Docket: IMM-6971-14
Citation:
2015 FC 1049
Fredericton, New Brunswick, September 9, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Bell
BETWEEN:
|
MEDINA LURENA
BRUCE
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Defendant
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Nature of the Matter
[1]
The Applicant, Ms. Medina Bruce, applies for
judicial review of an immigration officer’s denial of her application for an
exemption under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] from the requirement that she file her
application for a permanent resident visa from outside Canada. She bases her
claim for an exemption on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C)
considerations.
II.
Summary
[2]
Ms. Bruce is a 39 year old citizen of St.
Vincent and the Grenadines (St. Vincent). She came to Canada in May of 2000,
and has not left the country since that time. During her stay in Canada she has
worked unlawfully as a domestic employee. Complimentary reference letters from
clients for whom she has worked form part of the record. In December 2009, Ms.
Bruce met and later married Jeffery Billingy, who has been able to provide her
with physical, emotional and financial support. The couple now have a young
Canadian-born son, Joseph, who is two years old.
[3]
Ms. Bruce and her husband employed an
immigration consultant to assist them with their application for permanent
residency from within Canada. The applications were rejected and removal orders
were issued. Although her husband returned to St. Vincent, this Court stayed
Ms. Bruce’s removal order pending the conclusion of this judicial review
application. For the reasons set out below, I would dismiss the application.
III.
Issues
[4]
Ms. Bruce raises the following issues for
review:
1.
Was the Officer's decision reasonable with
respect to her establishment in Canada?
2.
Was the Officer's decision reasonable with
respect to hardship in the country of removal; hardship being largely based
upon perceived lack of medical services and lack of employment opportunities?
3.
Was the Officer's decision reasonable with
respect to the best interests of the child?
IV.
Immigration Officer’s Decision
[5]
The immigration officer (the Officer) denied Ms.
Bruce’s application on the basis of a lack of unusual and undeserved or
disproportionate hardship. The reasons underlying this finding are based upon
four premises.
[6]
First, the Officer was not persuaded that Ms.
Bruce’s establishment in Canada met the requisite level of hardship. In his
decision, the Officer refers to her consistent employment and self-sufficiency,
pattern of sound financial management, and involvement in her church. However,
the Officer finds her employment has been ‘based on a wilful disregard of
Canadian Immigration [sic] law’, and her establishment in Canada was made with
the full knowledge that she was here unlawfully and her removal ‘could become
an eventuality’. The Officer also observed that Ms. Bruce had produced no
documentary evidence to validate her employment earnings.
[7]
Second, the Officer found the country condition
evidence insufficient to establish that Ms. Bruce would face undue hardship in
terms of her ability to procure medical care or employment. The Officer notes
that the evidence demonstrates that St. Vincent provides psychotropic drugs
without charge to citizens who require them, although he acknowledges there are
limited facilities and resources available to mental health patients. Further, the
Officer notes that Ms. Bruce’s evidence of
employment conditions was merely demonstrative of a generalized problem, not one
amounting to undue and undeserved or disproportionate hardship.
[8]
The third weakness in Ms. Bruce’s application, relates
to her ties to family members in St. Vincent. The Officer notes Ms. Bruce’s husband,
father and two siblings live in St. Vincent. As a result, Ms. Bruce’s
experience on removal would amount to stress that is ‘inherent’, as opposed to ‘unusual’.
[9]
Finally, the Officer finds that it would be in
Joseph’s best interest to remain with his mother, regardless of where that may
be. The Officer further notes that Joseph would benefit from being reunited
with his father and other relatives in St. Vincent. Given his young age, the
Officer opines that Joseph has not developed any ties to Canada that would
cause hardship if he were to return to St. Vincent with his mother.
V.
Relevant Provisions
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27
Humanitarian and compassionate considerations — request of foreign
national
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Séjour pour motif d’ordre humanitaire à la demande de l’étranger
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25. (1) Subject to subsection (1.2), the Minister must, on request
of a foreign national in Canada who applies for permanent resident status and
who is inadmissible — other than under section 34, 35 or 37 — or who does not
meet the requirements of this Act, and may, on request of a foreign national
outside Canada — other than a foreign national who is inadmissible under
section 34, 35 or 37 — who applies for a permanent resident visa, examine the
circumstances concerning the foreign national and may grant the foreign
national permanent resident status or an exemption from any applicable
criteria or obligations of this Act if the Minister is of the opinion that it
is justified by humanitarian and compassionate considerations relating to the
foreign national, taking into account the best interests of a child directly
affected.
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25. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (1.2), le ministre doit, sur
demande d’un étranger se trouvant au Canada qui demande le statut de résident
permanent et qui soit est interdit de territoire — sauf si c’est en raison
d’un cas visé aux articles 34, 35 ou 37 —, soit ne se conforme pas à la
présente loi, et peut, sur demande d’un étranger se trouvant hors du Canada —
sauf s’il est interdit de territoire au titre des articles 34, 35 ou 37 — qui
demande un visa de résident permanent, étudier le cas de cet étranger; il
peut lui octroyer le statut de résident permanent ou lever tout ou partie des
critères et obligations applicables, s’il estime que des considérations
d’ordre humanitaire relatives à l’étranger le justifient, compte tenu de
l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant directement touché.
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VI.
Analysis
A.
