SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA
Between:
Her Majesty The
Queen
Appellant
and
Harjit
Singh Shoker
Respondent
‑ and ‑
Attorney
General of Canada and
Criminal
Lawyers’ Association (Ontario)
Interveners
Coram:
McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie, LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
Reasons for
Judgment:
(paras. 1 to 26)
Concurring
Reasons:
(paras. 27 to 44)
|
Charron J. (McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish and Abella JJ.
concurring)
LeBel J. (Bastarache J.
concurring)
|
______________________________
R. v. Shoker, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 399, 2006 SCC 44
Her Majesty The Queen Appellant
v.
Harjit Singh Shoker Respondent
and
Attorney General of Canada and
Criminal Lawyers’ Association (Ontario) Interveners
Indexed as: R. v. Shoker
Neutral citation: 2006 SCC 44.
File No.: 30779.
2006: February 14; 2006: October 13.
Present: McLachlin C.J. and Bastarache, Binnie,
LeBel, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.
on appeal from the court of appeal for british columbia
Criminal
law — Sentencing — Probation — Accused convicted
of entering a dwelling house with intent to commit sexual assault and sentenced
to incarceration followed by two years of probation subject to
conditions — Probation order requires accused to abstain from
consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription narcotics and
to provide bodily substances on demand by probation officer or peace officer to
monitor compliance with abstention condition — Whether sentencing
judge had jurisdiction under Criminal Code to authorize search and seizure of
bodily substances as part of probation order — Criminal Code,
R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 732.1(3) (c), 732.1(3) (h).
The accused was convicted of breaking and entering a
dwelling house with intent to commit sexual assault. A psychological pre‑sentencing
report revealed that accused blamed his drug use for his behaviour and
recommended requiring the accused to submit to random urinalysis to manage his
risk in the community. The accused was sentenced to imprisonment followed by
probation. The probation order required that he abstain absolutely from the
consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription narcotics and,
to determine compliance with the abstention condition, that he submit to
urinalysis, blood tests or breathalyzer tests upon the demand of a peace
officer or probation officer. The order also stated that any positive reading
would be a breach of the abstention condition. A majority of the Court of
Appeal held that ss. 732.1(3) (c) and 732.1(3) (h) of the Criminal
Code grant a sentencing judge statutory authority to include a monitoring
condition in a probation order but that compelling the accused to provide
bodily samples, in the absence of a governing regulatory or statutory
framework, is contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms . The Court of Appeal also held that the sentencing judge had no
jurisdiction to predetermine that a positive reading was a breach of probation.
Held: The
appeal should be dismissed.
Per McLachlin C.J.
and Binnie, Fish, Abella and Charron JJ.: The majority of the
Court of Appeal was correct to delete that part of the probation order
compelling the accused to provide bodily samples and stating that any positive
reading will be a breach of probation. Although a condition requiring
abstention from consumption and possession of alcohol and non‑prescription
narcotics is authorized under the Criminal Code , and was reasonable in
the accused’s circumstances, the sentencing judge had no authority under
ss. 732.1(3)(c) and 732.1(3)(h) of the Code to
authorize a search and seizure of bodily substances as part of a probation
order. Nor did he have jurisdiction to predetermine that any positive reading
would constitute a breach of probation. [3] [17] [26]
Section 732.1(3)(c), which allows an
abstention condition, defines a criminal offence, but enforcement powers are
not implicit from the simple creation of an offence. While the power to demand
bodily samples and the resulting analyses would undoubtedly assist in the
enforcement of a s. 732.1(3)(c) abstention condition, it cannot be
implied on that basis. Under s. 732.1(3)(h), a court is given a
broad power to craft other reasonable conditions for the purpose of protecting
society and for facilitating the accused’s reintegration into the community.
However, s. 732.1(3)(h) is not unlimited and must be read in
context. The conditions set out in s. 732.1(3) can assist in delineating
the scope of this residual provision. These listed conditions relate to
conduct, or abstention from conduct, the fulfilment of which has no
incriminating consequence for the probationer. When a condition may pose a
risk, such as participating in a treatment program, the consent of the
probationer is required. Conditions compelling bodily samples to facilitate
the gathering of evidence for enforcement purposes do not simply monitor the
probationer’s behaviour and, as such, are of a different kind and, because of
their potential effect, absent the probationer’s consent to such conditions,
raise constitutional concerns. The seizure of bodily samples must be subject
to stringent standards and safeguards to meet constitutional requirements.
Where Parliament authorizes the collection of bodily samples, it uses clear
language and sets out standards and safeguards for collecting these samples.
Parliament has not provided a scheme under s. 732.1(3) for collecting
bodily samples and such a scheme cannot be judicially enacted. [20-25]
Per Bastarache and
LeBel JJ.: Under well‑established rules of statutory interpretation,
s. 732.1(3) (h) of the Criminal Code grants authority to
include monitoring procedures in probation orders, including the condition
imposed on the accused that he provide bodily samples. Section 732.1(3) (h)
must be read in the context of probation and sentencing. A probation order
addresses the imperatives of the protection of society and the rehabilitation
of the accused. Sentencing judges are required to devise terms that are
reasonable in the sense that they complement these objectives and the terms set
out in s. 732.1(3) . The residual clause allows judges to frame conditions
to fit the distinct situation of each accused. So long as a reasonable
condition can be connected with the categories of terms contemplated by the Code,
it is grounded in an implied, but solid, statutory authority. Although the Code
provides for conditions concerning alcohol and drug use, it is silent about
monitoring these conditions. This Court has acknowledged implied statutory powers
when the need for them flows from the substantive provisions of a law, and the
need for a monitoring mechanism may arise from the nature of the obligations
imposed on an accused in a probation order. To hold otherwise would cast doubt
on a number of useful monitoring methods used to ensure that the goals of
probation are met. However, any condition of a probation order requiring
monitoring of an accused is open to review under s. 8 of the Charter .
