Docket: T-2627-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1196
Ottawa, Ontario, October 29, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Manson
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BETWEEN:
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TANIA ZULKOSKEY
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Applicant
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and
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CANADA
(MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT)
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This is an application for judicial review by
Ms. Tania Zulkoskey [the Applicant] of a decision of the Canadian Human Rights
Commission [CHRC or Commission] dated November 12, 2014, deciding not to deal
with her human rights complaint on the basis that it was “vexatious” within the
meaning of paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC
1985, c H-6 [CHRA or the Act]. Her complaint argues that
providing a single set of Employment Insurance [EI] parental benefits to
parents of twins is discriminatory under the CHRA.
I.
Background
[2]
The Applicant and her spouse paid EI premiums
for many years. In 2008, the Applicant became pregnant through artificial
insemination. She applied and was approved for EI sickness and maternity
benefits in June 2009. On July 10, 2009, she gave birth to twins.
[3]
In a letter dated July 22, 2009, the Applicant
requested that she be permitted to collect 15 weeks of maternity benefits and
have the remaining 35 weeks of parental benefits transferred to her spouse. The
request was approved.
[4]
On September 29, 2009, the Applicant and her
spouse requested by letter that they both receive 35 weeks of EI parental
benefits. The EI Commission denied her claim on the basis that her spouse had
already been awarded the maximum EI parental benefits under the Employment
Insurance Act, SC 1996, c 23 [EI Act], which provides one set of
benefits per pregnancy.
[5]
The Applicant appealed this decision to the
Board of Referees [the Board], which was denied on June 15, 2010, and then
further to the Office of the Umpire [the Umpire]. The question at these appeals
was interpretive: whether the Applicant was entitled to parental benefits under
the EI Act or not.
[6]
Upon consent of all parties, the Applicant’s
appeal to the Umpire, along with a number of similar appeals, was stayed
pending the final outcome of Martin v Canada (Attorney General), 2013
FCA 15 [Martin], as they all shared a common question of law; whether
parents of multiple-child pregnancies or adoptions were only entitled to 35
weeks of benefits per pregnancy or adoption, rather than 35 weeks per child.
[7]
Mr. Martin, a parent to twins born in 2009,
requested and was denied EI parental benefits beyond those granted to his
spouse. Mr. Martin had gone through the same appeals process as the Applicant,
and was unsuccessful on his two grounds of appeal on judicial review at the
Federal Court of Appeal [FCA]. The FCA determined that the impugned EI Act
provisions award 35 weeks per single pregnancy or multiple-adoption and do not
provide for an additional set of benefits in the case of twins or multiples.
They further found that these provisions are not discriminatory under subsection
15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11)
[the Charter]. The Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on June 27,
2013.
[8]
Initially, the Applicant had proposed that the
result and reasons in Martin be binding on her case, as her appeal “arises from virtually the same set of facts” as Martin
and seeks the same relief. The Umpire did not adopt this proposition, but
simply granted the stay without further conditions, stating that “[o]nce the Martin case has been finally determined, [the
Applicant] will have the opportunity to take the appropriate legal steps”.
[9]
All appeals before the Umpire were transferred
to the new Social Security Tribunal, Appeal Division [SST-AD]. On September 25,
2014, the SST-AD dismissed all outstanding appeals stayed pending the outcome
in Martin, stating that the issue of parental benefits and
multiple-child pregnancies or adoptions under the EI Act was now settled
law.
[10]
The Applicant did not seek judicial review of
the SST-AD’s decision.
[11]
On October 10, 2013, the Applicant filed a human
rights complaint with the CHRC, alleging that the one-benefit-per-birth cap
under the EI Act was discriminatory on the basis of family status under
the CHRA.
[12]
The CHRC requested that the Applicant provide
submissions regarding whether paragraph 41(1)(d) of the CHRA applied [the
Position Letter]. This provision directs that the Commission is not to deal
with a complaint that is “trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith”.
A vexatious claim arises where the complaint has been dealt with through
another process. The letter detailed that a Section 40/41 Report [the Report]
would be prepared by an Early Resolution Advisor [the investigator], which the
CHRC would use “as well as the complaint form and any
of the parties’ submissions to the report, to decide whether to deal with the
complaint”. The letter provided instructions on how to prepare a
position letter and what it should address.
