Docket: T-2173-15
Citation:
2016 FC 1236
Ottawa, Ontario, November 4, 2016
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Southcott
BETWEEN:
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VANYA PETKOVA
ANDONOVA
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Overview
[1]
The Applicant, Vanya Petkova Andonova, seeks
judicial review, pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC
1985, c F-7, of a December 4, 2015 decision of the Investigations Branch of the
Public Service Commission [the Commission]. In that decision, the Commission
decided not to investigate, pursuant to section 66 of the Public Service
Employment Act, SC 2003, c 22 [the Act], a request by Ms. Andonova for
review of an external appointment process by Citizenship and Immigration Canada
[CIC]. Ms. Andonova asserts that the decision to eliminate her from the CIC
appointment process was not made on the basis of merit.
[2]
As explained in greater detail below, this
application is dismissed, because the Commission’s decision is a reasonable
one. Its decision, that an investigation of Ms. Andonova’s case was not
warranted, was based on its conclusion that Ms. Andonova’s candidacy was
assessed against qualifications required for the position, using assessment
tools linked to those qualifications, and that she had failed to meet one of
the essential qualifications. My finding is that this conclusion falls within
the range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of
the facts and law.
II.
Background
[3]
Ms. Andonova is currently employed in the
private sector, working as an Administrative Coordinator in the field of
taxation. She explains that she is dedicated to a career in public service and
that, in pursuit of that objective, she applied for a clerical position with
CIC through an external appointment process. On June 3, 2015, CIC advised Ms.
Andonova by email that she had been placed on a shortlist for further
consideration for a General Support Clerk position. As part of that selection
process, she completed a written online examination on June 25, 2015 and
attended an in-person interview on July 16, 2015.
[4]
On October 19, 2015, after Ms. Andonova followed
up with CIC, she was informed that she would not be considered further in this
appointment process because the assessment board had determined that she did
not meet an essential qualification for the position — Effective Interactive
Communication. On October 22, 2015, Ms. Andonova requested that the
Investigations Branch of the Commission review this external appointment
process. Her request explained the process by which her application was
submitted and assessed and asserted her claim that the decision on her
application was not on the basis of merit.
[5]
On December 4, 2015, the Director of the
Investigations Branch of the Commission communicated to Ms. Andonova its
decision that an investigation was not warranted. That decision is the subject
of this judicial review.
III.
Evidentiary Issues
[6]
Before proceeding to the merits of Ms.
Andonova’s application, the Court must address evidentiary issues raised by the
parties. Ms. Andonova filed a motion in writing under Rule 369, seeking to add
to the record before the Court a supplementary affidavit which attaches
documentation including email correspondence between CIC and one of Ms.
Andonova’s references. The Respondent objects to this documentation being
considered by the Court, on the basis that it was not before the Commission
when it made its decision and on the basis that it is being submitted after the
parties have filed their respective application records. On May 24, 2016,
Justice Hughes issued an Order that this motion be dealt with by the judge
hearing the application for judicial review.
[7]
The Respondent also argues that certain
documents included in Ms. Andonova’s Application Record should not be given any
weight by the Court, because they were not before the Commission when it made
its decision not to investigate. These are documents attached to Ms. Andonova’s
affidavit, which appear intended to demonstrate certain of her skills, training
and achievements.
[8]
At the hearing of this application, I proposed
that the parties make their respective submissions on these evidentiary issues
in the course of their submissions on the application, so that the Court could
assess the relevance of the evidence with an understanding of the issues in the
application itself.
[9]
I turn first to the evidence, found at pages 36
to 52 of Ms. Andonova’s Application Record [the Disputed Evidence], which
includes certificates, test results, and other documentation relevant to her accomplishments.
The Respondent relies on authority to the effect that applications for judicial
review are to be conducted on the basis of material that was before the
original decision maker, subject to narrow exceptions for general evidence of a
background nature that is of assistance to the Court; evidence that is relevant
to an alleged denial of procedural fairness that is not evident in the record
before the decision-maker; or evidence that demonstrates a complete lack of
evidence before the decision-maker for an impugned finding (see Love v.
Canada (Privacy Commissioner), 2015 FCA 198 [Love], at para 17).
