicit warning as to the criminal
consequences of making false statements; (2) the entire statement was
videotaped; and (3) the opposing party has an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness at trial.
[96]
Importantly, Lamer C.J. left the door open for
alternative indicia of reliability, stating, at p. 796:
Alternatively, other circumstantial
guarantees of reliability may suffice to render such statements substantively
admissible, provided that the judge is satisfied that the circumstances provide
adequate assurances of reliability in place of those which the hearsay rule
traditionally requires.
[97]
Indeed, subsequent cases
have found hearsay evidence to be admissible even when all three of the indicia
from B. (K.G.) are not present. R. v. U. (F.J.), [1995] 3 S.C.R.
764, was such a case. In that case, the accused was arrested for reported
sexual activity with his 13-year-old daughter. During separate police
interviews, both the accused and his daughter provided matching and specific
details of the same sexual activities and occurrences, including having had
intercourse the previous night. The issue on appeal was whether the trial
judge erred in allowing the jury to compare the accused’s unadopted statement with
his daughter’s unadopted prior inconsistent statement. Despite the absence of
an oath and videotaped statement, this Court found that the reliability
threshold was met. In addition to the ability to cross-examine the accused,
the Court found reliability in the “strikingly similar” statements provided by
the accused and his daughter.
[98]
In Khelawon, this Court further clarified
that B. (K.G.) was never intended to create categorical exceptions.
Rather, admissibility was to be determined using the principled approach on a
case-by-case basis, allowing the indicia of oath, presence (or video), and
cross-examination to provide guidance in the reliability assessment as opposed
to rigid requirements.
[99]
Regardless of the circumstances of a particular case and the indicia that may be available for the
reliability analysis, it is crucial not to lose sight of the truth-seeking
function of an admissibility inquiry under the principled approach. In the
instance of a prior inconsistent statement, the purpose of the admissibility
inquiry is not to make an absolute determination of the reliability of the
hearsay statement as compared with the subsequent testimony. Rather, the
inquiry is intended to ensure that the statement is sufficiently reliable in
order for the trier of fact to assign the appropriate weight to the evidence.
As Charron J. states in Khelawon, the “general exclusionary rule is a
recognition of the difficulty for a trier of fact to assess what weight, if
any, is to be given to a statement made by a person who has not been seen or
heard, and who has not been subject to the test of cross-examination” (para.
35).
[100]
This principle is articulated in B. (K.G.) where this Court draws the distinction between
threshold reliability and ultimate reliability, stating:
The ultimate reliability of the
statement and the weight to be attached to it remain, as with all evidence,
determinations for the trier of fact. What the reliability component of the
principled approach to hearsay exceptions addresses is a threshold of reliability,
rather than ultimate or certain reliability. [p. 787]
[101]
As Charron J. stresses
in Khelawon, at paras. 92-93, this distinction does not mean that
relevant factors should be categorized in terms of threshold and ultimate
reliability. Rather, a more functional approach should be adopted by which the
context will determine whether certain factors go to threshold reliability.
The focus of the inquiry should be on the dangers of hearsay evidence and the
circumstances relied upon to overcome those dangers. However, “it is crucial
to the integrity of the fact-finding process that the question of ultimate
reliability not be pre-determined on the admissibility voir dire” (para.
93).
[102]
Given the truth-seeking function of the judicial
process, I am of the view that threshold reliability should be generously
interpreted in the admissibility inquiry. Trial fairness and protection
against the dangers of hearsay are not sacrificed where the trier of fact is
ultimately able to make reasonable determinations of the weight to be accorded
to evidence before the court. The reliability inquiry does not need to ensure
absolute reliability. Rather, the circumstances surrounding the hearsay
evidence must provide a sufficient basis for the trier of fact to assess and
assign the appropriate weight and eventually determine ultimate reliability.
