Date: 20150327
Docket: T-1952-13
Citation:
2015 FC 390
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Ottawa, Ontario, March 27, 2015
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Bédard
BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
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Plaintiff
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and
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CÉLESTIN HALINDINTWALI
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Defendant
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Background
[1]
The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (the
Minister) seeks a declaration, pursuant to paragraph 18(1)(b) of
the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C-29 [the Act], that Célestin Halindintwali
(the defendant) obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or
fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. For the reasons that
follow, I am of the opinion that the Minister has established, on a balance of probabilities,
that the defendant acquired Canadian citizenship by fraud and by concealing
material circumstances.
[2]
In 1995, the defendant went to the Canadian High
Commission in Nairobi, Kenya, to apply for permanent residence under the “Convention
refugee seeking resettlement” class. The application included the defendant’s wife,
Marie Solange Ingabire, and their daughter.
[3]
In his application, the defendant stated that he
and his wife were citizens of Burundi. He claimed that he was Hutu, while his
wife was Tutsi, and that it was difficult to live in Burundi as a mixed couple.
The defendant stated that their home in Bujumbura had
been burned down in March 1995 in an attack by Tutsi militants supported
by the Burundian army, and that their twin daughters had died during this
attack.
[4]
The defendant’s application for permanent residence
was approved. He obtained permanent resident status on July 22, 1997, and
became a Canadian citizen on June 21, 2001.
[5]
In June 2013, the Minister initiated a
process to revoke the defendant’s citizenship on the grounds that it had been
obtained by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances within the meaning of subsection 10(1) of the Act. The
Minister contends that the defendant made false representations to Canadian
authorities when applying for permanent residence. He maintains that the defendant
is Rwandan, and not Burundian, and that he submitted false information in order
to provide Canadian authorities with a story that would enable him to be
accepted as a refugee. The Minister also maintains that the defendant lied when
he stated in his permanent residence application that he had never participated
in a crime against humanity. The Minister claims that the defendant actively
participated in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 as a leader of the civil defence organization
in the prefecture of Butare, and that he was a member of the National
Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) party and its Interahamwe
militia.
II.
Nature of the proceeding and procedural history
A.
Nature of the proceeding
[6]
This is a reference pursuant to paragraph 18(1)(b)
of the Act. This proceeding is governed by sections 10 and 18 of the Act.
[7]
Pursuant to subsection 10(1) of the Act,
the Governor in Council may make an order revoking a person’s citizenship if he
is satisfied that the person obtained citizenship by false representation or
fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. Subsection 10(2)
of the Act creates a presumption whereby a person who obtained permanent
resident status by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing
material circumstances is deemed to have obtained citizenship through one of
those means. Section 10 reads as follows:
Order in
cases of fraud
10. (1) Subject to section 18 but notwithstanding any other
section of this Act, where the Governor in Council, on a report from the
Minister, is satisfied that any person has obtained, retained, renounced or
resumed citizenship under this Act by false representation or fraud or by
knowingly concealing material circumstances,
(a) the person ceases to be a citizen, or
(b) the renunciation of citizenship by the person shall be
deemed to have had no effect,
as of such date as may be fixed by order of the Governor in
Council with respect thereto.
Presumption
(2) A person shall be deemed to have obtained citizenship by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances if
the person was lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances
and, because of that admission, the person subsequently obtained citizenship.
1974-75-76, c.
108, s. 9.
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Décret en
cas de fraude
10. (1) Sous réserve du seul article 18, le gouverneur en conseil
peut, lorsqu’il est convaincu, sur rapport du ministre, que l’acquisition, la
conservation ou la répudiation de la citoyenneté, ou la réintégration dans
celle-ci, est intervenue sous le régime de la présente loi par fraude ou au
moyen d’une fausse déclaration ou de la dissimulation intentionnelle de faits
essentiels, prendre un décret aux termes duquel l’intéressé, à compter de la
date qui y est fixée :
a) soit
perd sa citoyenneté;
b) soit
est réputé ne pas avoir répudié sa citoyenneté.
Présomption
(2) Est réputée avoir acquis la citoyenneté par fraude, fausse
déclaration ou dissimulation intentionnelle de faits essentiels la personne
qui l’a acquise à raison d’une admission légale au Canada à titre de résident
permanent obtenue par l’un de ces trois moyens.
1974-75-76, ch.
108, art. 9.
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[8]
As per subsection 10(1), the Governor in
Council reaches the decision based on a report submitted by the Minister.
[9]
Section 18 of the Act provides a mechanism
that imposes on the Minister an obligation to give notice to the person involved
of the Minister’s intention to recommend that the Governor in Council revoke
that person’s citizenship. The person may then exercise his or her right to
request that the case be referred to the Federal Court to determine whether he or
she obtained citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly
concealing material circumstances. When the case is referred to the Court, the
Minister must await the Court’s decision before submitting his report to the
Governor in Council.
[10]
Section 18, which governs this process, reads
as follows:
Notice to
person in respect of revocation
18. (1) The Minister shall not make a report under section 10
unless the Minister has given notice of his intention to do so to the person
in respect of whom the report is to be made and
(a) that person does not, within thirty days after the day
on which the notice is sent, request that the Minister refer the case to the
Court; or
(b) that person does so request and the Court decides that
the person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.
Nature of
notice
(2) The notice referred to in subsection (1) shall state that the
person in respect of whom the report is to be made may, within thirty days
after the day on which the notice is sent to him, request that the Minister
refer the case to the Court, and such notice is sufficient if it is sent by
registered mail to the person at his latest known address.
Decision
final
(3) A decision of the Court made under subsection (1) is final
and, notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, no appeal lies therefrom.
1974-75-76, c.
108, s. 17.
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Avis
préalable à l’annulation
18. (1) Le ministre ne peut procéder à l’établissement du rapport
mentionné à l’article 10 sans avoir auparavant avisé l’intéressé de son
intention en ce sens et sans que l’une ou l’autre des conditions suivantes ne
se soit réalisée :
a) l’intéressé
n’a pas, dans les trente jours suivant la date d’expédition de l’avis,
demandé le renvoi de l’affaire devant la Cour;
b) la
Cour, saisie de l’affaire, a décidé qu’il y avait eu fraude, fausse
déclaration ou dissimulation intentionnelle de faits essentiels.
Nature de l’avis
(2) L’avis prévu au paragraphe (1) doit spécifier la faculté qu’a
l’intéressé, dans les trente jours suivant sa date d’expédition, de demander
au ministre le renvoi de l’affaire devant la Cour. La communication de l’avis
peut se faire par courrier recommandé envoyé à la dernière adresse connue de
l’intéressé.
Caractère définitif de la décision
(3) La décision de la Cour visée au
paragraphe (1) est définitive et, par dérogation à toute autre loi fédérale,
non susceptible d’appel.
1974-75-76, ch.
108, art. 17.
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[11]
Rule 169(a) of the Federal Courts
Rules, SOR/98-106 [the Rules], provides that Part 4 of the
Rules, which is applicable to proceedings required to be brought as an action, applies
to references under section 18 of the Act.
[12]
A reference under section 18 of the Act is
therefore filed as a statement of claim (rule 171). However, it is not an
action in the traditional sense of the word given that the Court is not being asked
to maintain or revoke the citizenship of the individual in question. Rather, the
Court must draw conclusions of fact and determine whether the person obtained
citizenship by false representation or fraud, or by knowingly concealing
material circumstances, and if so, make a declaration to this effect that will
serve as the basis for the report the Minister must submit to the Governor in
Council. The specific nature of a reference under section 18 of the Act
was clearly described by the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v Obodzinsky, 2002 FCA 518, at paragraph 15,
[2002] FCJ No 1800:
15 Of course, a reference by the
Minister under s. 18 of the Act is not an action in the ordinary or traditional
sense. A proceeding initiated under s. 18 is essentially an investigative
proceeding used to collect evidence of facts surrounding the acquisition of
citizenship, so as to determine whether it was obtained by fraudulent means. It
results simply in a non-executory finding which is the basis of a report by the
Minister to the Governor in Council for a decision to be taken by the latter,
unlike an action, which when valid produces executory conclusions. The very
nature of a reference under s. 18 of the Act is that the provisions contained
in Part 4 of the Court’s Rules must be applied, making the necessary
alterations not only as to terminology but also as to the advisability of applying
certain provisions contained in that Part’.
[See also Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration) v Tobiass, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, at paras 52, 55,
[1997] SCJ No 82].
[13]
The Court’s decision with regard to a reference
under section 18 of the Act is final and is not subject to appeal
(subsection 18(3) of the Act).
B.
Procedural history
[14]
On June 6, 2013, the Minister sent a notice
to the defendant informing him of the Minister’s intention to recommend that
the Governor in Council revoke the defendant’s citizenship pursuant to section 18
of the Act.
[15]
On June 21, 2013, the defendant, through
his counsel, exercised his right to request that the case be referred to the
Court.
[16]
The Minister filed his statement of claim on
November 27, 2013, and it was duly served on the defendant in accordance
with the Rules. The defendant did not file a statement of defence within the time
prescribed in rule 204 of the Rules, nor at any other time. The Minister made
numerous attempts to ensure that the defendant had not inadvertently failed to file
his statement of defence. Counsel for the Minister left messages for the defendant’s
counsel, but these were never returned.
[17]
In June 2014, the Court sent the parties a
notice of status review. The defendant did not reply. The Minister, meanwhile,
filed submissions with the Court, which among other things informed the Court
that the Minister intended to file a motion for confidentiality, and a motion
for default judgment.
[18]
On August 8, 2014, Prothonotary Richard
Morneau ordered that this proceeding continue as a specially managed
proceeding. Although the defendant had not filed a statement of defence or
responded to the notice of status review, a copy of Prothonotary Morneau’s
order, as well as the defendant’s motions for a confidentiality order and default
judgment, were served on the defendant on August 12, 2014. The defendant
has still not responded.
[19]
Rule 210(1) provides that where a defendant
fails to serve and file a statement of defence within the time set out in rule 204,
the plaintiff may bring a motion for judgment against the defendant on the
statement of claim. The plaintiff’s motion is supported by affidavit evidence (subsection 210(3)
of the Rules). Pursuant to rule 210(4), in dealing with a motion for default
judgment, the Court may grant judgment, dismiss the action or order that the
action proceed to trial and that the plaintiff prove its case in such manner as
the Court may direct.