[10]
I agree that the Respondent has accurately
characterized the relevant principle. There is no evidence before the Court
that the Disputed Evidence was before the Commission when it made its decision.
Ms. Andonova has argued that the Certified Tribunal Record in this matter is
deficient and that the Disputed Evidence was within the possession of CIC,
having been provided by her in the course of her application process. However,
there is no evidence before the Court to that effect. Ms. Andonova’s affidavit,
which attaches the Disputed Evidence, merely refers to this documentation as
supporting statements earlier in her affidavit. It does not state that this
documentation was provided to CIC.
[11]
Therefore, even if Ms. Andonova’s argument were
to be interpreted as an allegation of a procedural defect such as a deficient
investigation by the Commission, so as to arguably invoke an exception to the
principle that only material before the Commission is to be considered in the
judicial review, the evidence before the Court does not support a conclusion
that the Disputed Evidence was in the possession of CIC and should have been
identified by the Commission. Moreover, as explained in more detail below in my
analysis of the merits of this application, CIC’s decision to eliminate Ms.
Andonova from the appointment process, and the Commission’s decision not to
investigate her elimination, did not turn on her professional achievements, to
which the Disputed Evidence may have been relevant. Rather, it was based on
CIC’s assessment of one of the essential qualifications for the position for
which he was applying, through the written examination she submitted and the
interview she attended.
[12]
I therefore agree with the Respondent’s position
that the Disputed Evidence should be given no weight. I also note that, because
this evidence has no bearing on the basis on which Ms. Andonova was eliminated
from the appointment process, the Disputed Evidence would not affect my
decision even if I were to consider it.
[13]
Moving to the new evidence which Ms. Andonova
wishes to add to the record before the Court, I note that her Notice of Motion
relies on Rule 226(1) of the Federal Courts Rules, which requires a
party who becomes aware that its affidavit of documents is inaccurate or
deficient to serve a supplementary affidavit. The Respondent argues that Rule 226(1)
is not applicable to the present situation. However, Ms. Andonova is
self-represented, and I have considered her motion under Rule 312, which
permits a party to an application to file additional affidavit evidence and a
supplementary record with leave of the Court. In Forest Ethics Advocacy Assn v National Energy
Board, 2014 FCA 88 at paras 4-6, Justice Stratas articulated the test for
admissibility under Rule 312, which I would summarize as follows:
A.
The evidence must be
admissible on the application for judicial review;
B.
The evidence must be
relevant to an issue that is properly before the reviewing Court; and
C.
If these two
preliminary requirements are met, the Court may exercise its discretion,
considering the following:
i.
Was the evidence sought
to be adduced available when the party filed its affidavits or could it have
been available with the exercise of due diligence?
ii.
Is the evidence
sufficiently probative that it could affect the result?
iii.
Will the evidence cause
substantial or serious prejudice to the other party?
[14]
The new evidence which Ms. Andonova wishes to
introduce is email correspondence between CIC and Melanie Laskaris, one of her
references [the New Evidence]. Ms. Andonova’s affidavit attaching this evidence
explains that she became aware that her record was deficient, in that it did
not contain support for her assertion in this judicial review that her
references were checked following her interview, and that the New Evidence
supports this assertion.
[15]
The Respondent argues that the New Evidence
should not be introduced, because it was not before the decision-maker, the
Commission, and because of the timing of Ms. Andonova’s efforts to introduce
it. I have considered whether that this evidence falls within one of the
exceptions identified in Love , given that Ms. Andonova again argues
that the Certified Tribunal Record is deficient because it does not include the
New Evidence. She submits that, because the New Evidence represents
correspondence with CIC, it must have been within CIC’s possession. As with the
Disputed Evidence canvassed above, this argument could be characterized as an
allegation of a procedural defect in the Commission’s investigation, so as to
invoke an applicable exception and support a finding that the New Evidence is
potentially relevant and admissible. However, even characterizing Ms.
Andonova’s argument this way, I find that the factors applicable to the
exercise of the Court’s discretion under Rule 312 do not warrant admission of
the evidence.
[16]
The factors that militate in favour of admitting
the New Evidence are an absence of any significant prejudice to the Respondent
and the fact that the New Evidence demonstrates that it was received by Ms.