B. Application to the Case at Hand
[103]
As the following
analysis will disclose, the trial judge erred in his determination that the ASF
did not meet the standard of threshold reliability. That is not to say that
the circumstances in this case provide sufficient evidence to conclusively
determine that the ASF should be admitted. Rather, the admissibility inquiry
was incomplete and did not provide a proper basis for the trial judge to exclude
the relevant evidence. As articulated by the Ontario Court of Appeal, the
issue of admissibility should be addressed at a new trial where threshold
reliability can be properly assessed.
(1) The Nature of the
Hearsay Evidence in Question
[104]
Not all out-of-court statements are created
equal. Indeed, this idea is captured by the principle from Khelawon that
hearsay evidence will generally be admissible under the principled approach
where there is either inherent reliability or circumstances that allow
reliability to be tested by the trier of fact. While much of this analysis
hinges on the factors that can reduce the dangers of hearsay, the nature of the
hearsay statement before this Court cannot be ignored.
[105]
Much of the jurisprudence pertaining to the admission of prior inconsistent statements deals
with statements made to police (see Khelawon; B. (K.G.); U.
(F.J.); R. v. Couture, 2007 SCC 28, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 517; R. v.
Trieu (2005), 195 C.C.C. (3d) 373 (Ont. C.A.)) and to a lesser degree with
out-of-court conversations (see R. v. Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2
S.C.R. 298) or statements made at preliminary hearings for the trial where
admissibility is in question (see R. v. Hawkins, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 1043).
[106]
The hearsay statement at issue in this case is
an ASF which was drafted with the contribution and approval of Crown counsel,
defence counsel and the accused. More importantly, it was accepted by a court
in the sentencing of a youth for the very serious crime of second degree
murder. While the ASF and guilty plea proceedings did not include an explicit
indication by the Crown that it consented to a lesser charge against D.S.
because of his anticipated subsequent cooperation in proceedings against
Youvarajah, it is certainly implicit in the nature of the plea agreement and
the facts therein. Accordingly, the ASF was used in some capacity to reduce
the sentence of D.S. for a very serious crime.
[107]
The characteristics of
the ASF in this case are somewhat unique when compared to other statements in
previous case law. Statements to police and out-of-court conversations are not
generally admitted as evidence in proceedings that may limit another
individual’s freedom through sentencing, or that impact on society’s interest
in deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution, not to mention public protection
from dangerous offenders.
[108]
An ASF presented in
court carries an inherent level of reliability that the judicial system accepts
and, in fact, implicitly relies upon in the workings of the administration of
justice. It follows that not allowing an ASF to be admitted for its truth in a
subsequent hearing, to be weighed and evaluated by the trier of fact, is
problematic when viewed through the wider lens of the repute of the system of
administration of justice. What does it say about the administration of
justice if the courts accept the reliability of a statement to convict an
individual and to vary the length of his sentence for a crime as serious as
murder, but are unwilling to place that same statement before the trier of fact
in another proceeding to be weighed and considered against a recantation of
that statement?
[109]
As a general rule, if a
statement is accepted for its truth by the courts, and used to balance the
liberty interests of the accused with societal considerations such as
deterrence and retribution, then that statement provides a level of implicit
reliability that warrants consideration in the admissibility inquiry in a
subsequent third-party trial. That is not to say that a statement’s use and
judicial acceptance at a prior proceeding is sufficient in and of itself to
meet the reliability requirement of the principled approach. Rather, it is
merely a factor that must be considered in the admissibility inquiry, a factor
that goes towards meeting the threshold reliability standard.
[110]
Certainly, there are
potential dangers that could arise with the use of such statements at
subsequent trials. Indeed, these concerns are captured in a line of Ontario
cases that has suggested that care should be taken when considering the
admissibility of a statement for its truth under the principled approach when
it is read in at a witness’s earlier guilty plea (see R. v. Tran, 2010
ONCA 471, 103 O.R. (3d) 131; R. v. D.P., 2010 ONCA 563, 268 O.A.C. 118;
and R. v. McGee, 2009 CanLII 60789 (Ont. S.C.J.)). There is a whole
host of reasons for which an accused could provide untruthful information in
the context of a guilty plea, including a reduced sentence, expediency of
multiple proceedings, retribution against the target of a subsequent trial
through cooperative testimony, or even the lack of understanding of the meaning
of the statement or of the charges laid against the individual.
