Docket: T-1223-13
Citation:
2014 FC 819
Ottawa, Ontario, August 22, 2014
PRESENT: The
Honourable Mr. Justice Roy
BETWEEN:
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Applicant
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and
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BEVERLEY SKAALRUD
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Respondent
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JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1]
This case does not decide whether or not
granting death benefits solely to survivors and the children of the deceased
soldiers, thus excluding other family members, constitutes discrimination.
Rather, the issue to be decided is much narrower. It is whether a case that is
very similar to other cases already referred to the Canadian Human Rights
Tribunal [the Tribunal] should be excluded even before it reaches the Tribunal
for reasons of a jurisdictional nature.
[2]
The Attorney General seeks judicial review of
the decision of the Canadian Human Rights Commission [the Commission] to refer
a matter to the Tribunal for an inquiry into a complaint. The application is
made pursuant, presumably, to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act,
RSC 1985, c F-7.
[3]
The complainant before the Commission chose not
to participate in the judicial review application. As a result, no one appeared
in order to argue the other side of the issue raised by the government. I have
chosen to deal with this matter as narrowly as can be in those circumstances.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the judicial review
application ought to be dismissed.
I.
Facts
[4]
Braun Scott Woodfield, the son of Beverley Jean
Skaalrud, was killed, tragically, in Afghanistan while on active duty. He died
on November 24, 2005. He was single at the time of his death and there is no
claim that he had posterity.
[5]
Parliament passed the Canadian Forces Members
and Veterans Re-establishment and Compensation Act, SC 2005, c 21 [the Act]
and it received Royal Assent on May 13, 2005. According to some of its
provisions, the Act allows the Minister of Veterans Affairs to pay a death
benefit in some circumstances. For our purposes, it suffices to say that:
a)
the death benefit follows the death of a member
of the Canadian Forces;
b)
the death comes as a result of a service-related
injury;
c)
the death benefit goes to a “survivor” or a
dependant child;
(section 57 of the Act).
[6]
However, the Act was not proclaimed into force
upon Royal Assent (section 6, Interpretation Act, RSC, 1985, c
I-21). Rather, it came into force by order of the Governor in Council (section
117 of the Act) many months later, on April 1, 2006. There was no retroactive
effect of the Act. Accordingly, only those members of the Canadian Forces who
would unfortunately pass away after the coming into force of the Act, passed by
Parliament close to one year before the executive chose to bring the Act into
force, would be covered by the Act. Someone, like Braun Scott Woodfield, who
was killed while on active duty after the Act was passed, but before the
executive brought the said Act into force, would not be covered by its
provisions.
[7]
The Act limits the scope of the notion of
“survivor” in the definition it gives of the word:
“survivor”
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« survivant »
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“survivor”, in
relation to a deceased member or a deceased veteran, means
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« survivant » Selon
le cas :
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(a) their spouse
who was, at the time of the member’s or veteran’s death, residing with the
member or veteran; or
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a) l’époux qui, au
moment du décès du militaire ou vétéran, résidait avec celui-ci;
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(b) the person who
was, at the time of the member’s or veteran’s death, the member’s or
veteran’s common-law partner.
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b) la personne qui,
au moment du décès du militaire ou vétéran, était son conjoint de fait.
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The record before this Court shows that the
limitation of the death benefit to survivors found in section 57 of the Act has
been challenged as discriminatory by family members of deceased Canadian Forces
personnel who, by definition, are excluded.
[8]
The Report made by the Commission under section
49(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, RSC, 1985, c H-6 [CHRA]
informs the Court that there is a group of complaints arguing that family
members excluded by the limitation on who the survivors may be, for the purpose
of receiving death benefits under the Act, constitutes prohibited
discrimination, and they have already been referred to the Tribunal. However,
these complaints are all in relation to cases where the member of the Canadian
Forces passed away after the Act was proclaimed into force. Thus, the issue of
other family members being excluded from receiving death benefits, in cases
where the death occurred after the coming into force of the Act, is already before
the Tribunal.
[9]
The issue already before the Tribunal can be
summarized as whether or not there is discrimination, pursuant to the CHRA,
where the death benefit is limited to spouses/common-law partners and dependant
children, and not available to other family members.
[10]
But this is not the situation of Mrs Skaalrud.
Her son did not pass away after the coming into force of the Act. Had that been
such, her case would have been considered with that of others already before
the Tribunal. Instead, Mrs Skaalrud’s son was killed while on duty in the
period between the passage of the Act and its coming into force.
