Docket: IMM-5765-15
Citation:
2016 FC 1044
[ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, September 15, 2016
PRESENT: the Honourable Mr.
Justice Gascon
BETWEEN:
|
OSHALAH KAMARA
KIDD
|
Applicant
|
And
|
THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC SAFETY AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The applicant, Oshalah Kamara Kidd, is a citizen
of Jamaica. He is disputing a decision by a delegate of the Minister of Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness [the Minister’s delegate] dated November 4,
2015, to refer Mr. Kidd to an admissibility hearing before the Immigration
Division [ID] of the Immigration and Refugee Board. The purpose of this hearing
is to determine whether Mr. Kidd should be declared inadmissible on grounds of
serious criminality under paragraph 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27 [IRPA].
[2]
Under this application for judicial review, Mr.
Kidd is asking the Court to rescind the Minister’s delegate’s decision and
order another representative of the Minister to re-examine his file. Mr. Kidd
claims that the Minister’s delegate made three errors in deciding to refer his
file for an admissibility hearing before the ID. First, he supposedly failed to
adequately consider all the relevant factors, including the children’s best
interests; second, he reportedly incorrectly based his conclusions on a police
report of his most recent offences; and third, he apparently incorrectly
equated a conditional sentence to be served in the community with a sentence of
imprisonment within the meaning of paragraph 36(1)(a).
[3]
Therefore, Mr. Kidd’s application raises three
questions: was the Minister’s delegate’s interpretation of the word "imprisonment" reasonable; was the decision
to refer Mr. Kidd’s file for an admissibility hearing before the ID
unreasonable due to failure to consider the relevant factors; and did the
Minister’s delegate violate the principles of natural justice by basing his
decision on the 2015 police report?
[4]
For the following reasons, Mr. Kidd’s
application for judicial review must be dismissed. Having examined the evidence
available to the Minister’s delegate and the applicable legislation, I see
nothing that allows me to set aside the delegate’s decision. I cannot identify
any error in the Minister’s delegate’s decision that would justify the Court’s
intervention. In his decision, the Minister’s delegate considered the evidence,
and his conclusions are justifiable based on the facts and law and clearly fall
within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes under the circumstances.
Furthermore, the application for judicial review does not raise any procedural
fairness issues.
II.
Background
A.
The facts
[5]
Mr. Kidd arrived in Canada at the age of four
and is now 31 years old. Since his arrival, he has never been back to Jamaica
and has no contact with his family back in Jamaica. He has been married since
2013 and is the father of two children born in Canada.
[6]
Mr. Kidd has an extensive criminal record in
Canada. In January 2003, he was sentenced to 18 months of probation for
uttering counterfeit money and using counterfeit documents. He received a
warning letter from the Canada Border Services Agency [CBSA] about these
convictions. He was pardoned for them in 2009.
[7]
In November 2012, Mr. Kidd was convicted of
dangerous driving, seven counts of fraud, obstructing a police officer and
assault. In February 2013, Mr. Kidd was given a conditional sentence of 18
months in prison, which could be served in the community and included several
conditions (including a fine, community service and a probation order).
[8]
In June 2013, Mr. Kidd was notified that, due to
these convictions, an inadmissibility report under subsection 44(1) of the IRPA
was issued for him under paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA. CBSA invited Mr. Kidd
to make submissions explaining why his file should not be referred for an
admissibility hearing before the ID. In his written submissions, Mr. Kidd said
he felt remorse and had taken steps to avoid reoffending. He said he was aware
of the seriousness of the situation and understood that, were he to break the
law again, he would probably be deported from Canada.
[9]
In February 2015, however, Mr. Kidd was once
again charged with dangerous driving, driving a vehicle while prohibited and
obstructing a police officer. He pleaded guilty to the charges and was
sentenced to 87 days in prison to be served on weekends, a fine, 240 hours of
community service, and 2 years’ probation without supervision. In May 2015, Mr.
Kidd informed CBSA of these new charges and convictions.
