Docket: T-1459-13
Citation:
2015 FC 4
Ottawa, Ontario, January 5, 2015
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Boswell
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BETWEEN:
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RAED JASER
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Applicant
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and
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I.
Nature of the Matter and Background
[1]
Pursuant to paragraph 7(b) of the Criminal
Records Act, RSC 1985, c C-47 [the Act], the Parole Board of Canada
[the Board] revoked the applicant’s pardon after it learned that he had been
charged with several terrorism-related offences. The applicant now seeks
judicial review of the Board’s decision under subsection 18.1(1) of the Federal
Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7, requesting an order that sets aside the
Board’s decision, declares that paragraph 7(b) of the Act is unconstitutional,
and awards him his costs.
[2]
The applicant was convicted of several crimes between
1997 and 2001, including fraud over $5,000.00 and uttering threats, but was
later pardoned for his crimes on April 24, 2009.
[3]
Four years later, on April 22, 2013, the
applicant was charged with several terrorism-related offences that he allegedly
committed between April 1, 2012, and September 25, 2012. The Board learned
about these charges through open media sources shortly thereafter and asked the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police [the RCMP] about them. The RCMP sent the Board a
letter dated May 24, 2013, in which it confirmed the charges and also enclosed
a copy of the information laid against the applicant. The information alleges
that the applicant: (1) conspired to interfere with transportation facilities
for a terrorist group (Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 83.2,
248); (2) conspired to murder persons unknown for a terrorist group (Criminal
Code, ss 83.2, 235(1)); and (3) knowingly participated in or contributed
to any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing any terrorist
group’s ability to facilitate or carry out a terrorist activity (Criminal
Code, s 83.18).
[4]
The Board then sent a letter to the applicant
dated June 6, 2013, wherein it proposed to revoke his pardon (which is now
called a “record suspension” as a result of
amendments to the Act in 2012). The Board stated that it had received
information that the applicant was no longer of good conduct following his
being charged with conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack against a Via
Rail passenger train; this letter also invited the applicant to make written
submissions within 60 days of the date of the letter before a final
decision to revoke the applicant’s pardon was made.
[5]
The applicant’s lawyer responded to the Board in
a letter dated July 23, 2013, stating that “to proceed
with a revocation of the pardon at this stage is grossly unfair to Mr. Jaser
and an abuse of process”. He advanced four reasons that the status quo
should be maintained until the criminal charges against the applicant are
finally resolved: (1) the Board had nothing but allegations before it; (2) to
expect a response now would be inconsistent with the presumption of innocence
and his client’s right to silence before trial; (3) the Board appeared to
be animated by political bias; and (4) there was no reason to deal with the
proposed revocation while the charges were pending since the applicant’s pardon
would be automatically revoked if he was convicted of the charges, and the
Board could always revisit the matter later if he was not convicted.
II.
The Decision under review
[6]
In a letter dated July 30, 2013, the Board determined
that the submissions by the applicant’s lawyer did not provide sufficient
justification for altering the initial recommendation to revoke the pardon.
Accordingly, the Board revoked the applicant’s pardon pursuant to section 7
of the Act, which provides in part as follows:
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7. A record suspension [pardon] may be
revoked by the Board
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7. La
Commission peut révoquer la suspension du casier [réhabilitation] dans l’un
ou l’autre des cas suivants :
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[…]
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[…]
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(b) on evidence establishing to the satisfaction of the Board that
the person to whom it relates is no longer of good conduct; …
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b) il existe des preuves convaincantes, selon
elle, du fait que l’intéressé a cessé de bien se conduire;
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[7]
The Board found that the applicant was no longer
of good conduct because he was facing extremely serious criminal charges that
represented a direct and grave threat to public safety and he did not provide
any information about the conduct that caused him to incur such charges. As to
the allegation of abuse of process raised by the applicant’s lawyer, the Board
stated that it did not rely on media reports about the applicant’s alleged
conduct but, rather, relied on the official information received from the RCMP.
The Board found this information to be reliable and persuasive in determining
that the applicant no longer met the good conduct criterion.
III.
Issues
[8]
The parties agree that this case raises two main
issues:
1.
Is paragraph 7(b) of the Act
unconstitutional?