[20]
In this case, the Minister may proceed by
default. The defendant was properly informed of the proceeding. In fact, it was
the defendant who requested the reference to the Court, and he had legal
representation, at least at the outset. The statement of claim was duly served
on the defendant. Counsel for the Minister tried in vain to communicate with counsel
for the defendant. The defendant also received service of subsequent
proceedings even though, in principle, he was not so entitled. In particular, he
received service of the notice of status review, the order for a specially
managed proceeding, and the Minister’s motions for confidentiality and default
judgment.
[21]
It is unusual for a proceeding of this nature,
which could have such significant consequences for the person involved, to be
heard without that person’s participation, when in fact, the reference was initiated
at that person’s request. However, given the numerous opportunities provided to
the defendant to participate in this proceeding, I can only conclude that the defendant
chose, with full knowledge of the matter, not to participate. Furthermore, this
is not the first time that the Court has proceeded by default in such a
reference: in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Aguilar,
[2001] FCJ No 11, 109 ACWS (3d) 209 (FCTD), the Court granted an
application for default judgment in a reference to revoke citizenship, based
solely on documentary evidence.
III.
Legal framework
[22]
As I have already indicated, the Minister is
asking the Court to find, through application of paragraph 18(1)(b)
of the Act, that the defendant obtained his permanent residence status, and
consequently, his Canadian citizenship, by false representation or fraud, or by
knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[23]
The legal parameters applicable to a reference
to the Court are well established in case law, and I will summarize them
briefly before dealing with the evidence that was submitted by the Minister.
A.
Procedural rights
[24]
First, the procedural rights applicable to a
reference under the Act are governed by the provisions of the Act that were in
effect when the citizenship revocation proceedings were initiated (Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Furman, 2006 FC 993, at para 9,
[2006] FCJ No 1248 [Furman]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration) v Skomatchuk, 2006 FC 994, at para 9, [2006] FCJ No 1249
[Skomatchuk]; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Rogan,
2011 FC 1007, at para 17, [2011] FCJ No 1221 [Rogan]). In this
case, the proceeding began on June 6, 2013, when the Minister sent the defendant
notice of his intention to recommend that the Governor in Council revoke the defendant’s
citizenship. This case is therefore governed by the provisions of the Act that
were in effect on that date. Sections 10 and 18 of the Act that were cited
at the beginning of these reasons were in effect at that time.
B.
Substantive rights
[25]
The defendant’s substantive rights related to obtaining
Canadian citizenship derive from the Act that was in effect when he obtained
Canadian citizenship, i.e., in June 2001. His substantive rights related to
obtaining permanent resident status as a refugee seeking resettlement derive from
the provisions of the Immigration Act, RSC 1985, c I-2, and the Immigration
Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172 [the Regulations], which were in effect when
he applied for permanent resident status in November 1995 and obtained his
permanent resident status in July 1997 (Furman, at para 16; Skomatchuk,
at para 16; Rogan, at para 23).
[26]
To be admitted to Canada as a “Convention
refugee seeking resettlement,” the defendant had to be admissible first of all as
a refugee.
[27]
Section 2 of the Regulations defines the
criteria for this class of refugee:
“Convention refugee seeking resettlement” means a person, other
than a person whose case has been rejected in accordance with the
Comprehensive Plan of Action adopted by the International Conference on
Indo-Chinese Refugees on June 14, 1989, who is a Convention refugee
(a) who is outside Canada,
(b) who is seeking
admission to Canada for the purpose of resettling in Canada, and
(c) in respect of whom there is no possibility,
within a reasonable period of time, of a durable solution.
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« réfugié au
sens de la Convention cherchant à se réinstaller »
Personne, autre qu’une personne dont le cas a fait l’objet d’un
rejet conformément au plan d’action global adopté le 14 juin 1989 par la
Conférence internationale sur les réfugiés indochinois, qui est un réfugié au
sens de la Convention :
a) qui se trouve
hors du Canada;
b) qui cherche à
être admis au Canada pour s’y réinstaller;
c) à l’égard duquel aucune solution durable
n’est réalisable dans un laps de temps raisonnable.
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[28]
To be recognized as a refugee, a person must
demonstrate that he or she meets the definition of Convention refugee, which is
set out in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act:
“Convention refugee” means any person who
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group or political opinion,
(i) is outside
the country of the person’s nationality and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of that country, or
(ii) not having
a country of nationality, is outside the country of the person’s former
habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that fear, is unwilling to
return to that country, and
(b) has not ceased to be a Convention refugee by virtue of
subsection (2),
but does not
include any person to whom the Convention does not apply pursuant to section
E or F of Article 1 thereof, which sections are set out in the schedule to
this Act.
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« réfugié au sens de la Convention » Toute personne :
a) qui, craignant
avec raison d’être persécutée du fait de sa race, de sa religion, de sa
nationalité, de son appartenance à un groupe social ou de ses opinions
politiques :
(i) soit se trouve hors du pays dont elle a la
nationalité et ne peut ou, du fait de cette crainte, ne veut se réclamer de
la protection de ce pays;
(ii) soit, si elle n’a pas de nationalité et se
trouve hors du pays dans lequel elle avait sa résidence habituelle, ne peut
ou, en raison de cette crainte, ne veut y retourner;
b) n’a pas perdu
son statut de réfugié au sens de la Convention en application du paragraphe
(2).
Sont exclues de
la présente définition les personnes soustraites à l’application de la
Convention par les sections E ou F de l’article premier de celle-ci dont le
texte est reproduit à l’annexe de la présente loi.
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[29]
To be recognized as a refugee, the defendant had
to demonstrate the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution for one of
the enumerated reasons in every country in which he was a national (Canada (Attorney
General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at pp 752-754, [1993] SCJ No 74).
[30]
Furthermore, to be recognized as a refugee, the defendant
must not have been excluded from the definition of refugee. Clause 1F(a)
of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees excludes from the
definition of refugee any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons
for considering that he has committed a war crime or crime against humanity. Clause 1F(a)
reads as follows:
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person
with respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a
crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up
to make provision in respect of such crimes;
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F. Les dispositions de cette Convention ne seront pas applicables
aux personnes dont on aura des raisons sérieuses de penser :
a) qu’elles ont commis un crime contre la paix, un crime de guerre
ou un crime contre l’humanité, au sens des instruments internationaux
élaborés pour prévoir des dispositions relatives à ces crimes;
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[31]
Paragraph 19(1)(j) of the Immigration
Act also provided that no persons would be admitted if there were
reasonable grounds to believe that they had committed a war crime or crime
against humanity:
19. (1) No person shall be granted admission who is a member of any
of the following classes:
. . .
(j)
persons who there are reasonable grounds to believe have committed an act or
omission outside Canada that constituted a war crime or a crime against
humanity within the meaning of subsection 7(3.76) of the Criminal Code
and that, if it had been committed in Canada, would have constituted an
offence against the laws of Canada in force at the time of the act or
omission.
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19. (1) Les personnes suivantes
appartiennent à une catégorie non admissible :
[. . .]
j) celles dont on peut penser, pour des
motifs raisonnables, qu’elles ont commis, à l’étranger, un fait constituant
un crime de guerre ou un crime contre l’humanité au sens du paragraphe
7(3.76) du Code criminel et qui aurait constitué, au Canada, une
infraction au droit canadien en son état à l’époque de la perpétration.
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C.
Burden of proof and standard of proof
[32]
A reference under section 18 of the Act is
a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding. As such, the burden of proof that
lies with the Minister is that which applies in civil matters, i.e., a balance
of probabilities, despite the fact that the issue is an important one that
could have serious consequences for the defendant (Furman, at paras 21-23;
Skomatchuk, at paras 24-25; Rogan, at paras 26-27). In
order to find that the proof has been established based on a balance of
probabilities, the Court must be satisfied that in light of the evidence
presented, it is more probable than not that the alleged events did indeed
occur (Rogan, at para 28). As the Supreme Court of Canada indicated
in FH v McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, at para 49, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41:
49 In the result, I would reaffirm
that in civil cases there is only one standard of proof and that is proof on a
balance of probabilities. In all civil cases, the trial judge must
scrutinize the relevant evidence with care to determine whether it is more
likely than not that an alleged event occurred.
[Emphasis added.]
[33]
It is therefore up to the Minister to establish,
on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant obtained permanent resident
status, and consequently, Canadian citizenship, by false representation or fraud,
or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[34]
The fact that this proceeding is being conducted
without the defendant’s participation does not lighten the Minister’s burden of
proof. It has been established that in a judgment by default, every allegation
is treated as denied, and the onus is on the plaintiff to prove its claims (Teavana
Corporation v Teayama Inc, 2014 FC 372, at para 4, [2014] FCJ No 393;
Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v Lin, 2007 FC 1179, at para 4, [2007]
FCJ No 1528; Aquasmart Technologies v Klassen, 2011 FC 212, at para 5,
[2011] FCJ No 256).
D.
The legal test
[35]
The case law has established that in order to
meet his burden, the Minister does not have to demonstrate that the false
representation, fraud or knowing concealment of material circumstances would
necessarily have led to the rejection of the application for permanent
residence. He must, however, establish that the false representation, fraud or knowing
concealment of material circumstances involved elements that were sufficiently important
to cause a decision-maker to conclude that had they been known, these facts
would have led Canadian authorities to conduct more in-depth fact-finding or inquiries
before approving the application for permanent residence.
[36]
The courts have had more than one occasion to
rule on the elements that must be established to demonstrate that the person in
question knowingly concealed material circumstances, particularly in terms of
the intent to conceal and the materiality of the information concealed. Madam Justice
Mactavish provided a good description of the law in this regard in Rogan,
above:
31 The Minister does not have to
demonstrate that, had he been truthful during the immigration process, Mr.
Rogan’s application for permanent residence would necessarily have been
rejected. Rather, the Minister need only show that Mr. Rogan gained entry to
Canada by knowingly concealing material circumstances which had the effect of
foreclosing or averting further inquiries: Canada (Minister of Manpower and
Immigration) v. Brooks, [1974] S.C.R. 850, [1973] S.C.J. No. 112, at 873; Odynsky,
above, at para. 159; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.
Wysocki, 2003 FC 1172, 250 F.T.R. 174 at para. 16.
32 In order to find that someone
“knowingly conceal[ed] material circumstances” within the meaning of section 10
of the Citizenship Act, 1985, “the Court must find on evidence, and/or
reasonable inference from the evidence, that the person concerned concealed
circumstances material to the decision, whether he knew or did not know that
they were material, with the intent of misleading the decision-maker”: Odynsky,
above, at para. 159. See also Schneeberger, above, at para. 20.