In this case, the monitoring condition does not meet the requirements of
s. 8 . Compelling blood tests absent a statutory framework governing such
tests is not consistent with the Charter and random drug testing at a
probation officer’s discretion could become highly arbitrary. [30-37] [42-43]
The part of the order stating that a positive test
will be a breach of probation is contrary to criminal law principles that
require guilt to be proved in the usual manner. [41]
Cases Cited
By Charron J.
Referred to: R.
v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 2000 SCC 5; R. v.
Kootenay (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 311; R. v. Traverse
(2006), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 33; R. v. Ziatas (1973),
13 C.C.C. (2d) 287; R. v. Caja (1977), 36 C.C.C.
(2d) 401; R. v. Lavender (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 551;
R. v. L. (1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 398; R. v. McLeod (1993),
81 C.C.C. (3d) 83; R. v. Borden, [1994]
3 S.C.R. 145; R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607; R.
v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, 2001 SCC 83; Hunter
v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
By LeBel J.
Referred to: R. v.
M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393; R. v. Carlson (1996),
141 Sask. R. 168; R. v. Curtis (1996), 144 Sask. R. 156; R.
v. McLeod (1992), 109 Sask. R. 8 ; Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120,
2000 SCC 69.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1 , 8 .
Correctional Institution
Regulation, Alta. Reg. 205/2001,
ss. 48.1, 48.2.
Correctional Institutions
Regulation, Man. Reg. 227/92, ss. 28, 29,
29.1, 31(1).
Correctional Services Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C‑26.1, s. 17(g).
Correctional Services Act, S.M. 1998, c. 47, C.C.S.M. c. C230, s. 16.
Correctional Services Act, S.S. 1993, c. C‑39.1, s. 56(1).
Correctional Services
Administration, Discipline and Security Regulations, 2003, R.R.S., c. C‑39.1, Reg. 3, s. 40(1).
Correctional Services
Regulation, Man. Reg. 128/99, ss. 41 to
45.
Corrections Accountability Act,
2000, S.O. 2000, c. 40, s. 57.9(1)
to (3).
Corrections Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. C-29, ss. 14.1, 14.2.
Corrections and Conditional
Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20,
ss. 54 to 57 .
Corrections and Conditional
Release Regulations, SOR/92-620, ss. 60 to 72.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, ss. 253 to 261 , 487.04
to 487.091 , 718 to 718.2 , 731 , 732.1(2) , (3) , 733.1 , 742.3(2) (f).
P.E.I. Reg. EC616/92,
ss. 10, 11.
Authors Cited
Beaulac, Stéphane, and Pierre‑André Côté.
“Driedger’s ‘Modern Principle’ at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation,
Justification, Legitimization” (2006), 40 R.J.T. 131.
Ferris, Thomas Wayne. Sentencing:
Practical Approaches. Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2005.
Manson, Allan, Patrick Healy
and Gary Trotter. Sentencing and Penal Policy in
Canada: Cases, Materials, and Commentary.
Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2000.
Ruby, Clayton C. Sentencing,
6th ed. Markham, Ont.: Butterworths, 2004.
APPEAL from a judgment of the British Columbia
Court of Appeal (Finch C.J.B.C. and Hall and Levine JJ.A.) (2004),
206 B.C.A.C. 266, 338 W.A.C. 266, 192 C.C.C.
(3d) 176, 26 C.R. (6th) 97, 126 C.R.R. (2d) 149,
[2004] B.C.J. No. 2626 (QL), 2004 BCCA 643, deleting part of a
probation order. Appeal dismissed.
Wendy L. Rubin and Susan J. Brown, for the appellant.
Garth Barriere and
Dana Kripp, for the respondent.
Kenneth J. Yule, Q.C., and David Schermbrucker, for the
intervener the Attorney General of Canada.
James Stribopoulos
and Sarah Loosemore, for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’
Association (Ontario).
The judgment of McLachlin C.J. and Binnie, Fish,
Abella and Charron JJ. was delivered by
Charron J. —
1. Overview
1
This appeal raises the question whether a sentencing judge may require a
probationer to provide, on demand by the probation officer, samples of breath,
urine or blood for analysis to determine compliance with an abstention term of
the probation order. In allowing the appeal against sentence, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that the enforcement term violates s. 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to the absence of legislative or
regulatory standards or safeguards that would adequately protect the
probationer’s privacy interest. Levine J.A., in writing for the majority,
deleted the enforcement term, holding that it was up to Parliament and not the
courts to fill this “gap in . . . legislation” ((2004), 206 B.C.A.C. 266, 2004
BCCA 643, at para. 60). Hall J.A., in partial dissent, would have deleted the
requirement to provide blood samples but would have read in adequate safeguards
to ensure the constitutionality of the rest of the condition.
2
The Crown appeals to this Court and seeks to reinstate the enforcement
condition. At issue is whether ss. 732.1(3) (c) and 732.1(3) (h)
of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 , authorize the enforcement
condition and, if permissible, whether the condition must be predicated by
reasonable and probable grounds to suspect a violation of an abstention
condition.
3
For the reasons that follow, I would dismiss the appeal. A sentencing
judge has a broad jurisdiction in determining appropriate conditions of
probation. However, there is no authority under the Criminal Code to
authorize a search and seizure of bodily substances as part of a probation
order. In light of the fact that the impugned condition must be quashed for
lack of jurisdiction, it is neither necessary nor advisable for this Court to answer
the constitutional question. It is Parliament’s role to determine appropriate
standards and safeguards governing the collection of bodily samples for
enforcement purposes.