[13]
The Applicant’s Position Letter emphasized that
her prior EI Act complaint and appeals solely concerned interpretation
of the impugned provisions, but did not deal with her human rights issues. She
thus did not have her day in court. The Respondent’s position was that the
substance of the Applicant’s discrimination claim was conclusively decided in Martin;
the Applicant and Mr. Martin’s claims were nearly identical and consequently,
she should not be given an opportunity to relitigate an issue found
unsuccessful in another forum.
[14]
The Section 40/41 Report issued August 22, 2014,
summarized the complaint, the parties’ position letters and the Martin
decision. It also outlined the applicable case law and legal tests and
recommended that the complaint be dismissed as vexatious. The parties were
provided an opportunity to respond, within a 10-page limit [response
submissions].
[15]
The Applicant responded to the Report on
September 22, 2014. Her response submissions refer to her Position Letter in an
aim to demonstrate that the Report’s findings were inaccurate regarding the
scope of the EI Act appeals.
[16]
On October 3, 2014, the CHRC provided the
parties with copies of each other’s response submissions, to which they were
given an opportunity to respond to the other party’s submissions
[cross-disclosure submissions]. Both parties did so.
[17]
On November 12, 2014, the Commission decided not
to deal with the complaint, pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(d) of the CHRA
[the Decision]. Within its reasons, the Commission indicated that it relied the
following documents in arriving at its Decision:
a)
the Complaint Form, dated October 10, 2013;
b)
the Section 40/41 Report, dated August 22, 2014;
c)
response submissions from the Applicant
(received September 30, 2014) and the Respondent (dated September 19, 2014);
and
d)
cross-disclosure submissions from the Applicant
(dated October 8, 2014) and the Respondent (dated October 23, 2014).
[18]
The Commission adopted the recommendations from
the Section 40/41 Report, and provided reasons for their Decision, issued
November 12, 2014, as follows:
a)
the Applicant had exhausted other redress
procedures available to her: a final decision was issued on September 25, 2014,
by the SST-AD, which has the authority to decide on human rights issues;
b)
essentially the same allegations of discrimination
as the current complaint had been decided by the FCA decision in Martin,
which determined that the parental benefits sections of the EI Act did
not infringe section 15 Charter rights;
c)
using the result of Martin to preclude
this complaint would not result in unfairness or injustice (Penner v Niagara
Regional Police Services Board, 2013 SCC 19 [Penner]): although
tests under the Charter and CHRA are different, a human rights
analysis of the claim under the CHRA would, similar to the Charter
analysis in Martin, examine whether the complainant suffered adversity
based on a ground of discrimination and consider the purpose of the EI Act
parental benefit; and
d)
based on guidance from the Supreme Court, the
Commission determined it should not deal with the present complaint (British
Columbia (Workers' Compensation Board) v Figliola, 2011 SCC 52 [Figliola];
Penner, above).
II.
Issues
[19]
The issues are:
- Did the CHRC
provide adequate procedural fairness to the Applicant in the
circumstances?
- Was the CHRC’s
decision reasonable?
III.
Standard of Review
[20]
The standard of review for determining
procedural fairness is correctness and is reasonableness in reviewing the
Commission’s decision under subsection 41(1) of the CHRA not to deal
with the Applicant’s complaint (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa,
2009 SCC 12 at para 43; Ayangma v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FCA
213 at para 56).
[21]
The parties disagree on the level of deference
owed to the Commission on applying the standard of reasonableness under subsection
41(1) of the CHRA.
[22]
The range of acceptable outcomes varies with the
context. The Applicant argues that there is a narrower margin of appreciation
where the possible outcomes are constrained (Abraham v Canada (Attorney
General), 2012 FCA 266 at paras 42, 44, leave to appeal denied, 2013
CarswellNat 729 (SCC) [Abraham]). In the present case, the CHRC decided
between one of two opposing outcomes – to deal with the complaint or not –
thus, the Court should engage in a more exacting review of the decision (Canada
(Human Rights Commission) v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FCA 75 at paras
13-15 [CHRC, 2013]).