[111]
However, these potential
dangers do not apply in every case and the resulting blanket assertions of
unreliability do not take account of the nuanced approach that should take
stock of factors that may add to or detract from the reliability inquiry in the
particular context of the statement in question. While these cases correctly
highlight some of the reliability concerns with this type of statement, they do
not address some of the potential indicia of reliability that may be found in
certain circumstances. It requires little imagination to envision circumstances
where making a statement against friends, family, or professional acquaintances
could be socially or even physically detrimental to a recanting witness. These
social or physical ramifications against the interests of the witness provide
an indication of reliability that may be weighed against any motive to lie. But
these are considerations that must be borne out by the evidence and by the
unique circumstances of each case and may not even be necessary to explore in
depth at this stage of the analysis. Certainly, motive need not be considered
if reliability can be established by other means. Nevertheless, motive is
something that can provide context to the threshold reliability analysis.
[112]
I also do not accept
the argument that only the essential elements of the crime detailed in the ASF
are accepted for their truth by the courts in a guilty plea. The implication
of this proposition is that the courts are willing to accept a statement that
is only partially true so long as it provides the judiciary with the necessary
elements to convict an individual. Beyond the obvious concerns of threatening
individuals’ liberty or reducing sentencing based on documents that are deemed
to be at least partially unreliable or untrue, this creates an arbitrary
distinction about which aspects of a guilty plea are accepted for their truth.
[113]
Certainly an argument
could be made that the reliability of a guilty plea rests on the admission
against the interests of the accused. However, as I have stated above, what
constitutes a statement against the interests of the accused may vary from case
to case depending on the circumstances. Indeed, an individual may place his
safety or even his life in jeopardy by implicating himself in a serious crime.
This factor should be considered on the circumstances of each case. A rigid
rule finding that all third-party guilty pleas are unreliable is potentially
detrimental to the truth-finding function of the judicial process.
[114]
Further, accepting that only the essential
elements of a guilty plea need to be accepted for their truth ignores the interrelated nature of a guilty plea and sentencing.
Factors that do not form part of the essential elements of a crime may
nonetheless prove to be pertinent when considering mitigating or aggravating
factors in sentencing. This is particularly true where the trial judge is
presented with a joint submission by the Crown and the accused concerning
sentencing and must determine whether the recommendation is appropriate within
the entire context of the crime in question.
[115]
Looking at the case before this Court, the three
crucial facts from the ASF which the Crown relies on
are certainly not essential elements of D.S.’s crime. The source of the gun,
D.S.’s reasons for shooting Freake, and the manner in which the gun was
disposed of do not form part of the actus reus or mens rea
relating to D.S.’s crime. Nonetheless, these factors are relevant to motive
and the degree of planning and deliberation, all of which are properly
considered during sentencing. Allowing a judge to consider these factors in
sentencing, while finding that they are not sufficiently reliable to even be
weighed by the trier of fact in another case, allows for an inconsistent
application of the reliability of evidence and brings the administration of
justice into question.
[116]
In summary, when dealing
with threshold reliability, the fact that courts accept the statements read in
on a guilty plea when considering convictions and sentencing is a factor that points to the reliability of the prior
inconsistent statement, even when such statement implicates a third party. It
would not be prudent to make blanket conclusions about the dangers associated
with this sort of statement, nor about its inherent reliability. Each case
will have to be examined on its particular circumstances when determining
threshold reliability, but consideration should certainly be given to the
general acceptance of and reliance on statements read in as part of a guilty
plea.
[117]
While the nature of the statement in question
warrants consideration, it is still necessary in the instant case to determine
whether the ASF meets the requirements of necessity and reliability under the
principled approach. Since necessity is not at issue, the balance of my
analysis will explore whether the threshold of reliability is met.