2. The
Facts and Proceedings Below
4
Shortly after midnight on September 7, 2003, the complainant was
awakened when a naked stranger was getting in her bed. The intruder, Harjit
Singh Shoker, followed her when she fled to the kitchen to phone the police but
he did not attempt to leave. On arrest, he told the police that he had been
using a narcotic the previous day. Mr. Shoker did not testify at trial. He
was convicted of breaking and entering a dwelling-house with intent to commit
sexual assault.
5
A psychological assessment report prepared by Dr. Whittemore for
sentencing revealed that Mr. Shoker blamed his drug use for his behaviour,
stating that he had been on speed at the time of the offence. The report
described a history of substance abuse, starting with alcohol as a teenager and
later drugs including heroin, speed, cocaine and marijuana. The report also
referred to a similar incident that had occurred a few months earlier in
respect of which Mr. Shoker had been charged and awaiting trial at the time of
this offence. Mr. Shoker told Dr. Whittemore that he was under the influence
of alcohol at the time of this previous incident and thought he was at a
friend’s apartment. He was acquitted on that charge. Mr. Shoker did not feel
that he needed treatment as he had not used drugs for the three months he had been
in custody since his arrest. Describing Mr. Shoker’s behaviour as disturbing,
Dr. Whittemore suggested that the court might consider imposing a
condition requiring him to submit to random urinalysis to assist in managing
his risk in the community.
6
The trial judge sentenced Mr. Shoker to 20 months’ incarceration to be
followed by a two-year period of probation subject to a number of conditions.
The Crown did not ask that the order of probation include any condition for
treatment or testing of bodily substances and the offender did not consent to
those conditions. The following two conditions were later challenged by Mr.
Shoker on his appeal before the British Columbia Court of Appeal:
CONDITION 7: You shall attend for such treatment and counselling as
directed by the Probation Officer and successfully complete any such programs
to which you are referred.
.
. .
CONDITION 9: Abstain absolutely from the consumption and possession of
alcohol and non prescription narcotics and to submit to a urinalysis, blood
test or breathalyzer test upon the demand/request of a Peace Officer or
Probation Officer to determine compliance with this condition. Any positive
reading will be a breach of this condition.
7
The Court of Appeal deleted the reference to “treatment” in Condition 7
because a treatment condition can only be imposed under s. 732.1(3) (g)
of the Criminal Code with the consent of the offender. In addition, as
the majority of the court noted, there is no program in British Columbia for
curative treatment in relation to the consumption of alcohol or drugs as
described in para. (g.1). Condition 7 was amended accordingly and it is
no longer in issue before this Court. The court also deleted the last sentence
of Condition 9 for lack of jurisdiction — the sentencing judge could not
predetermine that any positive reading would constitute a breach of probation
as he had purported to do. The question of any breach would have to form the
basis of a new charge against Mr. Shoker and be determined by a court in the
usual way.
8
Fresh evidence admitted before the Court of Appeal revealed that funding
for urinalysis testing had been discontinued as of March 31, 2003, and the
service was no longer available in British Columbia. Hence the question of
urinalysis testing for this offender was effectively moot. However, the court
considered whether at law an offender can be required under the terms of a
probation order to submit to a demand for a sample of bodily substances,
including breath, urine and blood. Levine J.A., Finch C.J.B.C. concurring, was
of the view that the authority for imposing such a condition could be found in
s. 732.1(3) (c) of the Criminal Code with s. 732.1(3) (h)
supporting this interpretation. Despite this finding, Levine J.A., in writing
for the majority, held that the requirement to provide bodily samples, in the
absence of a regulatory or statutory framework governing how the samples will
be taken and tested, violates s. 8 of the Charter and that the defect
cannot be cured by judicial fiat. Hence, that part of Condition 9 following
the words “non prescription narcotics” was deleted. I read the majority’s
reasons as effectively holding that there is no statutory authority to require
a probationer to provide bodily samples on demand.
9
Hall J.A., in partial dissent, was of the view that the authority to impose
the condition could not be found under s. 732.1(3) (h) because
“Parliament has spoken in a specific manner about alcohol and drugs in s.
732.1(3) (c)” (para. 70). In his view, the power flowed rather from s.
732.1(3) (c) itself as “a reasonable methodology to ensure that such an
order is effective” (para. 70). Hall J.A. departed from the majority on the
question whether the condition could be amended to conform with the Charter .
He would have deleted the requirement to provide blood samples and would have
amended Condition 9 to require that urine or breath samples be provided upon
demand based on reasonable and probable grounds to suspect a violation of the
abstention condition.
3. Analysis
3.1 Relevant
Statutory Provisions
10
Probation is a form of sentence that can be imposed only in
circumstances described in s. 731 of the Criminal Code :
731. (1) Where a person is convicted of an
offence, a court may, having regard to the age and character of the offender,
the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission,
(a) if no minimum punishment is prescribed by law, suspend the
passing of sentence and direct that the offender be released on the conditions
prescribed in a probation order; or
(b) in addition to fining or sentencing the offender to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, direct that the offender
comply with the conditions prescribed in a probation order.
(2) A court may also make a probation order where
it discharges an accused under subsection 730(1).
Probation has
traditionally been viewed as a rehabilitative sentencing tool: R. v. Proulx,
[2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 2000 SCC 5, at paras. 31-33. The probationer remains free
to live in the community but certain restraints on his freedom are imposed for
the purpose of facilitating his rehabilitation and protecting society. An
offender who is bound by a probation order and who, without reasonable excuse,
fails or refuses to comply with that order is guilty of an offence under s.