[11]
For reasons that are not explained in the record
before the Court, the government created a program in favour of survivors and
dependent children of Canadian Forces personnel who were killed during that interim
period of time between the passing of the Act and its coming into force.
[12]
The government chose to use the Crown’s
prerogative power to make ex gratia payments to the class of survivors and dependant children of members
of the Canadian forces that would otherwise have been covered by the Act if it
were not for the fact that the event occurred before the Act was proclaimed
into law, but after Parliament had spoken and allowed for a death benefit to be
granted. The Report appears to summarize adequately the issue before the Court:
31. It is in this context that a group of
related complaints have recently been referred to the Tribunal. In the other
related complaints, all of the soldiers were killed following the enactment of
the NVC. The complainants in those cases are challenging the narrow definition
of “survivor” within the NVC. In this complaint, the complainant’s son was
killed prior to the enactment of the NVC, but within the specified time frame
for the ex gratia payments.
The ex gratia payments were
made based on the same definition(s) and criteria as found in the NVC.
(NVC refers to New Veterans Charter, the brand
given to the Act.)
[13]
The Order in Council allowing for payments
during the interim period reads as follows:
Her Excellency the Governor General in Council,
on the recommendation of the Minister of Veterans Affairs and the Treasury
Board, hereby authorizes the Minister of Veterans Affairs to make ex gratia payments in a total amount not
exceeding one million dollars to survivors and dependent children of Canadian
Forces members whose death is attributable to military service during the
period beginning on May 13, 2005 and ending on March 31, 2006.
[14]
The payments that can be made in accordance with
section 57 of the Act can therefore be made to the same class
(spouses/common-law partners and dependant children), except for the fact that
the events took place between May 13, 2005 and March 31, 2006. From that date
onward, section 57 applies; in the interim period, ex gratia payments are made.
[15]
In the case at bar, the Commission came to the
conclusion that the similarities between the cases already before the Tribunal
and the case of someone who died in the interim period, i.e. between the
passing of the Act and its coming into force, were sufficient to warrant that
the whole issue be referred to the Tribunal. The logic seems to be simple. If
the Tribunal can investigate the situation of family members that are excluded
from the program created by legislation, what reason can there be to deny
investigating what appears to be an extension of the program in cases where the
death occurred in the interim period?
[16]
Thus, the cases involving military personnel
killed after the coming into force of the Act who had family members that are
not survivors, as defined under the Act, are before the Tribunal. The
government extended benefits for survivors and dependent children by making ex gratia payments in cases where the death
occurred after the Act was passed, but before it was proclaimed into law.
Clearly Mrs Skaalrud could not benefit under the ex
gratia payments program. But she is refused for the
same reason she would have been refused had her son passed away after the Act
came into force. As far as Mrs Skaalrud is concerned, the only difference is
that her complaint would have been investigated by the Tribunal had the tragic
events happened after the coming into force of the Act, together with other
complaints that have already been referred to the Tribunal. However, in spite
of the fact that the reason for the refusal in the ex
gratia payments program is exactly the same as the
refusal in the death benefit program under the Act, the government claims that
the inquiry by the Tribunal is not available with respect to the ex gratia payments program.
II.
Decision
[17]
Given that the circumstances are quite similar,
the Commission concluded the matter involving the family of Braun Scott
Woodfield ought to be referred to the Tribunal. This was done pursuant to
section 49 of the CHRA. It reads:
Inquiries into
Complaints
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Instruction des
plaintes
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Request for
inquiry
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Instruction
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49. (1) At any
stage after the filing of a complaint, the Commission may request the
Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry into the complaint if the
Commission is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the
complaint, an inquiry is warranted.
|
49. (1) La
Commission peut, à toute étape postérieure au dépôt de la plainte, demander
au président du Tribunal de désigner un membre pour instruire la plainte, si
elle est convaincue, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à celle-ci, que
l’instruction est justifiée.
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Chairperson to
institute inquiry
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Formation
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(2) On receipt of a
request, the Chairperson shall institute an inquiry by assigning a member of
the Tribunal to inquire into the complaint, but the Chairperson may assign a
panel of three members if he or she considers that the complexity of the
complaint requires the inquiry to be conducted by three members.
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(2) Sur réception
de la demande, le président désigne un membre pour instruire la plainte. Il
peut, s’il estime que la difficulté de l’affaire le justifie, désigner trois
membres, auxquels dès lors les articles 50 à 58 s’appliquent.