Andonova on April 14, 2016, which is after she filed her original affidavit in
her Application Record on March 24, 2016. However, militating against
admission, there is no evidence to support a conclusion that with due diligence
Ms. Andonova could not have obtained the New Evidence before she filed her
Application Record. More significantly, I find the New Evidence to be of little
probative value to the issues before the Court. The Respondent acknowledges
that Ms. Andonova’s references were checked following her interview (although
noting that the evidence in the Certified Tribunal Record is that the
references were not assessed by CIC). As Ms. Andonova argues, the New Evidence
would support her assertion that her references were checked. However, as this
point is not disputed, the New Evidence is of little probative value to the
issues the Court is now considering, and I do not consider the factors
applicable under Rule 312 to support admission of the evidence.
[17]
The motion to admit the New Evidence is
therefore denied. I note that I will consider later in these Reasons the
arguments by Ms. Andonova that flow from the undisputed fact that her
references were checked following her interview.
IV.
Issues and Standard of Review
[18]
Ms. Andonova does not expressly set out the
issues for the Court’s consideration. The Respondent characterizes the issues
as identification of the applicable standard of review and the reasonableness
of the Commission’s decision not to investigate (the latter issue being based
on the Respondent’s position that the applicable standard is reasonableness).
[19]
I agree with this characterization of the
issues. I also agree with the Respondent’s position
that that past jurisprudence has settled that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review for
decisions of the Commission not to investigate under section 66 of the Act (see
Moglica v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 FCA 34 at para 5, leave to
appeal to SCC refused, 2010 CarswellNat 1315).
V.
Analysis
[20]
Before proceeding to
analysis of the merits of this application, it is helpful to review relevant
provisions of the Act. Part 2 of the Act addresses the process for appointments to
the Canadian Public Service. Under the heading “Basis of Appointment”, section 30 provides that such appointments are to be
made on the basis of merit and explains the meaning of this requirement:
Appointment on basis of merit
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Principes
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30 (1)
Appointments by the Commission to or from within the public service shall be
made on the basis of merit and must be free from political influence.
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30 (1)
Les nominations — internes ou externes — à la fonction publique faites par la
Commission sont fondées sur le mérite et sont indépendantes de toute
influence politique.
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Meaning of merit
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Définition du mérite
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2) An appointment is made on the basis of merit when
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(2) Une nomination est fondée sur le mérite lorsque les conditions
suivantes sont réunies :
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a) the Commission is satisfied that the person to be appointed
meets the essential qualifications for the work to be performed, as
established by the deputy head, including official language proficiency; and
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a) selon la Commission, la personne à nommer possède les
qualifications essentielles — notamment la compétence dans les langues
officielles — établies par l’administrateur général pour le travail à
accomplir;
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(b) the Commission has regard to
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(b) la Commission prend en compte :
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(i) any additional qualifications that the deputy head may
consider to be an asset for the work to be performed, or for the
organization, currently or in the future,
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(i) toute qualification supplémentaire que
l’administrateur général considère comme un atout pour le travail à accomplir
ou pour l’administration, pour le présent ou l’avenir,
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(ii) any current or future operational requirements of the
organization that may be identified by the deputy head, and
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(ii) toute exigence opérationnelle actuelle ou future de l’administration précisée par l’administrateur général,
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(iii) any current or future needs of the organization that may
be identified by the deputy head.
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(iii) tout besoin actuel ou futur de l’administration précisé par
l’administrateur général.
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Needs of public service
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Besoins
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(3) The current
and future needs of the organization referred to in subparagraph (2)(b)(iii)
may include current and future needs of the public service, as identified by
the employer, that the deputy head determines to be relevant to the
organization.
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(3) Les besoins actuels et futurs de l’administration visés au
sous-alinéa (2)b)(iii) peuvent comprendre les besoins actuels et futurs de la
fonction publique précisés par l’employeur et que l’administrateur général
considère comme pertinents pour l’administration.
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Interpretation
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Précision
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(4) The
Commission is not required to consider more than one person in order for an
appointment to be made on the basis of merit.
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(4) La Commission n’est pas tenue de prendre en compte plus d’une
personne pour faire une nomination fondée sur le mérite.
