Docket: IMM-4834-15
Citation:
2016 FC 498
Ottawa, Ontario, May 4, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Shore
BETWEEN:
|
KHURRAM,
MUHAMMAD
(A.K.A.
KHURRAM SIDDIQUE, MUHAMMAD)
|
MUHAMMAD
KHURRAM, FATIMA
|
KHURRAM, OMAR
MUHAMMAD
(A.K.A. MUHAMMAD
KHURRAM, OMAR)
|
MUHAMMAD
KHURRAM MUH, HAMZA
(A.K.A.
MUHAMMAD KHURRAM, HAMZA)
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
Credibility findings cannot be solely based on
objective country conditions, without taking into account key problematic
non-credible findings of a narrative of applicants, itself.
II.
Introduction
[2]
The Applicants seek judicial review pursuant to
subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001,
c 27 [IRPA], of a decision by the Refugee Protection Division [RPD] of the
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, wherein the RPD rejected the
Applicants’ claim for refugee protection under sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.
III.
Background
[3]
The Applicants, Muhammad Siddique Khurram
[Principal Applicant] (age 36), Fatima Muhammad Khurram (age 34), Hamza
Muhammad Khurram Muh (age 6) and Omar Muhammad Khurram (age 5), are citizens of
Pakistan.
[4]
The Principal Applicant is a Sunni Muslim; and
his wife is a Shia Muslim. They married in 2009. Upon their marriage, they
returned to the United Arab Emirates [UAE] for employment purposes. The
Applicants then, in October 2012, travelled to Pakistan for medical treatments
for their eldest son. On November 7, 2012, while the Applicants were still
in Pakistan, the Principal Applicant alleges that he was abducted because he is
married to a Shia Muslim by what he believes to be members of an Islamic
organization. He was allegedly released upon accepting to leave a package
inside a Shia mosque.
[5]
The subsequent day, the Principal Applicant
stated that he went to the police station; and, that the police officers had
refused to take his complaint; and, thus, not write a report. On
November 9, 2012, the Applicants fled to Dubai; their applications for
visas to Canada to visit the Principal Applicant’s brother were denied; and, in
June 2014, they travelled to the United Kingdom for a family vacation. In
January 2015, the Applicants successfully obtained visas for the United States
but their applications for temporary visitors’ visas to Canada were again
rejected in February 2015. In February 2015, the Principal Applicant alleges
that he began to receive threatening text messages by members of the
organization who had abducted him in November 2012. His wife and children had
also been victims of two car accidents; which had been intentionally caused.
Still, the Principal Applicant did not report these significant incidents and
the text messages to the authorities in the UAE due to fear of deportation. According
to the Principal Applicant the incidents are related.
[6]
On May 31, 2015, the Applicants left Dubai for
the United States and arrived in Canada on June 2, 2015. The Principal
Applicant alleges that even while in Canada he kept receiving threatening text
messages from the same individuals; but, still did not report the incidents to
the Canadian authorities.
IV.
Impugned Decision
[7]
In a decision, dated September 15, 2015,
the RPD held that the Applicants are not Convention refugees or persons in need
of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. The RPD held that the
Applicants are not credible except for the fact that the Principal Applicant is
a Sunni from Pakistan and his wife is a Shia, born and raised in the UAE, and
is a citizen of Pakistan, both children are citizens of Pakistan. In essence,
the RPD found that the Principal Applicant’s story of abduction is not
plausible. In addition, the Principal Applicant’s claim that the Pakistani
police had refused to register a “First Information
Report” is not supported by documentary evidence. The RPD also held that
the Applicants contentions that they were not able to approach the UAE
authorities about the alleged threats are not reasonable or credible; as both
the Principal Applicant and his wife had legal resident status in the UAE; and,
the documentary evidence does not support their claim of deportation simply
because his wife is a Shia Muslim. Moreover, the RPD found that it was
implausible that the Principal Applicant would not have changed his cellphone
number in the UAE and in Canada simply because of his friends and due to his
work. The RPD also did not believe that the Principal Applicant did receive
threatening text messages while in Canada.
[8]
Regarding the issue of state protection, the RPD
examined the documentary evidence, as a whole, and held on balance that “[t]here is no reference to the targeting and persecution of
Sunni Muslims who are married to Shia Muslims by extremists, other groups or
any authority in Pakistan”; and, that “[t]here
is no evidence to confirm that Sunni Muslim and Shia Muslim marriages are
illegal or subject to discrimination let alone discrimination that would amount
to persecution” (para 27 of the RPD’s decision).
[9]
As a result, the RPD rejected the Applicants
refugee claim.
V.
Issues
[10]
The central issues to be determined by this
application for judicial review are:
1)
Did the RPD erroneously frame the claim as a fear
of persecution on the basis of an interfaith marriage?
2)
Did the RPD err in its credibility findings?