(2) Reliability
[118]
The essential question before this Court is
whether the trial judge erred in finding that the ASF was not sufficiently
reliable to be admitted for its truth. For the reasons that follow, I agree
with the conclusion of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the trial judge failed
to adequately assess the available indicia of reliability and erroneously found
the opportunity to cross-examine D.S. to be illusory. While the ASF may in
fact prove to be too unreliable to be admitted, the trial judge’s analysis was
insufficient to permit him to come to that conclusion. As highlighted by
Charron J. in Khelawon, the most important contextual factor in the
reliability inquiry is the availability of the declarant for cross-examination.
Accordingly, my analysis will begin there.
(a) Cross-Examination
[119]
The opportunity to cross-examine the declarant
in relation to his prior inconsistent statement warrants strong consideration
in a reliability analysis. While the concerns of hearsay evidence still exist
even where the declarant is available at trial, cross-examination can go a long
way towards alleviating those concerns. As Lamer C.J. noted in B. (K.G.),
“the focus of the inquiry in the case of prior inconsistent statements is on
the comparative reliability of the prior statement and the testimony offered at
trial” (p. 787). The availability of cross-examination allows the opposing
party to test the current version and simultaneously address the declarant’s
initial statement. As Charron J. states in Khelawon, at para. 41:
Hence, although the underlying
rationale for the general exclusionary rule may not be as obvious when the
declarant is available to testify, it is the same — the difficulty of testing
the reliability of the out-of-court statement. The difficulty of assessing W’s
out-of-court statement is the reason why it falls within the definition of
hearsay and is subject to the general exclusionary rule. As one may readily
appreciate, however, the degree of difficulty may be substantially alleviated
in cases where the declarant is available for cross-examination on the earlier
statement, particularly where an accurate record of the statement can be
tendered in evidence. I will come back to that point later. My point here
is simply to explain why, by definition, hearsay extends to out-of-court
statements tendered for their truth even when the declarant is before the
court. [Emphasis added.]
[120]
The issue before this
Court is whether D.S.’s assertion of solicitor-client privilege led to the
opportunity for cross-examination becoming so illusory that it could not be
used to establish reliability. For the reasons that follow, I agree with the
Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding that the trial judge erred in finding the
opportunity for cross-examination to be illusory.
[121]
The first error committed by the trial judge was to overextend the breadth of
solicitor-client privilege and its impact on the ability to cross-examine D.S.
The trial judge found that solicitor-client privilege precluded questioning
D.S. and his former counsel about the circumstances of the guilty plea, the
drafting of the ASF, and D.S.’s implication of Youvarajah as the person who
provided him the gun and directed him to do the shooting. While I am loath to
provide a road map for the Crown to follow at a new trial, the Ontario Court of
Appeal was correct in finding that the opportunity to cross-examine D.S. was
not entirely closed and that the trial judge misapprehended the scope and
impact of solicitor-client privilege on the opportunity for cross-examination.
[122]
Solicitor-client privilege is intended to prohibit the disclosure of any form of communication
made in confidence between a lawyer and his client for the legitimate purpose
of obtaining lawful professional advice or assistance, unless the privilege is
waived by the client or a recognized exception to the privilege applies. This
definition is captured succinctly by J. H. Wigmore in Evidence in Trials at
Common Law (McNaughton rev. 1961), vol. 8, at p. 554, and adopted by this
Court in R. v. McClure, 2001 SCC 14, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at para. 36:
Where
legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his
capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in
confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from disclosure
by himself or by the legal adviser, except the protection be waived.
[123]
This definition does not
encompass all communications between a lawyer and his client. More importantly
to the admissibility inquiry in this case, solicitor-client privilege does not
foreclose cross-examining D.S. in relation to a number of areas concerning the
ASF. Specifically, the Ontario Court of Appeal identified six areas about
which D.S. could have been cross-examined, had the trial judge not
misunderstood the scope of solicitor-client privilege:
(1) D.S.’s understanding of the ASF;
(2) D.S.’s understanding of any conditions that were
attached to the plea deal;
(3) D.S.’s understanding of the consequences of
misleading the police, the court and the Crown;
(4) D.S.’s motive for making what he now asserts were
false statements;
(5) D.S.’s instructions to counsel regarding
communications to the court and the Crown; and
(6) D.S.’s knowledge of the Crown’s theory at the time
he provided counsel with instructions.