2.
Did the Board err in fact or law in revoking the
applicant’s pardon?
[9]
However, some elements of the second issue stated
above attract different standards of review by this Court, so it is useful to
separate and restate the issues as follows:
1.
What is the standard of review?
2.
Is paragraph 7(b) of the Act
unconstitutional?
3.
Was the process unfair?
4.
Did the Board err by relying on unproven charges
to revoke the pardon?
IV.
The Parties’ Arguments
A.
The Applicant’s Arguments
[10]
The applicant notes that what constitutes “good
conduct” is a factual assessment based on guidelines set out in Chapter 14.1 of
the Board’s Policy Manual [the Manual]. Although paragraphs 12 to 17 of
these guidelines offer some guidance as to what good conduct is, the applicant
notes that they do not explicitly state what it is not. They also do not refer
to outstanding criminal charges as being something to consider when assessing
good conduct. Nonetheless, the applicant states that these guidelines in the Manual
should apply to assessments of when a pardon is being revoked.
[11]
The applicant submits that since the Board
exercises statutory authority its scope of action is constrained by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 32 [the Charter].
[12]
Section 7 of the Charter states:
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7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
principles of fundamental justice.
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7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à
la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu’en
conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale.
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[13]
In the applicant’s view, revoking his pardon
while he is facing criminal charges engages his section 7 Charter rights
because it makes his prior convictions available as evidence against him. The
applicant says that this violates the principles of fundamental justice for two
reasons: (1) it infringes his rights to silence and against self-incrimination;
and (2) it is arbitrary and overbroad.
[14]
Although the Act does not compel a person
to speak or say anything incriminating, the applicant submits that it still undermines
his right to silence by creating a procedure through which he cannot
participate except by waiving that right. The applicant says he is in a
catch-22; either he answers the charges before the Board and potentially
creates evidence for the Crown at his pending trial, or he maintains his
silence and thereby ensures an adverse result by his pardon being revoked. The
latter occurred here since the Board premised the revocation of the applicant’s
pardon on the fact that he did “not provide any
information concerning the circumstances surrounding [his] conduct which caused
[him] to incur the above-noted charges”.
[15]
The applicant further argues that paragraph 7(b)
of the Act is overbroad to the extent that it could be used when
criminal charges are still pending. In the applicant’s view, the Board employed
paragraph 7(b) of the Act in a manner inconsistent with the objectives
of the Act. Pardons, the applicant says, are intended to provide
individuals who have been acting well despite a criminal history with a
measurable benefit, to sustain their efforts to rehabilitate themselves, and to
preserve the repute of the administration of justice. The applicant claims that
revoking pardons on the basis of untried charges is unnecessary and has no
rational connection to those objectives.
[16]
Furthermore, the applicant points out that, by
virtue of paragraph 7.2(a) of the Act, the pardon will cease to have
effect automatically if the applicant is convicted on the outstanding charges.
If the applicant is acquitted or the outstanding charges stayed, then he
submits that the Charter would no longer be engaged and the Board could
assess a revocation under paragraph 7(b) at that time.
[17]
For the same reasons, the applicant argues that
these violations cannot be saved by section 1 of the Charter since
overbroad legislation “would appear to be incapable of
passing the minimal impairment branch of the s. 1 analysis” (citing R
v Heywood, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 761 at 802-803, 120 DLR (4th) 348 [Heywood];
and Canada (AG) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at paras 73 to 76, [2013] 3 SCR
1101 [Bedford]). Consequently, the applicant says that paragraph 7(b) of
the Act should either be declared invalid to the extent of any
inconsistency with section 7 of the Charter, or read down under section
24(1) of the Charter so that a pardon cannot be revoked because of
outstanding criminal charges.
[18]
With respect to the substance of the Board’s
decision, the applicant submits that the standard upon which this should be
reviewed by this Court is one of correctness since it involves constitutional
issues and questions of procedural fairness.
[19]
In addition, the applicant says that it was
perverse and capricious for the Board to find that he was no longer of good
conduct solely because of unproven allegations in the information laid with
respect to the outstanding charges. Those allegations alone are not proof of
any facts, according to the applicant, and since the Board had access to none
of the evidence that might support the charges, it acted unreasonably.