33 “A misrepresentation of a material
fact includes an untruth, the withholding of truthful information, or a
misleading answer which has the effect of foreclosing or averting further
inquiries”: Schneeberger, at para. 22, citing Brooks. This is so
even if the answer to those inquiries might not turn up any independent ground
of deportation: Brooks, above, at 873.
34 In assessing the materiality of
the information concealed, regard must be had to the significance of the
undisclosed information to the decision in question: Schneeberger, at
para. 21. However, “more must be established than a technical transgression of
the Act. Innocent misrepresentations are not to result in the revocation of
citizenship”: Schneeberger, at para. 26, citing Canada (Minister of
Multiculturalism and Citizenship) v. Minhas (1993), 66 F.T.R. 155, [1993]
F.C.J. No. 712 (F.C.T.D.).
35 That said, misrepresentations
claimed to be “innocent” must be carefully examined, and willful blindness will
not be condoned. If faced with a situation of doubt, an applicant should
invariably err on the side of full disclosure: Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration) v. Phan, 2003 FC 1194, 240 F.T.R. 239
at para. 33.
[37]
There is less case law with regard to the
elements required to establish that citizenship was obtained by fraud or a
false declaration. Madam Justice Kane recently provided an excellent analysis
of the issue in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Savic,
2014 FC 523, [2014] FCJ No 562, concluding that intention to mislead is
also required to establish that citizenship was obtained by fraud or false
declarations. The relevant passage reads as follows:
66 The plaintiff’s primary argument
is that the defendant acted intentionally in concealing material circumstances
and in making false representations.
67 The plaintiff’s alternative
argument is that some conduct that falls under section 10, namely false
representations, need not be intentional. Success on this argument would avoid
the need to provide some evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities
that there was an intention to mislead the decision maker.
68 The overall goal of section 10 is
to ensure that persons who have obtained permanent resident status and
citizenship by providing false information or by withholding information that
is material to the decision will not continue to benefit from that status. In
my view, intent to mislead the decision maker is required for all conduct
referred to in section 10. That intention must be established on a
balance of probabilities; the plaintiff must provide some evidence of
intention or some evidence from which a reasonable inference of intention to
mislead can be drawn.
69 Section 10 refers to three types
of conduct (false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances) and it is possible that the same conduct could satisfy all three,
but that is not required.
70 Fraud arises in both criminal law
and in other contexts including tort and contract. Fraud is generally defined
as intentional or reckless misrepresentation of fact by words or by conduct
that deceives another person and which results in a detriment to that other
person (see Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc v Hryniak, 2014 SCC 8). The
conduct which amounts to fraud can also be an omission or silence in situations
where there is an obligation to disclose information.
71 The requirement for intention with
respect to conduct that amounts to fraud in section 10 does not need to be
spelled out because intention, which can include recklessness regarding the
statement or omission and the other person’s likely reliance on that statement,
is part of the definition of fraud.
. . .
74 This leaves for consideration the
conduct contemplated by false representations, which the plaintiff
alternatively submits does not require an intention to mislead. As noted above,
I do not agree. Simply making a false statement (i.e., a false representation)
in error or inadvertently should not result in a declaration under section 10. Some
intention to mislead is required. This intention must be established on a
balance of probabilities.
75 However, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation where a false representation that is not inadvertent
would not also be covered by the conduct described as fraud, given that in the
context of permanent resident applications, the representation would be relied
on by the decision maker and the applicant would benefit from making the false
representation.
76 Similarly, situations where an
applicant would “knowingly conceal material circumstances” may also constitute
a “false representation” and/or fraud.
[Emphasis added.]
IV.
Analysis of the evidence
[38]
The Minister alleges that in his application for
residence as a “Convention refugee seeking resettlement”, the defendant made false
representations and knowingly concealed material circumstances on two fronts:
- The defendant
made false representations with regard to his citizenship and several
other personal details, and he fabricated a story in order to be accepted
as a refugee;
- The defendant
lied when he stated on his permanent residence application form that he
had never committed war crimes or crimes against humanity, nor
participated in the perpetration of such crimes.
[39]
As part of the permanent residence application
process, the defendant filled out the permanent residence application form, in
which he provided several personal details. He signed this form on October 30,
1995. Section 31 of the form contains a declaration from the applicant to
the effect that the information he has provided is truthful, complete and
accurate and that he understands that any false statements or concealment of a
material fact may be grounds for his prosecution and/or removal from Canada.
A.
The evidence submitted by the Minister
[40]
The Minister submitted several pieces of
evidence.
[41]
These include an affidavit sworn on December 18,
2014, by Professor Timothy Pau Longman, an expert on the Rwandan genocide.
Professor Longman attached to this affidavit his curriculum vitae, his expert
report and a signed certificate acknowledging that he had read and agreed to
abide by the code of conduct for expert witnesses.
[42]
Professor Longman holds a doctorate in political
science from the University of Wisconsin, and is the Director of the African
Studies Center and Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston
University. He conducted exhaustive research in Rwanda for Human Rights Watch and
the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues from November 1995 to
July 1996. He also published a book on the genocide, entitled Christianity
and Genocide in Rwanda. Professor Longman was recognized as an expert in
the criminal trial of Jacques Mungwarere in Canada (R v Mungwarere,
2013 ONSC 4594, [2013] OJ No 6123 [Mungwarere]) and that of Beatrice
Munyenyezi in the United States.
[43]
I have no hesitation in recognizing Professor
Longman as an expert on issues related to the Rwandan genocide, particularly
its origins and the nature of the conflict and the massacres that it engendered.
[44]
The report submitted by Professor Longman
includes a very useful historical summary that provides for understanding what
contributed to the genocide that took place in 1994. The report also sheds
light on the sociopolitical context that existed in Rwanda in the 1990s and
during the genocide, in which approximately 800,000 Rwandans, primarily
Tutsis and so-called moderate Hutus, were killed. In his report, Professor
Longman also offered a picture of the various organizations and key players in
the genocide, as well as the methods they used. Among others, he described the
roles of the MRND (a political party), the Interahamwe (the MRND’s militia) and
the civil defence committees. He also described how the genocide was
perpetrated in Rwanda generally, and in the prefecture of Butare in particular.
He explained the role of Butare’s security and civil defence committees.
[45]
The Minister further submitted an affidavit from
Mr. Rudy Exantus, an RCMP investigator. Beginning in August 2008, Mr. Exantus
worked as an investigator on the RCMP criminal investigation into the possible involvement
of the defendant in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Since 2011, Mr. Exantus has
also executed search warrants and conducted inquiries with regard to the
defendant at the request of the Department of Justice Crimes Against Humanity
and War Crimes Section.
[46]
In the context of his investigation and the
search warrants he executed, Mr. Exantus and his colleagues met with several
witnesses in Canada, Rwanda, Belgium and the Netherlands. In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus
explained several aspects of the investigation and summarized the statements
made by 21 witnesses in the interviews that he or his colleagues
conducted.
[47]
In the context of this proceeding, the Minister
submitted a redacted copy of Mr. Exantus’s affidavit, in which the names
of witnesses whose statements were reported in the affidavit were expunged.
[48]
On September 23, 2014, I granted the
Minister’s motion for order of confidentiality and rendered the order attached
to these reasons (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Célestin
Halindintwali, 2014 FC 909, [2014] FCJ No 1297). Under the terms of that
order, I ordered that the identity of persons interviewed by the RCMP during
its investigations into the defendant and referred to in Mr. Rudy Exantus’s
affidavit be declared confidential and that only a copy of the affidavit with
the names of those individuals expunged be placed in the Court’s public record.
I myself saw an unredacted version of the affidavit.
[49]
The Minister also submitted as evidence, through
Mr. Exantus’s affidavit, various documents from the Government of Burundi,
the Government of Rwanda and numerous academic institutions in Burundi and
Rwanda.
[50]
In particular, Mr. Exantus referred to the
affidavits of the following individuals, which were also submitted as evidence
through his affidavit:
- Stanislas
Ngombwa, principal of the Byimana School of Sciences;
- Emmanuel
Havugimana, academic registrar at the National University of Rwanda;
- Emma
Munganyinka, head of the archives of the Southern Province (formerly known
as the prefecture of Butare, in Rwanda);
- Emmanuel
Semahoro, documentalist in the Rwandan Ministry of Infrastructure
(Minifra), the successor to the Ministry of Public Services and Energy
(Minitrape);
- Alexis
Ntagungira, director of public management in the Rwandan Ministry of Public
Service and Labour.
[51]
Several pieces of evidence were presented
through these deponents.
[52]
Through Mr. Exantus’s affidavit, the
Minister also presented as evidence various exhibits and transcripts from legal
proceedings that had taken place before the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR), most notably in the prosecution of Colonel Nteziryayo (Case No. ICTR-98-42-T).
[53]
The Minister also submitted affidavits from the
following individuals:
- Emmanuel
Ntaconsanze, responsible for the civil status registers in the commune of
Maranga in Burundi;
- Donatien
Irangeza, director of the Matyazo primary school in the province of Ngozi
in Burundi;
- Sylvain
Nsengiyumva, director of Mwumba College in the province of Ngozi in
Burundi;
- M. Josée
Bigendako, head of student services at the University of Burundi in
Bujumbura.
[54]
The Minister submitted the stenographic notes from
an interview with the defendant that was conducted by RCMP investigators on
August 29, 2002.
[55]
The Minister also submitted certain documents
from the defendant’s immigration file, as well as the affidavits of Alexandra
Paslat, Aleksandra Wojciechowski and Francine Galarneau. Ms. Galarneau is
First Secretary (Immigration) at the Canadian High Commission in London. When
the defendant submitted his application for permanent residence, Ms. Galarneau
was a visa officer at the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi, Kenya. She
processed the defendant’s application for permanent residence.
[56]
I will now deal with the Minister’s two
principal allegations.
B.
Did the defendant make false representations or
knowingly conceal material circumstances with regard to the personal details
that he supplied and the allegations of persecution that he made?
[57]
In her sworn affidavit of June 12, 2014,
Ms. Galarneau explained the various stages involved in processing the
defendant’s application for permanent residence. Several exhibits are attached
to her affidavit, including the defendant’s permanent residence form and the
notes she entered in CAIPS, which was the electronic database in use at that
time in the visa offices of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. In
her affidavit, Ms. Galarneau indicated that notes could not be changed
once they had been recorded in CAIPS and that they were always followed by the
initials of the person who had made the entries. I am satisfied that the notes
entered in CAIPS that are attached to Ms. Galarneau’s affidavit are indeed
the notes that she recorded in the database when processing the defendant’s
residence application.