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[21]
Section 31(1) of the Act sets out the employer’s
authority to establish qualification standards for a position:
Qualification standards
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Normes de qualification
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31(1) The employer may establish qualification
standards, in relation to education, knowledge, experience, occupational
certification, language or other qualifications, that the employer considers
necessary or desirable having regard to the nature of the work to be
performed and the present and future needs of the public service.
|
31 (1) L’employeur peut fixer des normes de
qualification, notamment en matière d’instruction, de connaissances,
d’expérience, d’attestation professionnelle ou de langue, nécessaires ou
souhaitables à son avis du fait de la nature du travail à accomplir et des
besoins actuels et futurs de la fonction publique.
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[22]
Section 36 provides authority for the selection
of assessment methods to determine whether a person meets applicable
qualifications:
Assessment methods
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Méthode d’évaluation
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36 In making an appointment, the Commission
may use any assessment method, such as a review of past performance and
accomplishments, interviews and examinations, that it considers appropriate
to determine whether a person meets the qualifications referred to in
paragraph 30(2)(a) and subparagraph 30(2)(b)(i).
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36 La Commission peut avoir recours à toute
méthode d’évaluation — notamment prise en compte des réalisations et du
rendement antérieur, examens ou entrevues — qu’elle estime indiquée pour
décider si une personne possède les qualifications visées à l’alinéa 30(2)a)
et au sous-alinéa 30(2)b)(i).
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[23]
Part 5 of the Act
addresses investigations and complaints relating to appointments. Section 66
deals specifically with investigations by the
Commission of external appointments:
External
Appointments
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Nominations externes
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66 The
Commission may investigate any external appointment process and, if it is
satisfied that the appointment was not made or proposed to be made on the
basis of merit, or that there was an error, an omission or improper conduct
that affected the selection of the person appointed or proposed for
appointment, the Commission may
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66 La
Commission peut mener une enquête sur tout processus de nomination externe;
si elle est convaincue que la nomination ou la proposition de nomination n’a
pas été fondée sur le mérite ou qu’une erreur, une omission ou une conduite
irrégulière a influé sur le choix de la personne nommée ou dont la nomination
est proposée, la Commission peut :
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(a) revoke the appointment or not make the appointment, as the
case may be; and
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a) révoquer la nomination ou ne pas faire
la nomination, selon le cas;
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(b) take any corrective action that it
considers appropriate.
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b) prendre les mesures correctives qu’elle
estime indiquées.
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[24]
Ms. Andonova’s request, that the Commission
review the external appointment process in which she was engaged, invoked the
Commission’s jurisdiction under section 66 of the Act, as she asserted that the
decision by CIC on her application was not made on the basis of merit. Noting
that CIC had advised her she did not meet the essential qualification of
Effective Interactive Communication, her request to the Commission referred to
her skills, training, and experience in that area. Similarly, in this
application for judicial review, she explains that she was able to complete the
written examination by correspondence within the stated time-frame and that she
was highly satisfied with her interview performance. She asserts that her
communication skills are strong, explaining that she has been an Administrative
Coordinator in taxation for nearly nine years and that she would not have been
able to perform her duties without effective communication skills.
[25]
Ms. Andonova has also explained to the Court
that she is passionate about the prospect of working for the Canadian Public
Service, that she shares the values of the Public Service, and that a position
of the sort which she sought with CIC represents her dream career. She also
explained that being eliminated from the appointment process, particularly
after CIC checked her references including from her present manager, has left
her in a vulnerable position in her current workplace.
[26]
Overall, Ms. Andonova’s argument to the
Commission, and again before the Court, is that the decision to eliminate her
from the competition could not have been based on merit, as she is confident
that she performed well in the written examination and at the interview and
that she possesses the communication skills required for the position. As
reflected in the Commission’s decision as conveyed to Ms. Andonova, and in the
File Review document which further explains the reasons for that decision, the
Commission made inquiries of CIC following receipt of her request. The
information obtained from CIC indicated that Ms. Andonova failed to meet one of
the essential qualifications for the position, being Effective Interactive
Communication. The Assessment Rating Guide applicable to Ms. Andonova’s
application indicated that this qualification was assessed based on the written
examination and the interview, resulting in her obtaining a mark of 2/5 where
the pass mark for the qualification was 3/5. The Assessment Rating Guide
further explained CIC’s analysis resulting in this mark.