[10]
In May 2015, due to the series of updates from
Mr. Kidd since the June 2013 notification, a CBSA enforcement officer signed a
report under subsection 44(1) of the IRPA recommending that Mr. Kidd be
referred for an admissibility hearing for serious criminality under paragraph
36(1)(a). In November 2015, the Minister’s delegate confirmed his agreement
with the officer’s recommendation.
B.
The decisions under dispute
[11]
In the notes dated October 2015 taken by the
Minister’s delegate as part of the decision, he says he agrees with the CBSA
enforcement officer’s recommendation to [translation]
"refer the subject, who is a long-term permanent
resident" for an admissibility hearing for serious criminality in
Canada. In his notes, the Minister’s delegate repeats Mr. Kidd’s personal information
and mentions his record, including his new convictions in February 2015. He
describes in detail the events that led to these latest charges.
[12]
On the report from the CBSA enforcement officer
supporting the Minister’s delegate’s decision, the officer checked the box
indicating that the Canadian authorities had already sent Mr. Kidd a warning
letter in February 2003. Under Long-term permanent resident, the officer
checked the boxes stating that Mr. Kidd became a permanent resident before the
age of 18 and was a permanent resident for 10 years before being convicted of a
reportable offence. The fact that Mr. Kidd is a long-term permanent resident is
also mentioned in the officer’s comments and notes. The officer also checked
the boxes indicating that Mr. Kidd has been found guilty of other criminal
offences but is not involved in criminal activities or organized crime.
[13]
The officer added that Mr. Kidd said he has an [translation] "irrational
fear of police authority, contributing to his exaggerated criminal behaviour,
and wanted to work on managing his feelings and undergo therapy for this
purpose." After taking into account [translation] "all new
information on the changes in the subject’s personal situation and
convictions," the officer maintained the recommendation to refer
Mr. Kidd’s report because he reoffended and had known he had an inadmissibility
report before he reoffended. According to the officer, Mr. Kidd needed to
demonstrate that he had become a law-abiding citizen, but he still acquired
recurrent convictions despite his precarious immigration situation and his full
knowledge of the potential consequences. The officer also noted that the new
convictions were of the same type as those indicated in the previous report,
which was an aggravating factor in Mr. Kidd’s case.
C.
Standard of review
[14]
There is no doubt that the IRPA is one of the
enabling statutes that the Minister’s delegate and CBSA are mandated to enforce
and apply. However, since Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.
Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 [Alberta Teachers], the
Supreme Court of Canada has many times recalled that "when
an administrative tribunal interprets or applies its home statute, there is a
presumption that the standard of review applicable to its decision is
reasonableness" (Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement
de la région de Laval, 2016 SCC 8 at paragraph 32; B010 v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 58 at paragraph 25; Wilson
v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 47 at
paragraph 17; ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Utilities
Commission), 2015 SCC 45 at paragraph 28; Tervita Corp. v. Canada
(Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3 at paragraph 35).
[15]
Of course, this presumption is not
unchallengeable. It can be overruled and the standard of correctness can be
applied, in the presence of one of the factors first set out by the Supreme
Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir] at
paragraphs 43–64 and recently reiterated in Mouvement laïque québécois
v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16 at paragraphs 46–48. Such is the case
when a contextual analysis reveals a clear intent of Parliament not to protect
the tribunal’s authority with respect to certain issues; when several courts have
concurrent and non-exclusive jurisdiction on a point of law; when an issue
raised is a general question of law that is of central importance to the legal
system as a whole and outside the area of expertise of the specialized
administrative tribunal; or when a constitutional question is at play.
[16]
It is clear that none of these scenarios exist
here and that the presumption established by Alberta Teachers is
therefore not rebutted in this case. The question of the interpretation of the
word "imprisonment" raised by Mr. Kidd’s
application is not among the limited range of questions for which Dunsmuir
and its descendants indicate that the standard of correctness should be
applied. The applicable standard of review is therefore that of reasonableness.