[23]
A reasonableness review is concerned with
whether the Commission’s decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable
outcomes, and whether the decision is justified, transparent and intelligible. The
Court must assess both the reasons given by the decision-maker and the result
reached (Love v Canada (Privacy Commissioner), 2015 FCA 198 at 22 [Love,
FCA]; Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para 47 [Dunsmuir]).
This range of acceptable options or “margin of appreciation,” widens or narrows
depending on the circumstances (British Columbia
(Securities Commission) v McLean, 2013 SCC 67 at
paras 37-41).
[24]
The language of the statute, which confers
discretion on the Commission to decline to deal with a complaint, along with
the nature of the Commission’s role as a screening rather than adjudicative
body, suggest the Commission is entitled to a higher level of deference under subsection
41(1) (Love v Canada (Privacy Commissioner), 2014 FC 643 at paras 19 –
23; aff’d Love, FCA, above).
[25]
In Bergeron v Canada (Attorney General),
2015 FCA 160 at para 46 [Bergeron], Justice David Stratas found that decisions
made under paragraph 41(1)(d) are deferential wherein the Commission considers
several fact-based or “factually-suffused questions of
mixed fact and law,” in coming to its determination, which warrants greater
deference from the Court.
[26]
Further, under subsection 41(1) the Commission
is performing a factual and policy-based screening relating to the allocation
of resources at the CHRC - not an adjudicative role. The Decision is based on
the principles of fairness and consistency in decision-making, which aims to
prevent the re-adjudication of matters adequately determined in another forum.
The Commission should thus be afforded “great latitude” upon review (Bergeron,
above, at para 45).
[27]
The wording of paragraph 41(1)(d) provides the
Commission with discretion to decline to deal with a complaint, stating that “the Commission shall deal with any complaint filed with it
unless in respect of that complaint it appears to the Commission that...(d)
the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith”
[emphasis added]. This suggests Parliament intended the Commission be seized
with this task and higher deference is to be afforded (O’Grady v Bell
Canada, 2012 FC 1448, at para 34; Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General),
2005 FCA 404 at para 38 [Sketchley]).
[28]
As stated by Justice Kane in Khapar v Air
Canada, 2014 FC 138 at para 47 [Khapar] (aff’d, 2015 FCA 99):
47…section 41
of the Act confers on the Commission ample discretion to decide when not to
deal with a complaint at this preliminary stage (Maracle, supra at para
47). Decisions made pursuant to section 41 of the Act are, therefore, accorded
significant deference by a reviewing court and accordingly, the scope of
judicial review is narrow.
IV.
Analysis
A.
Did the CHRC Provide Adequate Procedural Fairness
to the Applicant?
[29]
The Applicant argues she was not afforded
procedural fairness when the CHRC chose not to review her Position Letter,
despite stating it would. As well, she claims the reply limit of 10 pages to
the Section 40/41 Report was procedurally unfair.
[30]
In applying the Baker factors to
determine the amount of procedural fairness owed in the circumstances, the
Applicant argues that the Decision is important, as it engages her legal
responsibility to provide for her children and effectively precludes her from
having her day in court. She had a legitimate expectation that the CHRC would
review her Position Letter. The Decision was a quasi-judicial administrative
one, and should encompass basic elements of procedural fairness, including an
opportunity to canvass her position and evidence fully, and have it considered
by the decision-maker (Baker v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras 23-27).
[31]
The Applicant also claims she was prejudiced by
the CHRC changing the “rules of the game”. In Air Canada v Marley Greenglass
and Canadian Transportation Agency, 2014 FCA 288 at para 27 [Air Canada],
the FCA found a breach of procedural fairness partly by the way in which the “game-plan”
for adjudication, namely who would carry the burden of proof, had been
communicated.
[32]
The Applicant analogises Air Canada to
the present facts: letters from the CHRC to the Applicant stated that the
Commission would make a decision based on the Section 40/41 Report, the
complaint form and any of the parties’ submissions to the Report. She claims to
have had a legitimate expectation that the CHRC would review her Position
Letter, and referenced them in subsequent replies to the Report.