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Chair of panel
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Présidence
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(3) If a panel of
three members has been assigned to inquire into the complaint, the
Chairperson shall designate one of them to chair the inquiry, but the
Chairperson shall chair the inquiry if he or she is a member of the panel.
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(3) Le président
assume lui-même la présidence de la formation collégiale ou, lorsqu’il n’en
fait pas partie, la délègue à l’un des membres instructeurs.
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Copy of rules to parties
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Exemplaire aux parties
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(4) The Chairperson shall make a copy of the rules of procedure
available to each party to the complaint.
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(4) Le président met à la disposition des parties un exemplaire
des règles de pratique.
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Qualification of
member
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Avocat ou
notaire
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(5) If the
complaint involves a question about whether another Act or a regulation made
under another Act is inconsistent with this Act or a regulation made under
it, the member assigned to inquire into the complaint or, if three members
have been assigned, the member chairing the inquiry, must be a member of the
bar of a province or the Chambre des notaires du Québec.
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(5) Dans le cas où
la plainte met en cause la compatibilité d’une disposition d’une autre loi
fédérale ou de ses règlements d’application avec la présente loi ou ses
règlements d’application, le membre instructeur ou celui qui préside
l’instruction, lorsqu’elle est collégiale, doit être membre du barreau d’une
province ou de la Chambre des notaires du Québec.
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Question raised
subsequently
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Argument
présenté en cours d’instruction
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(6) If a question
as described in subsection (5) arises after a member or panel has been
assigned and the requirements of that subsection are not met, the inquiry
shall nevertheless proceed with the member or panel as designated.
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(6) Le fait qu’une
partie à l’enquête soulève la question de la compatibilité visée au
paragraphe (5) en cours d’instruction n’a pas pour effet de dessaisir le ou
les membres désignés pour entendre l’affaire et qui ne seraient pas autrement
qualifiés pour l’entendre.
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[18]
In so doing, the Commission examined a number of
considerations including of course the similarities between the case at hand
and the complaints already referred to the Tribunal. For the purpose of this
application, the similarities cannot be disputed and only the considerations
concerning legal issues raised by the government to the effect that the
Commission may not have jurisdiction to deal with in this case are apposite.
These are the issues raised in the judicial review application.
[19]
I will deal with the arguments put forth on this
application in the Analysis portion of these reasons. It will suffice at this
stage to reproduce paragraph 22 of the Report which encapsulates the decision:
22. The alleged discrimination in this
complaint resulted from an act of ministerial discretion, which appears to be
subject to the CHRA. This is because (i) the quasi-constitutional nature of the
CHRA, (ii) the Tribunal has decided cases involving an exercise of ministerial
discretion, and (iii) there is no exception in the CHRA prohibiting complaints
against the exercise of ministerial discretion. However, the extent to which
the CHRA applies to challenging an ex gratia order in council is a legal issue that ought to be explored more
fully at the Tribunal stage.
III.
Analysis
[20]
The applicant takes the view that the standard
of review is reasonableness. It is not a difficult concession for the Court to accept
in view of the decision of my colleague O’Keefe J in Canada (Attorney
General) v Emmett, 2013 FC 610. O’Keefe J found that Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10, [2012] 1 SCR
364, [Halifax (Regional Municipality)], applied given the
similarities between the federal and the Nova Scotia regimes. In that case, the
Supreme Court concluded that the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission’s decision
that an inquiry was warranted in all of the circumstances was reviewable on a
standard of reasonableness (para 17). I see no reason to depart from that
conclusion.
[21]
The applicant contends that the test should be
articulated as the Supreme Court did in that case: “[I]s
there a reasonable basis in law or on the evidence for the Commission’s
conclusion that an inquiry is warranted?” (para 17). I would add, that
the Court also said at paragraph 17 that reviewing courts should be reluctant
to intervene with respect to decisions that simply refer the matter to an
inquiry: “In my view, Bell (1971) should no longer be
followed and courts should exercise great restraint in intervening at this
early stage of the process.” I have reached the conclusion that this is
critical in this case.
[22]
That is indeed the main thrust in the Halifax (Regional Municipality) decision. Referring to Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339,
the Court notes at paragraph 44 that “reasonableness is a
single concept that “takes its colour” from the particular context”.
Hence, the range of possible, acceptable outcomes will vary with the “context of the particular type of decision making involved and
all relevant factors.”