3)
Did the RPD err by not performing a separate
section 97 analysis?
VI.
Legislation
[11]
The following are the relevant legislative
provisions of the IRPA:
Convention refugee
|
Définition de “réfugié”
|
96. A Convention refugee is a person
who, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion,
|
96. A
qualité de réfugié au sens de la Convention — le réfugié — la personne qui,
craignant avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion,
de sa nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
|
(a) is outside each of their countries of nationality and
is unable or, by reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the
protection of each of those countries; or
|
a) soit
se trouve hors de tout pays dont elle a la nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait
de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de la protection de chacun de ces pays;
|
(b) not having a country of nationality, is outside the
country of their former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of
that fear, unwilling to return to that country.
|
b)
soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se trouve hors du pays dans lequel
elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut ni, du fait de cette crainte, ne
veut y retourner.
|
Person in need of protection
|
Personne à protéger
|
97. (1) A person in need of protection
is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of
nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country
of former habitual residence, would subject them personally
|
97. (1)
A qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se trouve au Canada et
serait personnellement, par son renvoi vers tout pays dont elle a la
nationalité ou, si elle n’a pas de nationalité, dans lequel elle avait sa
résidence habituelle, exposée :
|
(a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist,
of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture;
or
|
a) soit
au risque, s’il y a des motifs sérieux de le croire, d’être soumise à la
torture au sens de l’article premier de la Convention contre la torture;
|
(b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment if
|
b) soit
à une menace à sa vie ou au risque de traitements ou peines cruels et
inusités dans le cas suivant :
|
(i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling
to avail themself of the protection of that country,
|
(i) elle ne peut ou, de ce fait, ne veut se réclamer de la
protection de ce pays,
|
(ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of
that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that
country,
|
(ii) elle y est exposée en tout lieu de ce pays alors que
d’autres personnes originaires de ce pays ou qui s’y trouvent ne le sont
généralement pas,
|
(iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful
sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards,
and
|
(iii) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de sanctions
légitimes — sauf celles infligées au mépris des normes internationales — et
inhérents à celles-ci ou occasionnés par elles,
|
(iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country
to provide adequate health or medical care.
|
(iv) la menace ou le risque ne résulte pas de l’incapacité
du pays de fournir des soins médicaux ou de santé adéquats.
|
(2) A person in Canada who is a member of a class of persons
prescribed by the regulations as being in need of protection is also a person
in need of protection.
|
(2) A également qualité de personne à protéger la personne qui se
trouve au Canada et fait partie d’une catégorie de personnes auxquelles est
reconnu par règlement le besoin de protection.
|
VII.
Position of the Parties
[12]
The Applicants submit that the RPD unreasonably
held that the Applicants refugee claim should be rejected. They raised several
arguments to support their position. Broadly, they submit that the RPD
unreasonably limited its analysis of the persecution faced by the Applicants on
the basis of a mixed Sunni-Shia Muslim marriage; when in fact the claim of
persecution is on the basis that the Principal Applicant’s wife is a Shia
Muslim in Pakistan. Secondly, the RPD made unreasonable plausibility findings
and consequently led the RPD to inaccurately hold that the Principal Applicant
was not credible. Furthermore, the RPD’s credibility findings towards the
Principal Applicant are unreasonable as the RPD had misstated evidence and
ignored corroborating documentary evidence. Thirdly, the RPD erred by relying
on specialized knowledge without affording them an adequate opportunity to
respond. Finally, the RPD erred by not making a full analysis of the
Applicants’ claim under section 97 of the IRPA.
[13]
Conversely, the Respondent submits the negative
credibility findings of the RPD are reasonable as the implausibility findings
are reasonable; the Applicants narrative lacks corroborative evidence; the RPD
did not rely on specialized knowledge; and, the RPD reasonably disbelieved the
Applicants’ allegations. Secondly, the RPD did not unduly restrict its analysis
of the Applicants’ claim; and, the Court must read the RPD’s decision as a
whole. Finally, since section 96 of the IRPA is based on a lower standard, the
RPD did not err by rejecting the Applicants’ claim under section 97 of the IRPA
without providing reasons.
VIII.
Standard of Review
[14]
All three issues before this Court must be
reviewed under the standard of reasonableness as they deal with mix law and
fact findings and factual findings by the RPD (Iqbal v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2014 FC 415 at para 15; Dunkova v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2010 FC 1322).
IX.
Analysis
A.