[20]
The applicant also accuses the Board of abuse of
process for revoking his pardon when it did and without proper evidence. The
applicant contends that requiring him to explain the circumstances surrounding
the charges while facing the jeopardy of a criminal trial affects his right to
remain silent and implicates other basic principles of fairness and, moreover, brings
the administration of justice into disrepute too. According to the applicant,
the Board did not properly balance the Charter interests at stake with the
statutory objectives of the Act, contrary to Doré v Barreau du Quebec,
2012 SCC 12 at paras 3, 5-6, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395, at paras 3, 5-6 [Doré].
[21]
That disregard for the applicant’s interests is
further compounded, the applicant submits, by comments made by the Minister of
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and by the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration about the earlier offences of which he was pardoned on the very
same day that the Board recommended revoking the applicant’s pardon. Since he
was entitled to the protections of the Act until his pardon was revoked,
the applicant argues that the fact that the Ministers disclosed the previous
offences on that day suggests a link, or at least “an
interesting coincidence”, between the Ministers’ comments and the Board’s
course of action.
[22]
The applicant therefore argues that the Board’s decision
should be set aside even if paragraph 7(b) of the Act is
constitutionally valid. Also, the applicant requests that, if the matter is
remitted back to the Board, the Court should direct that revocation of the
pardon not be considered until the outstanding criminal charges against the
applicant are finally resolved.
B.
The Respondent’s Arguments
[23]
The respondent contends that the standard of
review in respect of the Board’s decision is reasonableness. The respondent
emphasizes that a pardon is a discretionary privilege, not a right. A pardon
does not erase convictions and, even once one is granted, an offender will not
keep it unless he or she remains of good conduct.
[24]
The respondent also submits that the test as to
whether the Board’s decision is unconstitutional is set out in Bedford at para 76. Thus, the applicant needs to show a real, as opposed to a
speculative, link and adduce sufficient evidence of a causal connection. The
respondent points out that the Board’s decision was made only after it became
aware of the charges being laid, that the applicant was not compelled to answer
the Board in response to its letter dated June 6, 2013, and that the Board did
not convey any information to the RCMP or Crown prosecutors.
[25]
Seen in this light, the respondent submits that
revocation of a pardon does not engage section 7 of the Charter.
Although the prosecutor at the applicant’s criminal trial could seek to use the
applicant’s criminal record against him in some circumstances, the respondent
says that the trial judge would be able to assess whatever implications that
might have on the applicant’s Charter rights when deciding whether to
admit the record as evidence. As such, the respondent states that the
revocation proceedings before the Board are unrelated to the criminal
proceedings.
[26]
Even if the applicant’s section 7 Charter
rights may have been impugned, the respondent argues that the process before
the Board was consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. A Board
proceeding is not a criminal trial, and the respondent submits that any
requirements of fairness must be assessed in an administrative context (citing Lepage
v Canada (AG), 2007 QCCA 567 at para 14 (available on CanLII); and Doré
at para 36). Indeed, the respondent argues that neither the presumption of
innocence nor the right against testimonial compulsion apply (citing e.g. Giroux
v Canada (National Parole Board) (1994), 89 FTR 307 at para 20 (TD)
(available on QL) [Giroux]; Fernandez v Canada (AG), 2011 FC 275
at paras 54-55, [2012] 4 FCR 411 [Fernandez]). In the respondent’s view,
the Board is fully entitled to consider on-going police investigations and
pending criminal charges (citing e.g. Prasad v Canada (National Parole
Board), 51 FTR 300, 5 Admin LR (2d) 251 [Prasad]; R v Davis, [1996] BCJ No 2119 (QL) at paras 22-26 [Davis]).
[27]
The respondent disagrees with the applicant that
paragraph 7(b) of the Act is overbroad. On the contrary, the respondent
says that the legislative history of the Act is such that the purpose of
a record suspension is to relieve a rehabilitated offender of some of the
stigma associated with a criminal record. In the interests of public safety,
paragraph 7(b) of the Act permits revocation of a pardon when the
offender who received it has broken his or her covenant with society. The
respondent argues that the effects of paragraph 7(b) of the Act conform
to that purpose, and the phrase “no longer of good
conduct” is flexible enough that the provision cannot be overbroad.