[124]
Admittedly, these six areas of potentially
permissible lines of questioning could eventually be curtailed by issues of solicitor-client privilege. However, that is an issue
for the trial judge to address as those possible issues arise. In any event,
there is certainly the possibility of cross-examination in relation to these
six areas. Indeed, both defence counsel and Crown counsel cross-examined D.S.
on some of these very issues, eliciting information that could have been
relevant in the reliability assessment.
[125]
The Crown elicited
evidence from D.S. regarding his understanding of the ASF. Specifically, D.S.
acknowledged that at his guilty plea he agreed that “Yousanthan Youvarajah gave
[D.S.] a loaded small black handgun” and that he understood what that meant.
Further, the Crown read the following statement to D.S. from the ASF: “When he
was given the gun, [D.S.] was told by Yousanthan Youvarajah to shoot Mr. Freake
sometime during the course of the drug rip off” (A.R., vol. V, at pp. 62-63).
During the Crown’s cross-examination, D.S. admitted that he remembered the
statement being read at his guilty plea and that he agreed to those facts
through his counsel.
[126]
Similarly, defence
counsel was able to elicit substantial information regarding the motive behind
D.S.’s guilty plea and the ASF. Specifically, during defence counsel’s
cross-examination, D.S. conceded that a factor in his decision to plead guilty
was his impression that he would not have to provide further statements. He
also agreed to defence counsel’s assertion that D.S. signed an ASF that he knew
contained false information to “get to the end game that day which was pleading
to second degree murder” (A.R., vol. III, at p. 92). Defence counsel was also
able to elicit D.S.’s assertions that he had never implicated Youvarajah in the
killing until his guilty plea on September 17, 2009.
[127]
These examples are merely illustrative of the
information that was potentially available on cross-examination without
breaching D.S.’s asserted solicitor-client privilege. Had the trial judge
permitted the cross-examination to proceed and addressed issues involving
solicitor-client privilege as they arose, information sufficient to meet the
threshold reliability standard may have been brought forward.
[128]
The appellant claims
that any cross-examination on the six aforementioned areas would either skirt
the critical issues or be entirely blocked by solicitor-client privilege. I
cannot agree with this position. The appellant’s position presupposes that
D.S.’s recantation arose from direct or indirect communications with counsel.
While this is certainly possible, and maybe even likely, an admissibility
inquiry should not rest on assumptions. Further, and as I have already alluded
to, limits on cross-examination should not be applied rigidly and absolutely
where solicitor-client privilege is asserted. Rather, issues of privilege
should be addressed as they arise on cross-examination. This way, relevant
information that may not be prohibited by the assertion of privilege may still
be elicited, furthering the underlying truth-seeking function of the
proceedings.
[129]
While the issue is not
before this Court, it bears mentioning that this approach is not an invitation
for counsel to attempt to skirt privilege by inducing the waiver of privilege
by an unsuspecting witness who has clearly asserted solicitor-client
privilege. Solicitor-client privilege is a fundamental principle of the
Canadian legal system. Any conduct that unscrupulously attempts to erode
solicitor-client privilege should not be encouraged. While solicitor-client
privilege is not absolute and circumstances may arise where it will be
subordinated, duping a witness into waiving privilege is never an acceptable
practice.
[130]
Given that there were
several subjects about which D.S. could have been cross-examined and that this
could have potentially assisted in establishing reliability, the trial judge
erred in determining that cross-examination was effectively foreclosed by the
claim of solicitor-client privilege.