[58]
Ms. Galarneau stated that the defendant,
his wife and their daughter submitted an immigration application as “Convention
refugees seeking resettlement” and that in order to meet the requirements of
that class, they had to, among other things, meet the definition of “Convention
refugee”.
[59]
The defendant furnished a variety of details on
his form, including the following:
- He was born on
April 22, 1965, in Marangara, Burundi;
- He is a citizen
of Burundi;
- His wife, Marie
Solange Ingabire, was born on September 28, 1968, in Marangara,
Burundi;
- He was married
on October 13, 1993, in Marangara, Burundi;
- He attended
Matyazo primary school in Burundi from September 1972 to July 1978;
- He attended
Mwumba College in Burundi from September 1978 to July 1984;
- He attended the
University of Burundi in Bujumbura, Burundi, from October 1984 to
July 1988;
- He attended the
National University of Rwanda in Butare, Rwanda, from October 1988 to
September 1989;
- He was employed
by the Ministry of Public Services and Energy in Kigali, Rwanda, from
November 1989 to August 1993;
- He was employed
by the Ministry of Public Works and Equipment in Bujumbura, Burundi, from
October 1993 to March 1995;
- He lived in
Marangara, Burundi, from April 1965 to July 1988;
- He lived in the
Shyombo refugee camp in Butare, Rwanda, from August 1988 to November 1989;
- He lived in
Kigali, Rwanda, from November 1989 to August 1993;
- He lived in
Bujumbura, Burundi, from September 1993 to March 1995;
- He lived in the
Lukore camp in Tanzania from March to June 1995;
- He did not
mention any political or social organization of which he had been a member
or collaborator.
[60]
Ms. Galarneau met with the defendant and
his wife on February 5, 1996. During the interview, she reviewed with them
the information they had entered in their application for permanent residence
(APR), and they confirmed the accuracy of this information. At paragraph 16
of her affidavit, Ms. Galarneau recounts the story that she heard from the
defendant and his spouse:
[translation]
16. During the interview, Célestin
Halindintwali claimed that he was Hutu, and his wife said she was Tutsi. They
told me that their home in the Kamenge quarter in Bujumbura, Burundi, had been
burned down in March 1995 during an attack by Tutsi militia, supported by
the Burundian army. Their twin daughters died during that attack. They told me
of the difficulties faced by mixed couples in Burundi. I entered this
information in CAIPS on February 6, 1996, the day after the interview.
[61]
The notes that Ms. Galarneau entered in
CAIPS on February 6, 1996, read as follows:
[translation]
The claimant is Burundian. Copy of identity
cards for him and his wife attest to this fact.
Married, one child born in December 1995.
He is Hutu, she is Tutsi. Were living in the Kamenge quarter of Bujumbura when
their house was burned down in March 1995. Six people who were inside the
house died in the fire, which had been set by Tutsi militia supported by the
army. Among the victims were the applicants’ twin daughters, who had been born
in 1993. The claimant and his wife were visiting friends when these events took
place. They never returned home. Neighbours told them that the victims’ bodies
had been placed in a truck and taken away by the militia.
The claimant is an engineer by training
(degree from the University of Rwanda, where he lived in 1993) and worked for
the Ministry of Public Services.
The claimants left Burundi in March 1995
and travelled to the Lukore camp in Tanzania, which they left in June 1995.
The claimant lived in Rwanda, in a refugee
camp in Butare, between 1988 and 1989.
The wife’s parents are in Uvira, Zaire, living
in someone’s home, not a camp.
The claimants spoke of the difficulty and
insecurity for mixed couples.
. . .
[62]
At paragraph 17 of her affidavit, Ms. Galarneau
stated that based on the information provided by the defendant, she had
approved his application for permanent residence under the “Convention refugees
seeking resettlement” class as a CR1, or “government-assisted refugee”. She
stated that refugees who obtained a Quebec selection certificate were
considered as such.
[63]
However, the evidence shows, on a balance of
probabilities, that several of the details supplied by the defendant in the
context of his application for permanent residence were inaccurate.
(1)
Place of birth
[64]
The Minister contends that contrary to the
defendant’s statement to the effect that he was born on April 22, 1965, in
Marangara, Burundi, the defendant was in fact born in the Mukindo sector of the
Kibayi commune in the prefecture of Butare, Rwanda.
[65]
The evidence submitted demonstrates that there
is no birth record in the civil status registers for the commune of Marangara
in Burundi that corresponds to a person with the defendant’s name who was born
on April 22, 1965, in Marandara (paragraph 8 of the affidavit sworn
by Emmanuel Ntaconsanze). In his interview with the RCMP in 2002, the defendant
continued to claim that he was born in Burundi. However, the evidence, which includes
a variety of documents, notably a birth certificate, documents from academic
institutions and government documents, tends to establish that the defendant
was born in the Mukindo sector in the commune of Kibayi, Rwanda.
(2)
Citizenship
[66]
The Minister maintains that at the time of his
application for permanent residence, the defendant held Rwandan citizenship,
and not Burundian as he claimed. The evidence, including a certificate of
identity and a staff information form from the Ministry of Public Services, Energy
and Water, as well as other documents from Rwandan government agencies, notably
a certificate of full identity, establishes that the defendant held Rwandan
citizenship when he applied for permanent residence.
(3)
Place of marriage
[67]
The Minister maintains that contrary to his
claims, the defendant did not marry Solange Ingabire in 1993 in Burundi, but
rather in 1995 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
[68]
On his Personal Information Form (PIF), the
defendant states that he was married on October 13, 1993, in Maranga,
Burundi. He gave different information during his interview with the RCMP, stating
that he was married in 1995 in Burundi. The evidence submitted shows that there
is no marriage certificate in the civil status registers for the commune of
Marangara attesting to a marriage taking place between the defendant and Marie
Solange Ingabire in Marangara on October 13, 1993 (paragraphs 9 and
10 of the affidavit sworn by Emmanuel Ntaconsanze). While the actual location
and date of the marriage remain unclear, all of the evidence indicates that the
defendant was not married in 1993 in Burundi.
(4)
Place of education
[69]
The Minister maintains that the defendant
falsely claimed to have gone to school in Burundi, with the exception of his
last year of university, when he attended the National University of Rwanda in
Butare. The evidence shows, however, that the defendant did not go to school in
Burundi, but rather in Rwanda.
[70]
The defendant made contradictory statements as
to where he attended school. In his PIF, he indicated that he attended primary
and secondary school in Burundi and had also gone to university in Burundi,
with the exception of his final year, when he studied in Rwanda. However, in
his interview with the RCMP, the defendant stated that he had attended the
RINDA primary school in Kibayi and had gone to high school in Butare and
Byimana, all of which are in Rwanda.
[71]
In his affidavit, Donatien Irangeza, director of
the Matyazo primary school (in Burundi) stated that there were no academic
records in the school’s archives for a person having the defendant’s name and a
birth date of April 22, 1965, and who attended the school from September 1972
to July 1978. In the margins of his affidavit, he added that the Matyazo school
did not even exist at the time that the defendant claimed to have studied there
(from September 1972 to July 1978) and that it had only opened its
doors in 1986.
[72]
In his affidavit, Sylvain Nsengiyumva, director
of Mwumba College in Burundi, stated that there were no academic records in the
college’s archives for a person having the defendant’s name and a birth date of
April 22, 1965, and who attended the institution between September 1978
and July 1984. In the margins of his affidavit, he added that the college
had opened its doors in 2004, and therefore did not exist at the time the
defendant claimed to have studied there.
[73]
In his affidavit, M. Josée Bigendako, head
of student services at the University of Burundi in Bujumbura, stated that
there were no academic records in the university’s archives for a person having
the defendant’s name and a birth date of April 22, 1965, and who attended the
university from October 1984 to July 1988.
[74]
Documents from academic institutions in Rwanda
show that the defendant studied at the Byimana College of Modern Humanities
from 1981 to 1985 and that previous to that, he had attended the Groupe
scolaire de Butare.
[75]
Documents from the office of the academic
registrar at the National University of Rwanda indicate that the defendant
attended the Butare campus of that university from 1985 to 1989 and earned a
degree in engineering from the Faculty of Applied Sciences in 1989.
(5)
Employment history
[76]
In his PIF, the defendant claimed to have worked
for the Ministry of Public Services and Energy in Kigali from November 1989
to August 1993 and for the Ministry of Public Works and Equipment in
Bujumbura, Burundi, from October 1993 to March 1995.
[77]
The defendant provided different information
when he was interviewed by the RCMP. He claimed to have begun working for
Minitrape in Butare in September 1990 and to have been transferred to
Kigali in February 1993. He added that he returned to work for Minitrape
in Butare in May 1994, before leaving Rwanda in July 1994.
[78]
However, the evidence, which is composed of
several documents from the Rwandan government, indicates that the defendant
worked continuously in Rwanda from 1989 to 1994. In addition, in his interview
with the RCMP investigators, the defendant claimed that he returned to Butare
in 1994.
(6)
Places of residence
[79]
In his PIF, the defendant stated that he had
lived in the province of Ngozi, in Burundi, from April 1965 to July 1988;
in the Shyombo refugee camp in Butare, from August 1988 to November 1989;
in Kigali, from November 1989 to August 1993; in Bujumbura, Burundi, from
September 1993 to March 1995, and in the Lukore camp in Tanzania from
March 1995 to June 1995.
[80]
However, the evidence shows that the defendant
resided in Rwanda from his date of birth on April 22, 1965, until his
flight from Rwanda in July 1994.
[81]
In his interview with the RCMP investigators,
the defendant claimed that he was born in Burundi and had moved to the city of
Kigali when he was a child. He also claimed to have rented a house in Buye when
he was working in Butare and to have left for Kigali in February 1993. He
said he returned to Butare in May 1994 and lived in a room at the Ibis
hotel. He said he left Rwanda to go to Burundi in July 1994, before
leaving for Tanzania.
(7)
Events that took place in Burundi
[82]
As I have already mentioned, the defendant
claimed that he was Hutu and that his wife was Tutsi. In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus
stated that according to the documents obtained from teaching institutions in
Rwanda, the defendant’s wife is also Rwandan, and a Hutu like him.