[23]
Thus, reviewing courts are invited to show a
significant degree of deference concerning decisions that are as preliminary as
decisions to refer a complaint to the Tribunal in view of the Commission’s
discretion exercised in order to move the matter to an inquiry. The test has
been articulated as requiring only that “there was any
reasonable basis on the law or the evidence for the Commission’s decision to
refer the complaint to a board of inquiry” (para 45, Halifax (Regional Municipality)). The broad discretion the Commission has would justify a low
threshold like that articulated as “whether there is any
basis in reason for such an inquiry” (para 49). Reluctance to intervene
should be at the forefront of what a reviewing court should consider its task.
Both the decision and the decision-making process are owed deference:
[51] Third, this formulation reflects the
appropriate deference to the Commission’s process. Just as reasonableness
requires appropriate deference to a tribunal’s decision, it also implies
appropriate deference to its processes of decision-making. The proposed
formulation makes it clear that reviewing courts should be reluctant to
intervene before a board of inquiry has addressed the substance of the points
with respect to which the application for judicial review is brought. A
reviewing court should take into account the benefit of having the board’s
considered view of the point raised on review as well as the risks of an
unnecessary multiplication of issues and delay as was caused by premature
judicial intervention in this case. Only where there is no reasonable basis
in law or on the evidence to support the Commission’s decision that an inquiry
by a board of inquiry is warranted in all the circumstances would it be
appropriate to overcome judicial reluctance to intervene. [My emphasis]
[24]
There is no doubt in my view that the test (“any reasonable basis on the law or the evidence for the
Commission’s decision to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry”) articulated
in Halifax (Regional Municipality) finds application here in view
of the broad discretion left with the Commission. I reproduce again for ease of
reference subsection 49(1) of the CHRA:
Request for
inquiry
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Instruction
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49. (1) At any
stage after the filing of a complaint, the Commission may request the
Chairperson of the Tribunal to institute an inquiry into the complaint if the
Commission is satisfied that, having regard to all the circumstances of the
complaint, an inquiry is warranted.
|
49. (1) La
Commission peut, à toute étape postérieure au dépôt de la plainte, demander
au président du Tribunal de désigner un membre pour instruire la plainte, si
elle est convaincue, compte tenu des circonstances relatives à celle-ci, que
l’instruction est justifiée.
|
[25]
The Attorney General has taken issue with the
exercise of discretion by the Commission to refer the matter to the Tribunal in
spite of the fact similar matters, except for the fact the tragic deaths
occurred after the coming into force of the Act, have already found their way
before the Tribunal.
[26]
As I understand it, the applicant argues that
the making of an ex gratia payment is outside the scope of the CHRA. Two
arguments are made:
a)
The Commission’s analysis is flawed and
incomplete. The applicant seems to take issue with an act of ministerial
discretion being the subject of a review by the Tribunal. Noting that the
Tribunal has decided, and courts have agreed, that the exercise of discretion
is reviewable under the CHRA, the Commission ought to have examined the matter
more completely. The applicant seems to fault the Commission for not having
made a determination that the ex gratia payments made pursuant to the order-in-council do not constitute a practice
even though they may result from the exercise of ministerial discretion. If it
is not a practice under the CHRA, then it would be outside the scope of the
Tribunal to inquire. In that same vein, the Commission, in the view of the
applicant, should have considered the nature of an ex
gratia payment. The mere fact
that the analysis is incomplete and flawed would make the decision to refer the
matter to the Tribunal unreasonable.
b)
The making of ex gratia payments does not constitute a discriminatory practice. That is
because an ex gratia
payment is in the nature of a gift, and the provision of a gift is not a
practice subject to examination under the CHRA.
[27]
Neither one of these arguments satisfies me that
the preliminary decision to refer the matter to the Tribunal, having regard to
all the circumstances of the complaint, requires this Court’s intervention.
[28]
As for the first argument, the applicant invites
the Court to intervene because the Commission has not conducted the kind of
fulsome analysis the Tribunal would be conducting. Contrary to what the
applicant asserts in his factum (para 29), the use of section 49 of the CHRA is
not predicated on having “sufficient evidence to justify
proceeding to this next stage.” Rather, the CHRA provides that at any
stage after the complaint has been filed the Commission may refer the matter if
an inquiry is warranted. Actually, this would have been the kind of precise
analysis that would have been warranted following Bell v Ontario Human
Rights Com'n, [1971] S.C.R. 756. However, that is the very precedent Halifax (Regional Municipality) overturns.
[29]
The role of the Commission is very limited and
its discretion is quite broad. One has to be careful and come back to what the
Commission is actually doing. It merely decides that, “having
regard to all the circumstances of a complaint, an inquiry is warranted.”