[33]
In assessing the Baker factors, I agree
that the Applicant was owed a duty of fairness in the circumstances: the CHRC’s
decision affected the Applicant’s rights, privileges and interests.
[34]
The first two Baker factors point towards
a lesser degree of procedural fairness. The nature of the decision at the
screening stage falls on the administrative end of the spectrum, as the
determination is not made in an adversarial context. Additionally, the
statutory scheme does not include a privative clause and judicial review is
available for the Commission’s screening decision.
[35]
The Commission’s Decision at the screening phase
is of considerable importance to the Applicant. The decision to dismiss her
complaint will effectively preclude the Applicant from having her day in court
and obtaining relief under the Act: it is therefore determinative of her
rights. This Baker factor suggests an increased level of procedural
fairness.
[36]
The fourth Baker factor considers the
legitimate expectations of the Applicant, where the Commission undertook to follow
a certain procedure. A review of the correspondence suggests that the
Commission did not make a clear and unequivocal promise to review the
Applicant’s Position Letter. In the first letter to Ms. Zulkoskey, dated
November 22, 2013, regarding the applicability of paragraph 41(1)(d), the
Commission states:
The Commission will use the report, as well
as the complaint form and any of the parties’ submissions to the report,
to decide whether to deal with the complaint [emphasis added] (Letter from CHRC
to the Applicant, dated November 22, 2013; AR, Vol 1, Tab 3(A), p 17).
[37]
The subsequent follow-up letter from the CHRC to
the Applicant on August 25, 2014, provides her with the Section 40/41 Report
and indicates that:
The Commission will make a decision based on
the enclosed report, the complaint form, and any submissions (comments) it has
received from the parties. For this reason, if you disagree with information in
the report, it is important that you take this opportunity to make a submission
(Letter from CHRC to the Applicant, dated August 25, 2014; AR, Vol 1, Tab 3(C),
p 120).
[38]
The October 3, 2014 letter from CHRC to the
Applicant, providing the Respondent’s submissions and presenting the Applicant
with an opportunity to comment in response states “[t]he
Commission will read [the comments] when it is reviewing the report” (Letter
from CHRC to the Applicant, dated October 3, 2014; AR, Vol 1, Tab 3(D), p 122).
[39]
These letters illustrate that the Commission
considered the Applicant’s submissions. Although the August 25, 2014 letter
does not specify that the submissions reviewed would be those responding to the
Report, the very first letter sent to the Applicant clearly stipulates that
submissions to the Report would be considered, along with the Report to decide
whether to deal with a complaint. The CHRC ultimately considered the documents
it stated it would in that first letter, and therefore I do not find that the
Commission made a clear promise to the Applicant that they would consider her Position
Letter.
[40]
Moreover, procedural fairness in the CHRA
context does not require the Commission to re-consider everything submitted by
the parties prior to making its decision (Khapar, at para 63).
[41]
The fifth Baker factor, the choices made
by the Commission supports a lesser degree of procedural protection. The CHRA
provides no legislative guidance concerning the procedures to be followed in
subsection 41(1) investigations. Further, the Governor in Council has not
passed any regulations pursuant to subsection 43(4) regarding the procedure to
be followed at the screening stage. As a practical necessity, the Commission
must screen complaints before referring them for further inquiry. Their
procedural choices at this stage should therefore be afforded deference, so
long as they comply with the duty of fairness.
[42]
In summary, when the Baker factors are
considered as a whole, the procedural fairness to be afforded in the
circumstances of applying paragraph 41(1)(d) is on the lower end of the spectrum.
[43]
The investigator’s Report must be neutral and
thorough, which requires that the parties’ arguments be accurately summarized (Lusina
v Bell Canada, 2005 FC 134 at para 31). The Applicant claims it was
neither, as it incorrectly summarized her evidence. A comparison of the
Applicant’s Position Letter and the Report illustrates that the investigator
accurately summarized the Applicant’s Position Letter in the Report.
[44]
I disagree with the Applicant’s assertion that
the present circumstances are analogous to the “game change” in Air Canada:
this is not a situation involving reversal of the burden of proof whereby the
Applicant was prevented from submitting key evidence. The Applicant was
informed in various letters what would be considered by the Commission. The
Applicant was further given not one, but two, opportunities to respond. The
Commission’s reliance on the Report in making a final determination is
appropriate, considering that reviewing all the same documents considered at
the Section 40/41 Report stage would defeat the purposes of the preliminary
examination (Khapar, at para 63).