RPD’s framing of the claim as an interfaith
marriage
[15]
The Applicants submit that the RPD erred by
restricting the claim to an interfaith marriage. The claim was generally based
on the fact that the Applicant’s wife is a Shia in Pakistan and that the risk
of persecution was heightened by the fact that he, as a Sunni Muslim, had
entered into an interdenominational marriage. The Court does not find that this
is the case. At paragraph 28 of its decision, the RPD clearly considered the
fact that Shia Muslims have been targeted by Sunni fundamentalist groups
throughout Pakistan; and, that the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for
Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities
from Pakistan (dated 14 May 2012) states that members of the Shia community
may be in need of international protection. Hence, it would be erroneous to
find that the RPD unreasonably restricted its analysis of the claim to one of
interfaith marriage and not to the fact that the Applicant’s wife is a Shia
Muslim in Pakistan. Credibility findings cannot be solely based on objective
country conditions, without taking into account key problematic non-credible
findings of a narrative of applicants, itself.
B.
RPD’s credibility findings
[16]
The RPD made a negative credibility finding in
regard to parts of the narrative of the Applicants, themselves. As such, the
RPD held that on the balance of probabilities, the Principal Applicant’s narrative
of motives and reasons for and surrounding his 2012 visit to Pakistan was
fabricated. This negative credibility finding is the result of numerous
implausibility findings by the RPD. The RPD held that it was implausible that:
i) the Principal Applicant had been abducted by an Islamic organization in
Pakistan in November 2012; ii) the Pakistani police would have refused to
register a First Information Report the day after the alleged abduction; iii)
the Applicants were unable to approach the UAE authorities regarding the
threatening text messages received by fear of deportation given that the
Principal Applicant’s wife is a Shia; iv) the Principal Applicant’s wife two
motor vehicle accidents having been deliberately caused; v) the Principal
Applicant would not change his phone number after receiving threatening calls
and text messages; vi) the Principal Applicant would not change his phone
number upon his arrival in Canada; and, vii) the Principal Applicant would not
report the threatening texts to the Canadian authorities.
[17]
The Principal Applicant submits that the RPD
made adverse credibility findings that are not supported by the evidence. Great
deference is owed by this Court to RPD’s assessment of the evidence and
credibility findings – such as plausibility findings (Ahmadzai v Canada
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1025 at para 23). Nonetheless, where
the RPD make credibility findings that rest on plausibility determinations, “the implausibility must be clear and the RPD should provide
a reliable and verifiable evidentiary base against which the plausibility of
the Applicant's evidence may be judged” (Pavlov v Canada (Citizenship
and Immigration), 2016 FC 282 at para 14). The RPD must not make
implausibility findings without regard to the claimant’s milieu and culture; as
such, what might be implausible on the basis of Canadian standards may be based
on the claimant’s milieu (Valtchev v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), [2001] FCJ No 1131 at para 7); however, that was done, in
measure by the RPD. The Court agrees with Justice Peter B. Annis who disagreed
with the statements that “plausibility findings are dangerous
and should only be made in the clearest of cases” [Emphasis in
original.] (Bercasio v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 244
at para 29). There is a need for plausibility findings; however, must be based
on either significant subjective, or objective evidence, or both which in this
case, they are.
[18]
With the only possible exception of the negative
credibility inference regarding the First Information Report, the Court is of
the opinion that the RPD’s negative plausibility findings are reasonable as
they are intertwined with numerous adverse credibility conclusions which are
supported by reliable and a verifiable evidentiary based reasons, made with
regard to the Applicants’ milieu.
[19]
The RPD’s implausibility finding regarding the
lack of a registered First Information Report is, in itself, perhaps, opened to
question, as the documentary evidence specified by the RPD is that the
registration of a First Information Report generally requires the payment of a
bribe. As the RPD did not dig deeper and did not ask the Principal Applicant as
to whether he had been told to pay a bribe and as to why the Pakistani police
refused to register a First Information Report, it was possible to reflect on
why the RPD found that the lack of a First Information Report undermines the
Applicants’ claim. Nonetheless, as this one implausibility finding, in and of
itself, is not central to the overall negative credibility finding; and, given
that the RPD did rely on numerous other significant elements of evidence to
arrive at its conclusion, it was reasonable for the RPD to arrive at a negative
finding regarding the Applicants and to disbelieve their narrative on the basis
of a lack of credibility (Kosumov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2015 FC 1297 at para 11; Lin v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2011 FC 1235 at paras 59-60).
[20]
The role of the Court, in reviewing RPD’s
reasons, is not to engage in a line-by-line hunt for a possible error, its role
is to approach the decision as an organic whole, a sum of all parts (Communications,
Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper,
Ltd., 2013 SCC 34, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 458 at para 54; cited in Kanthasamy v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2015] 3 S.C.R. 909, 2015 SCC 61
(CanLII) at para 138, dissenting).
C.
Separate analysis for section 97 of the IRPA
claim
[21]
As the state protection analysis of the RPD
applied equally to sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA, there was no need for the
RPD to make a separate analysis under section 97 of the IRPA as the Court is
satisfied that the RPD considered the criteria applicable for each section (Karafazlioglu
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 302 at para 13; Bellingy
v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1252 at para 53).
X.
Conclusion
[22]
Consequently, the application for judicial
review is dismissed.