[83]
In his interview with the RCMP, the defendant
made no mention of the alleged events in Burundi. He did not mention the fire
or the death of his twin daughters. According to statements he made during the
interview, the defendant was not even in Bujumbura in 1995: he stated that he
went to Marangara, Burundi, after fleeing Rwanda in July 1994, but
indicated that he had only stayed there for three months before departing for
Tanzania. He also said that they fled Rwanda in July 1994 because [translation] “[we] were not welcome” in Rwanda after the change of
power and because the [translation] “war was coming”. Therefore,
according to the defendant’s own statements during the interview, the defendant
was not in Bujumbura when the events recounted in the application for refugee
protection would have taken place.
[84]
I therefore find that the evidence establishes
that the defendant made false representations with regard to several personal
details and that he knowingly concealed material circumstances pertaining to
his personal information in the context of his application for permanent
residence. I will return later to the consequences of those false
representations.
C.
Did the defendant make false representations and
did he knowingly omit material circumstances when he indicated that he had not
committed or participated in war crimes or crimes against humanity?
[85]
In section 25 of the form, the applicant
must indicate the names of political and social organizations, professional
associations and youth or student movements of which he has been a member since
his 18th birthday. The defendant did not indicate anything in this section.
[86]
In section 27F of the form, the defendant
answered “no” to the question as to whether he had ever participated in a war crime
or a crime against humanity.
[87]
To determine whether the Minister’s allegations
are founded, the Court must determine whether the evidence proves, on a balance
of probabilities, that the defendant committed or participated in a crime
against humanity by collaborating in the Rwandan genocide in 1994.
[88]
At the time of the defendant’s application for
permanent residence, a crime against humanity was defined in subsections 7(3.76)
and 7(3.77) of the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C‑46. Sections 21
and 22 of that Act defined what was meant by being a party to an offence:
7.
(3.76) For the purposes of this section,
. . .
“crime against humanity” means murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is
committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of
persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at
the time and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and in
that place, constitutes a contravention of customary international law or
conventional international law or is criminal according to the general
principles of law recognized by the community of nations;
. . .
(3.77) In the definitions “crime against humanity” and “war crime”
in subsection (3.76), “act or omission” includes, for greater certainty,
attempting or conspiring to commit, counselling any person to commit, aiding
or abetting any person in the commission of, or being an accessory after the
fact in relation to, an act or omission.
. . .
Parties to offence
21. (1) Every one is a party to an
offence who
(a) actually commits it;
(b) does or omits to do anything for the purpose of aiding
any person to commit it; or
(c) abets any person in committing it.
Common intention
(2) Where two or more persons form an intention in common to carry
out an unlawful purpose and to assist each other therein and any one of them,
in carrying out the common purpose, commits an offence, each of them who knew
or ought to have known that the commission of the offence would be a probable
consequence of carrying out the common purpose is a party to that offence.
Person counselling offence
22. (1) Where a person counsels
another person to be a party to an offence and that other person is
afterwards a party to that offence, the person who counselled is a party to
that offence, notwithstanding that the offence was committed in a way
different from that which was counselled.
Idem
(2) Every one who counsels another person to be a party to an
offence is a party to every offence that the other commits in consequence of
the counselling that the person who counselled knew or ought to have known
was likely to be committed in consequence of the counselling.
Definition of “counsel”
(3) For the purposes of this Act, “counsel” includes procure,
solicit or incite.
|
7.
(3.76) Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent au présent
article.
[. . .]
« crime contre l’humanité » Assassinat, extermination, réduction
en esclavage, déportation, persécution ou autre fait — acte ou omission —
inhumain d’une part, commis contre une population civile ou un groupe
identifiable de personnes — qu’il ait ou non constitué une transgression du
droit en vigueur à l’époque et au lieu de la perpétration — et d’autre part,
soit constituant, à l’époque et dans ce lieu, une transgression du droit
international coutumier ou conventionnel, soit ayant un caractère criminel d’après
les principes généraux de droit reconnus par l’ensemble des nations.
[. . .]
(3.77) Sont assimilés à un fait, aux définitions de « crime contre
l’humanité » et « crime de guerre », au paragraphe 3.76, la tentative, le
complot, la complicité après le fait, le conseil, l’aide ou l’encouragement à
l’égard du fait.
[…]
Participants à une infraction
21. (1)
Participent à une infraction :
a)
quiconque la commet réellement;
b)
quiconque accomplit ou omet d’accomplir quelque chose en vue d’aider quelqu’un
à la commettre;
c)
quiconque encourage quelqu’un à la commettre.
Intention commune
(2) Quand deux ou plusieurs personnes forment ensemble le projet
de poursuivre une fin illégale et de s’y entraider et que l’une d’entre elles
commet une infraction en réalisant cette fin commune, chacune d’elles qui
savait ou devait savoir que la réalisation de l’intention commune aurait pour
conséquence probable la perpétration de l’infraction, participe à cette
infraction.
Personne qui conseille à une autre de commettre une infraction
22. (1)
Lorsqu’une personne conseille à une autre personne de participer à une
infraction et que cette dernière y participe subséquemment, la personne qui a
conseillé participe à cette infraction, même si l’infraction a été commise d’une
manière différente de celle qui avait été conseillée.
Idem
(2) Quiconque conseille à une autre personne de participer à une
infraction participe à chaque infraction que l’autre commet en conséquence du
conseil et qui, d’après ce que savait ou aurait dû savoir celui qui a
conseillé, était susceptible d’être commise en conséquence du conseil.
Définitions de « conseiller » et de « conseil »
(3) Pour l’application
de la présente loi, « conseiller » s’entend d’amener et d’inciter, et «
conseil » s’entend de l’encouragement visant à amener ou à inciter.
|
[89]
In Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, at paragraph 119, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 100 [Mugesera],
the Supreme Court identified four elements that must be established for a
criminal act to be considered as a crime against humanity:
- An enumerated
proscribed act was committed. This involves showing that the accused
committed the criminal act and had the requisite guilty state of mind for
the underlying act;
- The act was
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack;
- The attack was
directed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of
persons; and
- The person
committing the proscribed act knew of the attack and knew or took the risk
that his or her act comprised a part of that attack.
[90]
In Ezokola v Canada (Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, at paragraph 91, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678 [Ezokola],
the Supreme Court enumerated six criteria to assist in assessing whether a
refugee claimant voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to a
crime or criminal purpose. They are the size and nature of the organization;
the part of the organization with which the person was most directly concerned;
the person’s duties and activities within the organization; the person’s
position or rank within the organization; the length of time the person was in
the organization; the method by which the person was recruited; and the person’s
opportunity to leave the organization.
[91]
The plaintiff claims that the criteria set out
in the Mugesera and Ezokola judgments have been met in this case
and that the evidence establishes that the defendant actively participated in
the genocide perpetrated in Rwanda, specifically in the prefecture of Butare. The
plaintiff contends that the defendant was one of the civil defence leaders,
that he was a member of the MRND and its Interahamwe militia and that he was
responsible for organizing the extermination of Tutsis in the prefecture of
Butare. The Minister’s specific allegations can be summarized as follows:
- The defendant
was a Minitrape supervisor in the prefecture of Butare and used that
ministry’s human and material resources to have mass graves dug, bodies
transported and victims of the genocide buried;
- The defendant
encouraged or forced Hutus to kill Tutsi civilians;
- The defendant
was involved in supervising and coordinating the construction of
barricades in the city of Butare and made a significant contribution to
the activities that took place at the barricades in the city of Butare;
- The defendant
provided logistical support to the Interahamwe militia and the civil
defence by transporting their armed men so they could help murder Tutsi
civilians;
- The defendant
served as a body guard and assistant to Colonel Nteziryayo, who was the
chief of civil defence for the prefecture of Butare and later the prefect
of Butare, and accompanied the colonel to various gatherings, meetings and
ceremonies, notably to the meeting held in Kibayi where the colonel
incited Hutus to exterminate Tutsi civilians.
[92]
The evidence submitted in support of the
Minister’s allegations is composed of a variety of documents, including
Professor Longman’s report.
[93]
As I have already indicated, Professor Longman’s
report provides a summary of the origins of the genocide and the people who
were involved, specifically in the prefecture of Butare. In his report,
Professor Longman explains how the Rwandan genocide was carried out, specifically
in the prefecture of Butare, as well as the role played by the civil defence
and the MRND and its Interahamwe militia. Professor Longman’s report
establishes the role of the civil defence and of the MRND and its militia in
the genocide. It also describes the role of Colonel Alphonse Nteziryayo
(found guilty of genocide by the ICTR), who lived with an Interahamwe group at
the Ibis hotel, in Butare. It also refers to the “Amanama Y’Urubyiruko”
document, which lists the members of the civil defence committee. However,
Professor Longman’s report does not specifically mention the defendant by name,
and does not establish the defendant’s participation in the Rwandan genocide.
[94]
In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus presented as
evidence a number of exhibits that were submitted to the ICTR. In particular, Mr. Exantus
presented as evidence the document “Amanama Y’Urubyiruko” and the stenographic
notes from the testimony of Sylvain Nsabimana and Pauline Nyiramashuko in the
trial of Colonel Nteziryayo before the ICTR.
[95]
I consider the certified documents from the ICTR
to be admissible as evidence under the authority of section 23 of the Canada
Evidence Act, RSC 1985, c C-5. In my opinion, although the ICTR is not
a court of a “foreign country”, it can be likened to an international court of
several countries, and there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the
documents in question because the copies included in the file were certified by
the ICTR. The ICTR was created through Resolution 955 (1994) of the United
Nations Security Council, acting pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations. Decisions of the Security Council are binding, and Member
States of the United Nations must comply with them. Canada has recognized the
ICTR since its creation and maintained an ongoing cooperative relationship with
it (see Oberlander v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 330, at para 14,
[2009] FCJ No 1451, citing the Canada’s War Crimes Program, Annual
Report 2000‑2001). The ICTR is a “designated” extradition
partner pursuant to the Extradition Act, SC 1999, c 18. Moreover,
Canadian courts have cited ICTR case law (see, for example, Mugesera, above,
at paras 84‑89, 102, 126, 143-147; Mungwarere, above, at para 36;
Munyaneza v R, 2014 QCCA 906, at paras 26, 32, 156-157, 168, 200,
255, [2014] QJ No 3059).
[96]
In the alternative, the stenographic notes from
the hearings before the ICTR and the exhibits submitted to that tribunal can be
admitted pursuant to the rules of the Civil Code of Québec (CCQ). Section
40 of the Canada Evidence Act provides that the laws of evidence in
force in the province in which the proceedings are taken apply on a suppletive
basis. In this case, the proceedings were instituted in Quebec. Moreover, the
second paragraph of article 2822 of the CCQ provides that a copy of a
document of which the foreign public office is the depositary makes proof of
its conformity to the original. The exhibits from the ICTR are certified
copies.
