Docket: IMM-1244-16
Citation:
2016 FC 1220
Ottawa, Ontario, November 2, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Gascon
BETWEEN:
|
ATTILA CSOKA
|
ZOLTAN CSOKA
|
ATTILANE CSOKA
|
KRISZTIAN CSOKA
|
ATTILA CSOKA
|
RICHARD CSOKA
|
Applicants
|
and
|
THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
|
Respondent
|
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The applicants, Mr. Attila Csoka, his common-law
partner Ms. Attilane Csoka, their three minor children and Mr. Csoka’s brother,
are a family from Hungary, and are members of the Roma community. In June 2015,
they arrived in Canada and filed a refugee claim, alleging that they feared
returning to Hungary due to the widespread discrimination against the Roma, and
the risk of violence they would face from organized racist groups such as
skinheads and the Hungarian Guardists.
[2]
In October 2015, the Refugee Protection Division
[RPD] of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada denied their claim,
finding that the members of the Csoka family were not Convention refugees nor
persons in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration
and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27. In March 2016, the Refugee
Appeal Division [RAD] dismissed the appeal of the Csoka family, confirming the
RPD’s decision. The RAD was not satisfied that the discrimination suffered by
the Csoka family in Hungary rose to the level of persecution, or that the
presumption of availability of state protection in Hungary for members of the
Roma community had been rebutted with clear and convincing evidence.
[3]
The Csoka family has applied to this Court for
judicial review of the RAD’s decision. They argue that the decision is
unreasonable as the RAD erred in conducting its state protection analysis. They
also contend that the RAD did not apply the right standard of intervention on
appeal of the RPD’s decision. They ask this Court to quash the RAD’s decision
and to send it back for redetermination by a different panel.
[4]
I agree that the RAD’s decision was unreasonable
as it wrongly concluded that the Csoka family could approach government
institutions and non-governmental organizations [NGOs], rather than the police,
to secure adequate state protection. In addition, the RAD unreasonably resorted
to documentary evidence that has been repeatedly discarded by this Court as
unreliable proof of state protection in Hungary. This suffices to push the
RAD’s decision outside the limits of possible,
acceptable outcomes. I must, therefore, allow this
application for judicial review and send the matter back for redetermination.
[5]
The state protection finding made by the RAD is
determinative and is the sole issue I need to address in considering this
application.
II.
Background
A.
The RAD’s decision
[6]
On the issue of state protection, the RAD found
that the evidence before it was mixed. However, it concluded that the Csoka
family had not demonstrated that the state protection in Hungary was so
inadequate that they would not approach the authorities at all, or that they
need not have taken all reasonable efforts to seek protection in their home
country. Based on the RAD’s assessment, the evidence presented showed that
Hungary is a democratic country, without a total breakdown of state apparatus
and authority. The RAD also observed that authorities in Hungary have taken
actions against extremist organizations. On the other hand, the RAD
acknowledged that some Hungarian people, as well as persons in positions of
authority and security officials, have a discriminatory and prejudicial
attitude toward Roma. However, the RAD determined that state protection remained
available in case of such discrimination.
[7]
The RAD reiterated that the onus is on the Csoka
family to make a reasonable effort to seek state protection in their home
country before seeking protection in Canada. The RAD found that the Csoka
family “would obtain adequate state protection in
Hungary upon return if they were to make a reasonable and diligent effort to
seek it”. The RAD further indicated that “[n]o
government is expected to guarantee perfect protection to all of its citizens
at all times, and the fact that a state is not always successful in protecting
its citizens is not enough to justify a claim”. Even if the evidence was
mixed, the RAD considered that the Csoka family “have
not demonstrated that state protection in Hungary is inadequate if they were to
make a diligent effort to seek it” and that “when
complaints are made, the authorities take action”. The RAD therefore
found that the Csoka family had not rebutted the presumption of state
protection.
[8]
As part of its analysis, the RAD accepted that “Roma Minority Government [sic] and other similar
organizations as well as NGOs do not provide state protection, and that it is
the police whose mandate is to provide state protection”. In reviewing
the documentary evidence, the RAD found that many governmental bodies and NGOs
were there to inform victims of discrimination and violence about their rights
and thus enabled citizens, including Roma, to seek remedies if they suffered
from discrimination. The RAD expected such organizations to be available to
assist the Csoka family upon their return to Hungary.
B.
The standard of review
[9]
The issue of the adequacy of state protection is
to be reviewed under the reasonableness standard as it involves questions of
mixed fact and law (The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v Flores
Carrillo, 2008 FCA 94 at para 36; Hinzman v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration) 2007 FCA 171 [Hinzman] at para 38; Gomez Florez v
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 659 at para 24; Moran
Gudiel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 902 at para 15). In
particular, the issue of whether the RAD relied on the police to provide
protection is also a question of mixed fact and law part of the RAD’s analysis
of state protection. It is therefore also reviewable under a reasonableness
standard (Hinzman at para 38; Meza Varela v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2011 FC 1364 [Meza Varela] at para 12).