[28]
The respondent further submits that the process before
the Board was fair because the applicant was afforded both notice and an
opportunity to make submissions. The applicant had the chance to fully
participate in the decision-making process, the respondent notes, but he simply
declined to make submissions.
[29]
The respondent also submits that the Board’s
conclusions and its decision were reasonable and that this Court has confirmed
that the Board can consider information pertaining to pending or stayed
charges. In the respondent’s view, the Board is not required to look behind any
information provided by reliable sources such as the police.
[30]
The respondent states that there was no abuse of
process, and argues that the applicant’s assertion of an “inescapable
link” between the two Ministers’ comments and the Board’s conduct is not
enough to prove such an allegation.
[31]
Finally, the respondent submits that, if the
application is allowed, it would be inappropriate to prohibit the Board from
considering the matter until the pending charges are resolved (citing Halifax
(Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2010 NSCA
8 at paras 20-22, 287 NSR (2d) 329). At most, the respondent says, if the
Board’s decision is not reasonable, the Court should only set aside the
decision and return the matter to the Board for reconsideration.
V.
Analysis
A.
What is the standard of review?
[32]
If past cases have satisfactorily determined the
degree of deference to be applied for each issue, then that analysis need not
be repeated (Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 at paras 57, 62,
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 [Dunsmuir]).
[33]
When a party challenges the constitutionality of
a law, the Court owes no deference to the tribunal (Dunsmuir at para 58;
Doré at para 43). However, when a party challenges the constitutionality
of a specific administrative decision, the heavily fact-based nature of that
decision may still attract a deferential approach (Doré at paras 36,
45-48, 53-58). In this case, the applicant has challenged paragraph 7(b) of the
Act directly, so correctness is the standard of review.
[34]
That is also the nominal standard of review for
the procedural fairness issue (Mission Institution v Khela, 2014 SCC 24
at para 79, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502; Khosa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),
2009 SCC 12 at para 43, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339 [Khosa]; Saini v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 375 at para 25 (available on CanLII) [Saini]).
Persons affected by a decision must receive every procedural protection to
which they are entitled, but relief may be withheld if any error “is purely technical and occasions no substantial wrong or
miscarriage of justice” (Khosa at para 43; Federal Courts Act,
s 18.1(5)).
[35]
I disagree with the applicant’s contention that
the substance of the Board’s decision should be reviewed on a correctness
standard. To the extent that there is a question of what “good conduct” means,
it is about interpreting the Act, which is a statute closely connected
to the Board’s function. Reasonableness is ordinarily presumed for such issues
(Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’
Association, 2011 SCC 61 at paras 30, 34, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 654). I see no
reason that this presumption should be rebutted, especially since section 2.1
of the Act gives to the Board the “exclusive
jurisdiction and absolute discretion to order, refuse to order or revoke a
record suspension”.
[36]
The applicant’s allegations of errors are purely
about the facts and the Board’s application of the law to those facts when
exercising its discretion to revoke the applicant’s pardon. All of those
questions attract the reasonableness standard of review (Dunsmuir at
para 53; Fernandez at para 20; Saini at paras 26-27; Foster v Canada (AG), 2013 FC 306 at para 18 (available on CanLII)). To the extent that such
questions may involve residual constitutional issues separate from whether
paragraph 7(b) of the Act runs afoul of section 7 of the Charter,
they are of an individualized type described in Doré at para 36.
B.
Is paragraph 7(b) of the Criminal Records Act unconstitutional?
[37]
The applicant claims that his rights under
section 7 of the Charter are engaged by the Board’s decision to revoke
his pardon because the Crown could potentially use past convictions against him
in the pending trial.
[38]
In my view, however, the applicant’s section 7
rights under the Charter are not yet engaged and have not been violated.
In Bedford at para 75, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that
section 7 rights are only engaged where there is a “sufficient
causal connection between the state-caused [effect] and the prejudice suffered
by the [claimant]”. The standard is a flexible one which is “sensitive to the context of the particular case and insists on
a real, as opposed to a speculative, link” (Bedford at para 76).