Standard of Review & Legal Test on an
H&C Application
[10]
The parties agree, as do I, that the standard of
review applicable on judicial review of an immigration officer’s discretionary
decision regarding an H&C application made under section 25 of the IRPA is
reasonableness (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at para 51, [2008]
1 SCR 190 [Dunsmuir]; Kisana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FCA 189 at para 18, [2009] FCJ No 713 [Kisana]; Kanthasamy
v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at paras
37, 79, [2014] FCJ No 472 [Kanthasamy]; Gonzalo v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 526 at para 11, [2015 ] FCJ No 573).
It follows that the Court will not intervene if the decision “falls within a range of possible outcomes which are
defensible in respect of the facts and law” (Dunsmuir, at para
47). Given the discretionary nature of H&C decisions, the range of potential
outcomes may be broad (Kanthasamy, at para 84).
[11]
It is well-established that on an H&C
application under subsection 25(1) of the IRPA, the Applicant must establish
that he or she will “personally suffer unusual and
undeserved, or disproportionate hardship” (Kanthasamy, at para
41). Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, establishment, ties to
Canada, best interests of any affected children, medical inadequacies in the
foreign country, discrimination in the foreign country that does not amount to
persecution, and other serious hazards in the foreign country (Kanthasamy, at
para 42).
B.
Establishment in Canada
[12]
With respect to Ms. Bruce’s establishment in
Canada, the Officer considered her employment history, bank statements,
involvement in her church, and letters of support. Although the Officer noted
that Ms. Bruce provided no evidence of employment earnings, this does not seem
to have played a significant role in the assessment given the recognition of
her continuous employment history, strong work ethic and active engagement in her community. However, as previously
noted, the Officer concluded Ms. Bruce knowingly obtained employment without
valid work permits with the knowledge she could become the subject of a removal
order at any time.
[13]
Although the Officer did not specifically
address the explanations Ms. Bruce gave for overstaying her visa – those being
legal fees and fear of discrimination – I am not satisfied such a failure
renders the decision unreasonable. A decision-maker is not required to address
every argument advanced by a party, provided the reasons as a whole allow the
reviewing court to understand why the decision was made. See, Newfoundland
and Labrador Nurses’ Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board),
2011 SCC 62 at para 16, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708. The Officer showed sensitivity to Ms.
Bruce’s medical condition, employment and ties to Canada, but concluded those
ties, established in wilful disregard of immigration law requirements, were
insufficient to justify granting the application. This conclusion was open to
the Officer on the evidence.
[14]
The Applicant contends that more consideration
should have been given to the fact that she has resided in Canada for over 14
years. However, a lengthy stay in Canada is not in and of itself grounds for an
H&C exemption when the length of stay is within the Applicant’s control.
See, Beladi v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC
1150, 182 ACWS (3d) 994; Mann v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2009 FC 126, [2009] FCJ No 151; Diaz v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 373, 252 ACWS (3d) 557. Ms. Bruce
states that she was aware she was not legally entitled to be in Canada, and it
is for that reason she had to secure ‘unofficial employment’. The circumstances
of her stay were clearly within her control. I would note the Officer
considered Ms. Bruce’s length of stay, but failed to give it as much weight as
she (Ms. Bruce) would have liked. It is not the role of this Court to interfere
with the Officer’s conclusion of the weight to be given to any particular
factor.
[15]
I am of the view the Officer’s decision with
respect to establishment in Canada falls within the range of reasonableness.
C.
Adequacy of Medical Care
[16]
The Officer refers to the medical opinions from
Ms. Bruce’s family physician and her psychiatrist. He also refers to the
country condition documents submitted by counsel. The Officer concludes Ms.
Bruce’s illness would be better dealt with in Canada and accepts that she will
need continued medical care. However, after making appropriate references to
the evidence, the Officer finds that treatment for schizophrenia is available
in St. Vincent. I would add, in the interests of a fulsome assessment of this
issue, that Ms. Bruce is not treated with medication for her schizophrenia.
Counsel advised at the hearing that her treatment, to date, has been limited to
psychotherapy.
[17]
Ms. Bruce further contends the Officer should
have considered the hardship she would face in obtaining employment. She claims
her medical condition constitutes a personalized risk. However, there was no
evidence regarding discrimination faced by persons with mental illness.
Furthermore, Ms. Bruce did not make this assertion in her submissions to the
Officer. In the circumstances, the Officer reasonably concluded that Ms. Bruce did
not face a personalized risk with respect to lack of employment opportunities in
St. Vincent.
D.
Best Interests of the Child
[18]
Ms. Bruce contends her lack of access to adequate
medical care in St. Vincent and her diminished employment prospects will negatively
impact Joseph. The Officer considered these factors, along with the fact that
Joseph’s father, grandfather and other relatives currently reside there. There was
some speculation at the hearing before the Officer that Joseph’s father would
be required to travel to Trinidad and Tobago for work. This factor was also
considered by the Officer.
[19]
Finally, even if there were sufficient evidence
to find that it would be in Joseph’s best interests to remain in Canada, this
would not necessarily have resulted in a different conclusion. The assessment
of H&C considerations is a holistic one. The best interests of a child must
be viewed in light of the application as a whole. (See, Kisana at para
24). The decision as a whole is one which falls within a range of possible
outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.
VII.
Conclusion
[20]
For the above reasons, I would dismiss the
application for judicial review without costs.
[21]
Neither party has submitted a question for
certification.