[131]
The appellant argues that the mistaken view of
the scope of solicitor-client privilege rested solely on the shoulders of Crown
counsel and that the trial judge cannot be held accountable for the tactical
decisions made by counsel. I cannot agree with this argument, given the facts
before this Court. Crown counsel certainly misunderstood the implications of
D.S.’s asserted privilege, but the transcripts provide clear indication that
the mistake was shared. Indeed, defence counsel was the first to state that
any cross-examination was meaningfully foreclosed once D.S. asserted privilege,
a position that, coincidentally or not, was advantageous to the accused’s
case. Crown counsel seemingly concurred by indicating that he did not
anticipate calling further witnesses after the privilege was asserted. The
trial judge did not correct these erroneous assumptions. Rather, as Simmons
J.A. correctly notes, “the trial judge put his stamp of approval on this
approach — and effectively prevented the Crown from reconsidering calling
D.S.’s counsel” (para. 95). This is evident from the following exchange:
[CROWN COUNSEL]: And I don’t
anticipate even now given the comments of Mr. Marentette I don’t anticipate
needing to call further witnesses.
THE COURT: Well, no legal
witnesses that have ever spoken to this man anyway.
[CROWN COUNSEL]: Right.
THE COURT: Right. I mean,
we’re going to take Mr. Marentette’s word as the final word on that.
[CROWN COUNSEL]: Right. [A.R.,
vol. II, at p. 132]
[132]
The trial judge’s
misapprehensions were also evident when he stated: “Well, you bump into the
solicitor/client . . . privilege every which way here” (A.R., vol. III, at p. 1).
Perhaps most telling was the following excerpt from the trial judge’s reasons
where he summarized the impact of solicitor-client privilege without having
heard any argument on the matter:
Solicitor/client privilege precluded
questions to or from [D.S.] or indeed of his counsel about how it came to be
that this confession from [D.S.] as the shooter and his implication of the
accused as the person who provided him with the gun and directed him to do the
shooting was made on the day of his guilty plea almost two years after his arrest
when he had never confessed or implicated Yousanthan Youvarajah in all that
time. [A.R., vol. I, at p. 59]
[133]
The appellant is correct
in asserting that a judge must remain an impartial arbiter and refrain from
intervening where parties do not properly raise evidentiary issues (see R.
v. S.G.T., 2010 SCC 20, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 688, at para. 36). However, it
cannot be said that the trial judge in the present case remained impartial by
weighing in with a clear expression of prohibition. The appellant’s argument would
be more compelling had the trial judge remained silent on the matter and merely
allowed Crown counsel to proceed, but this was clearly not the case. At the
very least, the trial judge’s remarks improperly influenced the conduct of
counsel.
[134]
While the appellant did
not present the argument before this Court that the instant case was analogous
to the situation in Conway, a brief discussion of that case is
warranted to support the conclusion that the opportunity to cross-examine D.S.
was not illusory.
[135]
In Conway, two men were charged with the
second degree murder of an elderly disabled man while committing a robbery.
They pleaded not guilty to murder charges but guilty to the lesser charge of
manslaughter on the grounds that they did not have the requisite mens rea,
having ingested intoxicating substances prior to committing the offence. One
witness provided a written statement to the police denying knowledge of the
killing and provided a subsequent written statement implicating the accused.
This statement had none of the indicia of reliability outlined in B. (K.G.).
At trial, the witness could not recall providing either written statement to
police. In finding the second written statement inadmissible for its truth,
Labrosse J.A. found that the opportunity to cross-examine a witness who
recanted and denied all recollection of the prior inconsistent statement was
illusory.
[136]
The important distinction to be made between that matter and the present one is that two
versions of the witness’s story could not be said to be before the trier of
fact. The evidence given by the witness amounted to a declaration of “I don’t
remember” (p. 589). As Labrosse J.A. stresses, the value of cross-examining a
recanting witness lies in assessing the comparative reliability of the two
versions. Where both versions cannot be tested by the trier of fact, this
cannot be accomplished.
[137]
In the instant case, the potential
cross-examination of D.S. as to his statements does not suffer from the same
deficiency as that encountered in Conway. Simmons J.A. correctly states
that while D.S. initially claimed not to recall signing the ASF, he later
confirmed that he remembered a number of events set out within the document.