[39]
In this case, the applicant has not yet suffered
any prejudice in defending the charges against him and may never suffer any. It
is possible that the pending charges against him may be withdrawn or stayed. Even
if the trial goes forward, the Crown could only use the applicant’s criminal
record against him if the trial judge admits that record into evidence. That
judge will be in a better position than this Court to assess the Charter
implications of allowing the applicant’s criminal record to be admitted.
[40]
The applicant has not established, therefore,
that he has suffered any prejudice and it was incumbent upon him to satisfy
the burden of proof (Bedford at para 78; Canadian Foundation for
Children, Youth and the Law v Canada (AG), 2004 SCC 4 at para 3, [2004] 1
SCR 76).
[41]
Even if section 7 of the Charter was engaged,
this would not make paragraph 7(b) of the Act in and of itself
unconstitutional. The applicant does not challenge the idea that pardons should
be revoked from people who are “no longer of good conduct”.
Rather, the applicant challenges only the timing of the revocation, something which
is not in any way mandated by paragraph 7(b) of the Act. Consequently,
there is nothing to strike down or sever, and the applicant is really asking
the Court to read in a requirement that no untried charges should be considered
by the Board in assessing whether a person is no longer of good conduct (see: Charter,
s 24(1); and Schacter v Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 at 695-696, 698-700, 93
DLR (4th) 1).
[42]
The problem with the applicant’s arguments on
this front is that it amounts to nothing more than a challenge of the specific
decision made against him. The timing of the inquiry by the Board into whether
to revoke a pardon is a choice the Board has the discretion to make under
section 2.1 of the Act, and the evidence that it considers satisfactory
is a purely factual question. Treating these as challenges to the law itself would
circumvent the appropriate standard of review for these questions as set out in
Doré at paras 34-58. Therefore, the applicant’s invitation to read
things into the statute should be refused.
C.
Was the process unfair?
[43]
The applicant complains about the fairness of
the decision, since: (1) he had no opportunity to present his case without
waiving his right to silence in the pending criminal case; and (2) there was an
abuse of process by the Board acting when it did.
[44]
As to the first of these complaints, this is
answered by subsection 7.1(1) of the Act which clearly recognizes that a
person whose pardon may be revoked is “entitled to make,
or have made on his or her behalf, any representations to the Board that he or
she believes relevant”. In this case, the Board sent the applicant its
proposal to revoke his pardon and invited him to make representations within 60
days. Surely, that is a reasonable amount of time within which to prepare and
deliver a response, and in my view that is all that subsection 7.1(1) of the Act
requires. The applicant was given an opportunity to make substantive
submissions, and the mere fact that he chose to maintain his silence in order to
avoid jeopardizing his defence to the outstanding criminal charges does not
make the process unfair.
[45]
As to the second complaint, the burden lies on
the applicant to establish any bias or abuse of process since it is presumed “that a member of a Tribunal will act fairly and impartially,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary” (Zündel v Citron,
[2000] 4 FCR 225 at para 36, 189 DLR (4th) 131 (CA)). At best, the applicant’s
argument in this regard is based only on the fact that the sheet recommending
that his pardon be revoked was signed on the same day that some Ministers made
comments about him. I agree with the respondent that an “interesting
coincidence” like that is not sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of fairness and impartiality.
[46]
Furthermore, the record is devoid of any
evidence of any political interference with the Board in making the decision
when it did. On the contrary, it discloses a logical progression of events by
which the Board became aware of the charges laid against the applicant and
proceeded to assess them. The Board learned about the charges through the media.
By letter dated May 2, 2013, about ten days after the charges had been laid, the
Board asked the RCMP to confirm the charges, which the RCMP did by letter dated
May 24, 2013. Some nine days later, a member of the Board reviewed the
information from the RCMP and recommended that the pardon be revoked, and that
recommendation was followed on July 30, 2013. A person reasonably informed of
this sequence of events would not apprehend any abuse of process on the part of
the Board.
[47]
In short, the process adopted and followed by
the Board in making its decision was fair.
D.
Did the Board err by relying on unproven charges
to revoke the pardon?