[10]
When reviewing a decision
on the standard of reasonableness, the analysis is concerned “with the existence of justification,
transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process”, and the RAD’s findings should not be
disturbed as long as the decision “falls within a range
of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts
and law” (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 47). In
conducting a reasonableness review of factual findings, it is not the role of
the Court to reweigh the evidence or the relative importance given by the
decision-maker to any relevant factor (Kanthasamy v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 99). Under a
reasonableness standard, as long as the process and the outcome fit comfortably
with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, and the
decision is supported by acceptable evidence that can be justified in fact and
in law, a reviewing court should not substitute its own view of a preferable
outcome (Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador
(Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 17).
III.
Analysis: was the RAD’s analysis of state protection
unreasonable?
[11]
The Csoka family challenges many elements in the
RAD’s state protection analysis. According to the Csoka family, the RAD used an
incorrect test, focusing on whether the Government of Hungary was making
efforts to improve the situation of its minorities, instead of analyzing
whether or not such efforts were effective and adequate in providing state
protection (Meza Varela at para 16; Orgona v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 1438 [Orgona] at para 11).
[12]
I do not subscribe to this assessment. The RAD
explicitly acknowledged that it was the actual adequacy of state protection
that mattered. Even a cursory reading of the RAD’s reasons demonstrates that it
focused not only on the efforts but also on the results of the state’s
intervention. Similarly, the claim that it is impossible to know whether the
RAD thought the situation worsened or improved for Roma in Hungary is without
merit. There is nothing unreasonable in acknowledging that the Roma people are
mistreated in Hungary and that there are frequent failures of state protection,
while still finding on balance that this is not sufficient to rebut the
presumption of state protection. The weighing of evidence is at the heart of
the RAD’s expertise. Contrary to what the Csoka family alleges, this does not indicate
that the RAD contradicted itself; it simply reflects the fact that the evidence
analyzed by the RAD went both ways. The RAD clearly stated, more than once,
that the documentary evidence before it was “mixed”.
[13]
However, I find that the RAD’s state protection analysis
drifted away from and outside of the range of possible, acceptable outcomes in
its consideration of the state protection avenues offered to Roma.
A.
The role of institutions other than the police
[14]
At the beginning of its analysis, the RAD
rightly stated that the police have the mandate to provide state protection. However,
its analysis then went on to strictly focus on the protection offered through
other government institutions and NGOs. This was an error, sufficient to render
the RAD’s state protection analysis unreasonable.
[15]
The Minister submits that the RAD simply analyzed
all the possible options open to the Csoka family to seek protection, including
NGOs, and thus performed a complete assessment of all aspects of Hungarian
avenues of redress. He mentions that the RAD acknowledged that it was the
police whose mandate it is to provide state protection. The Minister further
pleads that the Hungarian authorities were also found to be receptive to
complaints of discrimination filed by Roma.
[16]
I do not agree with this assessment. On the
contrary, my review of the RAD’s decision leads me to conclude that, throughout
its reasons, the RAD continuously implied that the Csoka family should have
approached governmental bodies other than the police as well as NGOs in order
to obtain state protection, and that those institutions offered acceptable and
satisfactory avenues of state protection. A reading of the RAD’s reasons
reveals that those avenues other than the police were not simply flagged as
another option available to the Csoka family. The evidence instead suggests
that the RAD viewed them as sufficient options open to them.
[17]
For example, the RAD stated that the Csoka
family had not demonstrated that “state protection in
Hungary is so inadequate that they need not have approached or would not
approach the authorities at all, or that they need not have taken or would not
take all reasonable efforts to seek state protection in their home country,
such as seeking help from people higher in authority, or with other mechanisms,
such as the Minorities Ombudsman’s Office or the Independent Police Complaints
Board (IPCB), before seeking international protection in Canada”
(emphasis added). There is not a word on police protection in that passage. The
RAD later referred to the problem of corruption in Hungary, but was satisfied
that the “government has mechanisms in place to
investigate and punish police abuse and corruption”. It then discussed
reports referring to investigations of police abuse and to the IPCB work. Here
again, the focus is on avenues to correct the shortcomings and abuses
of the police, not on state protection actually offered by the police.
[18]
Then, the RAD found that “there is no significant reason why [the Csoka family] would
not be able to complain to the state agency(ies) that oversee police inaction,
misconduct and abuse”. It also concluded that the Hungarian authorities “take action against police officers who abuse their power or
engage in illegal practices”. After having referred to a report by the
European Roma Rights Centre [ERRC] to illustrate concrete actions by the
police, the RAD found that “if [the Csoka family] were
to be denied adequate state protection or if their complaints were not to be taken
seriously by the police, they could report the police inaction or denial of
security services to people higher in authority, or seek redress by taking
their complaints to organizations with powers of oversight before seeking international
protection” (emphasis added).