[45]
The Commission carried out its statutory mandate
and has complied with its duty of fairness. The Report was neutral and
sufficiently thorough. The Applicant had ample opportunity to make submissions
and convey her disagreement with the information in the Report. She was
provided an opportunity to present her case, and the 10 page limit was not
procedurally unfair (Boshra v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FC 1128,
at paras 50-52). The Report, upon which the Commission’s Decision is based,
identified the issues, comprehensively canvassed the parties’ positions, the
factors to be applied in determining if a claim is vexatious, and subsequent
information gathered from the parties.
B.
Was the CHRC’s Decision Reasonable?
[46]
Under the CHRA, the Commission should only
decline to deal with a complaint at the screening stage if it is “plain and
obvious” that the Applicant’s complaint falls within one of the subsection
41(1) grounds (Canada Post Corp v Canada (Human Rights Commission),
[1997] FCJ No 578 at para 3, aff'd [1999] FCJ No 705 (FCA) [Canada Post].
Thus, it must be plain and obvious that the Applicant had already received a
final decision regarding her human rights complaint.
[47]
The Court’s role in this judicial review is to determine
whether the Commission’s determination that the complaint plainly and obviously
fell within paragraph 41(1)(d) is reasonable.
[48]
I find that the Decision was reasonable.
(1)
Applicant’s Position
[49]
The Applicant alleges that the CHRC’s decision
not to deal with her complaint was unreasonable because (a) she did not receive
a final decision, as she was not bound by Martin, and (b) her human
rights issues have not already been dealt with through another process.
(a)
The Applicant Did Not Receive a Final Decision
[50]
The Applicant argues that the CHRC erred in finding
that she received a final decision regarding discrimination and in relying on
this in its application of paragraph 41(1)(d) of the CHRA. Mr. Martin’s
case is separate and distinct and should have no bearing; she was not a party
to his case, nor did she have the opportunity to present evidence or arguments.
[51]
The CHRC found that the Applicant had her day in
court because essentially the same allegations of discrimination had been
decided in Martin and because the Applicant stayed her appeal at the
SST-AD and had it dismissed based on the outcome in Martin. She claims
this position is contrary to the actions of the Umpire, who in grating her stay
indicated that once Martin was determined, the Applicant could take the
appropriate legal steps to resolve her case.
(b)
The Applicant’s Human Rights Issues Have Never
Been Addressed
[52]
The Applicant also argues that this is not a
situation where her claim has already been adjudicated on and dismissed by a
tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the claim. Rather, the Applicant’s complaint
filed with the CHRC on October 10, 2013, was the first time she alleged the
impugned EI Act provisions violate the CHRA. The prior EI
proceedings only considered interpretation of the EI Act with the only
issue before the SST-AD being whether the Board was correct in their
interpretation – that 35 weeks was awarded per pregnancy or adoption, not per
child. Human rights issues were not raised.
(2)
Analysis
[53]
Paragraph 41(1)(d) of the Act grants the
Commission discretion not to deal with a complaint where the issues raised in
that complaint have been otherwise dealt with through another process. In the
Section 40/41 Report, the Commission was required to determine that the
Applicant’s situation plainly and obviously fell within paragraph 41(1)(d), and
if it did, whether justice required that the complaint be heard regardless (Canada
Post, above, at para 3).
[54]
It is appropriate to consider the Section 40/41
Report as part of the Commission’s reasons: their reasons are brief and they
adopt the Report’s analysis (Sketchley, above, at para 37). Since the
Commission’s final decision was based on not just the Report, the parties’
further submissions are also relevant.
[55]
The Report reveals that the investigator
thoroughly canvassed the facts, the legal principles stemming from relevant
case law and the positions of the parties. The Report accurately summarizes the
Applicant’s position letter. It then analyzes the relevant factors for
determining whether a complaint is vexatious, including; whether a decision was
made in another process, whether the issues raised during that process were
essentially the same as the present issues, whether the complainant raised
human rights issues, and whether the complainant finished available reviews or
appeals of the decision.