[17]
The same applies to weighing the different
factors leading to the Minister’s delegate’s decision to refer the case for an
admissibility hearing before the ID, since it is an issue of both facts and law
central to the administrative tribunal’s expertise (Faci v. Canada (Public
Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2011 FC 693 [Faci] at paragraph
17). Once again, the standard of reasonableness applies.
[18]
Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the
existence of "justification, transparency and
intelligibility within the decision-making process." But it is also
concerned with whether the decision falls "within
a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law" (Dunsmuir at paragraph 47). The reasons
for a decision are considered to be reasonable "if
the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its
decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range
of acceptable outcomes" (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses’ Union
v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 [Newfoundland
Nurses] at paragraph 16). In this context, the Court must show
restraint toward the tribunal’s decision and cannot substitute its own reasons.
Its mission is not to weigh the case’s evidence once again or to interfere with
the tribunal’s conclusions of fact; instead, it should limit itself to
determining whether a conclusion is irrational or arbitrary. However, it may,
if necessary, look to the record for the purpose of assessing the
reasonableness of the decision (Newfoundland Nurses at paragraph 15).
That said, judicial review is not a "line-by-line
treasure hunt for error" (Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v. Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd.,
2013 SCC 34 at paragraph 54).
[19]
The procedural fairness issue raised by Mr. Kidd’s
application for review is to be determined on the basis of a correctness
standard of review (Mission Institution v. Khela , 2014 SCC 24 at para.
79; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para.
43). That said, the question therefore is not so much whether the decision was
“correct,” but rather whether the process followed by the decision-maker was
fair (Majdalani v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 294 at
paragraph 15; Krishnamoorthy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011
FC 1342 at paragraph 13).
III.
Analysis
A.
The interpretation of the term "imprisonment" is reasonable
[20]
Mr. Kidd is criticizing the Minister’s delegate
for incorrectly equating his conditional sentence with a sentence of
imprisonment. He says that, since the convictions leading to the report on Mr.
Kidd are punishable by a maximum prison sentence of less than 10 years,
paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA cannot apply to Mr. Kidd unless he is considered
guilty of an offence under federal law for which "imprisonment"
of more than six months is imposed. However, he says, the Supreme Court
indicated that a "sentence of imprisonment"
does not always refer to a "conditional
sentence" and that it is important to consider the context (R v.
Middleton, 2009 SCC 21 [Middleton] at paragraphs 14–16). Based on Middleton,
Mr. Kidd claims that the Criminal Code contains several examples where
the term "sentence of imprisonment"
cannot include "conditional sentence."
[21]
Therefore, Mr. Kidd says that by equating his
conditional sentence with a sentence of imprisonment within the meaning of
paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA, which lists the reasons why someone can be
inadmissible for "serious criminality,"
the Minister’s delegate adopted an unreasonable interpretation. Mr. Kidd also
says that equating a conditional sentence with a sentence of imprisonment
within the meaning of paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA would be absurd. People
who are given conditional sentences are not considered "serious
criminals" (R. v. Proulx, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 [Proulx] at
paragraph 21). People are given conditional sentences when there are mitigating
circumstances and they are not considered a danger to the community. According
to Mr. Kidd, interpreting the word "imprisonment"
as including conditional sentences would mean that permanent residents meeting
the conditions for conditional sentences would in fact be required to ask the
courts for a sentence of imprisonment rather than a conditional sentence to be
served in the community to avoid deportation.
[22]
I disagree with Mr. Kidd’s arguments.
[23]
The question raised by Mr. Kidd was recently
resolved by the Federal Court of Appeal, which explicitly concluded in Canada
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) v. Tran, 2015 FCA 237 [Tran]
that a conditional sentence is still a sentence of imprisonment for the
purposes of paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA (Tran at paragraph 86). All
of Mr. Kidd’s arguments concerning the contradictory, absurd consequences that
the Minister’s delegate’s decision could lead to, as well as those concerning
the teachings of Supreme Court decisions on imprisonment, were all considered
and rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal in Tran. Although that
decision was appealed before the Supreme Court, it represents the law that
binds this Court. Therefore, I am required to conclude, as did the Federal
Court of Appeal in Tran, that the Minister’s delegate’s interpretation
that, for the purposes of paragraph 36(1)(a) of the IRPA, the term “imprisonment” includes sentences served in the
community is entirely justifiable and reasonable.