733.1 punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment.
11
All probation orders must contain at a minimum three conditions as prescribed
under s. 732.1(2) :
(a) keep the peace and be of good behaviour;
(b) appear before the court when required to do so by the court;
and
(c) notify the court or the probation officer in advance of any
change of name or address, and promptly notify the court or the probation
officer of any change of employment or occupation.
12
Additional optional conditions may be imposed pursuant to s. 732.1(3).
Only ss. 732.1(3)(c) and 732.1(3)(h) are at issue on this
appeal. However, it is important that they be read in the context of the
entire provision. Section 732.1(3) reads as follows:
732.1 . . .
(3) The court may prescribe, as additional
conditions of a probation order, that the offender do one or more of the
following:
(a) report to a probation officer
(i) within two working days, or such longer period as the court
directs, after the making of the probation order, and
(ii) thereafter, when required by the probation officer and in the
manner directed by the probation officer;
(b) remain within the jurisdiction of the court unless written
permission to go outside that jurisdiction is obtained from the court or the
probation officer;
(c) abstain from
(i) the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or
(ii) the consumption of drugs except in accordance with a medical
prescription;
(d) abstain from owning, possessing or carrying a weapon;
(e) provide for the support or care of dependants;
(f) perform up to 240 hours of community service over a period
not exceeding eighteen months;
(g) if the offender agrees, and subject to the program
director’s acceptance of the offender, participate actively in a treatment
program approved by the province;
(g.1) where the lieutenant governor in council of the province
in which the probation order is made has established a program for curative
treatment in relation to the consumption of alcohol or drugs, attend at a
treatment facility, designated by the lieutenant governor in council of the
province, for assessment and curative treatment in relation to the consumption
by the offender of alcohol or drugs that is recommended pursuant to the
program;
(g.2) where the lieutenant governor in council of the province
in which the probation order is made has established a program governing the
use of an alcohol ignition interlock device by an offender and if the offender
agrees to participate in the program, comply with the program; and
(h) comply with such other reasonable conditions as the court
considers desirable, subject to any regulations made under subsection
738(2) [s. 738(2) relates to restitution orders], for protecting society and
for facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community.
13
Before discussing the issue that arises in this case, I wish to make a
few general comments about the power to impose optional conditions under s.
732.1(3). The residual power under s. 732.1(3)(h) speaks of “other
reasonable conditions” imposed “for protecting society and for facilitating the
offender’s successful reintegration into the community”. Such language is
instructive, not only in respect of conditions crafted under this residual
power, but in respect of the optional conditions listed under s. 732.1(3):
before a condition can be imposed, it must be “reasonable” in the circumstances
and must be ordered for the purpose of protecting society and facilitating the
particular offender’s successful reintegration into the community. Reasonable
conditions will generally be linked to the particular offence but need not be.
What is required is a nexus between the offender, the protection of the
community and his reintegration into the community. See, for example, R. v.
Kootenay (2000), 150 C.C.C. (3d) 311 (Alta. C.A.), and R. v. Traverse
(2006), 205 C.C.C. (3d) 33 (Man. C.A.), where appellate courts have upheld
conditions requiring abstinence from alcohol or drugs even though these played
no part in the commission of the offence for which the offender was sentenced.
On the other hand, conditions of probation imposed to punish rather than
rehabilitate the offender have been struck out: R. v. Ziatas (1973), 13
C.C.C. (2d) 287 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Caja (1977), 36 C.C.C. (2d) 401 (Ont.
C.A.); R. v. Lavender (1981), 59 C.C.C. (2d) 551 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. L.
(1986), 50 C.R. (3d) 398 (Alta. C.A.). In contrast, punitive conditions may be
imposed pursuant to s. 742.3(2) (f) as part of a conditional sentence: Proulx,
at para. 34.
14
The residual power to craft individualized conditions of probation is
very broad. It constitutes an important sentencing tool. The purpose and
principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code make
it clear that sentencing is an individualized process that must take into
account both the circumstances of the offence and of the offender. It would be
impossible for Parliament to spell out every possible condition of probation
that can meet these sentence objectives. The sentencing judge is well placed
to craft conditions that are tailored to the particular offender to assist in
his rehabilitation and protect society. However, the residual power to impose
individualized conditions is not unlimited. The sentencing judge cannot impose
conditions that would contravene federal or provincial legislation or the Charter .
Further, inasmuch as the wording of the residual provision can inform the
sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion in imposing one of the listed
optional conditions as I have described, the listed conditions in turn can
assist in interpreting the scope of “other reasonable conditions” that can be
crafted under s. 732.1(3) (h). As we shall see, none of the listed
conditions is aimed at facilitating the investigation of suspected breaches of
probation. I will come back to this point later.
15
The underlying purpose for imposing conditions of probation also serves
to define the role of the probation officer. The intervener the Attorney
General of Canada aptly describes the probation officer’s functions in its
factum (at para. 21):
It is in the nature of a probation officer’s duties to act as an
officer of the court, to assist the probationer in his rehabilitation, and to
monitor compliance with the conditions of probation imposed by the sentencing
court. The supervising probation officer simultaneously performs two distinct
functions, rehabilitation and enforcement. The twin goals of probation —
rehabilitation of the offender and protection of society — require and justify
supervision in order to ensure that the probationer in fact observes his
conditions. This supervised control is a restraint on the probationer’s
freedom.