[97]
The document entitled “Amanama Y’ Urubyiruko”
contains the names of individuals who were members of the civil defence organizing
committee. A person with the same name as the defendant is listed as a member
of the MRND and of the civil defence organizing committee. This document was
submitted to the ICTR and is admissible as evidence.
[98]
The Minister also submitted the transcripts from
the testimony of Pauline Nyiramashuko and Sylvain Nsabimana before the ICTR.
They stated that they had received the document entitled “Amanama Y’
Urubyiruko” in May 1994. In the context of this proceeding, these are statements
by individuals who neither testified nor produced an affidavit. However, these statements
can be admitted as evidence if the criteria of necessity and reliability
codified in article 2879 of the CCQ are met.
[99]
Article 2870 of the CCQ maintains the common
law principles related to the admissibility of out-of-court-statements and
codifies the requirements of necessity and reliability. It reads as follows:
2870. A statement made by a person who
does not appear as a witness, concerning facts to which he could have legally
testified, is admissible as testimony on application and after notice is
given to the adverse party, provided the court authorizes it.
The court shall, however, ascertain that it is impossible for the
declarant to appear as a witness, or that it is unreasonable to require him
to do so, and that the reliability of the statement is sufficiently
guaranteed by the circumstances in which it is made.
Reliability is
presumed to be sufficiently guaranteed with respect in particular to documents
drawn up in the ordinary course of business of an enterprise, to documents
entered in a register required by law to be kept, and spontaneous statements
that are contemporaneous to the occurrence of the facts.
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2870.
La déclaration faite par une personne qui ne comparaît pas comme témoin, sur
des faits au sujet desquels elle aurait pu légalement déposer, peut être
admise à titre de témoignage, pourvu que, sur demande et après qu’avis en ait
été donné à la partie adverse, le tribunal l’autorise.
Celui-ci doit cependant s’assurer qu’il est impossible d’obtenir
la comparution du déclarant comme témoin, ou déraisonnable de l’exiger, et
que les circonstances entourant la déclaration donnent à celle-ci des
garanties suffisamment sérieuses pour pouvoir s’y fier.
Sont présumés présenter ces garanties, notamment, les documents
établis dans le cours des activités d’une entreprise et les documents insérés
dans un registre dont la tenue est exigée par la loi, de même que les
déclarations spontanées et contemporaines de la survenance des faits.
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[100] To be admissible therefore, the statements of individuals who do not
appear as witnesses must satisfy the criteria of necessity and reliability. Jean-Claude
Royer summarizes the purpose of those criteria as follows (page 569):
[translation]
With a view to rationalization, doctrine and
case law have identified two criteria justifying exceptions to the prohibition
on hearsay: necessity and reliability. The criterion of necessity is related to
society’s interest in discovering the truth. It also guarantees that the
evidence presented in court will be in the best possible form, normally through
viva voce testimony by the author of the statement. The criterion of
reliability, meanwhile, is intended to ensure the integrity of the judicial
process. Indeed, given that the main problem with hearsay is the impossibility
of verifying the accuracy of the statement, the criterion of reliability
identifies cases that provide for avoiding the risk.
[101] In this case, the criterion of necessity is satisfied because the
two witnesses are not available: they were found guilty by the ICTR, but their
appeal before that tribunal is pending. The criterion of reliability is also
satisfied because the declarations were made under oath in a judicial proceeding,
providing a sufficiently serious guarantee of reliability (see Jean-Claude
Royer and Sophie Lavallée, La preuve civile, 4th ed. (Cowansville :
Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) at pp 534-535, 577-578 [Royer]; R v Khelawon,
2006 SCC 57, at paras 79-80, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787).
[102] The statements of Ms. Nyiramashuko and Mr. Nsabimana were
submitted in order to introduce the document entitled “Amanama Y’ Urubyiruko”. This
document contains a list of names, but no other details with regard to the
individuals named. Although this document was filed with the ICTR and is
admissible as evidence, it is not sufficient in itself to establish that the
defendant is indeed named in it, nor to establish the defendant’s membership in
the MRND or the civil defence.
[103] In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus also referred to two books that
were written about the Rwandan genocide and that mention the defendant’s name. Mr
Exantus referred to the book Leave None to Tell the Story by Alison Des
Forges, in which Célestin Halindintwali is cited as being one of the organizers
of the massacres that preceded the official establishment of the civil defence,
and as a participant in those massacres. He also referred to the book: Rwanda
1994 : Les politiques du génocide à Butare written by André
Guichaoua, which indicates that Célestin Halindintwali was a close collaborator
of Colonel Nteziryayo and that he was responsible for recovering and burying
bodies. With respect, the fact that a person who has the same name as the
defendant is mentioned in two books does not establish that it is indeed the
defendant, and does not constitute evidence of his participation in the
genocide.
[104] In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus also summarized several
statements by 21 witnesses that had been gathered either by Mr. Exantus
himself or by other investigators in the context of the RCMP investigation into
the defendant. These people witnessed a number of events that the Minister is
invoking as indications of the defendant’s participation in the genocide. The
witnesses in question did not all report the same things, but there is a
certain similarity among some of the comments, and they all refer to the
defendant’s actions. This is the only evidence submitted by the Minister with
regard to specific activities of the defendant during the genocide.
[105] The affidavit of Mr. Exantus is admissible as evidence, but
that does not necessarily render admissible all of the elements to which it
refers. An affidavit is written testimony that replaces the oral testimony of a
witness, but that testimony must satisfy all of the criteria and rules of
evidence that apply to oral testimony (Royer, above, at p 565).
[106] The witness statements reported by Mr. Exantus are out-of-court
statements that constitute hearsay because they are reported to establish the
truth of their content. The admissibility of these statements must be analyzed
in light of the criteria of necessity and reliability set out in article 2870
of the CCQ.
[107] The fact that it is impossible or unreasonable to have witnesses
appear cannot be presumed. The Minister must therefore establish that it was
impossible or unreasonable in the circumstances to call the witnesses to appear.
He must also convince the Court that the circumstances in which the
out-of-court statements were made allow for confirming the reliability of their
content. I find that the Minister has not met this burden.
[108] First, the affidavit of Mr. Exantus does not contain any
explanation of the circumstances that would lead the Court to conclude that it
was impossible or unreasonable to obtain and submit affidavits from the
witnesses whose statements are reported. Mr. Exantus simply explains that
the witnesses were met with in different countries, notably Canada, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Rwanda.
[109] In his brief, the Minister mentions that all the witnesses who would
be called to testify, if there were a proceeding, live abroad and that the
effort to obtain affidavits from these witnesses would have been prohibitive in
the context of an uncontested proceeding. I find that explanation insufficient.
[110] As I already indicated, a proceeding by default does not lessen the
Minister’s burden of proof, nor reduce the responsibility of the Court. The
Minister must establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant
committed or participated in crimes against humanity. In the context of a default
proceeding, the plaintiff presents its evidence by affidavit, unless the Court
decides otherwise. This does not absolve the plaintiff from presenting the best
possible evidence, which must also be admissible.
[111] Furthermore, the Minister was able to produce affidavits from nine
individuals living in Burundi and Rwanda to establish that the defendant had
made a number of false statements with regard to his personal details. I do not
see how it would have been too onerous to obtain affidavits from the witnesses,
or at least from some of them, to establish the defendant’s participation in
the genocide. The witness statements that were reported in Mr. Exantus’s
affidavit constitute the bulk of the evidence submitted by the Minister with
regard to the defendant’s direct participation in the genocide. The allegations
of crimes against humanity are serious and require reliable proof. The evidence
does not establish in what way it would have been impossible or prohibitive to
obtain affidavits from these individuals.
[112] Furthermore, I do not consider the criterion of reliability to have
been met either. First, Mr. Exantus did not meet all the witnesses himself,
and he does not specify how many of them he did meet. Nor does he provide the
names of the other investigators who met with some of the witnesses. Mr. Exantus
claims that he read the contents of the statements made to the other
investigators, but the Court does not have at its disposal the reports of those
other investigators or the complete statements of the witnesses. The affidavit
of Mr. Exantus refers to certain statements by witnesses, but, in my
opinion, the context in which those statements were obtained is not
sufficiently detailed to provide a sufficient guarantee of reliability.
[113] The Minister has therefore not convinced me that the criteria of
necessity and reliability justify the admissibility of the witness statements referred
to in Mr. Exantus’s affidavit with regard to the defendant’s participation
in the genocide.
[114] I note that our Court adopted an even more conservative position in a
reference for revocation by refusing to admit direct affidavits from deceased
or mentally incompetent witnesses who had been interviewed by the RCMP (Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Bogutin (1997), 136 FTR
40, [1997] FCJ No 1310). The Court ruled that the affidavits were neither
necessary nor reliable, preferring the viva voce testimony of other
witnesses. In this case, even in the context of a judgment by default, I find
that the statements reported in Mr. Exantus’s affidavit do not meet the
criteria of necessity and reliability.
[115] Even if I had decided to admit the out-of-court statements of the
witnesses met by Mr. Exantus and other colleagues, I would have accorded
little probative value to that evidence. I feel it is insufficient to rely on
hearsay evidence to support a conclusion that a person committed a crime
against humanity when the Minister has not convinced the Court that it would
have been impossible or unreasonable to produce better evidence. Rule 81
of the Rules provides as follows:
Content of affidavits
81. (1) Affidavits shall be confined to facts within the deponent’s
personal knowledge except on motions, other than motions for summary judgment
or summary trial, in which statements as to the deponent’s belief, with the
grounds for it, may be included.
Affidavits on belief
(2) Where an affidavit is made on belief, an adverse inference may
be drawn from the failure of a party to provide evidence of persons having
personal knowledge of material facts.
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Contenu
81. (1) Les affidavits se limitent aux faits dont le déclarant a
une connaissance personnelle, sauf s’ils sont présentés à l’appui d’une
requête – autre qu’une requête en jugement sommaire ou en procès sommaire –
auquel cas ils peuvent contenir des déclarations fondées sur ce que le
déclarant croit être les faits, avec motifs à l’appui.
Poids de l’affidavit
(2) Lorsqu’un affidavit contient des déclarations fondées sur ce
que croit le déclarant, le fait de ne pas offrir le témoignage de personnes
ayant une connaissance personnelle des faits substantiels peut donner lieu à
des conclusions défavorables.