Indeed, Simmons J.A. astutely points out, at para. 74, that the trial judge
acknowledged this very fact when he stated: “When cross-examined by the Crown,
[D.S.] admitted making many of the statements in the [ASF] and conceded that many
of those statements were true” (A.R., vol. I, at pp. 49-50).
[138]
So while it is possible
for a recanting witness’s cross-examination to prove too illusory to ground a
reliability analysis, this may not be the situation in the present case. D.S.
was available for cross-examination, he recalled having made many of the
statements within the ASF, he did not dispute understanding the key facts in
the ASF which he subsequently denied at Youvarajah’s trial, and he recalled the
ASF being read in at his guilty plea proceeding. As a result, Simmons J.A.
correctly summarized that the trial judge erred by failing to assess “whether
it could properly be said that two versions of the events were before the
court; and whether the extent of D.S.’s recollection would afford sufficient
scope to assist the jury in assessing which, if either, version was true”
(para. 79).
[139]
Accordingly, the trial
judge erred in precluding a cross-examination which possibly could have gone
towards establishing the threshold reliability of the ASF. Given the
importance of cross-examination in the admissibility inquiry, this error is
sufficient in and of itself to order a new trial. However, in the interest of
completeness and of providing guidance for the new trial, I will briefly
address the errors of the trial judge with regard to other indicia of
reliability.
(b) Other
Indicia of Reliability
[140]
The two other indicia of
reliability detailed in B. (K.G.), namely a statement made under oath
and captured by video, were not present in the context of the ASF in this
matter. However, the inquiry does not end there. A reliability analysis is
not restricted to the three indicia detailed in B. (K.G.). In fact, as
stated by Lamer C.J. in B. (K.G.) itself, “other circumstantial
guarantees of reliability may suffice to render such statements substantively
admissible” (p. 796). This was clearly understood by the Ontario Court of
Appeal in this case where Simmons J.A. stated that “the focus of the threshold
reliability inquiry can change depending on the circumstances of the case”
(para. 123). I also agree with the Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding that other
factors were available in this case that could have satisfied the trial judge
that the circumstances surrounding the drafting and reading in of the ASF
provided assurances of reliability equivalent to an oath and presence, in the
form of video. If these indicia had been considered and cross-examination had
been permitted, it is possible that threshold reliability would have been
met.
[141]
In the instant case, perhaps the most persuasive
indicia of reliability are the nature of the statement and how it was
constructed. As quoted above, in Khelawon, at para. 41, Charron J.
indicated that where the declarant is available for cross-examination, an
accurate record of the statement can do much to alleviate the dangers of
hearsay.
[142]
The ASF tendered as evidence in D.S.’s guilty
plea proceeding provides just such a record. Having been reduced to writing,
signed not only by D.S. but by both Crown and defence counsel, and having been
read in to the record in the context of D.S.’s guilty plea, the source of the
document cannot be disputed.
[143]
The nature of how the ASF was constructed
further supports its reliability. This was not a statement that was unilaterally drafted and forced upon D.S. to adopt.
Rather, the drafting of the ASF was a collaborative effort where there is
evidence that at least one crucial component to the Crown’s case against
Youvarajah was supplied by defence counsel — namely the statement that
Youvarajah supplied D.S. with the gun.
[144]
Moreover, D.S. had the
opportunity to review the ASF with his counsel prior to signing it and adopting
it. This is an important aspect as it refutes any negative inferences that
could be drawn against the ASF on the grounds that it was not captured in
D.S.’s own words or that D.S. did not understand its contents.
[145]
The appellant correctly argues that a lawyer’s
ethical obligation not to knowingly present false statements to the court does
not ensure the truth of the contents of the ASF. However, it does provide some
assurances that D.S. was advised of the consequences of providing a false
statement. Before entering a guilty plea, counsel has an ethical obligation
under rules of professional conduct to ensure that the client (1) is
voluntarily admitting the elements of the offence; and (2) understands the
implications and possible consequences of a guilty plea, particularly with
regards to the authority and discretion of the court. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary in the instant case, it is not unreasonable to assume
that counsel would have advised D.S. about the contents of the ASF, the
potential consequences of implicating the appellant, and the potential penal
consequences of subsequently recanting. This assumption is also supported on
the record by D.S.’s admission that he understood that the basis of his guilty
plea was the ASF.