The supervisory
function of the probation officer in ensuring compliance with the conditions
and the manner in which this function must be performed becomes of central
importance in this case when we consider the full implications of enforcing an
abstention order by requiring bodily samples. The determinative question is
whether the supervisory power to demand samples of bodily substances for
enforcement purposes may be conferred upon the probation officer by the court
as a discretionary exercise of discretion or whether it must be authorized by
statute.
3.2 The
Impugned Condition
16
For ease of reference, I repeat the terms of Condition 9:
CONDITION 9: Abstain absolutely from the consumption and possession of
alcohol and non prescription narcotics and to submit to a urinalysis, blood
test or breathalyzer test upon the demand/request of a Peace Officer or
Probation Officer to determine compliance with this condition. Any positive
reading will be a breach of this condition. [Emphasis added.]
17
As indicated earlier, the sentencing judge did not have the jurisdiction
to predetermine that any positive reading would constitute a breach of
probation. Therefore, the last sentence of Condition 9 was properly deleted by
the Court of Appeal. The first part of the condition is also not in issue.
The abstention condition is expressly authorized under s. 732.1(3)(c)
and, given Mr. Shoker’s particular circumstances, it is entirely reasonable to
impose this condition to facilitate his rehabilitation and to protect society.
The prohibition against the possession of alcohol and non-prescription drugs,
imposed pursuant to the s. 732.1(3)(h) residual power, is also not in
dispute. What remains at issue is the requirement that bodily samples be
provided on demand.
18
The impugned condition is challenged essentially on Charter grounds.
In reviewing a sentencing judge’s exercise of discretion on Charter
grounds, an appellate court should first consider whether the sentencing judge
acted within his statutory jurisdiction. If a sentence is illegal on the basis
that it is unauthorized under the governing legislation, it must be struck down
and the constitutional issue does not arise. I will therefore consider whether
the requirement to provide bodily samples as a condition of probation falls
within the scope of s. 732.1 .
3.3 Requiring
Bodily Samples and Section 732.1 of the Criminal Code
19
The Crown submits that s. 732.1(3)(c) abstention conditions are
highly desirable for the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of
the public and that the sentencing objectives of such abstention terms can only
be achieved if there is also an effective mechanism to enforce them.
Therefore, the Crown argues that ss. 732.1(3)(c) and 732.1(3)(h),
read together, authorize the imposition of random sampling of an offender’s
bodily substances to ensure compliance with the abstention condition. Mr.
Shoker argues that the power to impose enforcement terms to the abstention
condition neither flows implicitly from s. 732.1(3)(c) nor does it fall
within the scope of s. 732.1(3)(h) “reasonable conditions”. If
Parliament had intended to authorize the seizure of bodily samples, he argues,
it would have expressly so stated as it has done in other existing legislative
schemes.
20
I will deal firstly with s. 732.1(3)(c). With respect to Hall
J.A.’s opinion to the contrary, the jurisdiction to impose enforcement terms
cannot simply flow from the power to impose an abstention condition. The
effect of including a s. 732.1(3)(c) abstention condition in a probation
order is to define a criminal offence, the commission of which is punishable
under s. 733.1 . Enforcement powers are not implicit from the simple creation
of an offence. For example, it cannot reasonably be contended that the
prohibition against impaired driving under s. 253 implicitly includes the
enforcement scheme for demanding bodily samples contained in ss. 254 to 258.
Yet, in essence, that is the argument here. The Crown submits that the
enforcement scheme should be implied as necessary to give effect to a s.
732.1(3)(c) abstention condition. I do not accept this argument.
Breach of probation is a criminal offence under the Criminal Code and,
as such, it is subject to the usual investigatory techniques and manner of
proof as any other offence. Hence, the probationer who is found consuming
alcohol with his friends in a drinking establishment can be prosecuted based on
the evidence of witnesses to the event. Likewise, the probationer who exhibits
signs of alcohol or drug impairment can be prosecuted and the offence can be
proven by testimonial evidence much in the same way as an offence for impaired
driving. The power to demand bodily samples and the resulting analyses would
undoubtedly assist in the enforcement of a s. 732.1(3) (c) condition, but
it cannot on that basis simply be implied.
21
The authority to impose enforcement terms, if any, must be found rather
in the residual clause. As indicated earlier, s. 732.1(3)(h) gives the
sentencing judge a broad power to craft other reasonable conditions designed to
protect society and facilitate the offender’s successful reintegration into the
community. Hall J.A. was of the view that the authority could not be found
under s. 732.1(3)(h) because Parliament has specifically addressed
alcohol and drugs in s. 732.1(3)(c). The fact that Parliament has
specifically addressed alcohol and drugs under s. 732.1(3)(c) — and also
in ss. 732.1(3)(g.1) and 732.1(3)(g.2) — is certainly a relevant
factor but, in my respectful view, it does not preclude the imposition of
“other” alcohol and drug-related “reasonable conditions” under the residual
clause. Any number of additional conditions aimed at ensuring that the
probationer comply with the abstention condition can be imposed. Indeed, the
prescription against the possession of alcohol and drug found in
Condition 9 is one example. Similarly, a sentencing judge could prescribe
that the offender not enter any premises where alcohol is sold or served; that
he not associate with his favourite drinking buddies; or that he obey a
curfew. All these conditions could be imposed to ensure better compliance with
the abstention condition and thereby facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation
and protect society. Absent peculiar circumstances, it could not seriously be
contended that any such condition would be unreasonable. LeBel J., in his
concurring reasons, expressed concerns that a narrow interpretation of the
residual clause would cast doubt on a number of useful monitoring methods, more
particularly the use of electronic monitoring. The legality of electronic
monitoring under s. 732.1(3)(h) is not before us and, hence, this Court
is not deciding this issue. We are concerned here only with the compelled seizure
of bodily samples as an enforcement mechanism. It is also noteworthy that in
each case referred to by LeBel J., the probationer’s consent was required for
participation in the Saskatchewan electronic monitoring program. Further, the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in R. v. McLeod (1993), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 83,
at p. 99, also made it clear that “the constitutionality of this form of
sanction was not argued or considered during argument”.