The characterization of the decision made by the Commission is important. Once
again, Halifax (Regional Municipality) is enlightening:
[19] I respectfully agree with the Court
of Appeal. The Commission’s decision to refer a complaint to a board of inquiry
is not a determination of whether the complaint falls within the Act. Rather,
within the scheme of the Act, the Commission plays an initial screening and
administrative role; it may, for example, decide to refer a complaint to a
board of inquiry so that the board can resolve a jurisdictional matter.
[30]
Here the applicant would have wanted the
Commission to resolve the jurisdictional matter. The applicant would like to
have a full analysis even at a preliminary stage because he wants to argue that
the complaint does not fall within the CHRA. That seems to be the very thing
the Commission should not do. The policy rationale for avoiding such exercise
would appear to be that “contemporary courts would not so
quickly accept that the question of whether a property is “self-contained”
could be answered by the abstract interpretive exercise undertaken in Bell
(1971), conducted without regard to the provision’s context within a
specialized, quasi-constitutional human rights regime” (para 34, Halifax
(Regional Municipality)). Asking the Commission to conduct a fulsome
analysis of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the complaint would
take us back to Bell (1971), supra. The strong urging of the
Supreme Court is for reviewing courts to resist.
[31]
The second argument put forth by the applicant
does not fare any better. The record before the Court is obviously minimal,
given that the matter has not progressed before the Tribunal where the facts
surrounding the ex gratia
payments would be presented. At this early stage, it is not completely
far-fetched to consider that the ex gratia payments were made to survivors and dependant children as if the
Act passed on May 13, 2005 had come into effect on that date. Parliament had
spoken, yet the program was not put in place such that survivors and dependent
children who would have benefited from the program otherwise did not get the
benefit of the law. Extending the coverage to the day the law was passed would
remedy that apparent unfairness. That appears to be what the Order in Council
does. As such, the class of beneficiaries is broadened through the use of the
Royal prerogative in the form of ex gratia payments.
[32]
If it is possible that the Act creates a
“practice” that can be investigated by the Tribunal, such that the family
members of military personnel who died in action after April 1, 2006 can see
their case investigated by the Tribunal, it is difficult to argue that that
same “practice” extended by Order in Council to the same class of individuals
cannot constitute a practice to the point that the Commission would commit a
reviewable error in referring the matter to the Tribunal.
[33]
As has already been noted, the situation of
family members, other than survivors and dependant children, is already before
the Tribunal for those beneficiating from the Act as of the date it was
proclaimed into force. The Commission wants to extend the inquiry to the period
between May 13, 2005, the day on which the Act was passed, and April 1, 2006, because
the class seems to have been extended by executive fiat. Is that unreasonable?
Can it be said at this early stage, to paraphrase the Supreme Court, that there
is no reasonable basis in law or on the evidence to support the Commission’s
decision that an inquiry is warranted? I do not think so.
[34]
The applicant has insisted that ex gratia payments are
gifts that cannot be governed by the CHRA. The argument seems to be that gifts are
not a practice covered by the Act. That, it seems to me, is something to be
determined, not the kind of issue to be decided ex ante. On this record, all we know is that the government has chosen to
make payments to a class of people remarkably similar to the class that will
benefit from the Act. The only difference appears to be that one is a
legislated program while the other one is based on the Royal Prerogative. In both
cases, public money is taken out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund (see
definition in section 2 of the Financial Administration Act, RSC, 1985,
c F-11), through an appropriation in order to make those payments. And it just
happens that the class covers the period between the passage of the Act and its
coming into force. This looks like the “infamous duck test”. In Dole v
William Enterprises, Inc, 876 F (2d) 186 (DC Cir 1989), it was dressed up
in more appropriate judicial garb:
WHEREAS it looks like a duck, and WHEREAS it
walks like a duck, and WHEREAS it quacks like a duck, WE THEREFORE HOLD that it
is a duck.”
(See Hussain v Obama, 718 F (3d) 964 (DC
Cir 2013) for a more recent use of the test.)
If the Tribunal will look into payments made
for cases originating after Royal Assent, is it unreasonable to consider
payments made before because of an argument that they are not a practice? It is
possible to argue that payments made in accordance with the Act do not
constitute a discriminatory practice under the CHRA. If such is the case, it
would likely follow that the ex gratia payments made for events that occurred after
the passage of the Act and before Royal Assent are not a discriminatory
practice either. However it would be for the Tribunal to investigate and decide,
a decision the applicant claims it cannot do because the Commission should have
opined is not part of their jurisdiction.
