Docket: IMM-3425-15
Citation:
2016 FC 225
Toronto, Ontario, February 18, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
|
ALI ASGHAR
GHAMOOSHI &
LEILA
SALIMIPOURBANI &
MAHDIS
GHAMOOSHI Through
His Litigation Guardian
LEILA SALIMIPOURBANI
&
MAHDIEH
GHAMOOSHI Through
Her Litigation
Guardian
LEILA
SALIMIPOURBANI
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[7] ... It is significant that throughout
history and even modern history: e.g. Christians of various denominations,
Jews, Moslems, Buddhists, Hindus and Baha'is have been killed for their beliefs
without necessarily even having had deep knowledge, or even any knowledge, of
their religions, other than adherence to their faith. Many died for their
faiths but, according to the annals of history, did not live according to their
faiths; yet, that did not stop their slaughter. Therefore, it is important to
view the evidence in this case such as provided by the specific church in
question and additional evidence therefrom that was provided.
(As explained by the undersigned in Oraminejad
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 997)
[2] Assessing the credibility of the
refugee claimant is intrinsic to the function of an administrative tribunal. A
certain level of deference is owed to the first instance tribunal’s findings of
fact to protect its primary function of weighing testimony. In some
circumstances, however, this Court must intervene where it appears that, upon
reviewing the entire record, the findings on the crux of the claim are
unsupported by all the evidence, which forms a whole on its own by these
nuances:
[1] A decision cannot be
rendered in a vacuum without considering the person who is before a first-instance
tribunal. Without taking into context all testimony, evidence, both subjective
and objective (country of origin condition evidence) and understanding the
clear nuances that form threads to comprehending a case, a first‑instance
tribunal may have heard a case but not necessarily have listened to it …
(Oraminejad, above).
(El Aoudie v MCI, 2012 FC 450 at paragraph 2 as per the undersigned therein).
II.
Introduction
[1]
The Applicants seek judicial review pursuant to
subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001,
c 27 [IRPA] of a decision rendered by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, wherein the RAD upheld a decision of
the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] that the Applicants are neither
Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection under sections 96 and 97
of the IRPA. It is also duly noted that the present case had been before the
RAD once before, wherein the Respondent agreed to have the matter considered
anew by the RAD. Thus, this is the second decision of the RAD in regard to the
Applicants, as the first decision of the RAD had been set aside in order for
the matter to be considered anew as per agreement of the Respondent.
III.
Background
[2]
The Applicants, Leila Salimipourbani (age 35)
[Principal Applicant], Ali Asghar Ghamooshi (age 47) [together, Adult
Applicants], and their children Mahdieh Ghamooshi (age 14) and Mahdis Ghamooshi
(age 11), are citizens of Iran; and, are alleged Christian converts.
[3]
The Applicants alleged that in August 2012,
during their family vacation in Greece, the Applicants met two Iranian
Christian converts, Mina and Ali. In September 2012, on their return to Iran,
the Adult Applicants, attracted to the virtues of Christianity, attended at
Mina and Ali’s home their first Christian meeting. Thereafter, the Adult
Applicants attended the meetings on a monthly basis.
[4]
In March 2013, the Applicants went to London,
England, for family vacations. Upon their return to Iran, the Adult Applicants
allege having been detained for approximately eight hours; and, interrogated in
regard to the purpose of their trip to London and as to whether they had
attended at any demonstration while in England.
[5]
On July 7, 2013, the Applicants traveled to
Canada for family vacations. On August 8, 2013, the Applicants, while
still in Canada, received a call from the Principal Applicant’s mother
informing them that their Christian friends, Mina and Ali, had been arrested at
an underground church meeting; and, that the Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e
Eslami (also known as the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution) went
to the Applicants’ home and seized their Farsi bible and computer.
[6]
On August 9, 2013, the Applicants sought
refugee status in Canada. The Applicants, further to addressing and applying
for status, began to attend church in Canada subsequent to having filed their
refugee claims. The Applicants were then officially baptized shortly before
their hearing before the RPD.