22
On the face of it, s. 732.1(3)(h) therefore appears wide enough
to permit enforcement terms such as the one imposed in this case since, it is
argued, submitting to testing would also ensure better compliance with the
abstention condition. However, the residual provision must be read in
context. Since it provides for “other” reasonable conditions, the listed
conditions under ss. 732.1(3)(a) to 732.1(3)(g.2) can assist in
delineating the scope of the residual provision. It is noteworthy that the
fulfilment of any of the listed conditions can have no incriminating consequence
for the probationer. In addition, when the condition may pose a risk, such as
participating in a treatment program, the consent of the offender is required
before the condition can be imposed. Section 732.1(3)(h) speaks of
“other reasonable conditions”. It is reasonable to infer that additional
conditions imposed under the residual power would be of the same kind as the
listed conditions. However, conditions intended to facilitate the gathering of
evidence for enforcement purposes do not simply monitor the probationer’s
behaviour and, as such, are of a different kind and, because of their potential
effect, absent the probationer’s consent to such conditions, raise
constitutional concerns. For example, could Mr. Shoker be compelled, as a
condition of his probation, to make his home available for inspection on demand
to better monitor the prescription against the possession of alcohol or drugs?
Such a condition in effect would subject him to a different standard than that
provided by Parliament for the issuance of a search warrant. In my view, it
could not reasonably be argued that the sentencing judge would have the
jurisdiction to override this scheme under the authority of the open-ended
language of s. 732.1(3)(h). It would be up to Parliament, if it saw
fit, to enact any such scheme.
23
The sentencing judge’s jurisdiction can be no greater in respect of the
seizure of bodily samples. The seizure of bodily samples is highly intrusive
and, as this Court has often reaffirmed, it is subject to stringent standards
and safeguards to meet constitutional requirements. Significantly, in R. v.
Borden, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 145, this Court held that where there is no
statutory authorization for the seizure of bodily samples, consent must be
obtained if the seizure is to be lawful. In R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1
S.C.R. 607, Cory J., speaking for the majority, held that the seizure of bodily
samples such as hair, buccal swabs and dental impressions, was not authorized
by the common law power to search incident to arrest. The principle was again
reaffirmed in R. v. Golden, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679, 2001 SCC 83. Again
here, it is my view that such statutory authorization cannot be read in the
general language of s. 732.1(3)(h). In the various circumstances where
Parliament has chosen to authorize the collection of bodily samples, it has not
only used clear language; it has also included in the legislation, or through
regulations, a number of standards and safeguards: see for example, the
collection of DNA samples for investigative purposes or, on conviction, for
inclusion in the DNA databank (ss. 487.04 to 487.091 of the Criminal Code );
the collection of breath and blood samples during the investigation of impaired
driving offences (ss. 253 to 261 of the Criminal Code ); and the
collection of urine samples from federal inmates and parolees (ss. 54 to 57 of
the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 , and ss.
60 to 72 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations,
SOR/92-620).
24
A number of provincial legislatures have also enacted legislation and
regulations governing the seizure of bodily samples from inmates of provincial
institutions: see, for example, Alberta, Corrections Act, R.S.A. 2000,
c. C-29, ss. 14.1 and 14.2, and Correctional Institution Regulation,
Alta. Reg. 205/2001, ss. 48.1 and 48.2; Saskatchewan, The Correctional
Services Act, S.S. 1993, c. C-39.1, s. 56(1), and The Correctional
Services Administration, Discipline and Security Regulations, 2003, R.R.S.,
c. C-39.1, Reg. 3, s. 40(1); Manitoba, Correctional Services Act, S.M.
1998, c. 47, C.C.S.M. c. C230, s. 16, Correctional Institutions Regulation,
Man. Reg. 227/92, ss. 28, 29, 29.1 and 31(1), and Correctional Services
Regulation, Man. Reg. 128/99, ss. 41 to 45; Prince Edward Island, Correctional
Services Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. C-26.1, s. 17(g), and P.E.I. Reg.
EC616/92, ss. 10 and 11; Ontario, Corrections Accountability Act, 2000,
S.O. 2000, c. 40, s. 57.9(1) to (3). The Ontario legislation, unlike other
provinces, applies to probationers as well as to provincial inmates.
25
The establishment of these standards and safeguards cannot be left to
the discretion of the sentencing judge in individual cases. There is no
question that a probationer has a lowered expectation of privacy. However, it
is up to Parliament, not the courts, to balance the probationers’ Charter rights
as against society’s interest in effectively monitoring their conduct. Since
the purpose of s. 8 is preventative, the following principle in Hunter v.
Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at p. 169, is particularly apposite
here:
While the courts are guardians of the Constitution and of individuals’
rights under it, it is the legislature’s responsibility to enact legislation
that embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the Constitution’s
requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the details that
will render legislative lacunae constitutional.