[146]
Perhaps most importantly, D.S. testified that he
understood the three crucial components of the ASF, namely that the appellant gave D.S. the gun, told him to shoot Freake, and
demanded that D.S. return the gun. Without more persuasive evidence to the
contrary, this essentially forecloses any argument that D.S. lacked
understanding of the ASF’s contents.
[147]
Looking beyond the construction of the ASF, the
context of the proceedings under which it was read in to court and the contents
of the ASF itself provide additional indicia supporting threshold reliability.
As the Ontario Court of Appeal stated, “the solemnity of the occasion on which
the [ASF] was presented” was a feature that favoured threshold reliability
(para. 137). It certainly would have been ideal for the ASF to have been
adopted under oath or solemn affirmation, but the nature of the guilty plea can
help fill that gap when considered with the other indicia of reliability before
the court.
[148]
The Ontario Court of Appeal also correctly
rejected the trial judge’s assertion that the lack of spontaneity of the statement and the fact that it was not in D.S.’s own words
detracted from the reliability of the ASF. While spontaneity can be an
indication of reliability, its absence does not necessarily detract from it.
With regards to an ASF prepared in the context of a guilty plea, reliability is
not found through spontaneity but through the carefully crafted language which
is subsequently adopted by the declarant after careful consideration with his
counsel.
[149]
Finally, the Ontario
Court of Appeal concluded that the lack of “presence” when the ASF was read
in at the guilty plea, for example by way of video, was of no
consequence since D.S.’s only contribution was to reply “yes” in response to
two separate questions by counsel (para. 128). I respectfully disagree with
this assessment. It is not appropriate to dismiss presence as indicia of
reliability merely because of the declarant’s limited level of involvement or
because of the brevity of his statement. Had there been video presence, D.S.’s
demeanour could have been assessed throughout the reading in of the ASF as well
as in his answers to the two questions posed to him. Even if one were to focus
solely on D.S.’s two short responses, such presence could provide invaluable
insight into D.S.’s demeanour and ultimately into the veracity of the
statement.
[150]
While I cannot agree with the Ontario Court of
Appeal’s assessment on the issue of presence, I do not think that lack of
presence is detrimental to potentially establishing reliability. If the
cross-examination is found sufficiently meaningful and other indicia support
the reliability of the ASF, presence may be superfluous. As I have detailed
above, the reliability indicia from B. (K.G.) are not rigid and the
absence of one factor can be overcome if other factors are sufficient in
establishing threshold reliability. It is not necessary for me to draw any
firm conclusion in this regard in the instant matter, and this is a question
best left for a new trial where all of the factors can be assessed in concert.
V. Conclusion
[151]
While there are certainly concerns with admitting evidence from a guilty plea
proceeding at the trial of a third party, I find it unpalatable to apply a
blanket prohibition at the admissibility inquiry stage. A proper admissibility
inquiry is only intended to determine whether the prior inconsistent statement
has sufficient markers of reliability to allow the trier of fact to reasonably
assess the appropriate weight it should be given. This is a contextual
question that will change with the particular circumstances of each case.
[152]
Based on my analysis
above, I do not think that a proper analysis was conducted in this case —
particularly in relation to the opportunity for cross-examination and the
consideration of other potential indicia of reliability. Accordingly, the
decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal should be upheld and a new trial
ordered. Reliability may be properly assessed at the new trial and the
evidence may be appropriately admitted or excluded upon consideration of all
the relevant factors.
[153]
For these reasons, I would dismiss the appeal.
Appeal
allowed, Rothstein and
Wagner JJ. dissenting.
Solicitors
for the appellant: Lockyer Campbell Posner, Toronto; Dawe &
Dineen, Toronto.
Solicitor
for the respondent: Attorney General of Ontario, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener: Henein
Hutchison, Toronto.