[27]
The Commission’s decision stated that a review
of the documentation provided suggested that the assessment tools employed were
linked to the qualifications required for the position and that it appeared Ms.
Andonova was assessed based on the criteria outlined in the assessment guide.
Based on the information it received, the Commission determined that an
investigation was not warranted, as the information did not raise a problem in
the application of the Act or related regulations and policies.
[28]
While Ms. Andonova’s interest in public service
is commendable, the Court cannot identify a reviewable error in the
Commission’s decision not to investigate the appointment process in her case.
The Commission identified that she was eliminated based on failure to meet an
essential qualification and that appropriate assessment tools (the examination
and interview) were employed to assess that qualification. While the Commission
did not expressly engage in a statutory analysis, I note from the statutory
provisions canvassed above that an appointment based on merit requires
assessment of essential qualifications for a position and that the Act
authorizes the establishment of qualifications and means of assessing such
qualifications. Particularly when reviewed against the standard of
reasonableness, which considers whether a decision falls within the range of
possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and
law (see Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at para 47), there is no
basis for the Court to interfere with the Commission’s decision.
[29]
With respect to the fact that a reference check
was conducted following Ms. Andonova’s interview, she points out that the File
Review document underlying the Commission’s decision states that it does not
appear that her references were contacted in light of the fact that she had not
met one of the qualifications assessed at the interview. The Respondent
acknowledged in argument that this statement is incorrect, as Ms. Andonova’s
references were contacted although not assessed. The Respondent referred the
Court to a communication from CIC to the Commission explaining that, because
Ms. Andonova did not obtain a passing mark for the Effective Interactive
Communication criterion, the reference component of the evaluation of three
other qualifications (Adaptability and Flexibility, Values and Ethics, and Focus
on Quality and Details) was not completed.
[30]
This explanation is consistent with a review of
the Assessment Rating Guide, which was used to record Ms. Andonova’s
performance and notes the assessment method used for each of the
qualifications. For instance, the section of the Assessment Rating Guide
related to Effective Interactive Communication describes this qualification as
being assessed based on an interview and written assessment. In contrast, the
section on Adaptability and Flexibility describes this qualification as being
assessed based on an interview, written assessment and reference check. This
section records “References were not assessed as she
did not pass C3”.
[31]
The evidence supports the Respondent’s position
that Ms. Andonova’s references were checked but not assessed, because she
failed to meet the essential qualification of Effective Interactive
Communication as assessed through the written examination and interview. It
appears that the Commission interpreted the information obtained from CIC, that
the references were not evaluated or assessed, as meaning that they were not
contacted. While this is a factual error, it is not a material or reviewable
error rendering the Commission’s decision unreasonable. Based on the record
before the Commission which demonstrates that Ms. Andonova’s references were
not assessed because she did not meet an essential qualification, I cannot
conclude that the Commission’s decision would have been any different if it had
recognized that the references, although not assessed, had been contacted.
[32]
I recognize that Ms. Andonova is arguing that
the fact her references were checked following her interview supports her
assertion that she passed the interview stage of the application process.
However, I see no basis in the record for such a conclusion. The evidence
canvassed above expressly supports the contrary assertion by the Respondent,
that Ms. Andonova’s references were not assessed because of the negative
evaluation of one of the essential qualifications resulting from the
examination and the interview.
[33]
Finally, I note that Ms. Andonova points out
that the Certified Tribunal Record contains multiple copies of her Assessment
Rating Guide, bearing a footnote date of July 16, 2015 (the interview date),
only one of which is signed and stamped with a date of August 4, 2015. I cannot
identify any basis from this evidence to conclude that the Commission’s
decision, not to investigate this appointment process, was unreasonable.
VI.
Costs
[34]
The Respondent seeks costs of this application.
The Respondent has not proposed an amount but concedes that such costs should
be nominal.
[35]
As the Respondent has prevailed in this
application and has claimed costs, I agree that a costs award is appropriate. I
note that, in Mabrouk v Canada (Public Service Commission), 2014 FC 166,
Justice McVeigh awarded costs of $250 against a self-represented applicant, in
dismissing an application for judicial review of a decision by an investigator
of the Commission following an investigation under section 66 of the Act.
Guided by this precedent, but also noting the express acknowledgement by the
Respondent in the present case that costs should be nominal, I award costs of
$150.