In this case,
the Crown argues that reasonable and probable grounds are not required for the
search and seizure of bodily substances from probationers and that the seizure
of blood samples is also reasonable. Hall J.A. disagreed. He would have
deleted the requirement to provide blood samples as too intrusive and
conditioned the requirement to provide urine and breath samples upon the
establishment of reasonable and probable grounds. Those are precisely the
kinds of policy decisions for Parliament to make having regard to the
limitations contained in the Charter . Parliament has specifically
addressed the issue of alcohol and intoxicating substances in ss. 732.1(3) (c),
732.1(3) (g.1) and 732.1(3) (g.2) but it has not provided for a
scheme for the collection of bodily samples as it has done in respect of
parolees. Such a scheme cannot be judicially enacted on the ground that the
court may find it desirable in an individual case. In addition to the
constitutional concerns raised by the collection of bodily samples, the
establishment of such a scheme requires the expenditure of resources and
usually the cooperation of the provinces. This reality is exemplified in this
case where the funding for urinalysis has been discontinued in British Columbia
rendering the probation condition moot. This is yet another reason why the
matter is one for Parliament.
26
For these reasons, I would conclude that there is no statutory authority
for requiring Mr. Shoker to submit bodily samples. In the absence of a
legislative scheme authorizing the seizure of bodily samples, the enforcement
of abstention conditions must be done in accordance with existing investigatory
tools. The majority of the Court of Appeal was therefore correct in deleting
that part of Condition 9 following the words “non prescription narcotics”. I
would dismiss the appeal.
The reasons of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. were delivered by
LeBel J. —
I. Introduction
27
I have read the reasons of my colleague Charron J. Although I agree
with her that the appeal should be dismissed, I reach this result on a
different basis. In my opinion, there is statutory authority for the kind of
order made by the sentencing judge. But the terms of the order were open to
review under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . As
they did not meet the requirements of s. 8 , the appeal should fail.
28
I need not return to the facts of this appeal, which were fully reviewed
by Charron J. I will focus on the two legal issues raised by the case at
bar. I will begin by considering whether statutory authority for the order can
be found in the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 . Then, I will turn
to the issue of whether the discretion delegated to the sentencing judge was
exercised in conformity with the Charter .
II. Statutory
Basis for the Order
29
This case is, first and foremost, one raising a problem of statutory
interpretation. Once more, the courts are trying to ascertain the intention of
Parliament using, I assume, the modern approach of purposive interpretation
(see S. Beaulac and P.-A. Côté, “Driedger’s ‘Modern Principle’ at the Supreme
Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization” (2006), 40 R.J.T.
131). In this context, I readily concede that a purely textual reading of the
relevant provisions of the Criminal Code (ss. 732.1(3) (c)
and 732.1(3) (h)) would not resolve the issue. Nowhere do these
provisions grant the sentencing judge, in so many words, the discretion to
impose on the accused, in a probation order, an obligation to give samples of
bodily substances. The Criminal Code expressly lists a number of
mandatory and optional conditions, which are reviewed by my colleague in her
reasons. Section 732.1(3) (c) authorizes the prohibition of the
consumption of drugs or alcohol, but says nothing about monitoring the
interdiction. Then, s. 732.1(3)(h), which plays the role of a basket or
residual clause, refers merely to “such other reasonable conditions as the
court considers desirable . . . for protecting society and for
facilitating the offender’s successful reintegration into the community”.
These words do not by themselves clearly grant a discretion. Read in context,
however, they do.
30
To determine whether statutory authority for the order exists, the court
must consider the context, namely probation and sentencing. A probation order
is framed in a situation in which the court must address, in an individualized
manner, the imperatives of the protection of society and rehabilitation of the
accused. The sentencing judge is required to address the circumstances of the
case and to devise terms that are reasonable in their context. The focus of
the analysis remains the reasonableness of the conditions themselves. They are
reasonable, and thus authorized by the statute, if they complement terms
provided for in the Code and address the objectives of the protection of
society and the reintegration of the accused into the community.
31
In a legal and factual environment such as this, the Code cannot
provide for everything. Parliament has wisely delegated to sentencing judges a
reasonable discretion to frame terms that will allow them to address the
particular situation of each accused. A reasonable condition that can be
connected with the categories of terms contemplated by the Code is
grounded in an implied, but solid, statutory authority. The condition may then
face a second level of scrutiny under the Charter , but it would
not lie outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing judge.
32
The Criminal Code provides for conditions concerning alcohol and
drug use. Prohibitions or restrictions on their use appear to have become
almost standard terms of many probation orders. Nevertheless, the Code
remains vague, even silent, about the monitoring of these conditions, although,
according to well-known textbooks on sentencing, probation orders often
incorporate monitoring procedures (C. C. Ruby, Sentencing (6th ed.
2004), at para. 10.57; A. Manson, P. Healy and G. Trotter, Sentencing and
Penal Policy in Canada (2000), at p. 280).
33
The residual clause in s. 732.1(3)(h) appears to have been
designed to address the difficulties faced by trial judges in framing orders
that fit the distinct situations of individual accused and that must be made
effective. It is there to fill in gaps, allowing the sentencing judge to flesh
out the terms of the probation order by adding reasonable conditions.
Conditions will be reasonable if they address the situation of the accused and
meet the standards of s. 8 of the Charter .
34
The residual clause was not adopted for the purpose of collecting
evidence for future prosecution. It exists to make sure that the terms of
probation orders are effective and can be implemented in a practical way. The
fact that the Criminal Code contains no specific monitoring provisions
simply reflects the generally individualized nature of the sentencing process
and of probation orders.
35
The need for a monitoring mechanism may result from the nature of the
obligations imposed on the accused by the probation order. Absent a monitoring
procedure in such circumstances, it might rightly be said that Parliament spoke
for nothing. To deny the existence of implied statutory powers in the present
case does not comport with the approach of this Court, which has not hesitated
to acknowledge the existence of such powers when the need for them flows from
the nature of the substantive provisions of a law. For example, in one
Charter case, which concerned public schools and their students, the Court
found implied authority for conducting reasonable searches of students in the
statutory obligations of schools and teachers to maintain order and discipline
(R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393, at para. 51, per
Cory J.):
If it is to be
reasonable the search must be conducted reasonably and must be authorized by a
statutory provision which is itself reasonable. There is no specific
authorization to search provided in the Education Act, R.S.N.S.