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[116] The Court does not hesitate to accord little weight to an affidavit
reporting hearsay evidence (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)
v Huntley, 2010 FC 1175, at para 270, [2010] FCJ No 1453; Seymour
Stephens v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 609, at
para 30, [2013] FCJ No 639; Tataskweyak Cree First Nation v Sinclair,
2007 FC 1107, at para 26, [2007] FCJ No 1429).
[117] The other evidence submitted by the Minister, including the statements
made by the defendant in his interview with the RCMP (among other things, he
admitted that he was in Butare in 1994, that he knew Colonel Nteziryayo and
that he lived in the Ibis hotel), are not sufficient to conclude, on a balance
of probabilities, that the defendant committed a crime or crimes against
humanity, and therefore, that he lied in that regard when he filled out his
application for permanent residence.
[118] This finding does not alter my finding with regard to the false
declarations and the knowing concealment by the defendant of material
circumstances related to the personal details that he provided in support of
his application for permanent residence.
D.
Conclusions
[119] I find, based on the evidence submitted by the Minister, that in the
context of his application for permanent residence, the defendant lied and
knowingly concealed material circumstances. I am convinced, based on a balance
of probabilities, that the defendant made numerous false declarations with
regard to the personal details that he provided in the context of his
application for permanent residence, such as his place of birth and marriage,
his citizenship, his place of residence and his employment history, and that he
completely fabricated a story of persecution.
[120] The case law does not require that the Minister prove that had it
not been for the false declarations and the knowing failure to disclose
material circumstances, the application for permanent residence would have been
rejected. I therefore do not have to rule in that regard. The Minister was
nevertheless required to prove that the defendant’s false declarations and
failure to disclose material circumstances had the effect of foreclosing or
averting further inquiries, and the Minister’s evidence has so convinced me.
[121] I am convinced that in this case, the defendant’s false
representations prevented Canadian immigration authorities from continuing to
collect information and undertaking a more in-depth inquiry before approving
the defendant’s application for permanent residence.
[122] The defendant’s false representations, as well as the important
information that he concealed, concerned significant elements pertaining to his
admissibility as a “Convention refugee seeking resettlement”. The defendant
concealed his Rwandan nationality and invented a story of persecution in
Burundi, when he was in fact in Rwanda.
[123] In her affidavit, Ms. Galarneau, who processed the defendant’s
permanent residence application, stated that had the defendant and his wife
declared themselves to be Rwandan, she would not have approved their
application for permanent residence because they claimed to be afraid of persecution
in Burundi, and not in Rwanda. If they had admitted to being Rwandan, they
would therefore not have met the definition of Convention refugee, which
requires demonstration of a well-founded fear of persecution in the country of nationality.
[124] Ms. Galarneau also stated that at the time of the defendant’s
application for permanent residence, Canadian authorities in the embassy in
Nairobi, Kenya, were conducting rigorous checks of visa applicants who were
originally from Rwanda in order to prevent anyone who had participated in the
genocide from settling in Canada. She stated that had the defendant declared
himself to be Rwandan, she would have questioned him in order to determine where
he was and what he had been doing during the genocide. Ms. Galarneau
indicated that in claiming to be from Burundi, the defendant avoided being
questioned with regard to his activities during the genocide.
[125] I am also convinced, on a balance of probabilities, that the
defendant’s false representations and failure to mention material circumstances
were made knowingly. These are not innocent misrepresentations or inadvertent
omissions. The defendant’s false representations concerned pretty much all of
the information he submitted in support of his application, both in terms of
personal details and his allegations of persecution. I am therefore convinced,
on a balance of probabilities, that the defendant made false representations
with the intention of misleading Canadian authorities in the context of his
application for Canadian residence.
[126] In my opinion, the defendant’s conduct corresponds to the three
types of conduct referred to in section 10 of the Act. I therefore find
that the defendant obtained permanent residence by false representation and
fraud and by knowingly concealing material circumstances.
[127] Therefore, through subsection 10(2) of the Act, the defendant
is deemed to have obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation and
fraud and by concealing material circumstances.
JUDGMENT
THE COURT’S
JUDGMENT IS that the
defendant, Célestin Halindintwali, obtained Canadian citizenship through fraud
or false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances,
within the meaning of paragraph 18(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act.
“Marie-Josée Bédard”
Certified true translation
Johanna Kratz,
Translator
Docket:
T-1952-13
Citation:
2014 FC 909
[UNREVISED ENGLISH CERTIFIED TRANSLATION]
Montréal, Quebec, September 23, 2014
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Bédard
BETWEEN:
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Plaintiff
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and
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CÉLESTIN HALINDINTWALI
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Defendant
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ORDER AND REASONS
[1]
This is a motion for order of confidentiality
filed by the plaintiff in the action brought under section 18(1)(b) of
the Citizenship Act, RSC, 1985, c C-29 (the Act). The purpose of the
action is to have the Court declare that the person obtained Canadian
citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing
material circumstances.
[2]
For the reasons that follow, this motion for
confidentiality is granted.
I.
Background
[3]
The defendant became a permanent resident of
Canada on July 22, 1997, and obtained Canadian citizenship on June 21, 2001.
The plaintiff contends that the defendant made false representations when he
applied for permanent residency in order to hide from Canadian authorities his
participation in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and that he completely
fabricated his account in order to be admitted in to Canada as a refugee.
[4]
The Act (in force as of June 6, 2013) provides a
procedure that enables the Governor in Council to make an order revoking a
person’s citizenship if he is satisfied that the person obtained citizenship by
false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances. The Governor in Council’s power in this respect is provided in
section 10 of the Act, which reads as follows:
Order in
cases of fraud
10. (1) Subject to section 18 but notwithstanding any other
section of this Act, where the Governor in Council, on a report from the
Minister, is satisfied that any person has obtained, retained, renounced or
resumed citizenship under this Act by false representation or fraud or by
knowingly concealing material circumstances,
(a) the person ceases to be a citizen, or
(b) the renunciation of citizenship by the person shall be deemed
to have had no effect,
as of such date as may be fixed by order of the Governor in
Council with respect thereto.
Presumption
(2) A person shall be deemed to have obtained citizenship by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances if
the person was lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances
and, because of that admission, the person subsequently obtained citizenship.
1974-75-76, c.
108, s. 9.
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Décret en
cas de fraude
10. (1) Sous réserve du seul article 18, le gouverneur en conseil
peut, lorsqu’il est convaincu, sur rapport du ministre, que l’acquisition, la
conservation ou la répudiation de la citoyenneté, ou la réintégration dans
celle-ci, est intervenue sous le régime de la présente loi par fraude ou au
moyen d’une fausse déclaration ou de la dissimulation intentionnelle de faits
essentiels, prendre un décret aux termes duquel l’intéressé, à compter de la
date qui y est fixée :
a) soit perd sa citoyenneté;
b) soit est réputé ne pas avoir répudié sa citoyenneté.
Présomption
(2) Est réputée avoir acquis la citoyenneté par fraude, fausse
déclaration ou dissimulation intentionnelle de faits essentiels la personne
qui l’a acquise à raison d’une admission légale au Canada à titre de résident
permanent obtenue par l’un de ces trois moyens.
1974-75-76, ch.
108, art. 9.
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[5]
As set out in subsection 10(1), the Governor in
Council acts after receiving a report from the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration (the Minister). However, under section 18 of the Act, the
Minister must give notice of his intention to submit a report to the Governor
in Council recommending that citizenship be revoked to the person in respect of
whom the report is to be made. That person may then request that the matter be
referred to the Federal Court, which will determine whether there has been
false representation, fraud or knowing concealment of material circumstances.
When the person concerned requests that the matter be referred to the Court,
the Minister must wait for the Court’s decision before submitting his report to
the Governor in Council. If the Court decides that citizenship has been
obtained by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material
circumstances, he may then submit his report recommending that the Governor in
Council revoke the person’s citizenship.
[6]
Section 18, which governs this process, reads as
follows:
Notice to
person in respect of revocation
18(1) The Minister shall not make a report under section
10 unless the Minister has given notice of his intention to do so to the
person in respect of whom the report is made and
(a) that person does not, within thirty days after the day on
which the notice is sent, request that the Minister refer the case to the
Court; or
(b) that person does so request and the Court decides that the
person has obtained, retained, renounced or resumed citizenship by false
representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances.
Nature of
notice
(2) The notice referred to in subsection (1) shall state that the
person in respect of whom the report is to be made may, within thirty days
after the day on which the notice is sent to him, request that the Minister
refer the case to the Court, and such notice is sufficient if it is sent by
registered mail to the person at his latest known address.
Decision final
(3) A decision of the Court made under subsection (1) is final
and, notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament, no appeal lies therefrom.
1974-75-76, c. 108, s. 17.
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Avis
préalable à l’annulation
18. (1) Le ministre ne peut procéder à l’établissement du rapport
mentionné à l’article 10 sans avoir auparavant avisé l’intéressé de son
intention en ce sens et sans que l’une ou l’autre des conditions suivantes ne
se soit réalisée :
a) l’intéressé n’a pas, dans les trente jours suivant la date
d’expédition de l’avis, demandé le renvoi de l’affaire devant la Cour;
b) la Cour, saisie de l’affaire, a décidé qu’il y avait eu fraude,
fausse déclaration ou dissimulation intentionnelle de faits essentiels.
Nature de
l’avis
(2) L’avis prévu at paragraphe (1) doit spécifier la faculté qu’a
l’intéressé, dans les trente jours suivant sa date d’expédition, de demander
au ministre le renvoi de l’affaire devant la Cour. La communication de l’avis
peut se faire par courrier recommandé envoyé à la dernière adresse connue de
l’intéressé.
Caractère
définitif de la décision
(3) La décision
de la Cour visée au paragraphe (1) est définitive et, par dérogation à toute
autre loi fédérale, non susceptible d’appel.
1974-75-76, ch.
108, art. 17.
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[7]
On June 6, 2013, the plaintiff sent a notice to
the defendant informing him of his intention to recommend that the Governor in
Council revoke his citizenship pursuant to section 18 of the Act.
[8]
On June 21, 2013, the defendant, through his
counsel, requested that the matter be referred to the Court.
II.
History of this
proceeding and default proceedings
[9]
The plaintiff filed his statement of claim with
the Registry of the Court on November 27, 2013. The defendant was served
with the statement of claim pursuant to Rule 128(1)(b) of the Federal
Courts Rules SOR/98-106 (the Rules). In accordance with Rule 128(2),
service of the statement of claim on the defendant was effective on December
20, 2013, and the defendant had 30 days to challenge the action by serving
and filing his statement of defence (Rule 204). The 30‑day period,
taking into account the holiday period, ended on February 5, 2014, and the
defendant had not served or filed his statement of defence.