[19]
It is well recognized that it is the police who
have the mandate to protect citizens (Katinszki v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2012 FC 1326 [Katinszki] at paras 14-15; Zepeda v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 491 at paras
24-25). In Malik, Justice Tremblay-Lamer indicated that “there is no obligation on an individual to seek counselling,
legal advice, or assistance from human rights agencies if the police is unable
to help” (Malik v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2003 FCT 453 at para 21).
[20]
Alternate institutions concerned with police
corruption or abuse do not constitute substitutes or avenues able to replace
the police protection itself: “[t]he jurisprudence of
this Court is very clear that the police force is presumed to be the main
institution mandated to protect citizens, and that other governmental or
private institutions are presumed not to have the means nor the mandate to assume
that responsibility” (Katinszki at para 15; Hindawi v Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 589 at para 27).
[21]
Investigations of complaints of police
corruption and abuse, or the presence of infrastructure providing redress in
case complaints are not dealt with, do not equate with state protection by
police. In other words, the RAD did not refer to any solid evidence of state
protection offered by the Hungarian police, even though it had acknowledged,
earlier in its analysis, that it is the police who are responsible for state
protection. In fact, as recognized by counsel for the Minister in his written
submissions and at the hearing before this Court, the sole reference to police
action and actual investigations of incidents of violence against Roma was to
the ERRC report, a report which has been found repeatedly unreliable by this
Court.
B.
The reports relied on by the RAD
[22]
The RAD’s error is indeed compounded by the fact
that the examples the panel referred to relate to institutions and reports
found to be undependable sources of state protection by this Court in several other
cases.
[23]
In Mezei v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2016 FC 1025 at paras 12-14, Justice Tremblay-Lamer recently noted
that references to actions by the IPCB support the conclusion that refugee
claimants could approach a higher authority, but they do not show that state
protection is available in practice. This Court has in fact frequently rejected
the idea that the IPCB provides state protection in Hungary (Katinszki
at para 14; Orgona at para 14; Balogh v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 76 at para 31). Reports about police
training programs have no bearing on the adequacy of state protection and are
not strong measures to curtail violence.
[24]
As to the ERRC report, this Court found it specifically
flawed, in somewhat strong terms, in Hanko v Canada (Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 474 [Hanko] at paras 12-14 and Marosi v
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (November 26, 2013)
IMM-1675-13 at paras 7-8. Contrary to the Minister’s submission, this ERRC
report was not one of many such reports considered by the RAD in its decision.
It rather stands out as the only piece of evidence cited by the RAD in support
of effective police protection.
[25]
What is even more troubling is that, in its
reasons, the RAD parroted, word for word, the very passage criticized and jettisoned
by the Court in Hanko. For the RAD to ignore this, and to remain deaf to
this issue despite the fact that counsel for the Csoka family specifically drew
the RAD’s attention to it in its submissions, is beyond comprehension, and
certain well outside the boundaries of reasonableness. When a decision-maker
disregards prior teachings of this Court in such an unbridled way and invokes
as the main proof of adequate state protection by the police a report specifically
discarded in previous decisions, this strongly calls for the Court’s intervention.
[26]
I agree with the Minister that it is not up to
the Court to reweigh the evidence. But, here, the evidence cited by the RAD simply
did not support a finding that adequate state protection was available. Despite
the able attempts by counsel for the Minister to rescue the RAD’s decision, the
panel’s reasons are so heavily anchored in the central role played by
organizations other than the police and in unreliable reports regarding police
actions that they run aground far beyond the confines of reasonableness. In the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that the reasons of the RAD provide the
justification, transparency and intelligibility required of a reasonable
decision.
[27]
I am mindful of the fact that, by returning this
matter to the RAD, the outcome of the RAD’s redetermination could be the same
after a new review is conducted in light of my decision and focuses on the
availability of state protection from the police. However, this is an
assessment and a weighing exercise that the RAD, not this Court, has to
conduct, and to which the Csoka family is entitled. It is possible that, informed
by these reasons of the error committed by the RAD and of the necessity to
properly consider the role of the Hungarian police in its state protection
analysis and to refrain from using deficient sources, another panel might come
to a different conclusion. I cannot say that the case leans so heavily against
granting the appeals of the Csoka family that sending the case back to the RAD
would serve no useful purpose (Lemus v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2014 FCA 114 at para 38).
IV.
Conclusion
[28]
For the reasons detailed above, the application
for judicial review filed by the Csoka family must be allowed as the RAD’s analysis
of state protection is unreasonable and the decision therefore does not
represent a possible, acceptable outcome based on the law and the evidence
presented before the RAD.
[29]
Neither party has proposed a question of general
importance for me to certify. I agree there is none.