[24]
In fact, Mr. Kidd himself recognized this when
he said that Tran opens the possibility of another interpretation of
this question being deemed reasonable. The fact that another interpretation of
the provision may also be reasonable does not mean that the interpretation
preferred by the Minister’s delegate was in any way unreasonable. The question
is not whether another interpretation of the law could be reasonable, but
whether the one used by the Minister’s delegate was reasonable.
[25]
I will add that the Minister’s delegate’s
interpretation is entirely consistent with the objectives of the IRPA, which
include prioritizing security and quickly removing permanent residents who have
engaged in serious criminality (Medovarski v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 [Medovarski] at paragraphs
9–11; Cha v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA
126 [Cha] at paragraph 24). I would also like to emphasize that the only
interpretations that can be deemed absurd are those that defeat the purpose of
the law or render an aspect of it pointless or futile (Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 26 at paragraph 178; Medovarski
at paragraphs 8 and 31). That is not the case here.
[26]
The Supreme Court has recognized that
conditional sentences may be given even when there are aggravating
circumstances, that they still retain some of the characteristics of sentences
of imprisonment, that they are punitive, and that they are not more lenient
punishments (Proulx at paragraphs 20–22 and 40–41).
[27]
As the Minister said in his submissions, and as
the Federal Court of Appeal noted in Tran, the legislative history shows
that Parliament considered excluding conditional sentences from the IRPA
provision on individuals inadmissible for serious criminality, but that these
options were ultimately rejected.
[28]
The question this Court must decide on is
whether the Minister’s delegate’s decision was reasonable. This means that the
role of this Court is not to re-examine the evidence available to the Minister’s
delegate nor to replace his conclusions with its own. We must defer to the
administrative tribunal’s interpretation, since this decision is part of its
field of expertise. This Court therefore has a limited role, and in this case,
this Court can rule on the interpretation of the term "imprisonment"
only if the Minister’s delegate’s conclusion on this matter lacks
justification, transparency or intelligibility or does not fall within the
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the
facts and law (Dunsmuir paragraph 47). However, the case law and
the contextual and purposive analyses all compel the conclusion that the
Minister’s delegate’s interpretation is obviously among the range of reasonable
outcomes. In these circumstances, the Court must not intervene.
B.
The Minister’s delegate reasonably weighed the
relevant factors
[29]
Mr. Kidd also claims that the Minister’s
delegate failed to weigh the relevant factors when reviewing the report
received under subsection 44(1) of the IRPA. Based primarily on Cha, Mr.
Kidd claims that the Minister’s agents and delegates have discretionary power
that varies depending on the circumstances of alleged inadmissibility. Since
permanent residents have more rights, decision-makers have greater
discretionary power as concerns them than as concerns foreign nationals (Cha
at paragraph 22). It is therefore reasonable to believe that long-term
permanent residents should enjoy a broader scope of discretionary power.
[30]
According to Mr. Kidd, the Citizenship and
Immigration Canada guide ENF 6 – Review of reports under A44(1) [the
Guide] has a specific section on handling the files of long-term residents like
Mr. Kidd. Therefore, special attention should be paid to the files of long-term
residents before their file is referred for an admissibility hearing before the
ID to determine whether they should be declared inadmissible for serious
criminality.