[10]
The plaintiff made many enquiries to ensure that
the defendant had not inadvertently failed to file his statement of defence.
Counsel for the plaintiff tried unsuccessfully to contact counsel for the
defendant by telephone and left him messages that were never returned. On
February 28, 2014, counsel for the plaintiff sent a letter by fax to
counsel for the defendant informing him that unless he received some reply by
March 10, 2014, he intended to file a motion for a default judgment.
Rule 210 of the Rules authorizes and provides for default proceedings when
a defendant fails to serve and file a statement of defence within the time set
out in Rule 204.
[11]
On June 16, 2014, the Court sent the parties a
Notice of Status Review. On June 27, 2014, the plaintiff filed written
submissions in reply to the Notice of Status Review. In his submissions, the
plaintiff informed the Court that he intended to file a motion for
confidentiality and a motion for default judgment.
[12]
On August 8, 2014, Prothonotary Morneau
ordered that the proceeding continue as a specially managed proceeding.
Moreover, given the importance of the case and although it is not required
under the Rules because the defendant had not filed a statement of defence,
Prothonotary Morneau ordered the plaintiff to serve on the defendant a
copy of the order as well as copies of the motions for confidentiality and
default judgment. In this case, this is a precaution to ensure that the
defendant truly chose to not participate in this hearing.
[13]
The evidence establishes that Mr. Morneau’s
order and the plaintiff’s two motions were served on defendant, in accordance
with Rule 140 of the Rules, on August 12, 2014. I am thus satisfied
that this motion for confidentiality may proceed by default.
III.
The motion for
confidentiality
[14]
In this case, the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant made several misrepresentations in the permanent residence
application that he filed in 1995 and knowingly concealed material
circumstances. More specifically, the plaintiff submits that the defendant falsely
stated that he had never committed a crime against humanity, whereas the
defendant, he claims, participated in the perpetration of crimes against
humanity against the Tutsi people during the Rwandan genocide. The plaintiff
also submits that the defendant lied about his country of nationality, place of
birth, where he had studied, his employment history, his marriage and his
grounds for his fear of persecution.
[15]
In support of his motion for default judgment,
and to adduce evidence of fraud and concealment of information, the plaintiff
filed the affidavit of Rudy Exantus, a police officer with the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP). Mr. Exantus is currently assigned to the RCMP Sensitive
and International Investigations Unit, but from July 2001 to 2012, he was
assigned to the RCMP War Crimes Unit.
[16]
As part of his work, starting in August 2008,
Mr. Exantus participated in a criminal investigation into the possible
involvement of the defendant in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Since 2011, he has
also completed research and investigation mandates regarding the procedure for
revoking the defendant’s citizenship, on the request of the Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes Section of the Department of Justice.
[17]
In his affidavit, Mr. Exantus stated that he had
personally interviewed witnesses as part of the criminal investigation and the
investigation related to the process to revoke the defendant’s citizenship. He
also stated that he was aware of statements obtained by colleagues who had also
participated in the investigations. Mr. Exantus stated that as part of these
investigations many people (the affidavit refers to the testimony of
20 witnesses) were interviewed in Canada, Rwanda, Belgium and Holland.
These people allegedly witnessed, in different respects, the defendant’s
participation in the genocide in the Butare prefecture between April and July
1994.
[18]
Mr. Exantus’ affidavit addresses statements
allegedly made by the people that were interviewed.
[19]
The version of Mr. Exantus’ affidavit filed
in Court identifies the witnesses by pseudonyms and has some portions that are
redacted.
[20]
The plaintiff submits that the safety of the
witnesses interviewed as part of the investigations and whose statements are
reported in Mr. Exantus’ affidavit, could be compromised if their identity
were disclosed publicly. That is the reason why the plaintiff and
Mr. Exantus identified the witnesses by pseudonyms. The plaintiff also
submits that the redacted excerpts of the affidavit contain and are limited to
information that would be likely to identify the people who made the
statements.
[21]
Through the motion for confidentiality, the
plaintiff thus seeks to preserve the confidentiality of the identities of the
witnesses who were interviewed and whose statements are recounted or summarized
in Mr. Exantus’ affidavit. The plaintiff is willing to file an unredacted
copy of the affidavit but asks that it be declared confidential and that the
redacted copy be the only copy placed in the Court’s public file.
IV.
Analysis
[22]
It is well known that one of the foundations of
our legal system is the open court principle. In principle, Court proceedings
are public as are Court files, pleadings and evidence entered in the Court
record. These principles are clearly reflected in subsections 26(1) and 29(1)
of the Rules. Nonetheless, there are recognized exceptions to the open court
principle.
[23]
Rule 151of the Rules sets out how motions
for confidentiality are dealt with and reads as follows:
Motion for
order of confidentiality
151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed
shall be treated as confidential.
Demonstrated
need for confidentiality
Before making an
order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material
should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in
open and accessible court proceedings.
|
Requête en
confidentialité
151. (1) The Court peut, sur requête, ordonner que des documents
ou éléments matériels qui seront déposés soient considérés comme
confidentiels.
Circonstances
justifiant la confidentialité
(2) Avant de
rendre une ordonnance en application du paragraphe (1), The Court doit être
convaincue de la nécessité de considérer les documents ou éléments matériels
comme confidentiels, étant donné l’intérêt du public à la publicité des
débats judiciaires.
|
[24]
Under Rule 151, before making an order of
confidentiality, the Court must be satisfied that the documents at issue should
be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and
accessible court proceedings. It is clear from Rule 151 and the
jurisprudence that confidentiality is an exception to the general open court
rule and it must be applied carefully and after thorough analysis.
[25]
In Sierra Club of Canada v Canada (Minister
of Finance), 2002 SCC 41, [2002] 2 SCR 522 (Sierra Club),
the Supreme Court set out the framework and the test to be applied by a court
hearing a motion for confidentiality. Thus, before making an order of
confidentiality, the Court must be satisfied that the need for preserving the
confidentiality of a document outweighs the public interest in open and
accessible Court proceedings. The Court reiterated and adapted to the context
of the case before it the two-branch test it had previously set out in other
decisions (Dagenais v Canadian Broadcasting Corp, [1994] 3 SCR 835,
1994 CanLII 39 (SCC) (Dagenais); Canadian Broadcasting Corp v
New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 SCR 480, 1996 CanLII
/84 (SCC); R v Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, [2001] 3 SCR 442) (Mentuck)).
The Court stated, at paragraph 53 (Sierra Club), a confidentiality order
should only be granted when the Court determines that
i. such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious
risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context
of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the
risk; and
ii. the salutary effects of the confidentiality order,
including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh
its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression,
which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court
proceedings.
[26]
The Court also reiterated that three elements
must be considered under the first branch of the test: (1) the risk in question
must be real and substantial, well grounded in the evidence; (2) the Court
should guard against protecting an excessive number of documents from
disclosure; and (3) the Court must consider whether reasonable alternatives to
a confidentiality order are available and restrict the order as much as is
reasonably possible (Sierra Club, paras 53-56).
[27]
In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v The Queen,
2011 SCC 3, [2011] 1 SCR 65 at para 13, the Court noted that the
analytical approach developed in Dagenais and Mentuck applies to
all discretionary decisions that affect the openness of proceedings.
[28]
These principles have been applied by our Court
and by the Federal Court of Appeal in motions for confidentiality filed under
Rule 151 (Grace Singer v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 FCA 3,
196 ACWS (3d) 717; Bah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2014 FC 693; British Columbia Lottery Corporation v
Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 307, [2013] FCJ No 1425 (British
Columbia)). In McCabe v Canada (Attorney General), 2000 CanLII
15987 (FC), [2000] FCJ No 1262, Justice Dawson discussed the applicable test
and the burden that rests on the party seeking a confidentiality order:
[8] The justifiable desire to keep one’s
affairs private is not, as a matter of law, a sufficient ground on which to
seek a confidentiality order. In order to obtain relief under Rule 151, the
Court must be satisfied that both a subjective and an objective test are met.
See: AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare),
[1999] F.C.J. No. 808 (A-289-98, A-315-98, A-316-98, May 11, 1999, F.C.A.)
affirming (1998) 81 C.P.R. (3d) 121. Subjectively, the party seeking
relief must establish that it believes its interest would be harmed by
disclosure. Objectively, the party seeking relief must prove, on a balance of
probabilities, that the information is in fact confidential.
(see also British Columbia at para
36).
[29]
In the present case, the Minister has satisfied
me that the identity of the witnesses whose statements are reported or
summarized in Mr. Exantus’ affidavit should remain confidential.
[30]
The ground raised to support the confidential
nature of the witnesses’ identities is the risk that the safety of these
persons would be compromised if their identities were disclosed publicly.
[31]
The uncontradicted evidence shows that some of
the people interviewed during the RCMP investigation expressed their fear of
reprisals from members of their community if their identity were revealed. The
evidence, specifically the affidavit of Alfred Kewnde, Chief of Investigations
at the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, which was filed with the Superior Court during the trial of Jacques
Mungwarere and was filed as an exhibit in support of Mr. Exantus’ affidavit,
shows that the fear for personal safety expressed by the people interviewed
during the investigations is serious and genuine.
[32]
Thus, I am satisfied that there are grounds for
preserving the confidentiality of the identity of the people interviewed during
the RCMP investigations about the defendant’s alleged participation in the
Rwandan genocide to avoid compromising their security. The threat to the safety
of witnesses is a serious risk that should be avoided to preserve an important
interest. I am also of the opinion that in order to avoid any risk to their
safety there are no reasonable options other than preventing the public
identification of the witnesses’ identities.
[33]
Furthermore, I am of the view that the salutary
effects of the confidentiality order outweigh its deleterious effects,
including on the right to freedom of expression and the public’s interest in
open and accessible Court proceedings. I would like to point out that steps
were taken to preserve the confidentiality of witnesses also by the superior
courts of Quebec and Ontario in the criminal trials of Désiré Munyaneza (R v
Munyaneza, 2001 QCCS 7113, [2007] JQ 25381) and Jacques Mungwarere, (R
v Mungwarere , 2011 CSON 1247, [2011] OJ No 2593), accused of
participating in the Rwandan genocide.
[34]
I am of the view that the findings sought by the
plaintiff are measures that limit as much as possible the information that will
be declared confidential in this case.