1989, [c. 136,] or its regulations. Nonetheless, the responsibility placed upon
teachers, and principals to maintain proper order and discipline in the school
and to attend to the health and comfort of students by necessary implication
authorizes searches of students. See s. 54(b) and Regulation 3(7) and (9).
Teachers must be able to search students if they are to fulfil the statutory
duties imposed upon them. It is reasonable, if not essential to provide
teachers and principals with this authorization to search. It is now necessary
to consider the circumstances in which the search itself may be considered to
be reasonable.
36
With respect for those who hold other views, under very well-established
rules of statutory interpretation, the Criminal Code grants the
sentencing judge the authority to include monitoring procedures in probation
orders. To hold otherwise might well cause unforeseen and undesirable effects,
as the inflexibility of such an interpretative approach would likely require
Parliament to attempt to foresee a wide range of individual situations and to
address them in minute detail. A drafting technique such as this would hardly
be consistent with the canons of sound legal drafting, even if it were
feasible.
37
Moreover, a narrow interpretation of the residual clause would cast
doubt on a number of useful monitoring methods, which sentencing judges appear
to be resorting to with increasing frequency. For example, it might prevent
the use of electronic monitoring, which allows probation officers or public
authorities to make sure that conditions relating to house arrest or curfews
are complied with. I note that a number of judges have found such conditions
to be valid:
The conclusion is that section 732.1(3)(h) allows
orders which restrict a defendant’s lifestyle, such as curfews, orders that he
or she not frequent specified places, or associate with specified persons, or
orders that a defendant be confined on electronic monitoring.
.
. .
The terms of probation can control the defendant’s
lifestyle. For example, a defendant might be . . . ordered to wear
an electronic monitoring device . . . .
.
. .
Thus, curfews, house arrest (with or without
electronic monitoring), bed checks . . . etc., can all be
appropriate “other conditions”. It does not matter whether one sees them as
rehabilitative measures, control measures, or punishment. What counts is
not the label but an intent that the condition should further public protection
or the acceptance of the defendant in the community, and some reasonable
grounds for belief that it will have a tendency to effect those purposes.
[Emphasis added.]
(T. W. Ferris, Sentencing: Practical Approaches (2005), at pp.
79, 116 and 216‑17)
Ferris reports
that the courts in the following cases held that electronic monitoring is
lawful under s. 732.1(3)(h) : R. v. Carlson (1996), 141 Sask. R.
168 (C.A.); R. v. Curtis (1996), 144 Sask. R. 156 (C.A.); R. v.
McLeod (1992), 109 Sask. R. 8 (C.A.).
38
The range of possible conditions is broad. The purpose of such
conditions is often to control aspects of the lifestyle of an accused to ensure
that the goals of probation — protection of society and reintegration into the
community — are achieved.
39
We should not assume that such a discretion would be abused by
sentencing judges or exercised in an unconstitutional manner in the absence of
a detailed statutory framework. In another context — a case concerning an
exercise of discretion by an administrative authority — this Court asserted
that it should not rely on assumptions of prospective breaches of the Charter :
I do not think there is any constitutional rule that requires
Parliament to deal with Customs’ treatment of constitutionally protected
expressive material by legislation (as the appellants contend) rather than by
way of regulation (as Parliament contemplated in s. 164(1)(j)) or even
by ministerial directive or departmental practice. Parliament is entitled
to proceed on the basis that its enactments “will be applied constitutionally”
by the public service.
. . .
[I]t is in the nature of government work that the power of the state is
exercised and the Charter rights of the citizen may therefore be
engaged. While there is evidence of actual abuse here, there is the potential
for abuse in many areas, and a rule requiring Parliament to enact in each
case special procedures for the protection of Charter rights would be
unnecessarily rigid. [Underlining added.]
(Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of
Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120, 2000 SCC 69, at paras. 71 and 137)
40
Any challenge in the instant case should have related to the
reasonableness of the order under s. 8 of the Charter . The authority to
impose the monitoring conditions exists. It remains to be seen whether the
conditions meet the standards of the Charter (see Ruby, at para. 10.63).
41
Before I move on to some brief comments on the application of s. 8 in
the context of the case at bar, I must add that I agree with Charron J. that
the part of the order that would, in essence, turn a positive test into a
breach of the conditions set out in the order is contrary to the principles of
criminal law. Guilt must be proved in the usual manner, that is, beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the accused is entitled to the protection of the law of
criminal evidence and criminal procedure.
III. Application
of Section 8
42
Section 8 raises difficulties in respect of parts of the order. I agree
that the part compelling the accused to undergo blood tests would be far too
intrusive and would breach s. 8 absent a statutory framework consistent with
the standards of the Charter .
43
Although it may very well be a more efficient way to monitor compliance,
random drug testing at the probation officer’s discretion could become highly
arbitrary. Courts would have difficulty defining a proper framework to
supplement the silence of the Code. This is a situation where
Parliament would be in a better position to address the issue. Its solution
would then be open to review by the courts under s. 8 and s. 1 of the Charter .
44
For these reasons, I agree with my colleague that the appeal should be
dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Solicitor for the appellant: Attorney General of British
Columbia, Vancouver.
Solicitor for the respondent: Garth Barriere,
Vancouver.
Solicitor for the intervener the Attorney General of Canada:
Attorney General of Canada, Vancouver.
Solicitors for the intervener the Criminal Lawyers’ Association
(Ontario): Kapoor & Stribopoulos, Toronto.