[31]
Mr. Kidd claims that the Minister’s delegate
failed to weigh Mr. Kidd’s personal interests against the public interest. As
recognized in case law (Faci at paragraph 18; Monge Monge v. Canada
(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2009 FC 809 at
paragraphs 15–16), the Minister’s delegate is required to sufficiently examine
the relevant factors to decide whether or not to refer the case for an
admissibility hearing, and therefore to weigh Mr. Kidd’s situation compared to
the harm he inflicts upon Canadian society. Mr. Kidd says that in this case,
the Minister’s delegate did not weigh the different factors. He claims that
neither the reasoning nor the decision can be reasonable, since the Minister’s
delegate did not truly weigh or evaluate the significant evidence to the
contrary, simply listing it. For instance, Mr. Kidd says that the evaluation of
the children’s best interests must be "alert,
alive and sensitive to" this interest (Baker v. Canada (Minister
of Citizenship and Immigration), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paragraph 75). Mr.
Kidd says that, while the Minister’s delegate took note of the children’s best
interests, he did not evaluate or weigh them (Kolosovs v. Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 165 at paragraph 11).
[32]
I do not share Mr. Kidd’s reading of the
Minister’s delegate’s decision, and I am not convinced by his arguments. It is
sufficient for the Minister’s delegate’s decision to be reasonable and to fall
within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes to be upheld. I find that that
is clearly the case here.
[33]
Although the Minister’s delegate has some
discretion in whether to refer the case to the ID, this discretion is limited
by the legislation. The Minister’s delegate’s decision is not required to
include humanitarian considerations. Subsection 25(1) of the IRPA does not
directly apply, and the fact that the children may be affected by the Minister’s
delegate’s decision does not create a specific obligation or result (Cha
at paragraph 38).
[34]
Moreover, while the Guide does contain a list of
factors, this list is not exhaustive, and the Minister’s delegate is not
required to consider any of the items specifically as part of the evidence. The
Minister’s delegate therefore has discretionary power, and not an obligation,
to consider the factors listed in the Guide (Faci at paragraph 63). Yet
the decision itself shows that the Minister’s delegate considered all of the
factors at play. In fact, nothing in the decision indicates or suggests that
the Minister’s delegate failed to consider the relevant factors in his
analysis.
[35]
In his October 2015 notes, the Minister’s
delegate confirms that he considered all of the evidence, including the
submissions sent by Mr. Kidd concerning his status as a long-term resident and
the fact that he would not be allowed an appeal before the IAD. The
decision-maker also noted several positive factors in Mr. Kidd’s favour,
including that he is married and a father, that he has no family in Jamaica,
that he takes care of his disabled mother, that he is a manager at a clothing
store and a part-time student, and that he is involved in his religious
community. However, as the Minister’s delegate noted, Mr. Kidd committed new
offences in 2015 with full knowledge of the consequences of his actions and
having received a warning letter. The offences threatened the lives of the
public.
[36]
The Minister’s delegate must evaluate the
applicant’s submissions in light of the known facts and their context. In Mr.
Kidd’s case, the fact that the decision-maker gave weight to Mr. Kidd
reoffending in 2015 and the specific events that occurred does not imply that
factors were left out of his analysis or that his decision was unreasonable.
Not only did Mr. Kidd have the opportunity to demonstrate why his case should
not be referred, but he also had the opportunity to demonstrate that he had
been rehabilitated since 2013, which he did not do, demonstrating instead an
ongoing risk of reoffending.
[37]
Having reviewed the tribunal’s decision and
docket, I am entirely unconvinced that the Minister’s delegate erred in weighing
the relevant factors. No doubt Mr. Kidd would have wanted the outcome of the
Minister’s delegate’s evaluation to be different, but this Court’s role is not
to re-evaluate the evidence before the administrative tribunal or substitute
another decision. It is sufficient for the decision to fall within a range of
possible, acceptable outcomes.
[38]
I will add that this is not a situation where
the reasoning supporting the decision cannot be evaluated. I do not share Mr.
Kidd’s opinion that the Minister’s delegate simply listed the relevant factors
without truly weighing them or ignored significant evidence. The CBSA officer’s
notes quite clearly show that all the facts about Mr. Kidd were taken into
consideration, both the positive factors favourable to Mr. Kidd and his
reoffending.