[48]
The Board decided that the applicant was no
longer of good conduct based only on the information supplied by the RCMP that
he had been charged with some serious crimes. The applicant claims that this
finding of fact was made perversely and capriciously, since a charge is merely
an allegation and the Board had no knowledge of any facts that might support the
charges. In my view, the applicant’s arguments in this regard miss the mark,
since it was not the veracity of the allegations underlying the charges which
the Board found reliable and credible but, rather, the very fact of the
information itself setting out the charges. Even if these allegations may
subsequently be proven to be unfounded, it was reasonable for the Board to
determine that the applicant was no longer of good conduct in the face of the
charges as alleged.
[49]
In the Manual, paragraph 17 provides the
following guidance for the Board when assessing good conduct:
17. The Board is responsible for validating
and confirming the information that is presented by the applicant and criminal
justice entities. All applications will be vetted to ensure that they meet
the required minimum standard for verifiable and reliable information before
they are submitted to Board members for decision. Moreover, Board decisions
must be based on factual information. The type of documents and information
that may be considered includes:
a. information from the police about a non-law
abiding behaviour that did not result in a charge;
b. information about an incident that
resulted in a charge that was subsequently withdrawn, stayed, or dismissed, or
that resulted in a peace bond, in the use of alternative measures or in
the acquittal of the applicant;
c. the relevance of the information
increases where the charge or charges are of a serious nature, […][Emphasis
added]
[50]
Clearly, subparagraphs (a) and (b) above both
suggest that the Board can and should consider police information about the
applicant’s conduct even if it did not result in a charge or a guilty verdict.
[51]
The applicant argues that the Board requires
more than just an unproven allegation. The applicant contrasts the present
situation with that in Yussuf v Canada (AG), 2004 FC 907 (available on
CanLII) [Yussuf], where the Board denied a pardon in a case where an
applicant had been charged but not convicted of an offence. The Board’s denial of
the pardon in Yussuf was upheld not just because the person had been
charged, but also because the Board had considered the evidence of a witness to
the crime.
[52]
However, the decision in Yussuf does not
fully support the applicant’s foregoing argument. There have been several cases
where the Board’s conclusion that someone was no longer of good conduct has been
upheld on less information than was available to the Board in this case. For
example, in Conille v Canada (AG), 2003 FCT 613 (available on CanLII) [Conille],
the Board decided to deny a pardon on the basis of nothing more than
confirmation from the RCMP that the applicant was a suspect in a murder case (at
para 10), and on judicial review Mr Justice Edmond Blanchard held that the
Board did not err by relying on such confirmation (at para 24). Justice
Blanchard further commented in Conille that it was “not the Board’s job to conduct police investigations in place
of the RCMP” (at para 26), and that the presumption of innocence does
not apply to applications for a pardon (at para 30; see also Giroux at
para 20). Similarly, in Davis at para 26, the British Columbia
Supreme Court decided that:
[T]he process by which the Governor General in
Council reaches a decision to revoke a pardon is one in which the Governor
General in Council may consider the existence of outstanding, but as yet
unproven criminal charges…[I]n determining whether the conditions of the pardon
had been breached, the Governor General in Council may … consider such matters
as the fact of the applicant being charged.
[53]
In my view, it was reasonable for the Board to
infer that the applicant was no longer of good conduct from the mere fact that
he was charged with the alleged offences. Although the Board did not look
behind the information it received from the RCMP, it is difficult to see what
more it needed to do since the mere fact of the information being laid speaks
for itself irrespective of whether the allegations contained in the information
are true or not. In these circumstances, I do not think the Board erred by
relying on the information.
[54]
In the end, I find that the Board’s decision was
reasonable and within the range of acceptable possible outcomes.
VI.
Conclusion
[55]
For the reasons set forth above, the applicant’s
application for judicial review shall be and is hereby dismissed.
[56]
At the hearing of this matter, the parties
requested leave to make submissions as to costs. I see no reason to depart from
the usual principle that costs should follow the event and the respondent shall
have its costs. If the parties cannot agree on the amount of costs within
10 calendar days of the date of this decision, they may each make brief written
submissions to the Court, not to exceed five pages in length. The respondent
shall serve and file its bill of costs and its submissions within 20 days of
the date of this decision, and the applicant shall serve and file its
submissions within 10 days after receiving the respondent’s submissions.
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