[35]
The other part of the argument is that the
payments are not subject to the CHRA because they are gifts. The applicant has
relied on authorities that state that an ex gratia payment is discretionary because the claimant does not have any
legal rights to it. But such is not the issue here. As Hogg and Monahan put it
in their Liability of the Crown (PW Hogg and PJ Monahan, Liability of
the Crown, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2000)):
There are two types of ex
gratia payments. One is an ad hoc response to a need that is unlikely to recur, and is intended to be
a singular event, not creating any moral or political obligation for other
cases. The other type of payments are those that are administered under a
written, published policy. The latter type of payments are discretionary in
theory only, as governments cannot easily resile from their announced policy. (under
para 6.6(8) Compensation based on risk, footnote 230)
With respect to that second category, the
question would be whether a program of compensation not based on legislation
but rather on the Royal Prerogative could be treated on a different basis.
Would a gift made on the basis of prohibited grounds of discrimination to a
class of people be less discriminatory than if provided for in legislation?
Here, the government’s argument seems to boil down to saying that as long as it
is a gift, it can be a discriminatory practice. I fail to see how the legal
nature of a payment can inoculate at such an early stage as the Commission
referring a matter against being a discriminatory practice under the CHRA.
[36]
To my way of thinking, it would be a live issue
to consider the use of ex gratia payments as a justification for a discriminatory practice if the
Tribunal were to find that the program created under the Act itself is
discriminatory under the CHRA. To put it in the converse, if the Act creates a
discriminatory program under the CHRA, the fact that that same program is
extended by executive fiat (ex gratia payments made on the same basis) may not justify that practice on
the basis that it is a gift extended to that class of people.
[37]
It would be for the Tribunal, on the basis of a
much more complete record than the one before this Court, to make that
determination. Contrary to what the applicant advanced, it is not unreasonable
to have that kind of a case be examined more carefully by the Tribunal. It
cannot be said that there is no reasonable basis in law or on the evidence to
support the decision that an inquiry is warranted.
[38]
At the end of the day, the applicant would want
for the Court to do that which reviewing courts are invited to avoid:
The proposed formulation makes it clear that
reviewing courts should be reluctant to intervene before a board of inquiry has
addressed the substance of the points with respect to which the application for
judicial review is brought. (para 51, Halifax (Regional Municipality))
[39]
To summarize, the applicant would have wanted
the Commission to conduct a more fulsome review, in spite of the fact that subsection
49(1) of the CHRA does not seem to require it. Had the Commission conducted the
review, it would have found, claims the applicant, that the ministerial
discretion used to extend the program does not constitute a prohibited
practice. The fact that the Commission did not undertake that kind of analysis
is seen as flawed and thus unreasonable. In my view, Halifax (Regional Municipality) constitutes a complete answer. The initial screening and
administrative role of the Commission is not as well adapted as that of the
Tribunal. Appropriate deference to the Commission’s decision-making process is
required. The applicant has not shown that there is no basis in law or on the
evidence that an inquiry is not warranted. The other argument posits that ex gratia payments cannot be a prohibited
practice. This is certainly not something that is readily apparent. It is
reasonable to let the Tribunal, on a fuller record, make that determination. It
would be for the Tribunal to decide if, through a gift, that is where no legal
rights or liability that accompany it, the government can discriminate
illegally between classes of people either because ex
gratia payments are altogether excluded from
consideration or they cannot constitute a prohibited practice under the CHRA. It
will only be where there is no reasonable basis in law or on the evidence that
an inquiry is not warranted that a reviewing court will intervene. The very
arguments put forth by the applicant make it imperative that the matter be
examined more carefully by the Tribunal.
[40]
I finish where I began. This case does not
decide whether or not the regime created by Parliament to provide death
benefits to survivors and dependant children is discriminatory under the CHRA. This
Court does not decide either that a program based on the Royal Prerogative is
discriminatory. This Court finds that the Commission did not make a reviewable
error by referring the complaint to the Tribunal as an inquiry is warranted.
The applicant’s argument that ex gratia payments fall outside the scope of the CHRA because they cannot be
covered under section 5 of the CHRA is in my view an issue that is worth
exploring in an inquiry; that is a reasonable basis in law to send the matter
to the Tribunal. The matter is not so clear cut that this inquiry should be
stopped before it begins. This is a case where the reviewing judge should show
restraint.
[41]
The application for judicial review is therefore
dismissed. As the application was not opposed, there will not be a cost order.