[56]
Although the Report accurately summarized the
Applicant’s position, the analysis contains some errors, specifically regarding
the content of the previous proceedings. Paragraph 75 of the Report
inaccurately states that “the allegations of
discrimination raised in the complainant’s human rights complaint are
essentially the same as the issues raised by the complainant under the EI Act
Process and decided upon by the SST-AD”. This is incorrect. The EI
Act Process and SST-AD dismissal only dealt with the issue of
interpretation of the impugned provisions. It is therefore inaccurate to claim
that the Applicant had her day in court regarding the human rights issue at any
of the prior proceedings.
[57]
However, the Applicant was given the opportunity
to address these errors in her response submissions to the Report, which were
considered by the Commission.
[58]
I agree that the Applicant did not receive a
final determination regarding discrimination at the SST-AD, however, I disagree
that her human rights issues have not been addressed.
[59]
The Applicant’s complaint arose from virtually
the same set of facts as Martin: both involved parents of twins who
requested and were denied parental benefits on the basis that their spouses had
received the maximum parental benefits payable.
[60]
The FCA in Martin interpreted the same
provisions of the EI Act and determined that these provisions were not
discriminatory under section 15 of the Charter. The Report canvasses the
difference between the legal equality tests under section 15 of the Charter
and under the CHRA and compares the findings in Martin with what
would be considered under the CHRA process, despite the different tests.
It ultimately concludes that the Applicant’s allegations of discrimination were
analyzed through the lens of the section 15 Charter analysis by the FCA
in Martin.
[61]
As noted by the Respondent, paragraph 41(1)(d)
allows for some divergence with respect to the exact issues raised, remedies
available and procedures used. The purpose of the provision would be undermined
if an exact parity were required (Bergeron v Canada (Attorney General),
2013 FC 301 at para 38).
[62]
Further, as the Respondent points out, Brown,
has set a precedent that it is not unreasonable to dismiss a human rights complaint
if the human rights issues raised in the complaint have been dealt with under
section 15 of the Charter (Canada (Attorney General) v Brown, 2001
FCA 385 at para 6 [Brown]; To-Thanh-Hien, above, at para 41).
[63]
After determining the claim was vexatious within
the meaning of the Act, the investigator noted that the Commission
retained discretion to deal with a complaint if justice required. The Report
shows the investigator was alive to the relevant jurisprudence, namely the
decisions in Boudreault v Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 99 FTR 293; Canada
Post Corp v Barrette, [2000] 4 FC 145 (FCA); Figliola, above; and Penner,
above.
[64]
In Figliola the Supreme Court set out
that the principles of finality, fairness and the preservation of the integrity
of the justice system by preventing unnecessary inconsistency, multiplicity and
delay, are to guide a decision whether to hear an already-decided claim. The
Commission is given the task to determine “whether it
makes sense to expend public and private resources on the relitigation of what
is essentially the same dispute” (paras 36, 37). It is clear the
Commission turned its mind to these principles.
[65]
The Commission’s decision that the Applicant’s
claim plainly and obviously fell within paragraph 41(1)(d) is two pronged.
Firstly, they determined that the Applicant had exhausted other redress
procedures available to her and that a final decision was reached under the
SST-AD. For the reasons stated above, I disagree, as it is clear the human
rights issues were not raised by the Applicant prior to her complaint at the
CHRC. However, the Commission’s reasons were also based on the fact that the
FCA in Martin decided on essentially the same allegations of
discrimination under the Charter. The fact that Martin involved a
different individual than the Applicant does not change the inevitable result
that the Applicant’s underlying facts and arguments have been decided in a
manner that negates any prospect for success in her case.
[66]
The Commission is afforded a margin of deference
within the range of acceptable and defensible outcomes on the facts and the
law, which is broad in these circumstances. Dunsmuir requires that the
Commission’s Decision fall within this range and that the Decision is
justified, transparent and intelligible. Despite the errors in the Report
regarding finality and other redress procedures, the decision in Martin
in and of itself provides reasonable justification for the Commission’s Decision
not to deal with the Applicant’s complaint.
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