[7]
In a decision dated November 13, 2013, the
RPD held that the Applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in
need of protection; as the RPD did not find the Applicants’ narrative credible;
and, also determined that their behavior was inconsistent with that of
individuals who are genuine converts to Christianity. The RPD further rejected
their sur place claim.
[8]
The Applicants appealed the RPD’s decision
before the RAD. In a decision dated March 10, 2014, the RAD dismissed the
appeal. The Applicants sought judicial review of that decision (see IMM‑2617‑14).
Upon consent from the Respondent, an order, dated March 30, 2015, granted
judicial review and the matter was remitted to the RAD for determination anew
by a differently constituted panel.
[9]
In a decision dated June 30, 2015, the RAD
upheld the RPD’s determination that the Applicants are neither Convention
refugees nor persons in need of protection.
IV.
Impugned Decision
[10]
As a preliminary matter, the RAD refused to
admit a letter, as well as a one-page document, as new evidence by relying on
rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. The RAD
further rejected the Applicants’ application for an oral hearing as the RAD did
not accept the newly admitted evidence (see section 110 of the IRPA). The RAD
confirmed RPD’s determination that the Applicants lacked credibility; and,
determined that their behavior is inconsistent with that of individuals who are
genuine Christian converts. The RAD held that although the credibility concerns
of the RPD may not individually, as such, be a basis for a denial of refugee
protection, cumulatively, due to the numerous concerns, there is a sufficient
basis for finding that the Applicants are not credible witnesses and are not
deserving of Canada’s protection.
[11]
With regard to the Applicants sur place
claim, the RAD held that the RPD failed to consider the risk of the Applicants
being considered apostates by Iranian authorities; and, whether their
conversion to Christianity may have come to the attention of Iranian
authorities. The RAD held that given the lack of genuineness of their
conversion to Christianity, the Applicants would not practice Christianity if
they were to return to Iran. Furthermore, as a result of the Applicants not
practicing Christianity upon their return to Iran, the RAD held that the
Applicants would not be perceived as apostates by the Iranian authorities.
V.
Issues
1.
Did the RAD err in upholding the RPD’s
credibility findings?
2.
Did the RAD err in law by not remitting the
matter back to the RPD or by not providing reasons as to why it did not remit
the matter?
VI.
Legislation
[12]
The following is the relevant legislative
provision from the IRPA:
Decision
|
Décision
|
111 (1) After considering the appeal,
the Refugee Appeal Division shall make one of the following decisions:
|
111 (1)
La Section d’appel des réfugiés confirme la décision attaquée, casse la
décision et y substitue la décision qui aurait dû être rendue ou renvoie,
conformément à ses instructions, l’affaire à la Section de la protection des
réfugiés.
|
(a) confirm the determination of the Refugee Protection Division;
|
[EN BLANC/BLANK]
|
(b) set aside the determination and substitute a
determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; or
|
[EN BLANC/BLANK]
|
(c) refer the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for
re-determination, giving the directions to the Refugee Protection Division
that it considers appropriate.
|
[EN BLANC/BLANK]
|
VII.
Position of the Parties
[13]
The Applicants submit that the RAD committed an
error of law by failing to remit the matter to the RPD, or to provide reasons
as to why it did not do so, after it recognized that the RPD failed to consider
the risks that the Applicants may face as apostates. Secondly, the RAD erred by
upholding RPD’s findings of credibility.
[14]
Conversely, the Respondent submits that the RAD
could, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the IRPA substitute RPD’s
determination of sur place claim; and, that the RAD reasonably
determined that the Applicants were neither Convention refugees nor persons in
need of protection. Secondly, the RAD reasonably held that the Applicants lacked
credibility.
VIII.
Standard of Review
[15]
The RAD’s decision to uphold the RPD’s
credibility findings, and the RAD’s determination on the sur place
claims must be reviewed under the standard of reasonableness. The standard of
correctness applies as to whether the RAD could substitute its determination to
that of the RPD on the sur place claims as opposed to remitting the
matter to the RPD (Li v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2015 FC 840).
IX.
Analysis
A.