[39]
The reasons for decision do not need to include
all the arguments or submissions that the applicant or reviewing judge would
have liked to see. The fact that a piece of evidence is not expressly dealt
with in a decision does not render it unreasonable when there are sufficient
grounds to assess the tribunal’s reasoning (Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No. 1425 [Cepeda-Gutierrez]
at paragraph 16). An administrative tribunal is presumed to have weighed
and examined all the evidence submitted to it, unless it is demonstrated not to
have done so (Newfoundland Nurses at paragraph 16; Florea v.
Canada (Employment and Immigration), [1993] FCJ No. 598 (FCA) at
paragraph 1). It is only when a tribunal is silent on evidence clearly
pointing to the opposite conclusion that the Court can intervene and infer that
the tribunal overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of
fact (Cepeda-Gutierrez at paragraph 17). That is not the case here.
C.
There was no breach of the rules of natural
justice
[40]
Lastly, Mr. Kidd is criticizing the Minister’s
delegate for basing his conclusions on the police report on the February 2015
offences and taking for granted that the facts reported therein are reliable
and accurate. Mr. Kidd said that the case law shows that police reports are not
proof of criminal conduct, but simply documents recording the allegations of
police (Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2014
FC 1040 at paragraph 24; Younis v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2008 FC 944 at paragraph 55; Rajagopal v. Canada (Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FC 523 at paragraph 43). Furthermore, by
basing his decision on the police report without giving Mr. Kidd the
opportunity to respond, the Minister’s delegate apparently breached the rules
of procedural fairness.
[41]
I do not share Mr. Kidd’s opinion; in fact, I
find that there was no breach of the principles of procedural fairness in this
case.
[42]
It is well established that procedural fairness
does not always require all documents and reports the decision was based on to
be provided. It is enough for the applicant to have sufficient knowledge of the
reasons for the decision to present their version of the facts, correct errors
as needed and participate fully in the decision-making process (Maghraoui v.
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 883 at paragraph 22). In this
case, Mr. Kidd clearly had knowledge of the police report on his last
re-offence, and he was the one to inform CBSA of his most recent offences. Mr.
Kidd cannot reasonably claim, as regards this police report, that he was unable
to fully participate in the Canadian authorities’ decision-making process.
[43]
Additionally, the 2015 police report is in no
way extrinsic evidence. It is evidence that Mr. Kidd certainly knew of from the
disclosure of evidence in his criminal case. Furthermore, although Mr. Kidd
claims the police report is neither reliable nor accurate, he does not say how
this evidence is erroneous or how the facts differ from reality. I am of the
opinion that the Minister’s delegate could validly consider the police report
on the 2015 events, since it could be used to evaluate the seriousness of the
actions that led to Mr. Kidd’s guilty verdict. These are not unproven
allegations, but actions Mr. Kidd pleaded guilty to, leading to several
charges, a conviction and a sentence of imprisonment.
[44]
The duty to act fairly does not apply to the
merit or the content of an outcome; rather, it applies to the process followed.
The nature and scope of the duty of procedural fairness can vary depending on
the attributes of the administrative tribunal and its enabling statute, but in
every case, its requirements refer to the procedure and not to the substantive
rights determined by the tribunal. The principle of procedural fairness can
never create substantive rights. It simply protects individuals, and allows the
Court to intervene if needed, when a decision does not respect a person’s right
to a fair and equitable procedure. However, the Minister’s delegate’s decision
to take into account the 2015 police report did not breach any of the
components of procedural fairness. In this case, there is no evidence that Mr.
Kidd was not heard or was treated unfairly.
IV.
Conclusion
[45]
For all of these reasons, the Minister’s
delegate’s decision is a reasonable outcome based on the law and the evidence.
Based on the standard of reasonableness, the decision under judicial review
must only be intelligible and transparent and fall within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law. This is the case here. In addition, I do not find any breach of the
principles of natural justice, and I am satisfied that Mr. Kidd’s basic rights
were respected throughout the process followed by CBSA and the Minister’s
delegate. Consequently, I must dismiss this application for judicial review.
[46]
None of the parties suggested a question of
general importance to be certified. I agree that there is none.