Credibility findings
[16]
The RAD, as per the jurisprudence of its
mandate, was meant to review all the evidence in the RPD’s record and conduct
its own independent assessment of the refugee claim, bearing in mind that
deference is owed in areas wherein the RPD assesses credibility findings (Huruglica
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799 [Huruglica]).
This, the RAD did not do.
[17]
As the RAD did not conduct a thorough
examination of the record nor that of the submissions of the parties, the Court
finds that it was unreasonable for the RAD to affirm the RPD’s credibility
findings. Although deference is owed by the RAD to the RPD regarding
credibility findings, the RAD unreasonably held that, cumulatively, the RPD
could find that the Applicants lacked credibility, as the Applicants’ behavior
was not consistent with that of people who are genuine converts to
Christianity. Belief may often not be recognized as in depth of knowledge of
religion, as adherents to religions may be adherents but not, necessarily, scholars
of their religion, nor, are all adherents, necessarily, devout to the degree
that would be considered significantly committed to adherence by which a
decision-maker or a tribunal would state its opinion on the depth of such belief
of applicants as ensuring genuineness of religious belief; yet due to
perception in certain contexts of country conditions such individuals are
nevertheless persecuted.
B.
Sur place claim
[18]
The Applicants submit that the RAD, having
recognized that the RPD failed to adequately consider the Applicants’ jeopardy in
respect of its perception of their Christianity (reference is made to the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Guidelines Booklet in respect of
the criteria and interpretation of the Refugee Convention as to “perception” of
the persecutors, themselves, and not of the perception of others), in the
context of Iran and its authorities, in the framework of documentary evidence
concerning the treatment of apostates in Iran (as an orbiter reflection, it is
recalled how belief was treated by notorious Inquisitions, whether called by
this or other designations, during the course of history). Reference is made to
the Applicants’ Record, RAD’s Decision at para 45, p 16). The RAD erred by
failing to remit the matter to the RPD or to provide reasons as to why that was
not done in the context of both notice to the Applicants and explanation of
credibility concerns thereon. This argument of the Applicants is, therefore, accepted.
[19]
The Court notes that, in the present case, the
RAD had a paper review in a matter of grave potential consequences to the
Applicants, whereas, the case would appear to require the actual presence of
the Applicants to conduct an “independent assessment of the Applicants”. This,
the RAD did not do. The Applicants were not present in a matter that
essentially required their presence. Therefore, the Court does not consider
that the RAD conducted “an independent assessment of the Applicants”.
[47] Unlike judicial review, the RAD,
pursuant to subsection 111(1)(b), may substitute the determination which
"in its opinion, should have been made". One precondition of
exercising this power is that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of
the application in order to arrive at its own opinion. It is not necessary, in
order to trigger this remedial power, that the RAD must find error on some
standard of review basis.
(Huruglica, above at para 47)
[20]
This Court, in reading paragraph 111(1)(b)
of the IRPA, has stated that the RAD, in and of itself, cannot raise a new
issue, not determined by the RPD without further notice to the parties (Ojarikre
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 896; Jianzhu
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 551 [Jianzhu]).
As such, it would be unreasonable for the RAD to independently decide on a sur
place claim where the RPD did not make a determination on the matter (Jianzhu,
above at para 12). As a result in view of the circumstances, it was incumbent
on the RAD to give notice to the Applicants as to the RAD’s undisclosed credibility
concerns in respect of the Applicants.
[21]
In the present case, the RAD did in fact assess from
a wholly different perspective whether the Applicants should be granted refugee
status on the basis of their sur place claim; however, that should not
have been done without the presence of the Applicants in this regard. Therefore,
the RAD’s determination, with regard to the sur place claim, is unreasonable
as the RAD did not base its assessment on the whole of the evidence in an
independent assessment of the Applicants. It was an error not to give notice to
the Applicants; and, thus, for the Applicants not to appear before the RAD
under the circumstances of the entirety of the evidence. In the circumstances,
the RAD was not able without the presence of the Applicants to verify its credibility
concerns without such presence.
X.
Conclusion
[22]
Consequently, the application for judicial
review is granted.